Weekly Significant Activity Report - September 13, 2025
Russia probes NATO's airspace, China flexes its muscles in the South China Sea, Iran resumes cooperation with IAEA, North Korea celebrates 77 years
This week's analysis highlights some of the most significant news concerning America's adversaries between September 6, 2025 - September 13, 2025.
Summary:
Russia used multiple military drills this week to highlight the strength of its alliances, while using drones and aerial probes of Western airspace to test the resolve of the NATO alliance and its support for Ukraine.
Despite its confident military posturing, multiple reports and announcements this week suggest the Kremlin is preparing for internal instability that may follow the end of the war and an overall economic downturn.
China asserted its dominion of the South China Sea by sailing its most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian, through the Taiwan Strait, and unilaterally declaring the disputed Scarborough Shoal a Chinese nature preserve.
Iran walked back its expulsion of inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in an attempt to stall European sanctions.
North Korea celebrated the 77th anniversary of its founding with support from its partners and new developments for its strategic forces.
1. RUSSIA PROBES THE WEST’S DEFENSES WHILE SHOWCASING SOLIDARITY WITH ALLIES
Russia Conducts Border Security Exercises with China and Mongolia
From September 8-9 Russia, China, and Mongolia conducted their first ever joint border security exercises “Border Defense Cooperation 2025” near Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia. The exercise focused on preventing “terrorist sabotage activities” along their shared border.
Estonia Protests Russian Violations of its Air Space
On September 8, a Russian MI-8 helicopter violated Estonian air space over Vaindloo Island in the Baltic Sea. The alleged violation—the third of its kind by the Russian military this year over Estonia—triggered a diplomatic protest by Tallinn.
Russia Mounts Large-Scale Drone Incursion into Poland
19 Russian long-range drones violated Polish airspace on September 10, amid the largest ever Russian drone attack on Ukraine. NATO air defenses were activated in response to the incident and shot down several drones. The remainder of the drones crash landed in rural areas, including into at least one home. The drones were identified as Gerbera reconnaissance drones. Poland invoked NATO’s Article 4 security consultations in the wake of the incident.
Russian Drone Violates Romanian Airspace
On September 13, a Russian drone flew into Romanian airspace during an attack on western Ukraine. Romania scrambled two F-16 fighters in response and tracked the drone until it apparently crash landed near the village of Chilia Veche along the Danube River border with Ukraine.
Russia and Belarus Begin Zapad-2025 Exercises
Russia and Belarus started their annual Zapad-2025 exercise on September 12. The exercise simulates a rapid “union state” response to a war with NATO along Russia’s western border. Zapad-2025 will run through September 16 and conclude with a simulated nuclear strike on NATO forces.
India Sending Military Units to Participate in Zapad-2025
India announced on September 9 that it has sent 65 members of the Indian Armed Forces to take part in Zapad-2025.
Takeaways:
The recovered Russian drones that landed in Poland contained extra fuel tanks. This modification suggests the incursion into Poland was a carefully planned provocation, rather than a mistake, as the President of the United States mused. While the drone that breached Romanian airspace still has not been recovered, the timing of the incident, the same week as the drone incursions in Poland and Russia’s largest ever drone and missile attack on Ukrainian cities, suggests that it was a similarly deliberate probe of NATO air defenses.
The Gerbera drones used in the incursion have somewhat erroneously been called “decoy” drones. The Gerbera are reconnaissance drones, which are shaped to look like the explosive Shahed-type drones Russia uses for long-range strikes. They probe Ukrainian air space, not simply to distract attention from actual armed drones, but to map the coverage of Ukraine’s air defenses to identify gaps that can be exploited in future attacks. In this case, the Gerbera drones were likely selected in order to penetrate Polish air space to gather information about the responsiveness of NATO air defenses.
The components of Gerbera drones appear to be manufactured by Chinese companies and shipped to the Russian military for assembly. The data collected from at least one Gerbera drone contained aerial imagery of Shenzhen, where its camera was likely produced and tested.
Russia regularly uses large-scale military exercises to surge military forces to areas it intends to stage provocations under benign sounding pretexts. Concerns over the Zapad exercises are especially high because the previous iteration of Zapad in 2021 was used by Russia to begin preparations for the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These concerns, which caused Poland to announce that it would close its border with Belarus on September 9, were amplified in the wake of the September 10 drone incursions. However, this year’s Zapad exercise will be much less overtly threatening (on land at least) due to its smaller size and its reduced presence along NATO borders.
Zapad-2025 will feature around 30,000 total troops, down significantly from the 2021 exercise which consisted of over 200,000 troops. Only 10,000 of these troops will be stationed in Belarus while the remainder will train elsewhere in Russia. A significant portion of the exercise will occur in the Arctic. There the Northern Fleet will conduct landings on Franz Josef Land, as well as missile tests and coastal security patrols.
