On November 3, 2026, the Democratic Party achieved a “blue wave” in the US midterm elections, regaining control of Congress and flipping long-time Republican Senate seats in Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina. The dramatic shift in power in Washington is likely to have significant effects on both domestic policy and international affairs.

While much attention has focused on domestic reactions to the midterm elections, this Situation Report examines how America’s adversaries are interpreting the results by providing a sampling of reactions from political commentators in China, Russia, and Iran. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are framing the election for domestic audiences.

This Situation Report is broken into three parts:

Interpretations of what the results of the midterms mean for the future of US global leadership
Interpretations of the effects of the election on US adversaries
1. On US-Russia Relations
2. On US-China Relations
3. On US-Iran Relations
Interpretations of what the election says about US domestic politics

1. INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THE RESULTS OF THE MIDTERMS MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF US GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Summary of Key Insights:

There is a general consensus among commentators that President Trump, while constrained by a Democratic Congress on domestic issues, will have considerable leeway to influence foreign policy and for that reason may choose to focus more on international affairs in the second half of his term to avoid a lame-duck Presidency.
A dominant view among commentators is that the election will not repair damage to US alliances incurred over the past two years. There is a view that President Trump sees US European allies—as well as some Asian allies—as ideologically aligned with his adversaries in the Democratic Party and establishment Republicans, making them a target for his frustrations over the election.
A recurring theme in analysis is the belief that the US will not return to its previous global leadership role due to changes in both political parties.

Notable Analysis from Chinese, Russia, and Iranian Commentators:

Andrei Kortunov, Former Director General and Academic Director of the Russian International Affairs Council, Op-ed in Kommersant, November 4, 2026

In Russia, there is a view that the more intense the internal struggle in the United States and the less unity there is in the American leadership, the better for Moscow.
They say that, mired in its internal squabbles, the US leadership will have fewer opportunities to pursue an aggressive policy on the world stage and impose its will on other participants in international life.
It’s quite possible that this is true in many specific international issues. But let’s not forget that a divided, weak, and insecure America is also an inconsistent, unpredictable, impulsive, and irresponsible leading world power, capable of all sorts of foreign policy surprises.
Including extremely unpleasant surprises that create numerous new risks for both their partners and their opponents.

Petr Akopov, Columnist at RIA Novosti, Op-ed in RIA Novosti, November 5, 2026

Europe could become the main target of the US president’s displeasure: he has nothing left to lose, and Congress’s attempts to interfere more actively in the administration’s foreign policy could only further provoke Trump. After all, he not only considers it his prerogative but also sees European elites as allies of the Democrats, who control Congress. They can slap the president’s foreign policy budget on the table, but, firstly, next year’s budget will still be passed by the current Congress, and secondly, the 2028 budget is still a long way off. Not America, but Europe. A number of important elections will be held next year, from France to Poland. And there is no doubt that Trump will actively support the European right, which is considered his allies, in defiance of Brussels and the Euro-Atlanticists. Yes, his support didn’t help Viktor Orbán this year, but that doesn’t mean the White House will abandon its focus on replacing the elite and weakening the European Union.
[…]
The second problem—and this is even more important—is that even if the Democrats win the American presidential election in two years, they will be completely different. American-led globalization, like unity with Europe, is no longer an unconditional value for many of them. The left, social democratic wing is gaining strength within the Democratic Party. Formally, they are closer to the European left, but they don’t think in terms of “The West is our common home, and we must teach everyone the right values.” American left-wing Democrats are not interventionists; they oppose not only American global hegemony but also the West as a world leader. They support America as they understand it: multicultural (non-white), working-class, even socialist, but they oppose attempts, especially by force, to maintain US global dominance.

Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director and Research Fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE), Paraphrased remarks from Valdai Discussion Club event, “Midterm Elections in the US Congress: Implications for Russian-American Relations,” November 6, 2026

The Democrats’ victory should not be seen as a choice in favor of a return to liberal hegemony. Americans voted against Trump, in part, because they believed he had deviated from his promised “America First” policies. At the same time, the right wing of the Republican Party, associated with J.D. Vance, and the left-wing Democrats largely advocate for a more restrained and less interventionist foreign policy.
The future of American policy after 2028 will depend on the internal struggle within the parties. It is possible that traditional forces will prevail in both parties – neoconservative Republicans and centrist Democrats.
In any case, the space for foreign policy maneuvering for the United States will decrease due to public disapproval of costly wars and interventions.
However, fundamental changes are unlikely: the United States will continue to compete with China and Russia and will maintain its presence in Europe. American foreign policy will gradually evolve, but Washington will not abandon its desire to maintain its leading position.

