This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between June 20, 2026 and June 27, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: US pilot reported encountering unusual Iranian drone formation prior to being shot down; Iran denied suggestions it will allow inspections to resume at its damaged nuclear sites and ruled out constraints on its ballistic missiles; Iran and the US engaged in three days of tit-for-tat attacks over continued Iranian threats to shipping.

2. Russian authorities in Crimea declared a state of emergency in response to deteriorating economic conditions on the peninsula amid Ukrainian strikes on critical infrastructure and supply routes.

3. The Prime Minister of South Ossetia (a breakaway province of the Republic of Georgia) resigned and joined the Kremlin as an advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, a move that may foreshadow a coming annexation of the territory by Russia.

4. A top Chinese Justice Ministry official highlighted plans to use powers in the soon to be enacted “ethnic unity law” to target human rights critics abroad.

5. New reporting highlighted significant developments in China’s strategic missile arsenal.

6. North Korea conducted tests of upgraded rocket and artillery systems.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

US Pilot Reports Encounter with Unusual Iranian Drone Technology

On June 23, CNN issued an investigative report stating that the pilot of a US F-15 fighter shot down by Iranian forces encountered an unusual interconnected “minefield” of Iranian drones prior to being downed. The report characterized the drone formation as appearing like a jellyfish, with drones moving in unison.

Iran Denies Allowing Return of IAEA Inspectors

This week, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued numerous denials that it would allow specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to return to the country to inspect damaged nuclear sites. The denials followed previous statements by both the US Vice President JD Vance and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi that inspectors would be given access to Iranian sites as part of any war-ending deal.

Iranian President Rules Out Talks Over Ballistic Missiles

On June 23, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that Iran will never engage in any negotiations over its ballistic missile program.

Iran Hopes to Make Billions from Hormuz Administration

A June 25 report by the Wall Street Journal suggests that Iran believes its plan to extract fees from “administering” the Strait of Hormuz could yield up to $40B in annual revenue.

US and Iran Again Trade Blows Over Hormuz Control

On June 25, Iranian forces struck the Singapore-flagged cargo vessel Ever Lovely, exiting the Strait of Hormuz along the Omani coast. The US launched retaliatory strikes on June 26, with US Central Command (CENTCOM) reporting strikes on Iranian missile and drone storage locations and coastal radar sites.

Bahrain was subsequently targeted by a wave of Iranian drones on June 26, seemingly in response to US strikes.

On June 27, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Centre reported a second vessel struck by an unknown projectile near the Strait of Hormuz, this time the Panamanian-flagged tanker Kiku. The US responded with a second, broader wave of strikes targeting Iranian air defenses and coastal military sites. Iranian forces then responded with additional strikes against US bases and other targets in Kuwait and Bahrain.

US strikes on Iranian coastal military targets on June 27. Source: US Central Command

Takeaways:

1. While Iran’s drone technology is remarkably advanced and effective, reports of its use of jellyfish-shaped, airborne minefields of drones should be treated with skepticism. The CNN report suggested the pilot’s recall of the event could have been compromised by a concussion received after being shot down.

2. The resumption of Iranian attacks on shipping near the Strait of Hormuz appears to have been prompted by an increase in ships following alternatives to routes authorized by Iran’s so-called “Persian Gulf Strait Authority.” Iran likely is using the attacks to ensure it retains coercive control over the Strait throughout negotiations in order to extract maximum concessions from the US. It also wants to normalize an enduring threat of violence to shipping in order to pressure governments and companies into cutting protection deals in order to squeeze as much of its reported goal of $40B in “service fees” for safe passage as possible in the future.

3. Confusion about the safety of passage through the Strait of Hormuz persists in large part because of ambiguity in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the US and Iran. The MOU specified the following terms for the Strait:

   “Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialog with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”

   Despite claims of the Trump Administration to the contrary, these terms largely defer authority over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to Iran in perpetuity.

4. Nuclear inspections and ballistic missiles are two red lines that will continue to complicate negotiations. While the Trump administration has suggested it will not pressure Iran on its missile program, US allies including the Gulf States and Israel are reportedly pressuring the administration to take a harder line. Iran may ultimately concede on inspections of its damaged nuclear sites, but such concessions are likely to come late in negotiations and in exchange for significant US compromises. Any agreement is likely to be subject to strict Iranian stipulations, and limited to well-known historic sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, rather than any blanket authority to inspect new sites like Pickaxe Mountain.

2. RUSSIA DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY IN CRIMEA

On June 26, Sergey Aksyonov, the Russian-installed “prime minister” of Crimea declared a state of emergency for the peninsula over deteriorating economic conditions caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on critical infrastructure and supply chains. The state of emergency allows the authorities to control the dwindling fuel supply. The announcement came as government traffic reporting showed a five-hour wait to leave the peninsula over the Kerch bridge.

Miles-long traffic jam of vehicles leaving Crimea at the approach to the Kerch Bridge. Source: Astra on Telegram

Takeaways:

Ukrainian long-range strikes on Crimea’s critical infrastructure, now amounting to as many as 100 per day, combined with a broader campaign of special forces raids and “middle-strike” drone attacks on ferry, train, and road routes supplying Crimea, have effectively imposed a distant blockade on the peninsula starving it of fuel, power, military equipment. The blockade has effectively turned the peninsula into a large wasting asset for the Kremlin which is absorbing precious military resources to keep supplied and defended.

Ukrainian Special Operations Forces destroy the North Crimean Canal Railway Bridge, a major logistics route for the peninsula. Source: Special Operations Forces (SSO) of Ukraine

3. RUSSIA INCHES TOWARD ANNEXING GEORGIAN TERRITORY

On June 23, South Ossetian President Alan Gagloev announced his resignation to become advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian media outlet Kommersant suggested the move represented a step toward “unifying” the South Ossetia breakaway region of Georgia with the Russian province of North Ossetia.

Takeaways:

While an internationally recognized part of the Republic of Georgia, South Ossetia has been effectively under Russian control since the early 1990s. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia was engineered by the Kremlin to consolidate its control over the territory as well as the nearby breakaway region of Abkhazia, in order to exert control over Georgian politics and create obstacles to the country’s entry into European institutions. The Kremlin has previously been hesitant to outright annex the territories due to complex ethnic geopolitics in the region that would challenge integration, and concerns that the move would eliminate their use as leverage over internal Georgian affairs. The calculus on annexation may be changing as Russian influence in the South Caucasus faces continual setbacks.

On June 7, 2026, Armenia re-elected the party of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who pledged to pivot away from Russian institutions toward Europe and the US after Russian peacekeepers failed to prevent Azerbaijan from seizing the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the Fall 2023. The results came despite great efforts by Russian intelligence and security services to try to sway the vote away from Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party to more pro-Russian candidates. Relations with Azerbaijan have also deteriorated since late 2024 after Russian air defenses shot down Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 flying between Baku and Grozny, Chechnya.

The shift away from Russian influence in both countries was symbolized in the August 2025 US-brokered peace deal between the former adversaries and an associated agreement to establish a US-led strategic transportation route through the region. The “Zangezur Corridor” connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik province would provide faster land-based shipping between China and the European Union and pose a threat to trade corridors running through Russian territory.

Annexing South Ossetia would shore up Russian influence in the South Caucasus through the threat of further territorial seizures from Georgia (such as Abkhazia) while warning Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow is willing to use force to maintain its regional dominance.

4. CHINA REITERATES PLANS TO TARGET FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICS

China’s Vice Justice Minister, Hu Weilie, announced on June 23 that Beijing would use provisions in the new “Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law” to target foreign individuals and groups who “undermine ethnic unity and progress or incite ethnic separatism.” Passed in March by the National People’s Congress, the new law goes into effect on July 1.

Takeaways:

The new statement appears to signal that Beijing intends to use the law to target foreign critics of its treatment of ethnic minorities—most notably Tibetans and Uyghurs—through Interpol red notices and other lawfare measures. Such measures are used to pressure foreign governments to either extradite foreign critics, or enact entry bans, or other sanctions against them to satisfy Beijing.

China has used similar measures in the past to target overseas Hong Kong dissidents under the city’s National Security Law. On July 25, 2025, the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force issued warrants for the arrest of 19 overseas democratic activists associated with the “Hong Kong Parliament” group, including 15 bounties worth HK$1 million (approximately $127,400). Nathan Law, among the most prominent of the activists targeted, was denied entry into Singapore in September 2025. Singapore defended its decision, saying Law’s presence was not in its national interest due to his outstanding arrest warrant.

5. NEW REPORT HIGHLIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS TO CHINA’S STRATEGIC MISSILES

A June 23 report by Janes found that the People’s Liberation Army debuted an upgraded DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. The new missile has fins on its warhead that according to Janes, “may be intended to enable terminal manoeuvres by adjusting the flight path in both horizontal and vertical planes, improving the ability to engage mobile targets and penetrate missile-defence systems that may provide it greater maneuverability making intercepts more difficult.”

The report also highlighted the first public appearance of a nuclear-capable DF-17 missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle.

Takeaways:

1. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have provided significant feedback on the effectiveness of US anti-ballistic missile systems and how they might be circumvented. The upgraded DF-26 may be inspired by lessons learned from Ukraine in particular where Russian forces have reportedly experimented with features on their ballistic missiles to make their terminal trajectory more unpredictable and harder to intercept by Patriot interceptors.

2. The DF-17 is China’s answer to the US’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system. The Dark Eagle has rotated through Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations for exercises over the past year. It is not clear if these deployments or any other action directly prompted China to highlight the strategic system now, but it is plausible, as China’s relations with its neighbors, especially Japan, have notably deteriorated in recent months.

6. NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS NEW WEAPONS TEST

On June 26, Kim Jong-un supervised a test of North Korea’s 240mm multiple launch rocket system, and extended range 155mm artillery shells.

North Korean state-media says the 24-tube, 240mm rocket system has a range of 90km and will be used for Corps-level fire support.

Takeaways:

The 240mm rocket system, a staple of the North Korean military dating back to the Cold War, has undergone years of upgrades under Kim Jong-un. Kim’s personal attendance at two test launches of the system in just over a month, further suggests the rockets represent a significant priority for North Korea’s defense industry.

The 240mm system appears to be moving away from use as an inaccurate area saturation weapon into a more precision strike capability. At the previous launch on May 26, 2026, Korean Central News Agency reported that the rockets utilized an “ultra-precision autonomous navigation system and the TERCOM (terrain contour matching) navigation system and employed an AI terminal guidance function,” to strike targets up to 100km away. While these technological claims are unverifiable, the purported capabilities resemble those of a small cruise missile. Even if the details are accurately portrayed, it is unclear whether North Korea is able to mass manufacture the rockets or whether a small number will serve as special capabilities.

Note: There will be no Weekly Significant Activity Report next week due to the July 4 holiday.

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While much attention has focused on US domestic and Western reactions to the Islamabad Memorandum (AKA the US-Iran Deal), this Situation Report examines how the negotiated end to the war is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from military strategists and political commentators in China and Russia. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are interpreting the war for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the conclusions the foreign commentators reached.

This Situation Report is broken into three parts:

1. On the War’s Outcomes

   1. Consequences for the US and Iran

   2. Consequences for the Middle East

   3. Consequences for International Order

2. On the Prospect of Continued Negotiations Between the US and Iran

3. Lessons Learned

1. ON THE WAR’S OUTCOMES

Summary of Key Insights:

Chinese and Russian commentators are generally of the opinion that the US did not achieve its war aims but that the war nevertheless produced an outcome closer to a draw than an Iranian victory. Commentators believe Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, along with a greater tolerance for pain and sacrifice and growing domestic political constraints on US President Donald Trump, produced more favorable terms for Iran.

Views were more skeptical as to whether Iran could be considered a true “winner,” as the war severely devastated the country. Iran is widely expected to continue to leverage control over the Strait of Hormuz to deter future US attacks and to exert influence on the world stage, but its diminished military and economy have imposed significant limitations on its options for wielding power.