It is very unlikely that Russia will attempt a dramatic conventional military attack during Zapad-2025. Russia is not capable of launching a successful military campaign against Poland or the Baltic states with the limited forces it has deployed for Zapad-2025. This is especially true as NATO has dramatically raised military readiness in the region with Operation Iron Defender 25 exercises featuring over 30,000 troops occurring at the same time as Zapad-2025, and the newly announced NATO air defense campaign Operation Eastern Sentry.
The Russian military may however probe NATO’s responses in areas it holds relative advantage—such as in the Arctic. It may also test next generation strategic weapons such as the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles, or Burevestnik nuclear cruise missiles.
India’s presence in the Zapad exercise is a signal that it will not be deterred from pursuing partnership with Russia. It is, however, a mixed signal. The contingent of Indian forces deployed to this year’s exercise is less than a third the size of the unit India sent to participate in Zapad-2021. This may suggest that the Indian government wants to strike a balance of satisfying nationalists who are eager to see the country defy pressure from the Trump administration to drop its relationship with Russia, without overly antagonizing Washington or Brussels.
The joint border defense exercises between Russia, China, and Mongolia follows a week after a memorandum of understanding was signed between the three countries advancing the construction of the Power of Siberia 2.0 pipeline. The memorandum triggered some initial concern among Russian investors who viewed it disproportionately favorable to Chinese interests, and another means of camouflaging delays in the final approval for the long delayed project. It is plausible that the exercises were promoted as a means of reassuring concerned parties that concrete steps were being taken toward the actual construction of the pipeline.
Nevertheless, the overall premise of the exercise as “border security” is somewhat odd given that these three countries are the only ones sharing borders in the region and represent the primary security threats to one another.
2. RUSSIA PREPARING FOR POTENTIAL INTERNAL INSTABILITY
Russian National Guard Will Bring Back Tank Units
Viktor Zolotov, the Director of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) announced on September 11 that the organization will reintroduce tank units. The move is portrayed as necessary to bolster the firepower of Russian internal security forces and boost their interoperability with the conventional military.
New Poll Shows Young Russians Unenthusiastic About the War
New polling by the Levada Institute (the most reputable Russian polling organization) suggests support for the war in Ukraine among the general Russian public remains high but appears skewed toward older demographics who are least likely to participate in fighting. Only 60% of 18-24 year olds say they approve of Russia’s military operations, with only 26% unqualified in their support.
Russian Officials Worried about Reintegrating War Veterans
A September 9 report by Reuters suggests that many high-ranking Russian officials are concerned that reintegrating war veterans back into civilian life will be a daunting challenge. Returning Russian soldiers have been implicated in hundreds of violent crimes.
Takeaways:
The Rosgvardia are controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Units typically perform law enforcement and local security operations as well as crowd control and counter-terrorism. As of 2024 there were over 370,000 service members of the Rosgvardia.
Units of the Rosgvardia have participated in the war in Ukraine but their role in combat has diminished since the initial invasion. Now they primarily serve as an occupation force in captured Ukrainian cities. As a result it is not clear that reintroducing tank units to its ranks would provide value to Russia’s war effort, especially as the Russian military’s once vast inventory of tanks has been greatly diminished. Instead, upgrades to the Rosgvardia's weaponry appear linked to the Kremlin's growing concerns about internal security. The organization has undergone multiple reforms aimed at enhancing its combat capabilities following its indecisive response to the rebellion of the Wagner Group in 2023. This latest upgrade appears to follow previous efforts to strengthen the Rosgvardia's capacity to address domestic threats, rather than expand its role as a paramilitary force in Ukraine.
While growing economic woes and declining youth support for the war contribute to the push for stronger internal security forces, the most pressing concern for the Kremlin is likely potential instability from a future mass demobilization. Local upticks in violent crime and social disorder have been attributed to returning war veterans, including over 750 murders and aggravated assaults. This represents a small preview of bigger challenges to come.
The problem of reintegration is complicated even further by easy availability of weapons, widespread mental health disorders, and mass recruitment of criminals. Reporting by independent Russian media suggests that Russian soldiers have created large illegal markets for guns and other military equipment. Mass demobilization may make this problem worse as soldiers face an impending loss of steady income from the state and the military’s ability to account for weapons becomes more difficult as it sheds leaders. The weapons trade may be especially appealing to the 180,000 prisoners recruited to fight in the war who do not have careers to return to.
A more robust Rosgvardia is likely a component of the Kremlin’s strategy to prevent the emergence of well-armed criminal syndicates after the war’s end amid an overall decline in Russia’s economic fortunes.
3. CHINA MAKING NEW POWER PLAYS AT SEA
China Announces New “Wildlife Refuge” on Disputed Scarborough Shoal
On September 11, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China announced a new bill creating a nature preserve on Huangyan Dao—the Chinese name for an atoll more commonly referred to as Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is an atoll at the center of an intense and frequently violent dispute with the Philippines.