Sun Chenghao, Associate Researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, Interview with Guancha, November 6, 2026

With major domestic legislation stalled, diplomatic negotiations, commercial agreements, and ceasefire arrangements are more likely to become the areas where Trump can demonstrate leadership and achieve political success. He may also rely more on direct communication with foreign leaders, attempting to push for breakthroughs through personal diplomacy. However, his foreign negotiating partners will also assess his ability to deliver on his promises, and Congress restricting funding or refusing to pass supporting legislation will also affect his negotiating power.
He may adjust his tone and approach to negotiations with allies, as dealing with the Iran war, the Ukraine crisis, and competition with China all require resources and cooperation from European and East Asian allies. However, increasing allies’ defense spending and demanding more procurement and investment from the US remain his long-term policy orientation. NATO’s defense spending commitments are also institutionalized, and the associated pressure is unlikely to disappear with a single election.
I believe Trump may engage in selective coordination, strengthening engagement on issues requiring allied support while continuing to exert cost-sharing and trade pressure. Allies will also be more proactive in cultivating relationships with Congress to secure policy continuity.

Diao Daming, Vice Dean of the National Academy of Development and Strategy at Renmin University of China’s School of International Studies, Interview with CCTV, November 5, 2026

In fact, the White House previously requested funding from Congress for the strike against Iran. If it continues to request funding from the Democratic Congress, even if Congress opposes military action against Iran, it probably cannot completely withhold funding. Congress will likely set limits, such as a budget or a timeframe, specifying when the operation will end and what objectives need to be achieved. This approach is inherently weak, lacking any real binding force, and its limitations are quite obvious; it is unlikely to completely reverse the White House’s policy.
Following this election, the US government faces significant domestic pressure. Therefore, in foreign affairs, it will likely focus on actions that could quickly achieve its goals and yield short-term benefits, such as rapidly withdrawing troops from NATO bases in Europe, and potentially further pressuring Ukraine and engaging in more interaction with Moscow to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict as soon as possible. However, Congressional Democrats will undoubtedly try every means to interfere with interactions between the US and Russia. This means that the US government may find it difficult to achieve its goals quickly in many areas.
Therefore, in the next two years, especially after the election cycle in 2028, the actions of the US government may become more unpredictable and uncertain, facing greater uncertainty. Under such circumstances, its diplomatic decisions may lead to more unexpected situations, which will also increase uncertainty for the world.

Niu Tan Qin (real name Liu Hong), Prominent geopolitical analyst on WeChat, Post on WeChat, November 6, 2026

A presidential election every four years and a midterm election every two years—each election reshuffles the deck and tells the world that agreements signed with the United States may only last two years.
This isn’t a problem with any one president; it’s a structural fatigue resulting from extreme polarization within the system. Trump’s lame-duck status simply manifests this fatigue on his person.
How can a country that can’t even produce its own domestic consensus lead a world order that it itself is constantly withdrawing from?
The pattern in world politics has always been this: the decline of a hegemon is often not due to defeat by its rivals, but rather to being dragged down by its own internal strife. The midterm elections cannot change America’s strength, but they do expose its cracks—and history has repeatedly proven that the collapse of an empire always begins with these cracks.
Europe is watching: Can a crippled America still be relied upon? Certainly, the voice of “strategic autonomy” is growing louder again.
Russia is watching: With Trump’s hands tied, the table for Russia-Ukraine negotiations may finally be set up.
The Middle East is watching, the Asia-Pacific region is watching, and the global South is watching—while Uncle Sam is busy arguing at home, many countries are beginning to reassess their position.
For China, the most important thing is definitely to manage our own affairs well. Strive for the best outcome and prepare for the worst. The scenery here is beautiful not because the wind doesn’t blow or the rain doesn’t fall, but because our roof is sturdy enough.
Great power rivalry is never about who has the stronger fist, but about who has a more stable foundation and a more determined approach. While others are embroiled in domestic disputes, living your own life well is the best answer.
Over the next two years, the world order will become more complex, American society will be more divided, the struggle will continue, the budget will be blocked, allies will be disheartened, the dollar will weaken, and states and the federal government will fight each other... Anger can win elections, but anger cannot govern an empire.

