Draw, Defeat, or Iranian Victory? How China and Russia Are Interpreting the US-Iran Islamabad Memorandum
While much attention has focused on US domestic and Western reactions to the Islamabad Memorandum (AKA the US-Iran Deal), this Situation Report examines how the negotiated end to the war is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from military strategists and political commentators in China and Russia. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are interpreting the war for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the conclusions the foreign commentators reached.
This Situation Report is broken into three parts:
On the War’s Outcomes
Consequences for the US and Iran
Consequences for the Middle East
Consequences for International Order
On the Prospect of Continued Negotiations Between the US and Iran
Lessons Learned
1. ON THE WAR’S OUTCOMES
Summary of Key Insights:
Chinese and Russian commentators are generally of the opinion that the US did not achieve its war aims but that the war nevertheless produced an outcome closer to a draw than an Iranian victory. Commentators believe Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, along with a greater tolerance for pain and sacrifice and growing domestic political constraints on US President Donald Trump, produced more favorable terms for Iran.
Views were more skeptical as to whether Iran could be considered a true “winner,” as the war severely devastated the country. Iran is widely expected to continue to leverage control over the Strait of Hormuz to deter future US attacks and to exert influence on the world stage, but its diminished military and economy have imposed significant limitations on its options for wielding power.
Israel is widely viewed as a major loser of the conflict, with its war aims ultimately unfulfilled and its relationship with the US increasingly—potentially irrevocably—strained. The Gulf States are also expected to review their geopolitical interests and their relationship with the US and Israel in the wake of the war.
Several commentators surprisingly gave President Trump credit for quickly recognizing the war could not be won and accepting an unfavorable deal over doubling down on a costly intractable conflict.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
1.a. Outcomes for the US and Iran
Fan Hongda, Director of China-Middle East Studies at Shaoxing University, The Paper, June 16, 2026.
Both the US and Iran claim to have the upper hand on the battlefield, but this advantage cannot be translated into victory. For the US, Trump has been looking for an opportunity to gracefully withdraw from this war. For Iran, although it has withstood the military pressure from the US and Israel, it is also unable to force the US to accept its conditions due to its own limitations.
Wang Jin, Associate Professor, and the Assistant Director, Institute of Middle East Studies, Northwest University of China, The Paper, June 16, 2026.
The main gains for the US include the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s return to the nuclear negotiation track, and the strategic buffer space provided by the de-escalation of the Middle East situation, which helps alleviate energy price fluctuations and domestic political and economic pressures. Iran, on the other hand, gained more direct benefits, including the fact that the US no longer effectively considers regime change as a negotiating objective, the potential lifting of some sanctions, the resumption of oil exports, and the possibility of the gradual unfreezing of frozen assets, while also retaining a certain degree of nuclear capability.
Judging from the outcome of the negotiations, the United States made significant concessions in lifting sanctions and demonstrating goodwill, while Iran responded on issues such as the disposal of highly enriched uranium and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, both sides were able to declare victory to their domestic audiences.
Yaroslav Mirsky, Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 13, 2026.
Beneath the propaganda veneer, the results of the Iranian campaign are soberly reckonable. Tehran has achieved things that seemed politically unattainable just a year ago. The US is ready to discuss a phased lifting of sanctions without requiring the prior dismantling of all nuclear infrastructure. The missile program and support for allied forces have been removed from the agenda for the first phase. The future agreement is expected to be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.
This latter is not a whim. Tehran remembers the history of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear deal, as a systemic lesson in the unreliability of bilateral agreements with Washington. The JCPOA was an executive agreement, not ratified by the Senate as a treaty, and that is precisely why the next president tore it up with the stroke of a pen. The Iranians' insistence on a Security Council resolution is an attempt to insert an institutional fuse where bilateral guarantees once proved to be mere paper. From a technical standpoint, this is sound.
But where Iran's public victory appears certain, the real balance is far more complex. The issue of uranium enrichment, key for Tehran, has officially been postponed until the second stage, and the divergence between the narratives here is at its greatest. Trump says "no enrichment." Tehran says "the right to enrichment is recognized." The parties have apparently agreed to debate this later, calling the current silence on this point an agreement. The fate of the accumulated highly enriched uranium, the enhanced IAEA inspection regime, the timing and scope of sanctions relief are the subjects of the next round, which promises to be no easier than the last.