Israel is widely viewed as a major loser of the conflict, with its war aims ultimately unfulfilled and its relationship with the US increasingly—potentially irrevocably—strained. The Gulf States are also expected to review their geopolitical interests and their relationship with the US and Israel in the wake of the war.

Several commentators surprisingly gave President Trump credit for quickly recognizing the war could not be won and accepting an unfavorable deal over doubling down on a costly intractable conflict.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

Fan Hongda, Director of China-Middle East Studies at Shaoxing University, The Paper, June 16, 2026.

Both the US and Iran claim to have the upper hand on the battlefield, but this advantage cannot be translated into victory. For the US, Trump has been looking for an opportunity to gracefully withdraw from this war. For Iran, although it has withstood the military pressure from the US and Israel, it is also unable to force the US to accept its conditions due to its own limitations.

Wang Jin, Associate Professor, and the Assistant Director, Institute of Middle East Studies, Northwest University of China, The Paper, June 16, 2026.

The main gains for the US include the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s return to the nuclear negotiation track, and the strategic buffer space provided by the de-escalation of the Middle East situation, which helps alleviate energy price fluctuations and domestic political and economic pressures. Iran, on the other hand, gained more direct benefits, including the fact that the US no longer effectively considers regime change as a negotiating objective, the potential lifting of some sanctions, the resumption of oil exports, and the possibility of the gradual unfreezing of frozen assets, while also retaining a certain degree of nuclear capability.

Judging from the outcome of the negotiations, the United States made significant concessions in lifting sanctions and demonstrating goodwill, while Iran responded on issues such as the disposal of highly enriched uranium and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, both sides were able to declare victory to their domestic audiences.

Yaroslav Mirsky, Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 13, 2026.

Beneath the propaganda veneer, the results of the Iranian campaign are soberly reckonable. Tehran has achieved things that seemed politically unattainable just a year ago. The US is ready to discuss a phased lifting of sanctions without requiring the prior dismantling of all nuclear infrastructure. The missile program and support for allied forces have been removed from the agenda for the first phase. The future agreement is expected to be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.

This latter is not a whim. Tehran remembers the history of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear deal, as a systemic lesson in the unreliability of bilateral agreements with Washington. The JCPOA was an executive agreement, not ratified by the Senate as a treaty, and that is precisely why the next president tore it up with the stroke of a pen. The Iranians' insistence on a Security Council resolution is an attempt to insert an institutional fuse where bilateral guarantees once proved to be mere paper. From a technical standpoint, this is sound.

But where Iran's public victory appears certain, the real balance is far more complex. The issue of uranium enrichment, key for Tehran, has officially been postponed until the second stage, and the divergence between the narratives here is at its greatest. Trump says "no enrichment." Tehran says "the right to enrichment is recognized." The parties have apparently agreed to debate this later, calling the current silence on this point an agreement. The fate of the accumulated highly enriched uranium, the enhanced IAEA inspection regime, the timing and scope of sanctions relief are the subjects of the next round, which promises to be no easier than the last.

The figure of 300 billion Russian resources has been renamed "reparations." In reality, according to negotiators, the discussion is about an international investment fund for post-war reconstruction. The precise nature of this fund (who pays, how much, and when) has yet to be agreed upon. Calling it "reparations" is tantamount to considering a clause that hasn't yet been written the final word on the deal. Iranian sources themselves admitted that not all mediators confirmed this exact 300 billion figure.

There's also the question of cost. The military campaign has left so much destruction on Iranian territory that it alone is a reason to negotiate, not to achieve an unconditional victory. Nuclear and missile facilities, the energy sector, and the sanctions-crunched economy all require restoration, and restoration now depends on the stability of the world. The blockade of Hormuz, the main trump card of Iran's tactics, has come at a cost not only to its opponents. Insurance premiums, disrupted export flows, and pressure on an already shaky economy—Tehran has also been charged.

Iran has won the right to sit at the table on its own terms. That's significant. But sitting at the table and rising from it as a winner are two different things, and mixing them is convenient precisely for those who sell simple recipes.

Fyodor Lukyanov, Professor and researcher at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.

The so-called “deal” between the US and Iran, announced by Trump and later confirmed by Tehran, is a typical product of the current political and diplomatic culture. Lots of big words, both sides proclaiming their grand victory, but almost no concrete details, instead promising to implement the agreement at the next stage. The immediate result is the restoration of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of which was precisely the result of the US and Israeli attack on Iran. In other words, after another costly round of military destruction and corresponding casualties, we’ve ended up back where we started.

[…]

President Trump’s goal was to extricate himself from this unpleasant and hopeless conflict, and the announced “grand bargain” appears to allow him to do so. Frankly, there’s no reason to expect its terms to be fulfilled: Iran has no intention of relinquishing its nuclear program (whatever that means), and the United States will bend over backwards to hold on to Iranian money and lift the bulk of sanctions against Tehran. So, there’s still plenty of room for bargaining. The risk of a new war between Iran and the United States remains, of course, and it’s palpable. But it seems everyone already understands that its outcome will be the same as the current one.

Farhad Ibrahimov, Professor of Political Science at RUDN University, Kommersant, June 18, 2026.

On the surface, the document appears to be a diplomatic victory. In essence, however, it leaves open all the key questions: who controls the nuclear program, when and how sanctions will be lifted, who pays for Iran’s reconstruction, what Israel will do next, and how long the US is willing to honor its own commitments.

The victory of the “doves” in Trump’s entourage, tentatively associated with his Vice President J.D. Vance, may prove temporary. Now they need to sell the memorandum as a show of strength through a deal: America, they say, has secured the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, stopped the war, and retained control of the nuclear issue. But the “hawks,” led by National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, haven’t disappeared. They will closely monitor Iran’s every move and exploit any delay, any ambiguity, any dispute with the IAEA as proof that Tehran is once again buying time.

Therein lies the weakness of the current memorandum. It promises too much too quickly, yet fails to answer the fundamental question: why should this time be any different than in 2015–2018? The answer is still unanswered. This is precisely why it is premature to talk of an Iranian victory or a US capitulation. Rather, we are talking about a fragile deal, in which both the US and Israel are already preparing their own versions of a future breakdown. Tehran will argue that it has secured recognition and the lifting of pressure. Washington will argue that it forced Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and curb its nuclear ambitions. Israel, for its part, will argue that no paperwork can negate the threat. And the next American president may well decide once again that someone else’s signature doesn’t bind him to anything.

Evgeny Shestakov, Journalist, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.

The contents of the memorandum are clear: Iran won the conflict with the United States. While the Americans pledged in the document to do much in the interests of the Islamic Republic, Tehran's reciprocal promises are extremely vague. Without inflicting significant damage directly on America during the war (the official death toll of 13 American citizens is acknowledged), the Iranians, through strikes on civilian and military targets of their "pro-American" neighbors in the Persian Gulf, forced them to exert the necessary pressure on Washington. And by closing the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran made it clear to other American allies that the war unleashed by the United States and Israel would be costly. This was enough to force the White House to stop self-deprecating, declaring victory every day, and to begin searching for realistic ways to end the conflict with minimal costs. But the Islamic Republic refused to allow Trump to do so, and the current memorandum is proof of that.

[…]

The memorandum's full provisions will never be implemented—those who drafted it clearly understood this. The document represents a set of wishes, primarily Iranian, which the White House took into account. The deal with the Islamic Republic cemented a reality that is offensive to America: it is impossible to change Iran through military force. It is easier to negotiate with them. And if Tel Aviv is dissatisfied with the deal, that's not America's problem. Trump, by all appearances, has no intention of further bowing to the "little partner," as the US president recently called Israel. At least not as long as the Jewish state is governed by the "ungrateful" and intractable Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has cleverly drawn the head of the White House into direct conflict with the Islamic Republic.

Oleg Barabanov, Professor at MGIMO University, Program Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Valdai Discussion Club, June 19, 2026.

Ultimately, in our view, Trump certainly didn’t win. But it’s also impossible to say he lost, by and large. Iran stood out, but nothing more. And if we’re going to use sports or football terms for the war, it’s probably neither a defeat nor a victory. It’s more likely a draw. This often happens in sports. It also happens in military conflicts. For example, the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s was essentially a draw. Each side remained in virtually the same position as before the conflict, without achieving any of their respective military objectives. True, it took eight years of bloody war for both sides to reach this point. Trump, however, realized this much more quickly. He started his war, it quickly became clear that victory was impossible, and then Trump just as quickly (very quickly by the standards of military conflicts) agreed to a draw. Clearly, from a media perspective, admitting that it’s ultimately a draw is impossible for Trump, and so it’s only natural that he proclaims everywhere that this is a great victory, that all goals have been achieved. It couldn't be otherwise in the media-saturated space of modern politics. This has happened in other conflicts, too, and could very well continue in the future. So, there’s nothing new here. What’s more interesting is something else. Trump has demonstrated, not just in words but in deeds, an understanding that a draw is better than an endless war, under conditions where victory has proven impossible, providing a rather rare example in world politics. Some might say that such a draw is a victory. A victory over oneself, which is perhaps the most difficult thing.

Boris Dolgov, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 18, 2026.

The main reason the US President signed the memorandum was the dashed hope of a blitzkrieg and a swift victory over Iran. The United States intended, at a minimum, to overthrow the current government, and at a maximum, to destroy Iranian statehood. But they failed. Iran not only withstood American attacks, which continued even during negotiations, but also retaliated against Israel and all thirteen US military bases in the region. Some of them were damaged beyond repair. These painful blows, and the generally protracted conflict, forced Trump to first resume bilateral contacts and then negotiate and conclude a painful agreement.

[…]

Instead of an American triumph, society witnessed a protracted war and rising fuel prices. In the run-up to the midterm congressional elections, the American opposition is taking advantage of all this. This is the second factor that forced Trump to sign the memorandum.

[…]

International oversight of the Iranian nuclear program will be discussed. In my opinion, Iran will agree to it. Despite the regime’s resilience, its military and political capabilities are limited.

Gevorg Mirzayan, Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Science’s US and Canadian Studies Institute, Business Newspaper Vzglyad, June 17, 2026.

Yet, none of the key US goals in this war were achieved, including regime change in Iran. On the contrary, the people rallied around the government as a result of American aggression.

The Islamic Republic’s situation on the eve of the war was extremely difficult. Having lost the war in Syria, failed to protect Hezbollah and the Houthis from a decapitating US-Israeli strike, and living in a permanent and increasingly severe economic crisis that had already erupted into large-scale protests, Tehran could easily experience an internal revolution or a government transformation favorable to the US within six months to a year. The country’s elites were divided, and everyone expected a power struggle following the departure of the gravely ill Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Now the situation has changed dramatically. After the Americans and Israelis assassinated the Grand Ayatollah and several other leaders, new elites have come to power. They are far more radical and decisive.

Moreover, Iran, which until recently viewed the lifting of sanctions as one of the few opportunities to save the national economy, has now received an alternative way to replenish its budget by charging fees for tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz. And the deal with the Americans effectively legitimizes this right—even if it appears to be “providing services for guiding and escorting vessels.”

Trump’s logic, in turn, is also understandable. The US president, having become embroiled in the Iranian adventure, found himself in a difficult position. He couldn’t finish off Iran, as that would require a dramatic increase in firepower in the Persian Gulf and a full-scale ground invasion. The US currently lacks both the resources (much of which was spent on Ukraine) and the political will to undertake such a mission.

But he couldn’t simply turn around and leave without an agreement, as that would have catastrophic consequences. Not only for Trump (who could lose the midterm elections), but also for the United States. A US attempt to simply flee the ongoing war would be perceived as a sign of America’s weakening and decrepitude, which would immediately embolden its other political adversaries and lead to the abandonment of its last remaining allies—in East Asia, for example.

So Trump took the damage-cutting approach, opting to strike a deal.

Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, International Affairs, June 15, 2026.

The war, which took place in two phases in 2025 and 2026, inevitably depleted Iran’s economic potential with its destruction and casualties, exacerbating the financial, economic, and social crisis that had been widening and deepening in Iran for many years. It also caused critical damage to Iran’s trade, economic, and financial ties with countries in the region and around the world, as well as to the export and import of oil and other vital goods, and dealt a blow to the Iranian budget.