Hassan Rashvand, Iranian political analyst, Op-ed in Kayhan, November 5, 2026

The defeat in the US midterm elections showed that the American public is no longer willing to pay the high price of expansionist policies and erosive interventions with inflation, rising energy prices, reduced purchasing power, and the destruction of its economic stability.

2. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE ELECTION ON US ADVERSARIES

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators generally believe US policy toward Russia will remain mostly consistent with how it has been since 2022, despite some oscillations under the Trump presidency. They expect continued demand for economic pressure and increased military support for Ukraine.
Commentators believe that strategic competition between the US and China enjoys a bipartisan consensus. There is a view that the election will likely lead to a more assertive Congress pushing the White House for arms sales to Taiwan, and greater scrutiny over trade and technology policy with China.
There is a consensus view that the war with Iran, and its consequences for the global economy, played an outsized role in influencing the election. However, most commentators believe that both US political parties are fundamentally hostile to Iran, and even war skeptics are not eager to concede defeat.

Notable Analysis from Chinese, Russia, and Iranian Commentators:

2.a. On US-Russia Relations

Alexander Kots, Prominent Russian military blogger, Kotsnews on Telegram, November 4, 2026

Trump’s attitude towards Russia will not change as a result of the elections. It is based on his personal love of deals, not on party lines. What will change are the opportunities. A president who has lost Congress is often referred to as a “lame duck” in America: they will no longer be able to pass laws without opposition. Foreign policy remains, where he is still in control.
The new Congress will not convene until January 3rd. Before that, there are negotiations in Abu Dhabi on November 10-11, where the Russian delegation will be led by presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky. A meeting between Putin, Trump, and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit is also possible. In September, Trump signed a law imposing strict sanctions on Russia, named after the late Senator Lindsey Graham, and in October, he almost completely froze it. He promised to decide what to do with it within 60 days. That deadline expires in mid-December. Sanctions on Russian diesel fuel have already been lifted until April 2027.
After January, the situation will be different. Congress will not take away the president’s control over foreign policy. However, Congress controls the money. Without a vote from the legislators, there will be no military budget, and no funding for the government – and it is easy to include a provision in these laws that prohibits lifting sanctions without the consent of Congress. This has already happened: in 2017, Congress almost unanimously stripped Trump of the power to unilaterally lift Russian sanctions, and he signed the law, calling it “seriously damaging.”

Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council and Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Paraphrased remarks from Valdai Discussion Club event, “Midterm Elections in the US Congress: Implications for Russian-American Relations,” November 6, 2026

For Russia, there should be no major changes expected. Anti-Russian legislation in the US Congress has typically been advanced on a bipartisan basis, so a change in the majority in the chambers is unlikely to significantly affect this course. In addition, a significant body of federal legislation, primarily sanctions-related, has already been established regarding Russia, consisting of approximately a dozen federal laws.
Thus, the Democrats’ victory does not mean a radical reassessment of US policy either towards Russia or towards Ukraine. The existing legal framework and the bipartisan nature of the anti-Russian course suggest that no significant change in the situation is likely to occur for Moscow.

The prospects for Russian-American relations in the short and medium term appear rather negative. The Republicans’ defeat weakens Trump’s position, and possible investigations into Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner will reduce the willingness of Ukraine and Europe to listen to proposals from the American administration.
Democrats will likely seek to resume direct financial assistance to Ukraine. Even if the volume of this assistance is significantly less than under Biden, the very fact of returning to such support will strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating position.
The prospects for economic and energy cooperation between Russia and the United States may suffer even more. Congressional investigations could cover all projects under discussion, including possible agreements between Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev. Under these conditions, cooperation with Russia will become extremely toxic for American businesses.
Democrats may also initiate new anti-Russian sanctions. They will seek laws that limit the White House’s right to independently decide whether to apply sanctions, and that provide for a more automatic mechanism for their introduction. On this issue, there will likely be enough votes in Congress to override a presidential veto.
As a result, the prospects for practical economic cooperation between Russia and the United States in the foreseeable future will be minimal. This will also affect Ukrainian negotiations: Kyiv will have fewer reasons to listen to the Trump administration, and Moscow will have less incentive to make concessions in the hope of economic interaction with Washington.