The figure of 300 billion Russian resources has been renamed "reparations." In reality, according to negotiators, the discussion is about an international investment fund for post-war reconstruction. The precise nature of this fund (who pays, how much, and when) has yet to be agreed upon. Calling it "reparations" is tantamount to considering a clause that hasn't yet been written the final word on the deal. Iranian sources themselves admitted that not all mediators confirmed this exact 300 billion figure.
There's also the question of cost. The military campaign has left so much destruction on Iranian territory that it alone is a reason to negotiate, not to achieve an unconditional victory. Nuclear and missile facilities, the energy sector, and the sanctions-crunched economy all require restoration, and restoration now depends on the stability of the world. The blockade of Hormuz, the main trump card of Iran's tactics, has come at a cost not only to its opponents. Insurance premiums, disrupted export flows, and pressure on an already shaky economy—Tehran has also been charged.
Iran has won the right to sit at the table on its own terms. That's significant. But sitting at the table and rising from it as a winner are two different things, and mixing them is convenient precisely for those who sell simple recipes.
Fyodor Lukyanov, Professor and researcher at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.
The so-called “deal” between the US and Iran, announced by Trump and later confirmed by Tehran, is a typical product of the current political and diplomatic culture. Lots of big words, both sides proclaiming their grand victory, but almost no concrete details, instead promising to implement the agreement at the next stage. The immediate result is the restoration of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of which was precisely the result of the US and Israeli attack on Iran. In other words, after another costly round of military destruction and corresponding casualties, we’ve ended up back where we started.
[…]
President Trump’s goal was to extricate himself from this unpleasant and hopeless conflict, and the announced “grand bargain” appears to allow him to do so. Frankly, there’s no reason to expect its terms to be fulfilled: Iran has no intention of relinquishing its nuclear program (whatever that means), and the United States will bend over backwards to hold on to Iranian money and lift the bulk of sanctions against Tehran. So, there’s still plenty of room for bargaining. The risk of a new war between Iran and the United States remains, of course, and it’s palpable. But it seems everyone already understands that its outcome will be the same as the current one.
Farhad Ibrahimov, Professor of Political Science at RUDN University, Kommersant, June 18, 2026.
On the surface, the document appears to be a diplomatic victory. In essence, however, it leaves open all the key questions: who controls the nuclear program, when and how sanctions will be lifted, who pays for Iran’s reconstruction, what Israel will do next, and how long the US is willing to honor its own commitments.
The victory of the “doves” in Trump’s entourage, tentatively associated with his Vice President J.D. Vance, may prove temporary. Now they need to sell the memorandum as a show of strength through a deal: America, they say, has secured the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, stopped the war, and retained control of the nuclear issue. But the “hawks,” led by National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, haven’t disappeared. They will closely monitor Iran’s every move and exploit any delay, any ambiguity, any dispute with the IAEA as proof that Tehran is once again buying time.
Therein lies the weakness of the current memorandum. It promises too much too quickly, yet fails to answer the fundamental question: why should this time be any different than in 2015–2018? The answer is still unanswered. This is precisely why it is premature to talk of an Iranian victory or a US capitulation. Rather, we are talking about a fragile deal, in which both the US and Israel are already preparing their own versions of a future breakdown. Tehran will argue that it has secured recognition and the lifting of pressure. Washington will argue that it forced Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and curb its nuclear ambitions. Israel, for its part, will argue that no paperwork can negate the threat. And the next American president may well decide once again that someone else’s signature doesn’t bind him to anything.
Evgeny Shestakov, Journalist, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.
The contents of the memorandum are clear: Iran won the conflict with the United States. While the Americans pledged in the document to do much in the interests of the Islamic Republic, Tehran's reciprocal promises are extremely vague. Without inflicting significant damage directly on America during the war (the official death toll of 13 American citizens is acknowledged), the Iranians, through strikes on civilian and military targets of their "pro-American" neighbors in the Persian Gulf, forced them to exert the necessary pressure on Washington. And by closing the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran made it clear to other American allies that the war unleashed by the United States and Israel would be costly. This was enough to force the White House to stop self-deprecating, declaring victory every day, and to begin searching for realistic ways to end the conflict with minimal costs. But the Islamic Republic refused to allow Trump to do so, and the current memorandum is proof of that.