The US-initiated war devastated Iranians’ living standards, pushing approximately 40% of the country’s 90 million population below the poverty line, creating a dire social situation for the ruling regime. Combined with sanctions, it caused losses of $30-80 million per day, disrupted Iran’s long-established system of governance, and claimed the lives of more than 70 prominent political and military figures, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Equally important, the war undermined Iran’s vital relations with the Persian Gulf monarchies.

In a live televised address on June 10, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian perhaps aptly summarized the article’s comments on the war’s aftermath: “We are currently under sanctions, and our routes are blocked. We face a difficult challenge.... Governing the country is no easy task under the current circumstances, given the shortages we face, the unrest we have experienced, and the problems that remain.”

Finally, the war has politically raised the question of the future and possible transformation of the current Islamic regime. The country’s current leadership understands this perfectly well. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran desperately needs agreements with the United States. These agreements can ensure not only peace but also the lifting of sanctions, numerous Western restrictions, and reprisals imposed on Iran, in order to establish the necessary flow of investment and high technology into the stagnating economy.

Qin Tian, ​​Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

Relatedly, other powers in the Middle East will also make adjustments. For example, the Gulf states, innocently caught in the crossfire, will inevitably rethink their security and geoeconomic strategies after the war, and will reconsider their relationship with Iran. A certain degree of détente, at least technically, between the Arab world, especially the Gulf states, and Iran is to be expected.

From an economic perspective, the ceasefire between the US and Iran is clearly a positive development, allowing for a significant recovery in Gulf oil exports. Due to the war, the Gulf region had effectively become a bottleneck in the global economy over the past two to three months. Unblocking this bottleneck will benefit the global economic cycle.

Gleb Ignatiev, lecturer at the Department of Politics and Management at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestia, June 18, 2026.

On the evening of June 17, Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the first part of the peace agreement. Washington received the most important thing: Tehran’s renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a promise of honor and guarantees. Israel received nothing but a commitment to cease fire in Lebanon or risk severing the entire deal.

Trump understands that Netanyahu’s belligerent sentiments could undo his greatest diplomatic triumph. And so the US president has placed his bets on distancing himself from Israel. At the G7 summit, Trump demonstratively demoted Israel from a “major ally” to a “minor partner.” This isn’t just a personal grudge against Netanyahu’s criticism. It’s a cold calculation: if Israel and Lebanon start shooting again, the deal between Washington and Tehran must not be undermined.

It seems Trump has satisfied his appetite for war and wants to return to his image as a great peacemaker. However, the main obstacle to his “ideal Middle East” has unexpectedly turned out to be not Mojtaba Khamenei, but Benjamin Netanyahu. Because of this clash of interests, their relationship is once again heading for the abyss.

Dmitry Trenin, President of the Russian International Affairs Council, Russian International Affairs Council, June 18, 2026.

Trump’s recent anger directed at Netanyahu reflects something much more important: A significant part of American society and the political class are losing patience with Israel and cooling toward it. This comes against the backdrop of Israel’s growing international isolation.

Indeed, Israel is the main loser from the war. Its new strategy of forcefully eliminating threats along all seven fronts, from Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and above all, Iran, promises ‘forever wars’ rather than stability and security. Its unstated nuclear deterrence has failed to prevent Iran from lobbing missiles and drones at Israeli targets. In the foreseeable future, Israel faces an election in which dissatisfaction with Netanyahu will run against wide support for his radical policies.

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have not fared well either. Their reliance on US military bases as a security guarantee turned out to be a disastrous bargain. Instead of protecting the host countries, these bases acted like magnets, attracting Iranian retaliatory strikes. The image of the Gulf nations as safe and comfortable places to do business has taken a big hit. If these nations are to recover, they will need to come up with a better security policy than aligning themselves with their failed protector.

Qin Tian, ​​Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

The most positive outcome of the memorandum reached between the US and Iran, and perhaps the most visible and perceptible result for the international community and even ordinary people, is the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The restoration of passage through the strait to some extent is already expected, and this is a very positive development.

However, the memorandum’s effectiveness is limited in other aspects. For example, while it calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, a complete and thorough ceasefire in Lebanon is not easy to achieve. In the long run, it’s uncertain whether the US and Iran will never fight again. The nuclear issue has also not been truly resolved.

The fact that the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding this time, rather than the more common agreement, suggests that both sides have given this consideration. Agreements are usually more binding and subject to stricter enforcement. A memorandum of understanding, on the other hand, only represents a certain degree of intent and possibility. It may not require particularly strict enforcement, nor does it imply a strong obligation for either side to fulfill or fully honor its terms.

The decision by both sides to sign a memorandum also carries a sense of caution and conservatism. For the US and Iran, two countries with deep-seated conflicts and fresh from a major war, reaching a binding agreement at this stage is quite difficult.

[…]

Of course, two uncertainties need to be considered during this process. The first is the speed of global economic recovery. According to current assessments, the Strait of Hormuz may take longer than expected to return to normal. Considering the backlog of ships and the mine clearance work during this period, resuming navigation may take more than a month or even longer, requiring a more comprehensive response from the international community.

Secondly, the sustainability of this recovery is now in doubt. Because US-Iran relations remain unstable, and Trump has threatened to resume military action against Iran if a final agreement cannot be reached in the next phase, it is uncertain how long the peace in the Strait of Hormuz can be maintained, or whether fighting will re-emerge in the Persian Gulf region periodically. This will create long-term uncertainty for the global economic recovery.

Dmitry Trenin, President of the Russian International Affairs Council, Russian International Affairs Council, June 18, 2026.

In the short term, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of the US naval blockade of Iran will ease the energy situation on the global market. Yet in the long term, the case of Hormuz has sent a ringing message that in the age of world order transition, all maritime chokepoints are potentially vulnerable to hostile action. Iranian leaders have learned that their ability to close the strait, and the US unwillingness to risk losses in trying to reopen it, Washington’s Achilles’ heel, could be a more powerful deterrent for Tehran than a nuclear-weapons capability. Meanwhile, Tehran intends to regulate traffic through the waterway together with Oman.

As for the nuclear program, Tehran will definitely continue it under any future comprehensive agreement with Washington, if an agreement is indeed reached. A failure to agree would leave Tehran free to pursue the program as before because the Iranians won’t surrender their nuclear materials to anyone. Regarding nuclear deterrence, however, the lessons from the recent war are mixed. On the one hand, America and Israel would probably not have attacked a nuclear-armed Iran. Look at North Korea. On the other hand, a nuclear-armed Israel, even under Iranian ballistic missile strikes, did not use nuclear weapons against Iran. Neither did the US. The option was reportedly discussed, but rejected. Thus, for Iran, being able to close Hormuz may be more effective.

2. ON THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators are skeptical that an agreement will be reached in 60 days to resolve outstanding issues outlined in the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, such as Iran’s nuclear program, the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and sanctions relief. There is a view that both sides understood these issues would not be fully fixed in 60 days and the negotiating period is essentially being used to freeze the conflict as neither side appears interested in a resumption of all out war. All commentators view Israel as a potential spoiler to continued negotiations.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

Niu Xinchun, Dean of the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

Currently, almost all the difficult issues between the US and Iran have been left for future negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz needs to be reopened within the next 60 days, but how to do so remains a major technical problem. Regarding the lifting of US economic sanctions against Iran, particularly the unfreezing of Iranian funds and how to handle the Iranian nuclear issue, no concrete agreements have been reached, and these all require negotiations within the next 60 days.

It is predictable that the possibility of reaching an agreement in the next 60 days is very small. It is highly likely that no agreement will be reached in the next 60 days, and these issues will be postponed, with the ceasefire being extended again.

That’s how things are in the Middle East; many temporary issues eventually become long-term. The same applies to the US-Iran issue. The nuclear issue and economic sanctions are decades-old problems, and the chances of them being resolved in the next 60 days are extremely slim.

Qin Tian, ​​Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

I think it will be quite difficult to achieve any substantial results in 60 days of negotiations. First of all, the core issue to be resolved in this phase of negotiations is actually the nuclear issue, which has been a source of contention between the US and Iran for many years. For example, how to dispose of and dilute nuclear materials, how to deal with Iranian nuclear facilities and whether or not to dismantle them, whether and to what extent Iran’s nuclear activities should be restricted—these are all difficult issues to resolve. At the same time, these issues are also closely linked to the lifting of sanctions, so the complexity of this negotiation is self-evident.

The negotiations also face some highly complex technical issues. For example, Iran’s nuclear materials are mainly believed to be buried under the collapsed nuclear facilities. How to retrieve these materials—this seemingly small issue—may be a technically challenging problem. I think the US and Iran will continue to engage in very intense competition.

In addition to the inherent difficulty of negotiating the nuclear issue, the negotiations also face many disruptive factors, such as the Israeli factor we just mentioned, which Israel will certainly try to undermine the subsequent negotiations between the US and Iran.

In addition to the subsequent negotiations themselves, the implementation of the memorandum is also subject to change. Problems arising during implementation could affect the progress of subsequent negotiations between the two parties.

Fan Hongda, Director of China-Middle East Studies at Shaoxing University, The Paper, June 16, 2026.

Whether the US and Iran can maintain peace in the future depends on whether they can make some tangible progress in the early stages of negotiations. This would allow them to extend the negotiations even if they cannot complete them within the 60-day period […] given the severe lack of mutual trust between the US and Iran, both sides can only adopt a wait-and-see approach to ensure they retain room for policy adjustments.

Oleg Akulinichev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian-Iranian Business Council under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Kommersant, June 15, 2026.

The weak point is Tehran’s nuclear program. Its fate is being sidelined, reserved for a 60-day period of “further negotiations.” Iran has already stockpiled over 400 kg of weapons-grade uranium. Trump, meanwhile, withdrew from Obama’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal and is now forced to renegotiate. Republican hawks have already warned that any nuclear agreement will be voted on in Congress. This means Trump risks either being accused of softness or the agreement collapsing just before the November midterm elections.

The second ticking time bomb is Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister Katz have already made it clear that the Israeli army will remain in the “safe zones” in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza indefinitely. “If Iran attacks because of events in Lebanon, we will attack them with all our might,” Mr. Katz declared. Iran, however, has included a complete ceasefire in Lebanon among its key conditions. Lebanon, therefore, is turning into a powder keg that could explode regardless of the “grand deal.”

3. LESSONS LEARNED

Summary of Key Insights:

While commentators note the value of leveraging asymmetric advantages, controlling geopolitical chokepoints, and instituting resilient command and control mechanisms, there is skepticism—particularly among Russian analysts—that broad lessons can be learned from Iran’s resistance to the US. They note that Iran survived by accepting significant sacrifices to its military and economy, and pursuing a strategy of regional retaliation that is unavailable to nuclear powers due to risk of catastrophic escalation.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

Yaroslav Mirsky, Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 13, 2026.

Iran has won the right to sit at the table on its own terms. That’s significant. But sitting at the table and rising from it as a winner are two different things, and mixing them is convenient precisely for those who sell simple recipes.

Why doesn’t this recipe carry over?

Here colleagues usually intervene and explain: Russia can do the same, only on a larger scale.

“The West fears escalation more than actual conflict,” writes one such author. “It’s enough to act firmly and consistently, and Washington will come running to the table.”

Withdraw from all formats of dialogue with NATO, deploy medium-range missiles in Kaliningrad and on the Finnish border, and launch systematic cyberattacks on European infrastructure. Iran has demonstrated this.

One would like to believe it. But the argument falls apart at the very first substantive question: under what conditions did Iranian tactics work, and are they replicable for Russia?

Iran escalated in a strictly regional theater. Its main lever created a threat that was sensitive to the global economy, but did not require Washington to make an immediate existential choice. Imagine escalation as a ladder. Between “closing the strait” and “starting a nuclear war,” Iran has flight after flight, so long that diplomacy has time to work on each rung. This headroom was the basis of Iran’s strategy of coercive bargaining: demonstrating a willingness to step up, without actually doing so until the enemy feels that continuing is too costly.