2.b. On US-China Relations

Sun Chenghao, Associate Researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, Interview with Guancha, November 6, 2026

From China's perspective, it is necessary to separately judge the policy direction and specific implementation. There is a relatively strong consensus between the two parties in the United States on competition with China, so the pressure on technology restrictions, supply chain security, and the Taiwan issue has a certain continuity; however, the rise of Congressional power will involve more political participants in negotiations, approvals, and implementation, and the specific pace may be more difficult to control.
Decentralization of power can increase constraints on unilateral presidential actions, but it can also increase obstacles to the implementation of agreements. Trump may want to advance trade arrangements through head-of-state diplomacy, while Congress may attach conditions, demand review, or even pass legislation to limit room for concessions. Departments within the US government, congressional committees, and different parties may not prioritize relations with China in the same way.
My assessment is that the direction of US competition with China will maintain strong continuity, but the implementation of specific policies and agreements may fluctuate more significantly. What will influence future policy direction is whether various US institutions can maintain basic consistency around the consensus reached, and whether policy adjustments will be clear, especially whether risks on issues involving China's core interests, such as Taiwan, will be continuously escalated by domestic partisan competition in the US. Future observation will focus not only on whether consensus can be reached between leaders, but also on whether the US political system can support and implement this consensus.

Chen Dongxiao, Senior Research Fellow and President of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), Interview with The Paper, November 4, 2026

The midterm elections may change the political landscape of Congress, but they do not necessarily have a disruptive and huge impact on China-US relations. A specific assessment needs to pay attention to the following preconditions:
First, the changes in the congressional landscape have primarily disrupted the Trump administration’s agenda in domestic policy, with a relatively limited impact on foreign policy. In foreign affairs, the administration itself possesses greater power and room for maneuver; even if Trump’s attention is somewhat diverted, he still retains considerable discretion in foreign policy decisions.
Secondly, even if the Democrats control Congress, their core objective will be to weaken Trump’s executive capacity over the next two years, and their focus may not be entirely on overturning the China policy. There is considerable consensus between the two parties on China strategy, and they lack the motivation to completely overturn the existing framework. It is worth noting that on certain issues such as arms sales to Taiwan, Congress has long been dissatisfied with Trump’s previous delays in arms sales, and after the election, both parties in Congress may exert greater practical pressure to push for arms purchases from Taiwan.
Furthermore, Trump possesses a distinct and unique decision-making style. When navigating his adversaries, he is rarely entirely swayed by bipartisan opposition and continues to pursue policies based on his own judgment. As long as his energy is not completely consumed by domestic political investigations and Congress does not prioritize China policy, he can still play a positive role in maintaining stable relations with China.

2.c. On US-Iran Relations

Hojjatoleslam Safahani, Iranian Friday prayer leader, Quoted by Defa Press, November 6, 2026

Hojjatoleslam Safahani, Friday sermon preacher, also referred to the midterm elections in the United States and attributed the Republicans’ defeat to recent developments and the war against the Iranian nation, saying: “The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has increased the cost of living in Europe and the United States and made living conditions difficult for them.”
He referred to the US government’s hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and added: “There are no Democrats or Republicans. Any party that comes to power will not stop its hostility towards the Iranian nation.”

Hassan Rashvand, Iranian political analyst, Op-ed in Kayhan, November 5, 2026

But with all the experiences from November 13, 1979 to the widespread US sanctions on Republican and Democratic governments, and the first to third wars that various American aggressor governments have imposed on our beloved Iran, it is strange that some do not learn lessons. With the weakening of one party and the victory of another party in America, there is a group inside that is reminded of India and, in a miscalculation, they believe that now is the time to get closer to America and that the Democratic Party, which has been the product of the most sanctions in the history of the revolution, can continue to negotiate in these conditions and remove the country from the shadow of war and sanctions. How beautifully and wisely did the beloved Imam of the nation, Ayatollah Seyyed Mujtaba Hosseini Khamenei (may Allah have mercy on him) respond to these people in his message on the anniversary of the fight against arrogance, saying: “If there are still those who have little hope of changing behavior or party and factional shifts in the ruling system, or who imagine that by giving concessions to America they can dissuade it from its hostility towards the Iranian nation, they are deeply mistaken. This false notion is ingratitude towards the great conquests that the Muslim nation of Iran has achieved under the shadow of trust, perseverance, and struggle. The great devil's desire is the unconditional surrender of the Iranian nation, and the slightest tendency to surrender to the dominating enemy will waste the immense capital that was gained through the blood of martyrs and the sacrifice of the nation's members, and will encourage the arrogant enemy to further exaggerate and wage further wars and audacity. Continuing the strategy of "the stronger Iran is" is the only way to reach the point of absolute deterrence.

Jafar Hardani, Columnist at Tabnak, Op-ed in Tabnak, November 4, 2026

The silent winner, but the victory of Iran. This victory lies not in the counting of votes, but in the logic of events. What led the Republicans to the abyss of defeat was the war with Iran; a war that Trump and his accomplices started, and the American people rejected it. The Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, His Excellency Dr. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, wrote in response to the election results: “Whether out of conscience or due to the pressure of living expenses, the American people said ‘no’ to the war, and we also confirm this message.” This is not a slogan, but an accurate reading of a reality. The American people declared with their vote that they do not accept Trump’s policies towards Iran. They considered the war with Iran to be a cause of high prices and a livelihood crisis, and Trump himself admitted that this war had contributed to the defeat of the Republicans. Therefore, Iran achieved victory not through conspiracy, not through interference, but through its own resistance and persistence: the enemy that waged war with Iran was defeated in its own home. And this victory has a message for Trump and his accomplices: If they continue their evil ways, the next stage will be the collapse of the United States of America. Qalibaf also warned that if the US government “betrays the general will of its people to serve international masters and blackmailers, it will find that our response will become a nightmare for the US government.” This warning is not from a position of weakness, but from a position of strength.

Ahmad Dastmalchian, Former Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, Interview in Didar News, November 5, 2026

Contrary to some analyses that are being put forward in society and that convey wrong signals to public opinion, I do not believe that the US elections can change the course of the substantive and existential war between Iran and the US.
Both parties and the American government, with the cooperation and complicity of the Zionist regime, have launched a war of essence and existence. Their goal is to maintain their components of power, superiority, and dominance in the world; and that is in a situation where the old international order is collapsing and a new order is being formed.
In order to maintain its superiority and position, America is forced to enter a decisive war in various arenas. Therefore, the elections cannot make a decisive change in the course of this main confrontation, which is defined within the framework of America’s grand strategy.

Daniyal Meshkin Ranjbar, Lecturer at Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Op-ed for the Valdai Discussion Club, November 5, 2026

There are three main scenarios for the development of US-Iranian relations.
The first scenario is a diplomatic detente under the influence of domestic political pressure. A major Republican defeat could strengthen Trump’s interest in reaching an agreement with Iran. Ending the active phase of the conflict and restoring shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would allow the White House to present the diplomatic result as a foreign policy victory, while reducing economic costs for American consumers.
Certain prerequisites for such a development already exist. Indirect negotiations are continuing with the mediation of Qatar, affecting the lifting of the American naval blockade, easing oil sanctions, unblocking Iranian assets and restoring shipping. However, discrepancies in the sequence of implementation of mutual obligations remain. Tehran is seeking to obtain concrete guarantees for the fulfillment of American obligations before making irreversible decisions. At the same time, the presence of a democratic majority does not guarantee the readiness of Congress to support large-scale sanctions relief without additional conditions on the nuclear program and regional security.
The second scenario is a continuation of limited confrontation with increased parliamentary control. In this case, Washington will retain the main elements of sanctions and military-political pressure but will be more careful about the transition to large-scale operations. The administration will be able to combine limited strikes, a naval blockade, and negotiations through intermediaries, avoiding solutions that require additional legislative support.
Such a model seems especially likely in the absence of a compromise on the key terms of the settlement. It allows Trump not to abandon previous demands, but for the Democrats to strengthen control over the administration. However, its weakness lies in the continued risk of unintended escalation. A prolonged confrontation without a stable settlement mechanism can escalate into a new stage of war due to a separate military incident.
The third scenario is escalation during the transition period. Despite the electoral defeat, Trump may maintain his desire to obtain concessions from Iran through additional forceful pressure. Until the new Congress takes office, institutional constraints will remain the same, and foreign policy decisions can be used to restore the image of a determined president.
At the same time, the expansion of hostilities will not necessarily strengthen the negotiating position of the United States. It can increase the cost of conflict, trigger Tehran’s retaliatory measures, increase instability in energy markets, and further complicate the White House’s relations with the future Congress. Consequently, military escalation is a tool with increasing political costs and an uncertain strategic outcome.

3. INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THE ELECTION SAYS ABOUT US DOMESTIC POLITICS

Summary of Key Insights:

There is a general consensus that the election marked the decline of the Trump presidency, with voters explicitly punishing Republican candidates for their affiliation with the failed or otherwise unpopular policies of the president.
Several commentators highlighted continued political polarization, driven by rapid societal changes and poor governance, as the cause of repeated pendulum swings in elections. They expect these trends to manifest in continued culture war fights and growing demands for new political movements such as democratic socialism.

Notable Analysis from Chinese, Russia, and Iranian Commentators:

Vladimir Vasiliev, Chief Research Fellow at the Institute of US and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Quoted in RIA Novosti, November 4, 2026

In September, speaking at the party convention, Trump urged regional Republicans to put his name on the ballot, turning the vote into a referendum on confidence in the president. Essentially, that's what happened. This election wasn't about anything or anyone, but about him. Americans made it clear: they no longer want anything to do with Trump and his team. And he's no longer facing impeachment, but prison.
[…]
The main winners are the democratic socialists. There will be no Trump or Trumpism in the 2028 elections. And it's completely unclear what the Democratic Party, with its left-wing ascendancy, will become. Their time is clearly coming.

Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs; Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Quoted in Argumenty i Fakty, November 5, 2026

The Republicans’ (read: Trump’s) failure today is due to exactly the same qualities that fueled the Republicans’ (read: Trump’s) triumph two years ago. Unceremonious pressure, fearless disregard for facts and their twisting, unwavering confidence in one’s own rightness, a reliance on politically incorrect commercialism and the abandonment of formal propriety—all of this allowed the Democrats to be steamrolled in 2024. And it provoked a counter-steamroller in 2026.
Clearly, people are tired of Trump; the less successful he was, the more he tried to compensate with his signature tactics, and this only made the impression worse.

Fyodor Voitolovsky, Director of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS), Interview with Vesti, November 5, 2026

The reasons [for the Republican losses] are very simple – socioeconomic. The economic situation didn’t meet voters’ expectations. Trump was expected to deliver economic growth, but what we got was inflation again.

Natalia Tsvetkova, Acting Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Paraphrased remarks from Valdai Discussion Club event, “Midterm Elections in the US Congress: Implications for Russian-American Relations,” November 6, 2026

The Democrats’ victory in the midterm elections was much more significant than expected. One of the important factors is the digital reindustrialization of the United States, initiated under Biden and continued by Trump. This involves the construction of factories for the production of semiconductors, batteries, and other high-tech products. A total of approximately 160 projects have been announced, with billion-dollar subsidies.
The development of new industries has led to an influx of workers and specialists from other countries, a change in the social structure of some states, and a shift in part of the electorate towards the Democrats. “Red” states are beginning to take on a “purple” hue.
The consequences of this digital reindustrialization will still be felt in the presidential elections. The Democrats have shown that they are capable of mobilizing protest movements, including student protests against Israel, and directing them towards electoral struggle.
At the same time, a new generation of politicians has emerged within the party: democratic socialists, industrial pragmatists, and representatives of the liberal wing. Who will be able to unite the party and take a centrist position will largely determine its candidate for the next presidential elections.