[…]
The memorandum's full provisions will never be implemented—those who drafted it clearly understood this. The document represents a set of wishes, primarily Iranian, which the White House took into account. The deal with the Islamic Republic cemented a reality that is offensive to America: it is impossible to change Iran through military force. It is easier to negotiate with them. And if Tel Aviv is dissatisfied with the deal, that's not America's problem. Trump, by all appearances, has no intention of further bowing to the "little partner," as the US president recently called Israel. At least not as long as the Jewish state is governed by the "ungrateful" and intractable Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has cleverly drawn the head of the White House into direct conflict with the Islamic Republic.
Oleg Barabanov, Professor at MGIMO University, Program Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Valdai Discussion Club, June 19, 2026.
Ultimately, in our view, Trump certainly didn’t win. But it’s also impossible to say he lost, by and large. Iran stood out, but nothing more. And if we’re going to use sports or football terms for the war, it’s probably neither a defeat nor a victory. It’s more likely a draw. This often happens in sports. It also happens in military conflicts. For example, the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s was essentially a draw. Each side remained in virtually the same position as before the conflict, without achieving any of their respective military objectives. True, it took eight years of bloody war for both sides to reach this point. Trump, however, realized this much more quickly. He started his war, it quickly became clear that victory was impossible, and then Trump just as quickly (very quickly by the standards of military conflicts) agreed to a draw. Clearly, from a media perspective, admitting that it’s ultimately a draw is impossible for Trump, and so it’s only natural that he proclaims everywhere that this is a great victory, that all goals have been achieved. It couldn't be otherwise in the media-saturated space of modern politics. This has happened in other conflicts, too, and could very well continue in the future. So, there’s nothing new here. What’s more interesting is something else. Trump has demonstrated, not just in words but in deeds, an understanding that a draw is better than an endless war, under conditions where victory has proven impossible, providing a rather rare example in world politics. Some might say that such a draw is a victory. A victory over oneself, which is perhaps the most difficult thing.
Boris Dolgov, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 18, 2026.
The main reason the US President signed the memorandum was the dashed hope of a blitzkrieg and a swift victory over Iran. The United States intended, at a minimum, to overthrow the current government, and at a maximum, to destroy Iranian statehood. But they failed. Iran not only withstood American attacks, which continued even during negotiations, but also retaliated against Israel and all thirteen US military bases in the region. Some of them were damaged beyond repair. These painful blows, and the generally protracted conflict, forced Trump to first resume bilateral contacts and then negotiate and conclude a painful agreement.
[…]
Instead of an American triumph, society witnessed a protracted war and rising fuel prices. In the run-up to the midterm congressional elections, the American opposition is taking advantage of all this. This is the second factor that forced Trump to sign the memorandum.
[…]
International oversight of the Iranian nuclear program will be discussed. In my opinion, Iran will agree to it. Despite the regime’s resilience, its military and political capabilities are limited.
Gevorg Mirzayan, Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Science’s US and Canadian Studies Institute, Business Newspaper Vzglyad, June 17, 2026.
Yet, none of the key US goals in this war were achieved, including regime change in Iran. On the contrary, the people rallied around the government as a result of American aggression.
The Islamic Republic’s situation on the eve of the war was extremely difficult. Having lost the war in Syria, failed to protect Hezbollah and the Houthis from a decapitating US-Israeli strike, and living in a permanent and increasingly severe economic crisis that had already erupted into large-scale protests, Tehran could easily experience an internal revolution or a government transformation favorable to the US within six months to a year. The country’s elites were divided, and everyone expected a power struggle following the departure of the gravely ill Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Now the situation has changed dramatically. After the Americans and Israelis assassinated the Grand Ayatollah and several other leaders, new elites have come to power. They are far more radical and decisive.
Moreover, Iran, which until recently viewed the lifting of sanctions as one of the few opportunities to save the national economy, has now received an alternative way to replenish its budget by charging fees for tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz. And the deal with the Americans effectively legitimizes this right—even if it appears to be “providing services for guiding and escorting vessels.”