Russia has a shorter ladder. A nuclear power, bordering NATO, a permanent seat on the Security Council, several active arms control treaties. Any of the proposed measures, from the “Oreshniki” project near the Finnish border to cyberattacks on the EU power grid, steps not to the bottom rung, but straight to the top, right up to the ceiling: a direct confrontation between nuclear powers. Where Tehran kept its distance until the top, Moscow stands almost right there.

And what’s more, it has already partially approached this threshold. The moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been declared invalid, the “Oreshnik” project is in serial production, and a readiness to deploy it in Belarus has been declared. The recipe for “unilaterally lifting the moratorium” is overdue: it has been implemented. Moscow has largely traveled the path presented as a revelation.

The idea of ​​a “Resistance Bloc” (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, with coordination across all theaters) demonstrates how easily an analytical impulse can devolve into geopolitical fantasy. China doesn’t build formal military alliances; this is a feature of its strategic culture, not a temporary posture. Beijing watches the Iranian bargaining with interest and without any desire to become complicit. A formalized bloc would give Washington exactly what it seeks: a coherent image of the enemy, justifying the maximum mobilization of its allies. Tehran understands this, which is why, despite all the rhetoric of an “axis of resistance,” it has always avoided formal military commitments that would automatically raise the bar for a retaliatory strike.

What the Iranian experience really says

Strip the propaganda out of the "Iran lesson," and a few observations remain. They're not as striking as the "toughness works" formula, but they're useful.

Asymmetric pressure works when it inflicts increasing damage on an adversary and leaves them with no easy way out. Hormuz was the perfect lever because it didn't just hit the US: through the global oil market, it also affected its allies and neutral observers. Such multifaceted pressure is incomparable to pressure on a single country or bloc.

Mediators aren't window dressing. They underpin the entire mechanism: Pakistan provided the platform for the April ceasefire, Qatar maintained the financial channel and direct negotiations on the June memorandum. Without them, the transition from direct confrontation to bargaining would have been much more difficult. Tehran, despite all the rhetoric of "resistance," invested heavily in these channels. And a demonstrative break with all mediators deprives them of their existence precisely when they're needed most.

Institutional consolidation is more important than the beauty of a public image. Tehran clings to the Security Council resolution for a purely practical reason: a document signed by all five permanent members is far more difficult to tear up alone than a "political agreement" within the gap between administrations. The lesson of the JCPOA has been firmly learned.

And most importantly, Iran's tactics worked because they were based on a long-term strategy with clear priorities. For twenty years, Tehran sought three things: recognition of its right to enrichment, the lifting of sanctions, and the preservation of its regional position. Every specific step—blocking the Strait, accelerating the nuclear program—was subordinated to these goals, not to the independent logic of escalation. Raising the stakes is possible without a strategy. But without one, they rise blindly, and excitement can easily be mistaken for calculation.

Fyodor Lukyanov, Professor and researcher at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.

The combined military potential of the United States and Israel (and one could also add the capabilities of the Persian Gulf states) is incomparably greater than Iran’s. However, this advantage prevented a quick and clear victory. Tehran’s retaliatory measures were combined—pressure on military installations, strikes on logistical and infrastructure targets, and the use of Iran-friendly forces and groups in the region. The latter, contrary to expectations, remained operational, although weakened by Israel’s targeted campaign over the previous two years.

Finally, blocking the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, something Iran had never resorted to before, proved to be a very effective tool that was difficult to counter.

Secondly, a key factor in military success is internal resilience, as Iran has demonstrated. The destruction of a significant portion of the country’s military and political leadership at the very outset of the campaign did not have a knockout effect. In fact, judging by several indicators, it even contributed to the moral and political mobilization of the ruling class and the unification of a society that had been divided even earlier in the year. The damage Iran is willing to bear is clearly greater than what the US and its regional allies are willing to tolerate, and this is also a factor in resilience. Clearly, the Islamic Republic has suffered significantly, and recovery will require a long and costly process. But the foundations for this recovery remain intact and have even strengthened, given the emergence of the additional factor of servitude for passage through the Strait.

Third, the overall balance of power and influence in the region. Before the war, there was growing confidence that Iran’s position was weakening due to the crisis within the country and the erosion of the “axis of resistance” under the attacks of its enemies. This confidence became one of the motives for the military action, conceived by the US and Israel as the final blow to destroy the regime and resolve the “Iranian question.” This calculation failed, and now there is reason to talk about the restoration of Iran’s geopolitical capabilities. On the one hand, relations between Iran and the Gulf monarchies have become strained due to the strikes on their targets; the monarchies are certainly harboring a desire for revenge. On the other hand, if Iran withstood the combined punitive action of the two main military powers in this part of the world, and they failed to achieve their goals, the arsenal of the Persian Gulf countries will be even more insufficient for a conflict with Iran. Therefore, the idea of ​​finding a security compromise with Iran, which has been on and off in recent years, is once again relevant.

“Max Vector” Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 20, 2026.

Even assuming Iran won outright, it still doesn't follow that "Russia should do the same," because the two countries are playing different games, with different pieces, at different stages. There are at least three seams along which direct transference is disrupted.

The first seam is nuclear, and it works in reverse. The entire Iranian bargaining was built around the threat of acquiring a bomb. This was an asset precisely because the bomb didn't yet exist: it could be promised, it could be used as a threat, it could be traded away, which is what Iran ultimately did. Russia already has a nuclear arsenal, and it's comparable to the US in terms of warheads. There's nothing to trade away, in the Iranian sense. But the escalation ladder is structured differently. What looks like a demonstration of resolve to a non-nuclear Tehran turns out to be a step closer to the threshold for a nuclear power. And here, the logic of "hit harder" rests not on courage, but on risk, which Iran structurally lacked. Comparing the courage of two players when one has the nuclear button at their fingertips and the other doesn't is to miss the button.

And now about the adversary. For Washington, Iran is an important, but peripheral, theater. The US can retreat here without losing anything existential: postpone, replay, or trade elsewhere. This is precisely why Trump is retreating—not out of weakness, but out of cold calculation, because the costs of escalation now outweigh the benefits for him. The Ukrainian track is not peripheral for Russia. The goal here is not to "force an overseas arbiter to make a deal and part ways," but to change the very status of a neighboring state. What for the US is long-range bargaining, for Russia is a change in the very type of war. And its adversary is not a player with limited stakes overseas, but a neighboring country with all-out stakes and a Western coalition behind it. The logic of pinpointing the opponent's pain point simply doesn't apply here.

The third difference is the phase. The Iranian war was a short and furious exchange of blows, quickly culminating in a negotiated settlement. The Russian special operation is in its fifth year and has long since become a form of positional attrition. The "take a decisive risk and negotiate" formula tacitly assumes there's an exit strategy: strike, set a price, and then sit down. In a war of attrition, there's no such strategy. Escalation doesn't hasten the end; it raises the stakes without any guarantee of a resolution, as Lebanon clearly demonstrates, where Hezbollah isn't party to the agreement, Israel refuses to withdraw its troops, fighting is escalating, and the entire memorandum could fall apart before its allotted sixty days. This is what "agree and part ways" looks like in practice.

The idea of ​​responding to tanks with a strike on the petrochemical plant of the enemy capital deserves special mention. In the Iranian context, this would be seen as pressing a specific sore point. In Russia, this would mean opening a new front against the nuclear coalition, that is, switching to a different game with an unpredictable outcome. One could call this decisiveness. Strategy is more complex.

A Russian missile struck and set ablaze Kyiv’s Pechersk Lavra during overnight attacks on June 14-15. The Pechersk Lavra, a monastery built in 1051 (predating the founding of Moscow by a century), is the most sacred site in Ukraine and among the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The attack, shocking and odious even by the ruthless standards of the Russian military, reflects a broader Kremlin effort to deliberately target Ukrainian cultural heritage sites in order to eliminate Ukrainian identity.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian cultural heritage is reflected in thousands of cases of damage to Ukrainian cultural sites recorded by both the Ukrainian government and international organizations since the Russian full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

Prior to the attack on the Pechersk Lavra, Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture reported that as of “the end of May 2026, 1,913 cultural heritage monuments and 2,573 cultural infrastructure facilities have been destroyed and damaged in Ukraine due to Russian aggression.”

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also recorded damage to 536 internationally registered Ukrainian cultural heritage sites as of June 10, including “154 religious sites, 280 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 41 museums, 33 monuments, 22 libraries, 5 archaeological sites, 1 archive.”

Below is a select list of some of the sites damaged or destroyed and an account of what has already been lost:

Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial

On March 1, 2022, a Russian missile struck and damaged the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center and nearby Jewish cemetery in Kyiv. The center is dedicated to commemorating the more than 33,000 Jews that were killed at the site in the Babyn Yar ravine between September 29-30, 1941 in the worst single massacre of Jews during the Holocaust. More than 100,000 total victims were killed at Babyn Yar by the Nazis between 1941 and 1943.

Drobytskyi Yar Holocaust Memorial

In March 2022, Russian artillery shelling damaged the Drobytskyi Yar Holocaust Memorial in Kharkiv. The memorial commemorates the more than 15,000 Jews who were killed by the Nazis at the Drobytskyi Yar ravine outside the city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine in a series of massacres beginning in October 1941.

The National Chornobyl Museum and The National Art Museum of Ukraine

On May 24, 2026, a Russian missile attack destroyed The National Chornobyl Museum. The museum catalogued the Chornobyl nuclear disaster and subsequent emergency response effort and preserved archives of unique historical documents and artifacts related to the events. The museum was destroyed less than a month after it was reopened following the completion of extensive renovations. The attack also caused significant damage to the National Art Museum of Ukraine, the country’s premier museum for Ukrainian visual art.

Additional Russian strikes on May 24 also damaged other Ukrainian cultural sites including the Hinaus Gallery, the Zhytnii Market, the Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature, the Ukrainian House, and the Kyiv Opera.

Mamai-Mogila Burial Mound Archaeological Site

A September 2024 report by Conflict Observatory identified significant damage to the Mamai-Mogila Burial Mounds in the Vasylivka district of Zaporizhzhia oblast caused by Russian occupation. The Mamai-Mogila are a series of burial mounds up to 20 meters in height constructed by prehistoric civilizations dating back to 3,000 BC. There is additional evidence to suggest that the damage to the site was caused by systematic looting rather than military operations or construction.

Transfiguration Cathedral in Odesa

On July 23, 2023, a Russian missile attack severely damaged the Transfiguration Cathedral in the city of Odesa. Eyewitnesses and evidence collected at the site suggest the Russian missile directly struck the church’s altar. The Transfiguration Cathedral is one of Ukraine’s most culturally significant religious sites, due to not only its aesthetic beauty but because of its connection to Ukrainian religious persecution during the Soviet period. The cathedral, built in the 19th century, was ordered destroyed by Joseph Stalin in 1936, and was rebuilt following Ukrainian independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mariupol Drama Theatre

On March 16, 2022, Russian forces bombed the Mariupol Drama Theater in the city of Mariupol in Donetsk oblast. The theater, once a prominent local center for performing arts, served as a shelter for hundreds of civilians during the Russian encirclement and sack of the city between February and March 2022. Russian bombing caused the collapse of the building, which killed as many as 600 civilians—mostly women, children and the elderly—who were seeking refuge inside at the time.

Lviv Historic City Center

On March 24, 2026, Russian drones struck and severely damaged the Bernardine Monastery and multiple residential buildings in Lviv’s UNESCO registered central historic district ‘L’viv – the Ensemble of the Historic Centre’ in a rare daytime attack.

Factor Druk Printing House

On May 27, 2024, a Russian missile strike severely damaged the Factor Druk Printing House in the city of Kharkiv. Factor Druk is the country’s largest Ukrainian language printing house and one of the largest full-cycle printing houses in all of Europe.

Kherson Art Museum

During Russia’s eight month occupation of the city of Kherson prior to its liberation in the Ukrainian counter offensive of November 2022, Russian forces, led by members of the Federal Security Service (FSB), systematically looted the Kherson Art Museum of more than 11,000 of its 13,500 artifacts. Items looted included priceless works of Ukrainian art, Scythian gold, ancient Greek amphora, World War II artifacts, and even the bones of Prince Grigory Potemkin stored in the museum.

Museum of Local History in Melitopol

An April 30, 2022, report by The New York Times found that Russian forces systematically looted the Museum of Local History in Melitopol, stealing as many as 1,700 artifacts, including 198 pieces of ancient Scythian gold dating back more than two millennia, and a priceless 1,500 year-old golden tiara from the reign of Attila the Hun.

Beyond Material Damage - Attacks on Ukrainian Cultural Identity

The most significant of Russia’s crimes against Ukrainian heritage go beyond damage to historical structures and artifacts. Russia’s war against Ukraine is a war waged for the extinction of the Ukrainian nation and its cultural identity. In territories it has occupied, Russia has moved to outlaw Ukrainian language education. It has shuttered non-Russian Orthodox places of worship. It has routinely subjected local inhabitants to arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, and execution for their affiliation with the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian nationalist groups.

Most egregious of all, Russia has abducted as many as 20,601 Ukrainian children, the heirs to Ukrainian cultural heritage. Many of these children have been forcibly transferred to remote parts of Russia and Belarus and impressed into military academies for future service in the Russian armed forces. At least two Ukrainian children have reportedly been sent with a cohort of Russians to the Songdowon communist youth camp in North Korea.

Taken together, Russia’s actions in Ukraine constitute a deliberate and systematic policy of erasure of Ukrainian history, Ukrainian culture, and ultimately the Ukrainian people themselves. It is a policy directly prescribed by the Kremlin: from the ideological treatises of Russian President Vladimir Putin who has declared that the Ukrainian people do not exist, to the “kill lists” drawn up to eliminate Ukrainian nationalists and cultural elites at the start of the invasion, to the constant dehumanizing language used by Russian leaders to describe Ukrainians as Nazis.

The Kremlin’s ultimate war aim is not simply the seizure of Ukrainian territory but the destruction of the Ukrainian people and of Ukraine as an idea—that is to say genocide. The Kremlin is not interested in off ramps or positive incentives and will only abandon this goal when it becomes clear the Russian war effort faces total exhaustion. Until then, it is likely that we will see additional, and possibly even more brazen, Russian attacks.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between June 6, 2026 and June 13, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: Days of strikes exchanged between the US, Israel, and Iran threatened the ongoing ceasefire and negotiations; however military escalation was controlled after a diplomatic breakthrough was announced suggesting a war-ending agreement could be signed Sunday, June 14.

2. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine exceeded the duration of the First World War, with the Kremlin showing no signs of stopping the war.

3. China intensified its weeks of provocative maritime maneuvers around Taiwan with patrols east of the island to challenge Japanese and Philippine border delimitation negotiations, and a transit through restricted waters around Taiwan’s Taiping island.

4. China arrested US scholar Min Zin, an expert on Myanmar, on espionage charges ahead of a state visit by Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing to Beijing.

5. Xi Jinping made a state visit to North Korea to strengthen ties between the two long-time allies amid years of multi-vector diplomacy by Pyongyang.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Ceasefire Interrupted by Days of Bombing

This week the US, Israel and Iran engaged in multiple days of exchanging long-range strikes despite ongoing ceasefire and negotiations.

On June 7, Iran launched a ballistic missile attack against Israel, in response to the country’s continued offensive in Lebanon against Iranian proxy group Hezbollah. In response, (despite a warning by US President Donald Trump,) Israel conducted multiple waves of air strikes on Iranian missile sites and air defense systems.

On June 8, an Iranian drone struck and downed a US AH-64 Apache attack helicopter near the coast of Oman. The drone allegedly failed to detonate but forced the crew to conduct an emergency landing over water. Both crew members were subsequently rescued by a US Navy drone boat—the first such rescue in US history. In response to the attack, the US launched two days of “proportional” strikes on Iranian missile sites, air defense and communications systems near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran further retaliated with multiple waves of drone and missile strikes on US bases, as well as other sites, in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.

War-Ending Agreement Announced

On June 11, US President Donald Trump abruptly called off a third day of air strikes on Iran to announce an imminent deal to end the war between the two countries. President Trump later announced that an agreement would be signed on Sunday June 14 in Geneva, Switzerland.

While President Trump has previously claimed (on several dozen occasions) that a deal to end the war was close, Iranian officials and Pakistani mediators similarly voiced optimism that a final agreement had been reached. On June 12, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated that the final text of a US-Iran agreement to end the war has been agreed upon. A sentiment reflected by social media posts by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

The announcement of a deal was met with mixed reactions in Iran. Media outlets associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps such as Tasnim News, stated that no final decision had been reached on the final text of an agreement.

With less than a day before it is to be signed, the actual contents of the deal remain uncertain. Ongoing reporting has suggested the agreement is a two-page memorandum of understanding consisting of 14 points to end hostilities and begin a 60 day process of further negotiations around more intractable issues such as the status of Iran’s nuclear program and regional security. However, such reports remain disputed as US and Iranian officials have issued denials regarding key points of a supposed agreement.

President Trump has made multiple announcements that the deal to be signed Sunday would include provisions for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz immediately, renounce (again) the development of nuclear weapons, and begin a process of dismantling its nuclear program, all without the US releasing Iranian assets. Iran’s Foreign Ministry on the other hand has claimed the deal will allow Iran to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz and issue “service fees” for transit, and will give it immediate access to billions of dollars of frozen assets.

Takeaways:

1. On the Possibility of a War-Ending Deal: Because US and Iranian officials have disputed the terms of the deal, it is difficult to say what the actual terms are and whether an agreement will actually be signed on Sunday. In any case, it seems likely that officials from both sides are trying to pro-actively shape discussions around the deal (including through misleading information) before the actual terms are announced and identify and counter key domestic critics in advance. The actual deal will likely involve some compromise by both sides and may leave key issues such as Iran’s nuclear stockpile to further negotiations.

2. On This Week’s Flare Up and Climb Down: Even if a deal is reached, this week’s flare up of violence, despite the continued ceasefire, illustrates potential challenges with compliance. Any deal that leaves hawkish domestic audiences unsatisfied could lead to intense political pressure to strengthen military posturing or attempt to extract greater concessions from future rounds of negotiations. The political pressure will likely be greatest in Iran, as the current war has elevated more militant members of the Iranian security forces to key leadership positions, created new grievances against the US to be avenged, and shown Iran’s capacity to wield power through unrestrained military force.

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   In an early sign of the difficulties of selling a deal in Iran, some hardline officials familiar with the contents of the deal have already expressed dissatisfaction with the terms. Upon seeing the agreement, Mahmoud Nabavian, a hawkish Iranian cleric and member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Committee, said “After seeing the text of the agreement, I must say that compared with the two previous versions, it is more damaging and Iran’s retreats have also increased.”

2. RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE PASSED BOTH WORLD WARS IN LENGTH

On June 11, Russia’s war against Ukraine entered its 1569th day, exceeding the length of World War I. The war previously surpassed the duration of Soviet involvement in World War II on January 12, 2026.

On June 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin further illustrated his intention to continue the war by issuing a decree increasing the size of the Russian military to 2.399 million, up from 2.392 million in March.

Takeaways:

1. On Whether Russia Will Seek Peace: Despite its worsening position in the long and intractable conflict, the Kremlin is still unlikely to willingly end the war in Ukraine. Entering into an armistice along the current lines of control would represent a major admission of defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin who views the seizure of the remainder of the Donbas (the final 20% of Donetsk region under Ukrainian control) as a minimum acceptable war aim. Growing Ukrainian military strength casts doubt on whether even the seizure of the Donbas would be a sufficiently convincing victory given Russia’s original aim to “de-militarize” Ukraine. As a result we should expect that Russia will continue to press its war for months to come and will likely choose escalation, through either attempts at mobilization, nuclear saber rattling or threats to NATO member states, over an indecisive end to the war.

2. On Ukraine’s Ability to Win: Successive months of Russian territorial losses, coming on top of mounting casualties, and an intensifying Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has hammered Russian logistics and industrial targets, has sparked growing debate as to whether Ukraine has seized the battlefield initiative and could defeat the Russian military through a cumulative campaign of attrition. While the debate has intensified, the trend lines leading to this moment have been obvious for some time now.

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   In a January 2024 piece for the Wilson Center, entitled “Ukraine Can Win a War of Attrition,” OPFOR Journal’s Dan White argued that given time and continued support from the West, the effects of Western sanctions, Ukraine’s determined defense in depth and intensifying long-range strike campaign, would reach critical mass to give it an advantage over a much larger but less mobilized Russia in a prolonged war. While tactics and technology have evolved since the piece was written, the overall trend of diminishing Russian capability through attrition in manpower and economic capacity has continued. Ukraine, meanwhile, has preserved and even grown its comprehensive national power by developing the world’s most innovative military industrial complex through total society mobilization buttressed by Western military and financial support.

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3. CHINA INTENSIFIES PROVOCATIVE MARITIME PATROLS AROUND TAIWAN

China Conducts “Special Maritime Traffic Law Enforcement Operation” East of Taiwan

Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration announced on June 7 that multiple large Chinese paramilitary vessels had entered waters east of Taiwan as part of a “special maritime traffic law enforcement operation” announced last week to challenge territorial delimitation negotiations between Japan and the Philippines in the area. The group included three cutters of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration’s sea patrol “Hai Xun”—including its largest patrol ship, the 10,000 ton Hai Xun 09— as well as a special purpose firefighting ship Donghaijiu 113, and five ships of the China Coast Guard.

On June 9, Joseph Wu, the Secretary General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, announced that Chinese vessels had attempted to hail foreign vessels in Taiwanese waters, direct their movement, and conduct law enforcement inspections. Chinese state media confirmed these activities, stating:

“During the operation, authorities investigated and addressed various illegal and irregular maritime activities to maintain navigational order, inspected vessels’ navigation aid equipment, and verified the identification code information of passing ships. Maritime law enforcement personnel also conducted patrols of key anchorages, offshore construction areas, high-risk vessel collision warning zones, and waters where submarine power and communication cables are being laid.”

China announced the end of the “special operation” on June 10.

Chinese Ships Enter Restricted Waters Around Taiping Island

On June 11, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration announced that two Chinese vessels entered into prohibited waters around the Taiwanese island of Taiping in the Spratly Island archipelago. The Chinese vessels included the sea patrol ship Sansha Zhi Fa 301 and the supply ship San Sha 2 Hao. The event marked the first time Chinese government vessels entered the restricted territorial waters of the island.

Takeaways:

Both of these moves represent significant steps by China to normalize its control over not only Taiwanese territory, but the broader territorial waters of the South and East China Seas. As noted in the Weekly Significant Activity Report - June 6, 2026, by initiating snap maritime exercises at the site of a border delimitation adjustment by Japan and the Philippines, China is conducting what is effectively its own anti-freedom of navigation patrols. In a sense China is attempting to demonstrate that in the absence of an active US naval presence to challenge its claims, the single prevailing law in the Western Pacific is that of the Chinese Communist Party, with all decisions made on regional maritime issues made in Beijing.

This is not merely conjecture. On May 1, 2026, a new maritime law went into effect in China. The law, initially passed in October 2025, follows a growing push by China’s Supreme People’s Court to settle international maritime disputes in Chinese courts. With an export-driven economy, the world's largest shipbuilding industry, and a rapidly growing navy, China has strong incentives to advance an alternative framework for maritime law that protects its interests and legitimizes its extensive maritime territorial claims that existing international law does not recognize.

4. CHINA ARRESTS US SCHOLAR FOR ESPIONAGE

On June 12, China’s security services announced the arrest of US citizen Min Zin in the city of Kunming on charges of espionage. Min Zin, a PhD candidate at University of California, Berkeley, former Myanmar pro-democracy activist, and founder of the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar, was arrested on June 3 upon arriving in Kunming airport for an event at an area university.

Takeaways:

It is very unusual for China to arrest US citizens on national security related charges. It is possible Min Zin became involved in research on Chinese policy toward Myanmar that ran afoul of local national security laws. However, the timing of the arrest, coming shortly before a June 15-19 state visit to China by Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing, suggests Zin may have been deliberately set up to be arrested at the behest of the Myanmar junta.

5. XI JINPING MAKES RARE STATE VISIT TO NORTH KOREA

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a two-day state visit to North Korea from June 8-9. The trip was Xi’s first visit to North Korea in seven years.

Readouts of the trip featured mutual commitments by China and North Korea to strengthen strategic ties, however nuclear issues and peninsula security were notably absent from discussions.

Takeaways:

1. On the Purpose of the Visit: Overall, the state visit by Xi did not produce any major diplomatic developments, but illustrated China’s enduring interest in keeping constructive relations with North Korea amid Pyongyang’s strategy of diversifying its diplomatic relations. This interest has taken on growing importance in recent years as Kim Jong-un has hedged against dependence on Beijing by forging a new alliance borne of wartime sacrifice with Russia—a bond the North previously shared exclusively with China. The alliance with Russia has helped modernize the North Korean military and contribute to a period of relative economic prosperity. The visit by Xi may have also been used to head off potential diplomatic engagement between the US and North Korea, a goal hinted at in both Washington and Pyongyang since Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025.

2. On the Lack of Emphasis on Denuclearization: The lack of mention of denuclearization by Xi is a major win for Kim Jong-un who has made the expansion and recognition of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal a central priority. That concession by Xi (which could be retracted at a later date) was likely made to head off talks between the US and North Korea, which Pyongyang conditioned on the US’s recognition of its nuclear arsenal.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between May 30, 2026 and June 6, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: US and Iranian forces engaged in multiple armed skirmishes, as Iran launched drones and missiles at its neighbors despite ongoing ceasefire.

2. New reporting suggests Russia has lost territory in Ukraine for two months in a row amid toughening Ukrainian defenses.

3. New reports showed Russia and China advancing the development of two powerful and unusual naval vessels.

4. China escalated maritime disputes with Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines with new patrols near Taiwan and the construction of two unknown structures on Scarborough Shoal.

5. Kim Jong-un inspected North Korea’s most advanced naval destroyer and promised to develop newer and more powerful warships in the next five years.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

The ceasefire between Iran and the US came under increasing strain this week as the two sides engaged in multiple armed skirmishes after Iranian strikes on the Gulf States.

On June 3, Iran launched dozens of drones and missiles against Bahrain and Kuwait. While most of the weapons were intercepted, one Iranian Shahed drone struck Kuwait International Airport resulting in severe damage to its Terminal 1. Iran denied responsibility for the attack.

Between June 5-6, Iran again launched multiple waves of attack drones and missiles at a variety of targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Strait of Hormuz. The US responded by attacking Iranian coastal radars on Qeshem and Goruk Island.

Source: Vahid Online on Telegram

Takeaways:

1. On Iran’s Denials of Striking Kuwait International Airport: While Iran denied responsibility for the attack, claiming the damage was caused by a malfunctioning Patriot Missile interceptor, CCTV footage clearly shows an Iranian Shahed-type drone strike the roof of the airport.

2. On Iranian Regional Retaliation: Iran is using continued attacks on its Gulf State neighbors to keep momentum going for a transformation of regional power away from the US. Hawkish members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and clergy who have grown in influence since the start of the war have become increasingly vocal in their belief that a policy of unrestrained regional bullying is working to reshape control over the Middle East in Tehran’s favor. On June 6, spokesperson for the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ebrahim Rezaei, stated that Iran will retaliate violently against its neighbors for grievances it has about the US presence in the region.

   “We are in the process of establishing an Iranian equation in the region, whereby Iran no longer exercises restraint against any mischief or disorder. It will bring some pain and expense for the Americans, but they will get used to it.”

   Top cleric and Chairman of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli-Larijani also stated on June 6, that Iran would use an end to the war to generate a “strategic transformation” of the region, with greater Iranian influence over its neighboring Islamic countries’ security—presumably achieved through threat of violence and coercion.

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   The top grievances Iran has at the moment are the continued US blockade and Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran appears to be using continued attacks against the Gulf States to send the message that regional security is indivisible and that there will be no return to business as usual as long as Iranian interests are threatened. Iran appears to have focused increasing pressure on Kuwait and Bahrain in recent days as part of this strategy to probe for vulnerabilities in the US alliance system.

2. RUSSIA LOSES TERRITORY IN UKRAINE FOR SECOND MONTH IN A ROW

According to analysis released this week by the Institute for the Study of War, May marked the second consecutive month that Russian forces experienced net territorial losses to Ukrainian counterattacks.

Takeaways:

Russia’s offensive capability has eroded substantially due to months of extremely high casualties that have exceeded replacement rates. Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated defensive in depth and reconnaissance strike complex, facilitated by overwhelming numbers of surveillance and attack drones, has made even the incremental gains from previous Russian offensives extremely difficult to maintain. Illustrative of these advances in Ukrainian defensive capability, on June 4, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces announced that the new unit inflicted 100,000 Russian casualties in the first year of its existence.

Ukrainian defenses have grown so strong that even ardent pro-war Russian military bloggers have begun expressing concerns that further rounds of mobilization may yield increased casualties without major breakthroughs.

3. RUSSIA AND CHINA COMPLETING NEW AND UNUSUAL WARSHIPS

Massive Russian Surface Combatant Begins Final Sea Trials

On June 1, Russian state-media outlet Interfax announced that the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov had begun final sea trials. Assigned to the Northern Fleet, the Admiral Nakhimov will be Russia’s largest and most powerful combat vessel when it enters service sometime in 2027.

Unusual Chinese Submarine Seen Under Construction

A June 3 article in Naval News identified a new type of “sailless” submarine under construction at JN Shipyard in Shanghai. Author H. I. Sutton assessed the dimensions of the vessel to be approximately the size of a standard US Virginia-class submarine at 120m long and 10-11m wide, with the distinct difference between the two vessels being the Chinese submarine’s lack of a prominent top “sail.” The author suggests a second vessel of a similar design is under construction at the Huludao shipyard at Bohai.

Takeaways:

1. On the Capabilities of the Admiral Nakhimov: There is no official confirmation about the ship’s official weapons systems, however, prominent Russian defense publication TopWar.ru, suggests the ship will have capacity for about 192 missiles and torpedoes: “Preliminary reports, as there is no official confirmation, indicate that the ship received 80 UKSK slots for Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles, as well as Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, 92 (probably) S-300FM air defense missile silos, and 20 533mm torpedoes or Vodopad anti-submarine missiles.”

2. On the Design of the Chinese Submarine: The concept of a sailless submarine is rare, though not entirely novel, with Chinese, Russian and Western navies previously experimenting with low-profile top sails. As Sutton notes, the design of this particular boat suggests it is a new class of nuclear attack submarine, with the lack of a top sail used to increase its underwater speed and stealth.

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4. CHINA ESCALATING MARITIME BATTLES WITH TAIWAN, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES

Chinese Construction Detected on Scarborough Shoal

On May 30, the Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. announced on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue that Manila was investigating new information that China is constructing infrastructure on the Chinese-occupied Philippine waters of Scarborough Shoal (AKA Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc). Teodoro Jr.’s claims of Chinese construction were quickly validated by satellite imagery that showed two man-made objects located at the southern entrance of a lagoon on the shoal.

Standoff Near Taiwan’s Pratas/Dongsha Island Continues

On June 6, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration stated that for the first time a Chinese survey ship “Maritime Silk Road 6” escorted by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel forced their way into the territorial waters of Taiwan’s Pratas/Dongsha Island.

China Launches “Special Law Enforcement Operation” in Waters East of Taiwan

On June 6, China’s Ministry of Transportation announced a “special law enforcement operation” in the waters east of Taiwan in response to recent plans by Japan and the Philippines to delimit the maritime borders of their exclusive economic zones—an action China demands a say in due to its claims to Taiwan and the broader regional waterways.

Takeaways:

1. On Chinese Construction At Scarborough Shoal: Continued construction on Scarborough Shoal would represent a major escalation in China’s efforts to seize the territorial waters of the Philippines in violation of the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, which denied Beijing’s claims to the region. This latest move follows increasingly aggressive behavior by China near Scarborough Shoal over the past year, including numerous violent incidents against Philippine mariners and a unilateral declaration in September 2025 that Scarborough Shoal would be transformed into a Chinese national wildlife refuge and nature preserve.

2. On Chinese Patrols Near Pratas/Dongsha Island: This week’s patrol marks the second major standoff between the Chinese and Taiwanese coast guards near the island in just over a week. The recent incidents exemplify the growing frequency and intensity of maritime encounters near the island. On June 1, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that since 2024, China has increased the number of maritime patrols intruding into Taiwanese territorial waters near Pratas/Dongsha Island to more than 30 annually.

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   As noted in last week’s Significant Activity Report, China views Pratas/Dongsha as part of Taiwan’s weak underbelly. It is using continuous probes of the island to test the broader readiness of the Taiwanese coast guard and military to respond to threats.

3. On the New “Special Law Enforcement Operation”: China appears to have launched maritime patrols in the region Japan and the Philippines are working to delimit (i.e. negotiating adjustments to borders where there are overlapping claims) because of additional overlap with Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone.1 Because China claims Taiwan, it views actions that impact Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty as an affront to its own. Further, Beijing, which holds expansive claims over the South and East China Seas, is unlikely to accept Japan—whose relations with Beijing have grown increasingly hostile under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi—setting new maritime rules in the region.

5. KIM JONG-UN INSPECTS NEWEST DESTROYER AND HINTS AT NEW TYPES OF WARSHIPS TO COME

On June 4, Kim Jong-un inspected the North Korean Navy’s 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyer Kang Kon, the second of two advanced warships Pyongyang launched within the last two years. During the visit Kim suggested Pyongyang would soon embark on the production of more advanced warships. According to Korean Central News Agency:

“Comrade Kim Jong Un expressed great trust and expectation that the vast plans for bolstering up the warship force, including the development and production of underwater secret weapons and the building of 10,000-tonnage destroyers under the five-year plan for modernizing the Navy approved by the Ninth Congress of the WPK, would be surely carried out by our reliable and powerful defence science research group, self-supporting shipbuilding industry and competent and intelligent workers in the munitions industry.”

Takeaways:

The visit to the Kang Kon appeared to roughly coincide with the one year anniversary of the ship’s capsizing during launch, an effort to demonstrate the ship was fully functional. The visit also preceded the upcoming June 8-9 state visit to Pyongyang by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and may have been an attempt to assert North Korea’s growing capability as a regional power. In this regard, the move to inspect a Choe Hyon-class destroyer may have also been especially symbolic as the ship is widely suspected of being developed with Russian technical assistance.

It is also worth noting that Kim Jong-un’s daughter, and presumed successor Ju-ae, accompanied her father on the inspection.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed in May 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. An operative of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps indicted for global terror plots, also planned assassinations of the Trump family.

2. Cuba has expanded security and intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, and Iran, including the expansion of spy bases and purchase of attack drones.

3. The mayor of a city in Los Angeles County pleaded guilty to serving as an illegal foreign agent of China.

4. A new report suggests hackers from Iran are behind recent cyber intrusions that compromised safety monitors at fueling stations.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

5. A new report highlighted the role of Russia’s “Social Design Agency” in provoking civil unrest and election manipulation in Europe, efforts which may soon be replicated in America given the organization’s previous activities.

1. INDICTED IRANIAN OPERATIVE PLANNED ATTACK ON PRESIDENT’S FAMILY

A report by the New York Post alleges that Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, an Iraqi-Iranian operative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), detained in Turkey on May 15 and extradited to the US had plans to assassinate Ivanka Trump, the daughter of President Trump and wife of special envoy Jared Kushner. The plot was conceived as revenge for the US’s assassination of Qasem Soleimani.

Al-Saadi has been indicted for his role in planning and coordinating attacks on American and Israeli interests as well as Jews across Europe and had attempted to carry out attacks in the US. According to a statement by the US Department of Justice:

“Al-Saadi has helped plan and direct approximately 18 attacks and attempted attacks across Europe on behalf of those terrorist organizations (the “European Terrorist Attacks”). Those attacks were carried out in the name of a purportedly new terrorist group with the pseudonym Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, which is actually a front of Kata’ib Hizballah and other U.S. designated FTOs.

“In addition, in or about March and April 2026, Al-Saadi attempted to carry out attacks in the United States, including against a synagogue in New York, New York. Most recently, on or about April 30, Al-Saadi tried to find someone in the United States who could carry out a terrorist attack and kill or injure individuals here.”

Additional Information:

1. The indictment provides additional public insight into the nature of recent Iranian overseas proxy operations by labeling the group “Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya,” an elaborate cover for Kaitab Hezbollah, an Iraqi paramilitary group sponsored by Iran’s IRGC. As noted in previous Homeland Security Briefs for March and April, Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya has claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on Jews and Iranian dissidents and American and Israeli interests across Europe. The connection with Al-Saadi and Kaitab Hezbollah reveals that Iranian forces have been much more directly involved in violent and disruptive incidents in Europe than previously publicly acknowledged, and that Iran has been attempting to export such activities to the US with less success.

2. According to George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, Iran has both plotted and conducted assassinations against Iranian dissidents and an array of other perceived threats within the US since 1980. But the regime has become brazen in its target selection in recent years, elevating its preference for targets to top government officials in the wake of the killing of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. Since then Iran has engaged in multiple plots to target Donald Trump and members of his first administration.

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   On March 6, 2026, Pakistani national Asif Merchant was convicted of attempting to arrange murder-for-hire schemes in the US targeting President Trump. Like Al-Saadi, Merchant served as a third-country national operative of the IRGC. Both cases illustrate a common tactic in Iran’s proxy operations in the West, the use of multiple layers of proxies to distance Iranian nationals from being implicated in terrorist plots. In these and other cases the IRGC has attempted to utilize vetted operatives from third countries to coordinate local actors, often from criminal organizations or disaffected groups, to carry out violent attacks or other forms of direct action.

2. ROLE OF RUSSIA, CHINA, AND IRAN AS TOP CUBAN SECURITY PARTNERS COMES UNDER SCRUTINY AMID INTENSIFYING US PRESSURE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ISLAND

Russia and Iran Have Been Supplying Cuba with Long-Range Attack Drones

According to a May 17 report by Axios, the US intelligence community assesses that Cuba has received over 300 Shahed-type drones from Russia and Iran since 2023. The Cuban military has allegedly considered plans for using the drones to attack the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, as well as additional military targets in Key West and the Caribbean.

Russia and China Expanding Listening Posts in Cuba

According to a May 22 report by the Wall Street Journal, both China and Russia have greatly increased the number of intelligence officers and support personnel to their signals intelligence collection sites in Cuba since 2023. According to the report, China maintains three signals intelligence sites on the island while Russia maintains two.

Additional Information:

1. First and foremost, it is worth noting that the intelligence assessments released this month come amid a mounting campaign of political and economic pressure on Cuba by the US, and do not necessarily reflect new imminent threats to US homeland security. Nevertheless Russia, China, and Iran have strong incentives to provide Cuba with security assistance which may directly or indirectly pose future threats to US homeland security.

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   Cuba is Russia’s most consequential ally in Latin America. Cuba has historically served as both a security partner for Moscow and a hub for regional influence. Cubans today are believed to make up the largest number of foreign fighters in Russia’s war in Ukraine, with a force of up to 5,000 Cuban “volunteers” continuously deployed with the Russian armed forces in combat. Havana’s importance to Moscow has grown in the wake of the US operation to arrest former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

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   China similarly views Cuba as important, though ultimately not an essential partner in the region. Cuba provides Beijing with a geopolitical foothold near US shores and a presence in security cooperation in Latin America. The growing importance of the region to China’s global interests is evident in China’s decision to release a new official policy paper on engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (its first in nine years) only five days after the release of the 2025 US National Security Strategy which invoked a return of the Monroe Doctrine.

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   Iran and its proxy Hezbollah have cultivated ties with Cuba and Venezuela as well as other anti-American dictatorships in Latin America since the early 2000s. While much of its previous cooperation focused on financing IRGC operations through regional drug trafficking and money laundering, Iran has new incentives to both arm Cuba and use the island as staging ground for its own proxy operations against the US homeland as revenge for US attacks and to establish leverage to deter future US military operations.

2. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China has been expanding and redeveloping the Cold War-era Bejucal signals intelligence facility since 2014. The expansion has included the building of multiple new circularly disposed antenna arrays and probable infrastructure for more advanced electronic surveillance. Russia’s primary spy base in Cuba is the Lourdes electronic warfare center located near Havana. Lourdes is a Cold War-era signals intelligence base which Russia reopened in 2014 as part of an agreement to write off 90% of Cuba’s debt, as a retaliatory measure for deteriorating relations with the US after the Russian seizure of Crimea.

3. In March 2026, prominent Russian military blogger “Rybar” (the alias of Mikhail Zvinchuk, a former press officer for Russia’s Ministry of Defense) suggested that based on lessons Russia and Iran had learned from their own drone wars, Cuba could use Shahed-type drones most effectively in a confrontation with the US to not only strike military targets but to wreak havoc on critical infrastructure by striking data centers and threatening regional airports to snarl air travel. While Rybar is not a government official, the extremely popular Telegram account with 1.5 million followers receives substantial information and financial support from the Russian military and defense sector, suggesting familiarity with official plans—including the presence of Russian drones in the country two months before public acknowledgement by the US.

   

3. LA COUNTY MAYOR PLEADS GUILTY TO ACTING AS A CHINESE FOREIGN AGENT

On May 11, the Department of Justice announced that Eileen Wang, the Mayor of the City of Arcadia, in Los Angeles County, California, will plead guilty to operating as an illegal foreign agent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Wang was first elected to the Arcadia City Council in November 2022, and was selected to serve as Mayor through December 2026 through the council’s leadership rotation.

As part of her plea agreement Wang admitted to working with Chinese officials to promote pro-PRC narratives in the US, through a news website catering to Chinese-American communities called “U.S. News Center,” between 2020 and 2022. Wang denies that her conduct continued after being elected.

Additional Information:

1. Eileen Wang’s denials that she either continued her illegal operations on behalf of the PRC after her election or moved beyond republishing propaganda deserve further scrutiny. Wang operated with multiple co-conspirators including her long-time political advisor Yaoning “Mike” Sun, and a high-level PRC intelligence operative “John” Chen Jun. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief - February 2026, both Sun and Chen engaged in aggressive efforts to not only spread PRC propaganda but to surveil and intimidate local Chinese communities in Southern California on behalf of intelligence operatives affiliated with the PRC’s Los Angeles Consulate into 2024. Further, as part of his plea agreement, Sun claims to have brought Wang to a meeting with PRC officials in December 2022, one month after her election, in which he claimed both he and Wang were dedicated to advancing PRC interests.

2. Illustrative of the growing extent of China’s transnational repression is that only two days after Wang pleaded guilty, a 64 year-old Chinese-American man “Harry” Lu Jianwang, was convicted of serving as an illegal foreign agent of the PRC in federal court in Brooklyn. In that case, Lu and a co-defendant, Chen Jinping, helped operate an illegal overseas “police station” for China’s Ministry of Public Security in Manhattan’s Chinatown neighborhood. Chen pleaded guilty to conspiring to act as an illegal foreign agent of the PRC in December 2024.

4. SUSPECTED IRANIAN CYBER OPERATIVES HACKED SAFETY MONITORS AT US GAS STATIONS

A May 15 report by CNN alleged that US officials believe that Iranian threat actors were involved in a series of cyber intrusions into automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems that monitor the amount of fuel in fuel tanks at gas stations across several US states. While no damage has yet been observed from the hack, the hacks could have allowed gas leaks to go undetected and potentially cause catastrophic explosions. Some experts see the incident as the first step toward a “kinetic” cyber attack in which malicious digital disruptions result in real-world destruction.

Additional Information:

As noted in the CNN report, and cited in a 2021 report by the UK’s Sky News, Iranian actors have previously singled out ATGs as attractive targets for cyber attacks due to a combination of perceived vulnerability to intrusion, and capacity to result in substantial physical damage. Iranian actors have pursued similar easy-to-access, single points of system failure in other forms of critical infrastructure. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief - April, this has included programmable logic controllers governing water and wastewater facilities at small municipal systems.

5. RUSSIAN OPERATIVES CONDUCTING HATE CRIMES AND ELECTION INFLUENCE OPS ACROSS EUROPE

A May 24 report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) has found that leaked documents obtained from Russia’s Social Design Agency (SDA), a Kremlin-led intelligence task force fronting as a public relations firm, show Russian operatives have been behind a series of vandalism incidents and hate crimes in Europe used to stoke civil unrest. Notable operations executed by SDA in recent months included the May 2025 defacement of the Paris Holocaust Museum and three local synagogues with green paint and the September 2025 vandalism of nine Paris mosques and Islamic cultural centers with pig heads.

Additional Information:

In addition to fomenting civil unrest, a major long-running project for Russia’s SDA is conducting election influence operations. As noted in the OCCRP report, the SDA has employed sophisticated disinformation operations ahead of Armenia’s nationwide election in June to discredit the party of pro-Western Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The lessons learned from that campaign are likely to be used against the US in the upcoming 2026 midterm election. In September 2024 the US Department of Justice announced it had disrupted a plot by the SDA to spread disinformation about US support to Ukraine across US social media outlets ahead of the 2024 general election.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between May 23, 2026 and May 30, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: Iran’s internet blackout was lifted; no war-ending deal reached despite repeated US claims of near breakthrough; US and Iranian forces engaged in multiple armed skirmishes despite ongoing ceasefire.

2. For the third time, Russia launched an “Oreshnik” intermediate-range ballistic missile at Ukraine.

3. A Russian Shahed-type drone struck an apartment building and exploded in Romania.

4. Taiwan announced it has observed an uptick in Chinese maritime patrols near the island since the Xi-Trump Summit in mid-May.

5. North Korea announced the successful test of a new “AI-enabled” missile.

6. New reporting indicated that North Korea introduced a shoot-to-kill policy to crack down on unauthorized crossings of its northern border with China.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Internet Blackout Ends (Mostly)

According to monitoring organization Netblocks, internet connectivity was broadly restored across Iran on May 26.

Deal or No Deal with Iran

This week featured continual US claims and repeated Iranian denials that a deal to end the war was imminent. As of May 30, no deal to end the war has been reached.

US and Iran Skirmish Despite Ceasefire

US and Iranian forces engaged in multiple armed skirmishes this week despite the official ceasefire.

On May 25, US aircraft attacked several Iranian attack boats and missile sites in the vicinity of Larak island in the Strait of Hormuz in response to threatened Iranian attacks. Between May 27 and 28, Iran launched a ballistic missile at US bases in Kuwait and five additional one-way attack drones at US forces operating near the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in American retaliatory strikes on Bandar Abbas. On May 30, Iran again launched a ballistic missile at Kuwait, striking the US’s Ali Al Salem Air Base. The attack reportedly resulted in multiple American casualties and damage to two MQ-9 drones.

Takeaways:

1. On Iran’s Internet Restoration: While connectivity has largely returned, Iran’s future internet appears poised to be permanently heavily restricted and censored. In a May 23 interview, Mohammad Sarafraz, a member of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, announced that Iran has imported advanced Chinese technology to more closely monitor and control the country’s internet.

2. On a War-Ending Deal: The White House has repeatedly teased an imminent deal to end the war with Iran for nearly a week. The delay is almost certainly the result of Iran’s unwillingness to cede to any US conditions when it feels that its continuing survival and control over maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz positions it to dictate terms. It is also likely that the regime doesn’t trust that the US will honor any deal over the long-term and sees little reason to settle when it has leverage. The repeated drone and missile attacks attest to Iran’s willingness to push the limits of the ceasefire to demonstrate that it is the US that is most interested in preserving the ceasefire to avoid another round of fighting.