The Fujian Carrier Transits the Taiwan Strait
On September 12 the Chinese military announced that the Fujian, China’s third, and most advanced aircraft carrier had transited the Taiwan Strait as part of a deployment to the South China Sea. The ship will conduct “scientific research tests and training missions” as part of its deployment.
Takeaways:
China claims Scarborough Shoal as part of its expansive “9-Dash Line,” an area of the South China Sea approximately 3.5 million square kilometers in area (about 10% larger than India) that Beijing has declared its “blue national soil.”
Scarborough Shoal is at the center of an intense territorial and often violent dispute between China and the Philippines. In 2016, the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines in a case contesting China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. However, China rejected the ruling and continues to assert control over the area. In August an attempt by Chinese maritime forces to intimidate Filipino fishermen in the area went awry resulting in a collision between ships of the Chinese Coast Guard and People’s Liberation Army Navy.
The Fujian’s highly publicized transit of the Taiwan Strait into the South China Sea is a sign that the People’s Liberation Army Navy may be preparing the ship for its official commissioning. It is also a barely concealed warning to both Taiwan and the Philippines, that follows official Chinese protests of the two’s increasing security cooperation in the South China Sea.
The journey represents the longest deployment of the ship so far, and its first operation in the South China Sea.
4. IRAN RENEWS COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA
Iran announced this week that it would permit a new and more limited cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran’s renewed cooperation with the IAEA comes less than three months after it kicked inspectors out of the country following the 12-Day War. As part of the new agreement, IAEA inspectors will only inspect the Bushehr nuclear power plant where they are needed to supervise the safe replacement of fuel.
Takeaways:
The expulsion of IAEA inspectors was a desperate move by Tehran to satisfy nationalist furor and show some kind of resolve in the wake of its brutal losses in the 12-Day War. It was also a move that, like Iran’s subsequent threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), received little support from its key international partners—Russia and China. The reversal was likely accelerated by the snapback of sanctions by France, Germany, and the UK at the end of August. The three European signatories to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) supervising Iran’s nuclear program demanded Iran resume cooperation with the IAEA as one of three steps required to lift the reinstated sanctions. The other steps included resuming negotiations, and accounting for its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
Iran’s restored cooperation with the IAEA is still limited to its Bushehr nuclear power plant, which was not targeted by US and Israeli air strikes. Bushehr was not bombed because it is a power plant rather than a research facility used to enrich uranium. Bushehr is also a light water reactor that would need substantial modifications, likely with Russian assistance, in order to produce enough plutonium to create the fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Tehran’s decision to allow inspections at the facility (where it doesn’t plan on conducting any nefarious activities anyway) is an attempt to delay the return of European sanctions through drawn out confidence building gestures that distract from demands to inspect the damaged Natanz, Isfahan and Fordo enrichment sites.
5. NORTH KOREA CELEBRATES FOUNDING ANNIVERSARY WITH ADVANCEMENTS IN MISSILE TECH
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Turns 77
North Korea celebrated the 77th anniversary of its founding on September 9. Numerous world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, sent congratulatory messages to Kim Jong-un for the occasion.
North Korea Tests Engine for Next Generation Missiles
Kim Jong-un oversaw the ninth and final test of the solid fuel engine of the new Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on September 9.
Kim Jong-un Announces Development of New Nuclear Strategy
On September 13, Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea would release a new strategy for developing its nuclear forces as well as advanced conventional weapons at the 2026 Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.
Takeaways:
The warm congratulatory message from Xi Jinping, which came days after his meeting with Kim Jong-un in Beijing, suggests stable ties in the relationship between China and North Korea despite Pyongyang’s military support for Russia and its potentially destabilizing advancements in missile technology.
The progress made toward the new Hwasong-20 ICBM is significant in that it could potentially alter fundamental assumptions about the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. The new missile will likely be able to strike targets across the continental US. As a solid-fueled ICBM, the Hwasong-20 will also be fired with less warning than previous liquid-fueled missiles. Solid fuel will also be lighter than its predecessors, enabling the missile to carry a payload of multiple nuclear warheads as part of a multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV) delivery system. North Korea has expressed interest in developing MIRVs with Russian assistance.
If North Korea is able to field a small number of Hwasong-20 ICBMs equipped with MIRVs it could threaten to overwhelm the 44 ground-based missile interceptors the US has based in Alaska and California. Such a capability would enable North Korea to dramatically increase tension on the Korean peninsula by credibly threatening cities in the continental US. This increased threat could complicate joint US-South Korea responses to conventional military escalations instigated by Pyongyang in the future, as US officials will be forced to balance America’s commitment to its allies against broader strategic risks to the US homeland.
A new and more robust ICBM force aimed at deterring the US from involving itself in an inter-Korean conflict is likely the focus of the nuclear strategy set to be released next year during the Ninth Party Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea.