Operation Epic Fury - The View From Moscow and Beijing
While much attention has focused on domestic and allied reactions to the US war against Iran, this Situation Report examines how the purpose and progress of the war is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from military strategists and political commentators in China and Russia. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are interpreting the war for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the merits of the war itself or the conclusions the foreign commentators reached.
This Situation Report is broken into four parts:
Interpretations of why the US launched the war
Interpretations of US strategy and its effectiveness
On the US’s goals
On the impact of the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
On the use of new US military technology
Interpretations of Iranian strategy and its effectiveness
On Iran’s goals
On Iran’s ability to counter the US military
Forecasts of how the war might end
On the likelihood of regime change in Iran
On the long-term consequences for international order
1. INTERPRETATIONS OF WHY THE US LAUNCHED THE WAR
Summary of Key Insights:
Commentators assert that the US and Israel have used the prospect of Iran eventually developing nuclear weapons as a convenient pretext for attacking Iran for the purpose of regime change. Perceptions of Iranian weakness, compounded by US military momentum from strikes on Iran in June 2025 and the seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, may have given American and Israeli policymakers the sense that a historic window of opportunity had opened to finalize a decades-long project of dominating the Middle East.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
By An Gang, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Strategic and Security Studies, Tsinghua University in the Beijing Review, March 5, 2026
“On February 28, 2026, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, launched a military strike against Iran, killing Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and a number of high-ranking military and political officials who were convening a meeting at his residence that same day.
“This follows the January 3rd raid by U.S. special forces in Caracas, where Venezuelan President Maduro and his wife were abducted. This marks yet another instance in a short period of time that the Trump administration has trampled on basic norms of international relations and principles of international law, violated the sovereignty and security of another country, and committed atrocities against its leader. The Chinese government, along with many members of the international community, firmly opposes and strongly condemns this action.
“Trump and his administration, adhering to a policy of “beast-like realism” and the principle of ‘peace through strength,’ disdain to provide a full explanation for the reasons behind these two overseas military operations. In Venezuela, they claimed it was to ‘crack down on the ringleaders of drug cartels,’ while in Iran, they allegedly acted as a righteous indignation against its ‘crimes of massacring its people.’ However, the underlying logic of these two actions is interconnected. First, to create a chilling effect, breaking down the ‘anti-American arc’ formed by the most vocal left-wing regimes in Latin America and the ‘arc of resistance’ supported and manipulated by Iran in the Middle East, thereby deterring global ‘authoritarian anti-American forces.’ Second, to practice ‘energy greed,’ gain more control over oil pricing, manipulate the international crude oil market, and seize multiple benefits from economic, financial, and strategic perspectives, thus compressing the profit margins of export-oriented economies. Third, to create more ‘victories,’ pursue domestic political effects, confuse the base, and strive to reverse the increasingly obvious defeat of the Republican Party in the 2026 midterm elections.”
By Tang Zhichao, director of the Center for Middle East Development and Governance Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences via interview with China News Service, February 28, 2026
“First, Trump is ‘dissatisfied’ with the proposals put forward by Iran and believes that military pressure is needed to force Iran to make concessions, thus using force to promote negotiations. Second, the negotiations may be entirely a ‘smokescreen,’ just like in June 2025. As of the [February] 26th local time, the US military deployment, especially the second aircraft carrier, can be said to be fully in place, a result of careful planning by the US.
“He believes that these developments indicate that the United States and Israel have completely given up hope of negotiating with Iran, and that their goal is to achieve regime change in Iran.”
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 10
“The Iran War is the final phase of the liquidation of the Middle East, as it emerged in the twentieth century, in the process of decline and dismantling of colonial empires. The starting point of the current stage can probably be considered Operation Desert Storm 35 years ago - the first U.S. attack on Iraq to liberate Kuwait, occupied by Saddam Hussein. Those events came at a turning point in international: the end of the Cold War, the self-decommission of the USSR and the onset of a ‘unipolar moment’, in other words, hegemony in the world of the United States.
“Everything further: the Islamist attack on New York and Washington in September 2001, the global fight against terrorism, the retaliatory action in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the ‘Arab Spring’. the intervention in Libya, the stimulation of the civil war in Syria, etc. - meant being sucked into the funnel, control over the process was quickly lost. The policy of the United States (and behind it and all the rest) has turned into an ongoing response to rapid change, and the United States has squeezed between the need to get out of the trap created by itself and the inability to do it without the risk of losing influence not only in the Middle East.
“Retrospectively, it can be stated that almost all the decisions of the White House on the Middle East in recent decades have been situational. The possible consequences were not calculated at least two or three times ahead, although each individual step was presented as an ideologically and geopolitically thought-out strategy.”
By Zhou Xinping, Beijing Review columnist, March 5
“The apparent reason for the US and Israel’s military action against Iran is the ‘Iranian nuclear issue,’ but in reality, it is to curb Iran’s oil production. Looking at the core demands of the US regarding Middle Eastern oil over the past 80 years, its policy has never changed—it’s not simply about ‘stealing oil,’ but about controlling the pricing, settlement, and distribution channels of Middle Eastern oil, thereby maintaining the petrodollar’s hegemony and global dominance.
“Since Roosevelt’s 1945 agreement with Saudi Arabia for ‘military protection in exchange for control of oil,’ which led to the deployment of US troops to the Persian Gulf, successive US administrations have viewed the Middle East as America’s oil backyard. However, Iran’s resistance to the US has consistently displeased the US. In 1953, orchestrated by British and US intelligence agencies, a coup d’état occurred in Iran, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh, which advocated for the return of oil sovereignty. Anglo-American oil companies gained control of Iranian oil, pioneering the ‘regime change for oil’ strategy. After the US and Saudi Arabia agreed in 1974 to settle global oil transactions in US dollars, the dollar became deeply intertwined with oil. The Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003 were key US actions to eliminate anti-American forces in the Middle East and consolidate its dominance over Middle Eastern oil.”
“However, Iran, a major oil producer in the Middle East, has been free from US and British control since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. What bothers the US even more is that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil export route through the Middle East. Therefore, for decades, the US government has viewed Iran as a hostile nation and exerted pressure on it. In particular, recent US administrations have repeatedly imposed sanctions on Iran, attempting to reduce its oil exports and cripple its economy. In the last decade or so, Iran has largely determined its own oil production, deviating from the US-led OPEC production quotas. Furthermore, Iran has increasingly de-dollarized its oil exports, adopting multiple settlement methods such as its own currency, the renminbi, and the ruble—something the US cannot tolerate.”
By Vladimir Orlov, Director of the PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), Kommersant, March 1, 2026
“So, why? The June 2025 war ended in a draw. On the one hand, the Americans and Israelis inflicted serious damage on Iranian nuclear infrastructure facilities that could have played a critical role in Iran’s acquisition of nuclear material enriched enough to create a nuclear explosive device. Key Iranian scientists were sidelined.
“These are the conclusions contained in the PIR Center’s report, ‘The Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment of the Current Status and Capabilities,’ which will be made publicly available on March 2. On the other hand, as stated in the report, as of February of this year, ‘Iran retains the technical knowledge and experience resulting from more than three decades of nuclear development. More than 30 nuclear facilities remain operational throughout the country. Most importantly, the status of more than 440 kg of HEU, which could potentially be used to create a special munition, remains unclear. This amount is potentially sufficient to create 10 nuclear warheads with further enrichment.’
“And by the end of last year, the Israelis had become despondent: Trump, as authoritative Israeli sources told me then, was ‘losing interest’ in Iran, his thoughts, they said, preoccupied with Venezuela and the Ukrainian crisis; and he believed that ‘the Americans had done their job.’ Therefore, they told me, it took Netanyahu’s remarkable efforts to get Trump back on his combative side: ‘Until Iran is cleansed, it will remain a thorn in Trump’s side.’ Then came the options: what would ‘cleanse Iran’ mean? Apply the Republicans’ favorite tactic, ‘regime change’ (read: coup d’état); or limit themselves to ‘cleaning up’ with depth charges those nuclear facilities they missed last June.
“But, as the alarmed Israelis soon discovered, their concerns were unnecessary. Trump hadn’t forgotten about Iran. Yes, he’d become engrossed in Venezuela, practicing a new tactic there: partial ‘regime change.’ But he apparently considered a full-scale ‘cleansing’ and humiliation of Iran part of his mission, and this wasn’t just about Israel or its nuclear program. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage-taking at the US embassy in Iran that same year, Iran has remained the main uncontrollable irritant to the US globally.
“Not North Korea. Not Cuba. Not even Russia or China (although sending a clear signal to China by ‘cleansing Iran’ would also be a very timely move for Trump). Here in Russia, they’d say, ‘It was ruining the statistics,’ this Iran. It was ruining Trump’s mood. The Iranian negotiators turned out to be good negotiators. ‘They’re dragging their feet, leading you by the nose!’ the Israelis egged him on. And now it’s time for revenge.”
2. INTERPRETATIONS OF US STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS
Summary of Key Insights:
Commentators assert that the Trump administration is confused and divided about its overall strategy, particularly as its current campaign strategy, focused on decapitating strikes and targeting of military infrastructure, has so far failed to topple the regime. The division over strategy reflects a broader schism in Trump’s political base, which is willing to accept short and decisive military campaigns to achieve limited objectives, but is skeptical of prolonged and costly wars, particularly in the Middle East. As a result, they believe the administration is likely to buckle under pressure and seek a quick exit if Iran puts up long-term resistance or succeeds in strangling global energy exports. Caught between the need to claim a tangible victory and the desire to avoid an ignominious defeat, the US may be tempted to put boots on the ground—either to seize Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium at Isfahan or to occupy its oil facilities on Kharg Island as a bargaining chip.
Commentators further note that the US has come to appreciate the importance of high-performance strike drones, but nonetheless remains behind both Iran and Russia in capabilities and lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
2.a. On the US’s goals:
By An Gang, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Strategic and Security Studies, Tsinghua University in the Beijing Review, March 5, 2026
“The overconfident Trump administration’s reckless decision to launch a war against Iran may not have been well-considered, let alone based on any medium- to long-term strategic planning. Unlike previous US overseas military operations, the Trump administration tended to be a ‘hit-and-run’ approach, focusing on destruction rather than creation, and not aiming to reform Iran’s governance system. Iran is not a small or weak country; its internal situation is extremely complex. Currently, its military system has devolved into a situation where different branches and factions are fighting independently, leaving the US without a clear target and effective means to communicate with its adversary and control the intensity of the war. The US will now face the critical questions of how to win and how to withdraw. It is possible that the war will not go smoothly, losses will exceed expectations, and a swift victory will be impossible, forcing the US to continue investing more war resources.
“Even if the Trump administration declares itself victorious and leaves the Iranian battlefield, it will inevitably leave behind a mess in the Middle East: a locally radicalized Iran lacking effective central control will have a long-term negative impact on regional peace and stability, as well as on America’s hard and soft power and its alliance system. More importantly, the rapid and aggressive actions Trump has taken since taking office over a year ago are showing a pattern of ‘one wave of momentum, then a decline, and finally exhaustion,’ exacerbating political divisions and even internal divisions within the MAGA camp. Therefore, the likelihood of the US government taking new large-scale, risky actions against specific countries before the midterm elections is decreasing.”
By Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Valdai Discussion Club, March 10, 2026
“A window of opportunity has also opened for Washington to crush its long-standing adversary. Donald Trump's predecessors hesitated to undertake a campaign of this scale, preferring sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence operations. Like Israel, the United States could chalk up significant damage to Iran's military-industrial potential. Unlike Israel, the United States is virtually invulnerable to retaliatory strikes. Military losses are minimal. The psychological demonstration has a wider target audience than Iran. The campaign has demonstrated that the leaders of the vast majority of countries can be assassinated with political will and without any ethical qualms. The main problem is what to do next. The effects of the first round of fighting are already wearing off. Iran has not collapsed. This means it will be necessary to either engage in a risky ground operation or ‘stand back and watch.’ A ground operation is not ruled out, but it is not yet the baseline scenario. The United States may pause and launch another strike at an opportune moment. But the problem is that Iranian resistance will keep the region on edge. This will lead to high oil prices and problems for allies. Therefore, a wait-and-see approach is also risky. While the US has an extremely high margin of safety and can afford to play the long game, the Trump administration is in a more difficult position. A shaky victory, Iranian attacks, and rising gas prices are fraught with domestic problems for the Republicans.”
By Dmitry Novikov, Associate Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestiya, March 3, 2026
“Washington and Tel Aviv seek to destroy even the semblance of Iran's ambition for regional hegemony, which it has nurtured for decades. This will be facilitated either by regime change or, failing that, by a significant decline in Iranian military capabilities. Iran's minimum goal, therefore, is to endure and prevent critical long-term damage to its military and economic capabilities. It can do this, among other things, by raising the costs of continued military action for its opponents.”
2.b. On the impact of the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei:
By Cheng Tong, Dean of the School of Oriental Languages at Shanghai International Studies University, via CCTV, March 4, 2026
“The UN Charter stipulates that the assassination of a foreign leader constitutes a serious violation of sovereignty. Treaties such as the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention also explicitly prohibit the assassination of national leaders. Khamenei was not only Iran's supreme political leader but also a Shiite religious leader. We have seen that after news of Khamenei's martyrdom spread, not only in Iran but also in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries, Shiite Muslims were outraged, taking to the streets and chanting slogans of revenge. It can be said that the consequences of this US-Israeli ‘targeted killing’ operation will be far-reaching, complex, and extremely destructive, potentially leading to a vicious cycle of deepening hatred and violence begetting violence.”
By Evgeny Fedorov, Russian nationalist politician and member of the State Duma, TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication), March 11, 2026
“Trump's first mistake was eliminating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Whatever anyone says about him, the old man didn't seize power in Iran, but was the elected spiritual leader of a nation of 80 million. It's a real Pandora's Box—now anyone has the moral right to assassinate legitimately elected heads of state. If Americans can do it, why shouldn't others try? Trump's terrorist act is a direct warning to Russia and China. The United States has crossed another red line, and this clearly needs to be taken into account.
”Now, regarding Iranians dissatisfied with the government, whom Trump proposed to seize power in the country. There were, of course, some celebrations of the ayatollah's death, but no one supported them. It's all about the Shiite perception of death. Khamenei died at the hands of the enemy, meaning he became a martyr. And that's a completely different balance of power in the Middle East. Such things are not forgiven, and they are avenged. Iranians, who only yesterday sympathized with the rebels, are sincerely mourning the Ayatollah and demanding more missiles from the IRGC for Israel and the United States. And the missiles have flown.”
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 2, 2026
“The Supreme Leader of Iran was not just destroyed by a targeted strike, but this destruction was also declared a great achievement and a benefit for the future resolution of the conflict. However, Ali Khamenei is a legitimate (according to the laws of his country) head of state - a member of the United Nations, recognized by almost everyone and a full participant in all forms of international relations. Including political negotiations with the organizers of the attack, which have continued until now.
“The killing of the head of one state by the forces of another state and by the decision of its leadership in accordance with the same model as the leaders of terrorist organizations or drug cartels are liquidated is a fundamentally different dimension of world politics.
“Even in comparison with previous cases of regime changes, including such brutal finals as the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya or the execution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Both episodes became possible thanks to external military intervention. But Gaddafi was killed by his Libyan opponents as a result of an act of internal turmoil, and Hussein was executed after the Iraqi court’s verdict trial, no matter how to assess his objectivity. The case of Iran is different, it is a reproduction of the method that Israel applied to the heads of Hezbollah and Hamas. And the United States fully supports this approach.”
2.c. On the use of new US military technology:
By Tai Fengshun and Huang Lin, Special correspondents for The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group), March 3, 2026
“The US military had three objectives in using suicide drones, which had only been in service with the troops for a few months, in this airstrike against Iran.
“The first objective is to test the combat capabilities of the ‘LUCAS’ in actual combat. Iran is a medium-sized military power in the Middle East, and the intensity and scale of the war would far exceed those of some of the smaller countries that the United States has previously attacked. Through actual combat, the performance of the ‘LUCAS’ can be tested, providing more practical evidence for the accumulation of tactics and subsequent improvements.
“Although the ‘LUCAS’ is a copy of an Iranian drone, its design incorporates the US understanding and positioning of such weapons. Reportedly, the drone incorporates advanced collaborative capabilities. Some models are equipped with Starlink satellite communication terminals, enabling autonomous coordination and suitability for swarm tactics and network-centric warfare. This means multiple ‘LUCAS’ can share data, coordinate target allocation, dynamically adjust attack missions, and effectively resist electronic jamming, achieving a more intelligent and efficient swarm precision strike capability than the Iranian ‘Shahed-136’ drone.
“The second objective is to ‘fight fire with fire’ on the battlefield, thereby reducing operational costs. The US military’s first use of the Lucas suicide drone is a specific tactical action based on modern battlefield experience, aimed at countering the threat of low-cost drones and addressing the cost-effectiveness dilemma. Iran has equipped itself with a large number of long-range suicide drones such as the Witness and Arash, using them extensively since the start of the war. Combined with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range rocket artillery, they have repeatedly and successfully struck US bases in the Middle East, destroying facilities and causing personnel casualties at US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar.
“Each LUCAS drone costs approximately $35,000 to produce, making it a much cheaper beyond-visual-range weapon than missiles. It can provide the U.S. military with low-cost, scalable military capabilities in the Middle East. In this conflict, the U.S. quickly announced the use of this drone, which also sent a message to the U.S. domestically that the U.S. military no longer relies solely on expensive beyond-visual-range strike weapons on the battlefield, but is also fighting against adversaries with low-cost weapons.
“The U.S. military’s large-scale deployment of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems deserves close attention.
“The third objective is to accelerate the ‘Replicator’ program through real-world combat, driving a profound transformation in operational thinking and tactics, serving high-end warfare and great power competition, and thus warranting attention. In 2024, the US military drew lessons from the conflict between Ukraine and Russia—where both countries utilized a large number of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as for frontline operations and attacks on fixed targets deep within enemy territory, targeting fixed military installations, infrastructure, and factories to weaken the other’s war potential. The ‘Replicator’ program aims to deploy unmanned systems on a large scale, enabling the US military to distribute its combat power across a large number of relatively inexpensive systems. This is a multi-domain program that may include autonomous air, ground, surface, underwater, and/or space unmanned systems.
“The U.S. military believes that low-cost, high-performance, and rapidly producible unmanned systems are one of the key development trends in future weapons. Major powers like Russia have already begun to equip themselves with large numbers of low-cost, long-range lethal systems, while the United States lags behind in this area. The ‘Replicator’ program is a crucial project to catch up and address the challenges of future great power competition. The ‘Replicator’ program is essentially a large-scale integration of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and unmanned platforms. The ‘Replicator’ program marks a significant shift in the U.S. military’s strategic thinking: from relying on a few high-precision, expensive platforms and munitions to a combination of high-end platforms (including munitions) and the large-scale deployment of ‘consumable’ low-cost autonomous systems. Its core strategic objective is to create new military superiority through a combination of qualitative and quantitative advantages, attempting to leverage its industrial and technological capabilities to enable the U.S. military to adapt to both high-end combat and protracted wars of attrition, thereby reshaping the logic of deterrence and warfare.”
By Fighterbomber, leading pro-Kremlin Russian military blogger, on Telegram, March 11, 2026
“If we were preparing for the last war before the Special Military Operation (SMO), then the US and Israel prepared for the future war, so much so that they missed the present moment.
“Their reliance on robots and technological superiority reached its peak, and their desire to preserve the lives of their taxpayers was taken to the extreme. The attacking side decided to achieve its goals without infantry.
“As a result, the world’s first army, reinforced by the most cunning country on the planet, is now forced to invent new war goals and excuses every day to explain why everything went to hell.
“This sounds very familiar, doesn’t it?
“After reading Russian-Ukrainian channels, the Americans realized that today, the main weapon is drones, and so they launched a drone attack.
“Judging by the losses, the tactics of using aircraft in conditions of complete technological and numerical superiority are no different from the tactics of using aircraft in the SMO.
“They operate without entering the zone of destruction of even single air defense systems.
“But having a shitload of attack drones, Israel and the US launched a massive attack with Hermes and Reaper drones. Practically all the accurate hits of the day come from them. On the 12th day of the war, Iran continues to shoot them down gradually.”
3. INTERPRETATIONS OF IRANIAN STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS
Summary of Key Insights
Commentators believe that while Iran is capable of landing periodic strikes on US military bases, it cannot defeat the US military in a decisive engagement. Iran’s optimal strategy is to endure US and Israeli strikes while maintaining sufficient resistance to disrupt the global economy and frustrate US allies, and ultimately force the US to settle on its terms.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
3.a. On Iran’s goals:
By Yuri Lyamin, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 13, 2026
"Despite all the destruction and losses, Iran continues to withstand attacks and continues to respond. Among other things, Iran has now established de facto complete control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
"The Iranian leadership is clearly demonstrating that it is prepared to continue fighting until the US agrees to terms acceptable to the Iranians. Iran wants to break the vicious cycle of negotiations, war, ceasefire, negotiations, and a new war at any cost, and is therefore pursuing its strategy of drawing the US into a protracted conflict. In other words, they are imposing a scenario that Trump clearly did not sign up for.”
By Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University via Global Times, March 8, 2026
“Unable to strike the US mainland, Iran has no choice but to target US bases, embassies, and other assets in the Middle East. However, this approach carries severe negative consequences, namely worsening relations with Gulf countries.
“Therefore, Iran has proactively sought understanding from Gulf states through an apology, he told the Global Times. From Iran’s perspective, it must carefully consider its own geopolitical environment. Particularly since restoring ties with Saudi Arabia in 2023, improving relations with Gulf countries has been a key direction in Iranian diplomacy, aimed at optimizing its external surroundings.”
By Roman Skomorokhov, Russian defense journalist, TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication), March 5, 2026
“And Iran, by destroying its neighbors' oil refineries with ballistic missiles and drones, and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, will ultimately drive oil prices to $200 per barrel. And then, truly, half the world will come to Trump and start beating him over the head with sticks, because they will have no other choice, especially those who don't have their own oil.
“It's clear that Uncle Donald will sell out; it's a question of price.
“But Iran will hold out; the country is so independent of the rest of the world that only North Korea will be more resilient. Yes, Iran won't be able to reach its main enemy (not Israel), but it can easily destroy everything within reach with ballistic missiles manufactured underground and launched from underground. And in the end, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain—they will all come crawling back to beg Trump to calm down. Because what the US is spending on this war pales in comparison to what the Gulf countries are losing from the halted production and transportation of oil and gas.
"So, Iran is not alone in its war. He has so many allies, and they say Oman and Jordan are next... Everything will depend solely on the accuracy and destructive power of the IRGC missiles. And yesterday's US allies will start to back off and raise questions about closing US military bases.”
By Anton Mamedov, Russian military analyst, Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 11, 2026
“As for defense, Iran has changed its tactics. They’ve realized they can’t survive a symmetrical war with the US. So now we’re seeing a classic ‘death defense’: minefields at sea, thousands of drones, mobile missile teams constantly shifting positions. Their goal is to make US presence in the region as costly as possible. They won’t allow the Americans to safely [extract] its uranium. Every kilometer of advance will come at a very high price.”
By Dmitry Novikov, Associate Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestiya, March 3, 2026
“Meanwhile, the dynamics of domestic political support could become a critical constraint on American involvement in the military operation. Unlike the Vietnam and Iraq wars, where it took years for domestic circumstances to change course, the current situation is more dynamic. The ruling administration is already entering the election cycle, with important midterm congressional elections looming. A defeat in these elections would turn the current president into a lame duck and negate the revolutionary momentum of the first year of his second term.
“American voters’ attitudes toward wars in the Middle East are overwhelmingly negative. This is well characterized by polls on attitudes toward the 2003 Iraq campaign. According to them, Republican supporters (and Trump is concerned about them) still consider the war just (Saddam Hussein was a bad guy), but clearly excessive in terms of the scale of its presence and the cost. In other words, a show of force is possible and necessary, but only as long as it doesn’t result in serious material costs and losses.
“This makes support for a major military operation in the Middle East highly volatile, even among Trump’s nuclear-armed base. The first operation against Iran was viewed positively by his supporters, primarily due to its swiftness and lack of casualties. The United States demonstrated superior power and achieved a concrete result (a strike on nuclear program facilities, their declared destruction). Israel initiated the military action, and the immediate outcome of American intervention was the end of the conflict.
[…]
“Under these circumstances, by maintaining resistance and raising the economic and political costs of continuing the war for Washington, Tehran could emerge from this phase of the confrontation, if not as a winner, then certainly not as a loser.
“Moreover, if Iran seriously expects to maintain or even strengthen its regional position, it would be in its interests not to let the United States out of the conflict so easily. Prolonging the conflict, even in a more sluggish form, will present Washington with increasingly difficult practical challenges and will ultimately force it to decide: retreat, sealing a less than favorable outcome, or face the quagmire of a protracted military campaign.”
3.b. On Iran’s ability to counter the US military:
By Zhang Junshe, Non-Resident Fellow at the People's Liberation Army Naval Academic Research Institute, via The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group), March 5, 2026
“‘Iran possesses a certain anti-carrier capability. It is equipped with multiple anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles capable of striking maritime targets, as well as suicide drones. Iran has also launched some reconnaissance satellites, which, when combined with drones, can also be used to reconnoiter and locate US aircraft carriers,’ Zhang Junshe explained.
“‘In terms of anti-carrier warfare, ballistic missiles are one of the most effective weapons. Anti-ship ballistic missiles, with their high speed and strong penetration capabilities, are more difficult for aircraft carriers to defend against,’ Zhang Junshe said. ‘Actions against US aircraft carriers can also boost the morale of domestic resistance.’
“‘I also believe that Iran has a certain anti-carrier capability, but its anti-carrier warfare system is not perfect and its threat to the US military is relatively limited,’ Han Dong pointed out. ‘Especially in the absence of air superiority, US carrier-based aircraft and drones will continue to suppress Iran’s anti-ship missile forces to reduce the threat of Iranian missiles to US aircraft carriers, and the contest between the two sides will continue.’”
By Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, prominent Russian ultranationalist, former Russian FSB officer and commander of separatist forces in Ukraine, on Telegram, March 12, 2026
“In my opinion (I have already written about this to some correspondents) without significant military participation of China (in the form of ‘volunteers’ with a large number of air defense and anti-aircraft missiles) Iran has no chance of resisting the prevailing air forces of the US and Israel coalition.
“Even if we assume that the number of missiles in Israel will be insufficient for a long (30-60 days or more) campaign, and Iran’s missiles can more or less unhindered reach Israeli territory (while, of course, Israel will have enough anti-aircraft and air defense missiles to protect the most important military objects) — this will not in any way affect the readiness/ability of the Israeli Air Force to maintain a high pace of bombing.
“All the more Iran will not be able to neutralize the three US aircraft carrier groups, because its fleet is completely ‘knocked out’, and there is no air force as such. The missile weapons against the aircraft carrier groups are not effective enough at the distances at which the US Navy ships are located.
“Day after day, week after week, the ‘coalition’ will strike all available targets in Iranian territory until Iran is completely destabilized and plunged into total chaos. (And the death of even several hundred in Israel... and even many thousands — this will not prevent it in any way. On the contrary — it will give the ‘allies’ the ‘moral justification’ they need to kill tens (and then hundreds) of thousands of Persians.
“No matter how many missiles Iran has, it will not be able to destroy even just one Israel. It can cause damage — but nothing more. Whereas the Americans and Israelis will sooner or later achieve the complete disorganization of the Iranian air defense and then begin to methodically and massively destroy bridges, communications, life-support systems, etc., which after a while will cause mass starvation and epidemics in major Iranian cities (Gaza will seem like a ‘children’s morning show’ compared to what Iran could ‘collapse into’ after 2-3 months of continuous massive bombing).”
4. FORECASTS OF HOW THE WAR MIGHT END AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Summary of Key Insights:
Commentators believe the war is unlikely to result in regime change in Iran. The regime retains more than enough support and military capacity to suppress any domestic challenge to its rule. The US appears unable and unwilling to commit to a full-scale invasion needed to topple the government.
Some commentators further argue that while the conflict may yield short-term advantages for China and Russia, the broader destabilization of the international order it produces is unlikely to serve the long-term interests of any major power.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
4.a. On the likelihood of regime change in Iran:
By Anton Mamedov, Russian military analyst, Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 11, 2026
“Despite the colossal losses and destruction, Iran is confident that the West’s main goal has failed. Washington and Tel Aviv’s bet on a ‘super-harsh strike’ intended to provoke panic among the elite and popular uprising has failed. The death of the Supreme Leader, contrary to expectations, did not destroy the state, and the ‘martyrdom’ factor merely consolidated the population.
“Iran has demonstrated the vulnerability of the US’s extensive military infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. Retaliatory strikes against US facilities are already calling into question the Arab monarchies’ continued military cooperation with Washington. US partners are beginning to question the wisdom of paying for costly ‘defense’ that provokes, rather than deters, aggression.
“On the other hand, Iran’s economy has suffered devastating damage: energy and infrastructure facilities have been destroyed. Rebuilding them under sanctions will take decades, which promises enormous social pressure for the country’s new leadership.”
By Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University via Global Times, March 7, 2026
“However, without launching a ground invasion, it is extremely difficult for US and Israel to achieve their objective of toppling the Iranian regime.
“Whether the US becomes mired in a quagmire depends on American strategic decision-making and the degree of damage inflicted on the US by Iran’s counterattacks, said Liu, judging from White House Middle East policy and Trump’s personal style, there is a risk of getting bogged down, but it may not be particularly high.
“It is possible that, once it becomes clear regime change in Iran is unattainable and the cost becomes extremely unaffordable, the US will seek to end the conflict and declare victory.”
By Vladimir Fitin, advisor to the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1, 2026
“The combat readiness of the regime’s main force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), remains high, which guarantees the suppression of anti-government protests… To prevent this, the Americans will have to launch a ground operation, but it’s unlikely they’ll decide to do so. Perhaps some airborne sorties will occur. But the coffins that would inevitably start arriving in the US would be the worst possible gift to Trump ahead of the upcoming midterm congressional elections in November.”
4.b. On the long-term consequences for international order:
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 2
“The fundamental deterrents of international relations that have survived from previous eras are being dismantled. Recognition of the legitimacy of states is due to specific circumstances, and even the sympathies/antipathies of individual actors. This turns international relations into a likeness of Russian roulette. And knocks out the very base from under them. Not that everyone acted exclusively in accordance with the norms of law and morality (the latter is interpreted differently depending on the cultural tradition). But certain frames were present, now they are being removed.
“Since they went to this consistently and approached quite smoothly, many political elites do not seem to consider these events in such a dramatic way. They are considered, albeit a rather sharp, but generally an understandable manifestation of contradictions. However, not everyone thinks so. The conclusions that the opponents of the United States have the right to draw are begging.
“First of all, negotiating with the Americans makes almost no sense, the real question is either about surrender or imitation to prepare for a forceful decision.
“Secondly, the situation is quite plausible when there is nowhere to retreat and nothing to lose. And then any of the ‘last’ arguments is legitimate, the type of ‘red button’ that is available - literal or figurative.
“These conclusions persist, no matter what happens in Iran in the coming days. Even if there is an improved likeness of Venezuela with a backstage agreement on the transfer of power to some hands that suit everyone (the likelifess does not look high yet, but what can be ruled out now?), such social engineering will not calm other regimes that oppose the United States. The mechanism of change of control and putting under control is indicated, this is a much tougher option than even the “color revolutions” of the zero years, the opposition to it will strengthen and become more desperate. With consequences that become fatal under a certain scenario.”
By Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Valdai Discussion Club, March 10, 2026
“Iran is facing its most difficult situation in its history since the Islamic Revolution. The model the country has built over decades for open conflict with its adversaries is being severely tested. Recovering the potential lost as a result of the attacks will take years. There is no immediate resolution to the economic problems in sight. The blockade of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is also affecting Iran, as its oil supplies are also limited. The US naval blockade is unlikely to lift anytime soon, even if the intensity of the fighting subsides. Tehran is also at risk from the fact that it has entered into the conflict with the US and Israel virtually alone diplomatically. No other powers have made any firm commitments to defend the country. On the other hand, Iran has demonstrated its will to resist, and its society and political system have demonstrated the ability to consolidate in the face of an external threat. Although Iran possesses far fewer military and economic capabilities, it retains the potential to make the cost of the conflict even higher for its adversaries. For Iran, the war is much more existential in nature than for others. The first round of the military campaign against Iran once again reveals the old patterns of international relations: major players are less sensitive to crises, asymmetry of power is hardly an obstacle to resistance, a lack of allies is a problem, but as a junior partner, one can find oneself hostage to a major player's game. The most important question is how the current crisis will impact the transformation of the entire international system. Given its fragility, another jolt could transform the crumbling of the international structure into a full-blown collapse.”
"And then, truly, half the world will come to Trump and start beating him over the head with sticks, because they will have no other choice, especially those who don't have their own oil."
I found this a fun turn of phrase. Thank you for putting this together. I wonder what they think of the gulf states' lack of action to secure oil shipping despite possessing navies suitable for the task. Gulf Leadership in their 50s now would have seen the Iran-Iraq tanker wars as young boys.