One of the reasons for the Democrats’ significant victory was the large number of independent voters. According to polls, they make up about 45 percent of registered voters. Many of them are disillusioned with the parties and the political system: in 2024, they supported Trump, but quickly lost trust in him and now voted for the Democrats.
This proportion of independent voters is making the cycles of American political change shorter. If the Democrats win the 2028 presidential election, the Republicans could have a comeback in the 2030 midterm elections. Therefore, it is too early to write off the Republican Party.
The United States will remain a deeply divided country. Polarization exists not only between the parties, but also within them. There is also a lack of trust in state institutions, and fundamental problems – the decline in income for the middle class, the migration issue, and dissatisfaction with life – are not being resolved.

Sun Chenghao, Associate Researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, Interview with Guancha, November 6, 2026

Economic anxiety played a prominent role in this election, but voters’ demands also included dissatisfaction with the loss of power, political corruption, and governance failure. The latest national voter survey in the United States shows that about 40% of voters listed the economy as the most important issue for the country, and about 30% chose the state of the democratic system, indicating that material pressures and institutional anxieties are simultaneously at play.
Cultural and identity issues still possess strong partisan mobilizing power, but with the cost of living continuing to rise, they are less likely to replace voters’ direct judgments of governance performance. A family’s ability to afford housing, healthcare, and daily expenses influences their voting choices more than macroeconomic indicators. Tariffs and overseas wars thus become domestic economic issues, and the costs of foreign policy become directly part of household bills.
A noteworthy change is that voters are increasingly demanding that politicians explain the actual impact of policies on ordinary people. The Democratic Party was able to link the cost of living, anti-corruption efforts, and presidential oversight, creating cross-group mobilization. However, this also means the Democratic Party will face similar challenges in the future. If both parties repeatedly promise to improve living standards but fail to deliver, voters may punish the ruling party more frequently, and public distrust of the political system will continue to accumulate.

Zhang Jiadong, Professor at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, Quoted in the Global Times, November 5, 2026

From a historical perspective, it is not uncommon for US presidents to face opposition parties controlling Congress in the latter half of their terms. Therefore, the political changes brought about by this election should not be exaggerated.

Niu Tan Qin (real name Liu Hong), Prominent geopolitical analyst on WeChat, Post on WeChat, November 6, 2026

This is something many headlines might miss, but it could be the longest tail of consequences.
The Democrats not only won in Washington, but also overturned hundreds of state legislature seats, breaking the Republican supermajority with veto power in several states and gaining a majority of governorships for the first time since 2010.
In Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, Democrats achieved full control of the governorship and both houses of the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Senate turned blue for the first time since 1978.
What does that mean?
Democratic governors will push through agendas that Trump can’t get through at the federal level: minimum wage, abortion rights, gun safety, and clean electricity.
At the federal level, these states will become political bastions resisting Trump’s immigration enforcement and welfare cuts. Since the Republicans will redraw district lines, the Democrats will follow suit to ensure a long-term Democratic majority.
Federalism, which was originally intended to be a stabilizer for the United States, is now becoming a battlefield of parallel confrontation. Red states and blue states are living as two separate Americas.

Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Professor of English Literature and Orientalism at the University of Tehran, Op-ed in Jam-e Jam online, November 4, 2026

On the other hand, the role of economic factors in shaping the election results should not be ignored. In the relatively distant past, the Democratic Party paid more attention to the middle class, especially the lower and low-income classes, but in recent decades, the party's ties with big capitalists have become more pronounced, and attention to the economic demands of these classes has been somewhat marginalized.
In the current situation, economic dissatisfaction, along with opposition to the war and support for the Zionist regime, has become one of the factors exerting pressure on the American political structure. If this trend continues and economic conditions become more difficult, demands for fundamental changes in the political structure will increase.
In general, the recent American elections should be examined from an angle beyond the competition between Republicans and Democrats. What is important is the increasing gap between the demands of large segments of American society and the established policies of the country's two main parties. Opposition to war, protest against genocide, and economic discontent have now become demands that cannot be ignored. These developments, especially if Washington’s confrontational policies toward Iran and the region continue, could significantly increase the domestic and external costs of America’s war-making decisions

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

Situation Report: The US Midterms As Seen…