Trump’s logic, in turn, is also understandable. The US president, having become embroiled in the Iranian adventure, found himself in a difficult position. He couldn’t finish off Iran, as that would require a dramatic increase in firepower in the Persian Gulf and a full-scale ground invasion. The US currently lacks both the resources (much of which was spent on Ukraine) and the political will to undertake such a mission.
But he couldn’t simply turn around and leave without an agreement, as that would have catastrophic consequences. Not only for Trump (who could lose the midterm elections), but also for the United States. A US attempt to simply flee the ongoing war would be perceived as a sign of America’s weakening and decrepitude, which would immediately embolden its other political adversaries and lead to the abandonment of its last remaining allies—in East Asia, for example.
So Trump took the damage-cutting approach, opting to strike a deal.
Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, International Affairs, June 15, 2026.
The war, which took place in two phases in 2025 and 2026, inevitably depleted Iran’s economic potential with its destruction and casualties, exacerbating the financial, economic, and social crisis that had been widening and deepening in Iran for many years. It also caused critical damage to Iran’s trade, economic, and financial ties with countries in the region and around the world, as well as to the export and import of oil and other vital goods, and dealt a blow to the Iranian budget.
The US-initiated war devastated Iranians’ living standards, pushing approximately 40% of the country’s 90 million population below the poverty line, creating a dire social situation for the ruling regime. Combined with sanctions, it caused losses of $30-80 million per day, disrupted Iran’s long-established system of governance, and claimed the lives of more than 70 prominent political and military figures, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Equally important, the war undermined Iran’s vital relations with the Persian Gulf monarchies.
In a live televised address on June 10, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian perhaps aptly summarized the article’s comments on the war’s aftermath: “We are currently under sanctions, and our routes are blocked. We face a difficult challenge.... Governing the country is no easy task under the current circumstances, given the shortages we face, the unrest we have experienced, and the problems that remain.”
Finally, the war has politically raised the question of the future and possible transformation of the current Islamic regime. The country’s current leadership understands this perfectly well. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran desperately needs agreements with the United States. These agreements can ensure not only peace but also the lifting of sanctions, numerous Western restrictions, and reprisals imposed on Iran, in order to establish the necessary flow of investment and high technology into the stagnating economy.
1.b. Outcomes for the Middle East
Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.
Relatedly, other powers in the Middle East will also make adjustments. For example, the Gulf states, innocently caught in the crossfire, will inevitably rethink their security and geoeconomic strategies after the war, and will reconsider their relationship with Iran. A certain degree of détente, at least technically, between the Arab world, especially the Gulf states, and Iran is to be expected.
From an economic perspective, the ceasefire between the US and Iran is clearly a positive development, allowing for a significant recovery in Gulf oil exports. Due to the war, the Gulf region had effectively become a bottleneck in the global economy over the past two to three months. Unblocking this bottleneck will benefit the global economic cycle.
Gleb Ignatiev, lecturer at the Department of Politics and Management at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestia, June 18, 2026.
On the evening of June 17, Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the first part of the peace agreement. Washington received the most important thing: Tehran’s renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a promise of honor and guarantees. Israel received nothing but a commitment to cease fire in Lebanon or risk severing the entire deal.
Trump understands that Netanyahu’s belligerent sentiments could undo his greatest diplomatic triumph. And so the US president has placed his bets on distancing himself from Israel. At the G7 summit, Trump demonstratively demoted Israel from a “major ally” to a “minor partner.” This isn’t just a personal grudge against Netanyahu’s criticism. It’s a cold calculation: if Israel and Lebanon start shooting again, the deal between Washington and Tehran must not be undermined.
It seems Trump has satisfied his appetite for war and wants to return to his image as a great peacemaker. However, the main obstacle to his “ideal Middle East” has unexpectedly turned out to be not Mojtaba Khamenei, but Benjamin Netanyahu. Because of this clash of interests, their relationship is once again heading for the abyss.
Dmitry Trenin, President of the Russian International Affairs Council, Russian International Affairs Council, June 18, 2026.
Trump’s recent anger directed at Netanyahu reflects something much more important: A significant part of American society and the political class are losing patience with Israel and cooling toward it. This comes against the backdrop of Israel’s growing international isolation.
Indeed, Israel is the main loser from the war. Its new strategy of forcefully eliminating threats along all seven fronts, from Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and above all, Iran, promises ‘forever wars’ rather than stability and security. Its unstated nuclear deterrence has failed to prevent Iran from lobbing missiles and drones at Israeli targets. In the foreseeable future, Israel faces an election in which dissatisfaction with Netanyahu will run against wide support for his radical policies.
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have not fared well either. Their reliance on US military bases as a security guarantee turned out to be a disastrous bargain. Instead of protecting the host countries, these bases acted like magnets, attracting Iranian retaliatory strikes. The image of the Gulf nations as safe and comfortable places to do business has taken a big hit. If these nations are to recover, they will need to come up with a better security policy than aligning themselves with their failed protector.
1.c. Outcomes for International Order
Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.
The most positive outcome of the memorandum reached between the US and Iran, and perhaps the most visible and perceptible result for the international community and even ordinary people, is the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The restoration of passage through the strait to some extent is already expected, and this is a very positive development.
However, the memorandum’s effectiveness is limited in other aspects. For example, while it calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, a complete and thorough ceasefire in Lebanon is not easy to achieve. In the long run, it’s uncertain whether the US and Iran will never fight again. The nuclear issue has also not been truly resolved.
The fact that the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding this time, rather than the more common agreement, suggests that both sides have given this consideration. Agreements are usually more binding and subject to stricter enforcement. A memorandum of understanding, on the other hand, only represents a certain degree of intent and possibility. It may not require particularly strict enforcement, nor does it imply a strong obligation for either side to fulfill or fully honor its terms.
The decision by both sides to sign a memorandum also carries a sense of caution and conservatism. For the US and Iran, two countries with deep-seated conflicts and fresh from a major war, reaching a binding agreement at this stage is quite difficult.
[…]
Of course, two uncertainties need to be considered during this process. The first is the speed of global economic recovery. According to current assessments, the Strait of Hormuz may take longer than expected to return to normal. Considering the backlog of ships and the mine clearance work during this period, resuming navigation may take more than a month or even longer, requiring a more comprehensive response from the international community.
Secondly, the sustainability of this recovery is now in doubt. Because US-Iran relations remain unstable, and Trump has threatened to resume military action against Iran if a final agreement cannot be reached in the next phase, it is uncertain how long the peace in the Strait of Hormuz can be maintained, or whether fighting will re-emerge in the Persian Gulf region periodically. This will create long-term uncertainty for the global economic recovery.
Dmitry Trenin, President of the Russian International Affairs Council, Russian International Affairs Council, June 18, 2026.
In the short term, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of the US naval blockade of Iran will ease the energy situation on the global market. Yet in the long term, the case of Hormuz has sent a ringing message that in the age of world order transition, all maritime chokepoints are potentially vulnerable to hostile action. Iranian leaders have learned that their ability to close the strait, and the US unwillingness to risk losses in trying to reopen it, Washington’s Achilles’ heel, could be a more powerful deterrent for Tehran than a nuclear-weapons capability. Meanwhile, Tehran intends to regulate traffic through the waterway together with Oman.
As for the nuclear program, Tehran will definitely continue it under any future comprehensive agreement with Washington, if an agreement is indeed reached. A failure to agree would leave Tehran free to pursue the program as before because the Iranians won’t surrender their nuclear materials to anyone. Regarding nuclear deterrence, however, the lessons from the recent war are mixed. On the one hand, America and Israel would probably not have attacked a nuclear-armed Iran. Look at North Korea. On the other hand, a nuclear-armed Israel, even under Iranian ballistic missile strikes, did not use nuclear weapons against Iran. Neither did the US. The option was reportedly discussed, but rejected. Thus, for Iran, being able to close Hormuz may be more effective.
2. ON THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN
Summary of Key Insights:
Commentators are skeptical that an agreement will be reached in 60 days to resolve outstanding issues outlined in the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, such as Iran’s nuclear program, the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and sanctions relief. There is a view that both sides understood these issues would not be fully fixed in 60 days and the negotiating period is essentially being used to freeze the conflict as neither side appears interested in a resumption of all out war. All commentators view Israel as a potential spoiler to continued negotiations.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
Niu Xinchun, Dean of the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.
Currently, almost all the difficult issues between the US and Iran have been left for future negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz needs to be reopened within the next 60 days, but how to do so remains a major technical problem. Regarding the lifting of US economic sanctions against Iran, particularly the unfreezing of Iranian funds and how to handle the Iranian nuclear issue, no concrete agreements have been reached, and these all require negotiations within the next 60 days.
It is predictable that the possibility of reaching an agreement in the next 60 days is very small. It is highly likely that no agreement will be reached in the next 60 days, and these issues will be postponed, with the ceasefire being extended again.
That’s how things are in the Middle East; many temporary issues eventually become long-term. The same applies to the US-Iran issue. The nuclear issue and economic sanctions are decades-old problems, and the chances of them being resolved in the next 60 days are extremely slim.
Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.
I think it will be quite difficult to achieve any substantial results in 60 days of negotiations. First of all, the core issue to be resolved in this phase of negotiations is actually the nuclear issue, which has been a source of contention between the US and Iran for many years. For example, how to dispose of and dilute nuclear materials, how to deal with Iranian nuclear facilities and whether or not to dismantle them, whether and to what extent Iran’s nuclear activities should be restricted—these are all difficult issues to resolve. At the same time, these issues are also closely linked to the lifting of sanctions, so the complexity of this negotiation is self-evident.
The negotiations also face some highly complex technical issues. For example, Iran’s nuclear materials are mainly believed to be buried under the collapsed nuclear facilities. How to retrieve these materials—this seemingly small issue—may be a technically challenging problem. I think the US and Iran will continue to engage in very intense competition.
In addition to the inherent difficulty of negotiating the nuclear issue, the negotiations also face many disruptive factors, such as the Israeli factor we just mentioned, which Israel will certainly try to undermine the subsequent negotiations between the US and Iran.
In addition to the subsequent negotiations themselves, the implementation of the memorandum is also subject to change. Problems arising during implementation could affect the progress of subsequent negotiations between the two parties.
Fan Hongda, Director of China-Middle East Studies at Shaoxing University, The Paper, June 16, 2026.
Whether the US and Iran can maintain peace in the future depends on whether they can make some tangible progress in the early stages of negotiations. This would allow them to extend the negotiations even if they cannot complete them within the 60-day period […] given the severe lack of mutual trust between the US and Iran, both sides can only adopt a wait-and-see approach to ensure they retain room for policy adjustments.
Oleg Akulinichev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian-Iranian Business Council under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Kommersant, June 15, 2026.
The weak point is Tehran’s nuclear program. Its fate is being sidelined, reserved for a 60-day period of “further negotiations.” Iran has already stockpiled over 400 kg of weapons-grade uranium. Trump, meanwhile, withdrew from Obama’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal and is now forced to renegotiate. Republican hawks have already warned that any nuclear agreement will be voted on in Congress. This means Trump risks either being accused of softness or the agreement collapsing just before the November midterm elections.
The second ticking time bomb is Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister Katz have already made it clear that the Israeli army will remain in the “safe zones” in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza indefinitely. “If Iran attacks because of events in Lebanon, we will attack them with all our might,” Mr. Katz declared. Iran, however, has included a complete ceasefire in Lebanon among its key conditions. Lebanon, therefore, is turning into a powder keg that could explode regardless of the “grand deal.”
3. LESSONS LEARNED
Summary of Key Insights:
While commentators note the value of leveraging asymmetric advantages, controlling geopolitical chokepoints, and instituting resilient command and control mechanisms, there is skepticism—particularly among Russian analysts—that broad lessons can be learned from Iran’s resistance to the US. They note that Iran survived by accepting significant sacrifices to its military and economy, and pursuing a strategy of regional retaliation that is unavailable to nuclear powers due to risk of catastrophic escalation.
Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:
Yaroslav Mirsky, Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 13, 2026.
Iran has won the right to sit at the table on its own terms. That’s significant. But sitting at the table and rising from it as a winner are two different things, and mixing them is convenient precisely for those who sell simple recipes.
Why doesn’t this recipe carry over?
Here colleagues usually intervene and explain: Russia can do the same, only on a larger scale.
“The West fears escalation more than actual conflict,” writes one such author. “It’s enough to act firmly and consistently, and Washington will come running to the table.”
Withdraw from all formats of dialogue with NATO, deploy medium-range missiles in Kaliningrad and on the Finnish border, and launch systematic cyberattacks on European infrastructure. Iran has demonstrated this.
One would like to believe it. But the argument falls apart at the very first substantive question: under what conditions did Iranian tactics work, and are they replicable for Russia?
Iran escalated in a strictly regional theater. Its main lever created a threat that was sensitive to the global economy, but did not require Washington to make an immediate existential choice. Imagine escalation as a ladder. Between “closing the strait” and “starting a nuclear war,” Iran has flight after flight, so long that diplomacy has time to work on each rung. This headroom was the basis of Iran’s strategy of coercive bargaining: demonstrating a willingness to step up, without actually doing so until the enemy feels that continuing is too costly.
Russia has a shorter ladder. A nuclear power, bordering NATO, a permanent seat on the Security Council, several active arms control treaties. Any of the proposed measures, from the “Oreshniki” project near the Finnish border to cyberattacks on the EU power grid, steps not to the bottom rung, but straight to the top, right up to the ceiling: a direct confrontation between nuclear powers. Where Tehran kept its distance until the top, Moscow stands almost right there.
And what’s more, it has already partially approached this threshold. The moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been declared invalid, the “Oreshnik” project is in serial production, and a readiness to deploy it in Belarus has been declared. The recipe for “unilaterally lifting the moratorium” is overdue: it has been implemented. Moscow has largely traveled the path presented as a revelation.
The idea of a “Resistance Bloc” (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, with coordination across all theaters) demonstrates how easily an analytical impulse can devolve into geopolitical fantasy. China doesn’t build formal military alliances; this is a feature of its strategic culture, not a temporary posture. Beijing watches the Iranian bargaining with interest and without any desire to become complicit. A formalized bloc would give Washington exactly what it seeks: a coherent image of the enemy, justifying the maximum mobilization of its allies. Tehran understands this, which is why, despite all the rhetoric of an “axis of resistance,” it has always avoided formal military commitments that would automatically raise the bar for a retaliatory strike.What the Iranian experience really says
Strip the propaganda out of the "Iran lesson," and a few observations remain. They're not as striking as the "toughness works" formula, but they're useful.
Asymmetric pressure works when it inflicts increasing damage on an adversary and leaves them with no easy way out. Hormuz was the perfect lever because it didn't just hit the US: through the global oil market, it also affected its allies and neutral observers. Such multifaceted pressure is incomparable to pressure on a single country or bloc.
Mediators aren't window dressing. They underpin the entire mechanism: Pakistan provided the platform for the April ceasefire, Qatar maintained the financial channel and direct negotiations on the June memorandum. Without them, the transition from direct confrontation to bargaining would have been much more difficult. Tehran, despite all the rhetoric of "resistance," invested heavily in these channels. And a demonstrative break with all mediators deprives them of their existence precisely when they're needed most.
Institutional consolidation is more important than the beauty of a public image. Tehran clings to the Security Council resolution for a purely practical reason: a document signed by all five permanent members is far more difficult to tear up alone than a "political agreement" within the gap between administrations. The lesson of the JCPOA has been firmly learned.
And most importantly, Iran's tactics worked because they were based on a long-term strategy with clear priorities. For twenty years, Tehran sought three things: recognition of its right to enrichment, the lifting of sanctions, and the preservation of its regional position. Every specific step—blocking the Strait, accelerating the nuclear program—was subordinated to these goals, not to the independent logic of escalation. Raising the stakes is possible without a strategy. But without one, they rise blindly, and excitement can easily be mistaken for calculation.
Fyodor Lukyanov, Professor and researcher at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.
The combined military potential of the United States and Israel (and one could also add the capabilities of the Persian Gulf states) is incomparably greater than Iran’s. However, this advantage prevented a quick and clear victory. Tehran’s retaliatory measures were combined—pressure on military installations, strikes on logistical and infrastructure targets, and the use of Iran-friendly forces and groups in the region. The latter, contrary to expectations, remained operational, although weakened by Israel’s targeted campaign over the previous two years.
Finally, blocking the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, something Iran had never resorted to before, proved to be a very effective tool that was difficult to counter.
Secondly, a key factor in military success is internal resilience, as Iran has demonstrated. The destruction of a significant portion of the country’s military and political leadership at the very outset of the campaign did not have a knockout effect. In fact, judging by several indicators, it even contributed to the moral and political mobilization of the ruling class and the unification of a society that had been divided even earlier in the year. The damage Iran is willing to bear is clearly greater than what the US and its regional allies are willing to tolerate, and this is also a factor in resilience. Clearly, the Islamic Republic has suffered significantly, and recovery will require a long and costly process. But the foundations for this recovery remain intact and have even strengthened, given the emergence of the additional factor of servitude for passage through the Strait.
Third, the overall balance of power and influence in the region. Before the war, there was growing confidence that Iran’s position was weakening due to the crisis within the country and the erosion of the “axis of resistance” under the attacks of its enemies. This confidence became one of the motives for the military action, conceived by the US and Israel as the final blow to destroy the regime and resolve the “Iranian question.” This calculation failed, and now there is reason to talk about the restoration of Iran’s geopolitical capabilities. On the one hand, relations between Iran and the Gulf monarchies have become strained due to the strikes on their targets; the monarchies are certainly harboring a desire for revenge. On the other hand, if Iran withstood the combined punitive action of the two main military powers in this part of the world, and they failed to achieve their goals, the arsenal of the Persian Gulf countries will be even more insufficient for a conflict with Iran. Therefore, the idea of finding a security compromise with Iran, which has been on and off in recent years, is once again relevant.
“Max Vector” Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 20, 2026.
Even assuming Iran won outright, it still doesn't follow that "Russia should do the same," because the two countries are playing different games, with different pieces, at different stages. There are at least three seams along which direct transference is disrupted.
The first seam is nuclear, and it works in reverse. The entire Iranian bargaining was built around the threat of acquiring a bomb. This was an asset precisely because the bomb didn't yet exist: it could be promised, it could be used as a threat, it could be traded away, which is what Iran ultimately did. Russia already has a nuclear arsenal, and it's comparable to the US in terms of warheads. There's nothing to trade away, in the Iranian sense. But the escalation ladder is structured differently. What looks like a demonstration of resolve to a non-nuclear Tehran turns out to be a step closer to the threshold for a nuclear power. And here, the logic of "hit harder" rests not on courage, but on risk, which Iran structurally lacked. Comparing the courage of two players when one has the nuclear button at their fingertips and the other doesn't is to miss the button.
And now about the adversary. For Washington, Iran is an important, but peripheral, theater. The US can retreat here without losing anything existential: postpone, replay, or trade elsewhere. This is precisely why Trump is retreating—not out of weakness, but out of cold calculation, because the costs of escalation now outweigh the benefits for him. The Ukrainian track is not peripheral for Russia. The goal here is not to "force an overseas arbiter to make a deal and part ways," but to change the very status of a neighboring state. What for the US is long-range bargaining, for Russia is a change in the very type of war. And its adversary is not a player with limited stakes overseas, but a neighboring country with all-out stakes and a Western coalition behind it. The logic of pinpointing the opponent's pain point simply doesn't apply here.
The third difference is the phase. The Iranian war was a short and furious exchange of blows, quickly culminating in a negotiated settlement. The Russian special operation is in its fifth year and has long since become a form of positional attrition. The "take a decisive risk and negotiate" formula tacitly assumes there's an exit strategy: strike, set a price, and then sit down. In a war of attrition, there's no such strategy. Escalation doesn't hasten the end; it raises the stakes without any guarantee of a resolution, as Lebanon clearly demonstrates, where Hezbollah isn't party to the agreement, Israel refuses to withdraw its troops, fighting is escalating, and the entire memorandum could fall apart before its allotted sixty days. This is what "agree and part ways" looks like in practice.
The idea of responding to tanks with a strike on the petrochemical plant of the enemy capital deserves special mention. In the Iranian context, this would be seen as pressing a specific sore point. In Russia, this would mean opening a new front against the nuclear coalition, that is, switching to a different game with an unpredictable outcome. One could call this decisiveness. Strategy is more complex.
This briefing was compiled by Dan White. For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com