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   The White House’s strategy to force Iran to negotiate an end to the war through a prolonged economic blockade may not meaningfully influence the decision-making of the hardline elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and clerical establishment whose grip on power appears to have solidified after US decapitating strikes vacated top leadership positions. Ideological hardliners and members of the regime’s security forces naturally derive power and legitimacy from conflict with the US. Further, the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz has provided vindication that their preferred policy of unrestrained regional retaliation is an effective tool for countering American aggression. These elements of the Iranian state, responsible for both recently massacring thousands of their own citizens and cutting the entire country off the internet, do not care about the economic well-being of the country as long as they are able to retain their grip on power. The economic blockade by itself is unlikely to loosen that control over a timeline acceptable to the current US administration, as the regime has long experience insulating its core sources of coercive power from US sanctions.

2. RUSSIA LAUNCHES THIRD ORESHNIK MISSILE AT UKRAINE

On May 24, the Russian military launched an “Oreshnik” intermediate-range ballistic missile at Kyiv oblast, amid a massive air assault on the capital and other major cities involving 600 drones and 90 missiles. This was the third use of the new nuclear-capable missile in Ukraine since November 2024.

Re-entry vehicles from the Oreshnik dispersing upon descent. Source: United24Media

Takeaways:

1. On The Unusual Appearance of an Oreshnik Strike: The individual clusters of projectiles streaking toward the ground in the video above are components of multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). When employed as a nuclear weapon, the MIRVs would each carry an individual nuclear warhead. However, in its current setting the MIRVs appear to carry little to no explosive material, relying primarily on kinetic energy to damage infrastructure. The lack of explosive material is possibly due to weight restrictions (nuclear warheads tend to weigh less than large conventional explosives.)

   

2. On a Possible Second Oreshnik Strike: There are numerous indications—one of which being assertions by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—that Russia launched a second Oreshnik at Ukraine. The second missile appears to have either failed in flight or fallen short of its target. Multiple reports suggest the missile may have landed in occupied Donetsk.

3. On the Oreshnik’s Novelty: Ukrainian specialists have found evidence suggesting the “new” Oreshnik missile was manufactured as a modified version of the RS-26 “Rubezh” road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017. While this news has been primarily taken as evidence that the Russian wonder weapon is not as cutting-edge as the Russian government portrays, the more significant takeaway from this information is that the weapon—whose range and capabilities violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)—was developed long before Russia’s August 4, 2025 treaty withdrawal. It is the latest evidence that suggests long-running and systemic violations of arms control agreements by the Kremlin. This revelation is important for US policymakers to consider as both countries seek to restore some bilateral arms control after the collapse of the INF and New Start Treaties over the past year.

3. RUSSIAN ATTACK DRONE STRIKES ROMANIAN APARTMENT BUILDING

On May 29, a Russian one-way attack drone crossed into Romanian airspace during an air assault on Ukraine, striking the roof of an apartment building in the city of Galati and exploding. The strike injured two and caused a fire which forced the evacuation of the building. In response, Bucharest launched Article 4 consultations with NATO allies, closed the Russian consulate in Constanta and expelled its consul general.

Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that it is impossible to know whose drone it was until “objective data” could be obtained and analyzed.

Aftermath of Russian drone strike in Galati, Romania. Source: Intel Slava on Telegram

Takeaways:

1. On Russian Drone Incursions into NATO Territory: Russian drones have repeatedly violated the airspace and landed on the territory of Romania and nearby Moldova amid attacks on western Ukraine. In one previous instance in November 2025, a Russian reconnaissance drone crashed into a house in Moldova’s Floresti district. However, this is the first time an explosive-filled attack drone struck either country.

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   This is only the most serious of a growing number of Russian drone incursions into the territory of NATO member states over the past year. And these incidents have ticked up amid increasingly provocative rhetoric and posturing by the Kremlin toward the Baltic States and Moldova in 2026.

2. On How These Incursions Fit in a Broader Context of Increasing Aggression Toward NATO: The previous territorial violations by Russian drones and Russia’s broader campaign of sabotage and intimidation in Europe, including thwarted plots to bomb commercial aviation, mean that this incident should not be assumed to be a one-off accident. As a result, NATO must take the incident as a serious provocation by Russia and strengthen its air defenses, including considering whether to extend an air defense buffer zone into Ukrainian airspace, where drones can be shot down prior to reaching NATO borders.

4. CHINA RAMPS UP MARITIME PATROLS NEAR TAIWAN

Taiwan’s Security Council Chief Says China Has Boosted Maritime Activities Since Xi-Trump Summit

On May 23, Joseph Wu, the Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, announced that Taiwan has observed a considerable uptick in Chinese maritime activity near its shores, with 100 vessels deployed in the East and South China Seas since President Trump’s state visit to China.

Coast Guards of China and Taiwan Engage in Standoff Near Taiwanese Islands

On May 23, ships of the coast guards of China and Taiwan engaged in a prolonged standoff near the Taiwanese Pratas/Dongsha Islands in the South China Sea. A noteworthy radio exchange between the vessels included the Taiwan Coast Guard radioing to its Chinese counterpart: “Please do not destroy peace. You should return and strive for democracy. That is ‌the correct ⁠way to serve your country.”

Takeaways:

1. On Ties Between Increased Maritime Activity and Xi-Trump Summit: It is difficult to say whether the broader increase in Chinese maritime activity is directly tied to President Trump’s visit to China and ongoing refusal to approve a pending arms sale to the island nation. This is because China has been increasing the size of its navy and the operational tempo of its maritime forces for years now and has been conducting a number of significant training exercises so far this spring.

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   However, there is considerable evidence that China has indeed seized upon the US President’s comments casting doubt on US military assistance to Taiwan, incorporating them into its cognitive warfare operations aimed to instill a sense of hopelessness and abandonment in the island’s population. On May 25, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau announced that it has flagged more than 100 social media accounts and 9,000 messages associated with Chinese actors pushing narratives casting doubt on the US’s security commitments since the Xi-Trump meeting.

2. On Chinese Patrols at Pratas Island: China frequently tests Taiwan’s responses to air and maritime patrols near the Pratas/Dongsha Island. In January 2026, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theater Command announced that it would begin conducting regular aerial patrols near the island with drones. The constant testing of the island’s defenses is due to its strategic location in the northern reaches of the South China Sea. China wants control of Dongsha to both better project power into the South China Sea and to isolate the Taiwanese main island. Moreover, the island is a Taiwanese national park with limited military presence, and China may be eager to gauge Taiwan’s responses to incursions in the area as a proxy for the overall readiness of the Taiwanese armed forces.

5. NORTH KOREA TESTS NEW MISSILE AND ROCKET SYSTEMS

On May 27, North Korea announced that it had conducted a successful test of a new “tactical cruise missile” and lightweight multi-purpose rocket launch system. According to Korean Central News Agency, the tactical cruise missile employs cutting-edge technology including AI for both in-flight navigation and terminal guidance.

“The tactical cruising shell [sic], which has a combination of the ultra-precision autonomous navigation system and the TERCOM (terrain contour matching) navigation system and employed an AI terminal guidance function, is a powerful weapon system that can strike in an ultra-precision way any target 100 kilometers away by multimode flight based on gliding and propelling.”

This is the eighth major missile test by North Korea this year.

Takeaways:

North Korea has made multiple claims to have developed AI-enhanced weapons systems over the past year. In March 2025, North Korea reported the successful test of an “AI-enabled” attack drone. This was followed in September by a major policy announcement by Kim Jong-un that North Korea would make the integration of AI into unmanned systems its top strategic priority. While these supposed breakthroughs in frontier military technology should be received with some skepticism due to North Korea’s economic backwardness, Pyongyang has shown it can effectively direct its limited resources to produce some high-end weapons and technological systems.

Investigations by the Stimson Center’s 38 North have documented extensive efforts by North Korea to develop international networks for gathering technology and know-how on artificial intelligence for years. Many of these networks run through China, where North Koreans have developed elaborate smuggling operations to obtain high-end chips and computers for the country’s military.

6. NORTH KOREA INTRODUCES SHOOT TO KILL POLICY ON NORTHERN BORDER

According to a May 29 report by Daily NK, North Korea’s State Information Bureau has ordered North Korean border security units to violently crack down on attempts to cross the northern border with China through a new shoot-on-sight policy. The crackdown on cross-border movements also includes stepped up coordination with Chinese law enforcement and increased internal surveillance.

Takeaways:

This latest crack down marks a major escalation of Kim Jong-un’s years-long campaign to seal the North Korean border with China. This campaign has included the building of a massive series of border fences since the Covid-19 pandemic, and the mass employment of radio frequency detectors by law enforcement to root out North Koreans attempting to call family members across the Chinese border.

Like many things in North Korea, there is not enough information about the regime’s decision-making to understand the timing of this move, however, it is clear that the Kim regime sees a porous northern border as a major strategic liability. The fear of defection to South Korea however, does not appear to be the dominant fear driving the crackdown, as such defections have dropped dramatically since 2020. Economic opportunity in China instead appears to be the top concern as it is the predominant driver of unauthorized cross-border migration. Income earned in China threatens the regime’s absolute control over the population by giving North Koreans both an alternative source of subsistence independent of the government and exposure to the dramatic contrast in living standards between the countries.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between May 16, 2026 and May 23, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: nationwide internet blackout continued; Iranian proxies attacked the UAE’s Barakah Nuclear Power Plant; Iran announced expansive new boundaries for its control over the Strait of Hormuz; Iranian leaders gave multiple indications that they will not compromise on key issues in negotiations with the US; the IRGC issued new warnings that it will launch even more widespread attacks in the event of renewed hostilities with the US.

2. Russia conducted major military exercises involving its strategic forces which featured the deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory.

3. China hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin for a state visit from May 19-20.

4. A delegation of North Korean officials toured a drone factory in Russia’s far east as part of growing military and economic ties between the two countries.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Internet Blackout Exceeds 12 Weeks

According to the internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, May 16 marked 85 days of a near-total internet blackout in Iran.

Deputy head of the Iranian parliament’s cultural committee, Ali Yazdikhah, asserted this week that the internet shutdown would continue indefinitely, due to ongoing national security threats.

Suspected Iranian Drone Attacks Nuclear Power Plant in the UAE

On May 17, the UAE reported a drone strike on the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant complex in Abu Dhabi. According to senior UAE official Anwar Gargash, the drone, which entered the country from Iraq, is believed to have been launched by an Iranian proxy group.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei rebuffed the assertion, suggesting the attack was a false-flag operation conducted by Israel, and complained of blatant double standards regarding attacks on nuclear facilities.

“The hypocrisy is obvious. Open attacks by the United States and the Israeli regime on Iran’s secured nuclear facilities do not provoke condemnation, but rather excuses and justifications. Yet when a supposed false-flag operation takes place—one whose authorship even the UAE has refused to officially attribute to Iran—those same voices suddenly invoke the solemn language of ‘international law’ and ‘regional security.’”

New Government Organization Announces Expansive Area of Control Over Hormuz Waterway

On May 20, a new Iranian government organization, the “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” dedicated to controlling and extracting fees from maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, issued new definitions for the boundaries of the waterway under the control of the Iranian armed forces.

Top Iranian Leaders Rule Out Compromise with the US

A May 21 report by Reuters states that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has ruled out any deal with the US to remove Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the country.

In talks with Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir in Tehran on May 22, Iranian Parliamentary speaker and chief negotiator, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, announced that Iran would not compromise with the US on any of its core national interests.

The IRGC Warns New War Will be Transnational

A new statement issued on May 20 by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) warned that it will expand the war outside the region in the event of a resumption of hostilities.

“The American-Zionist enemy, who has not learned from the repeated major and strategic defeats by the Islamic Revolution and has once again opened its mouth to threats, should know that although they attacked us with the full capabilities of two armies, which are the most expensive armies in the world, we have not yet deployed all the capacities of the Islamic Revolution against them.

“But now, if the aggression against Iran is repeated, the regional war that was promised will this time extend beyond the region, and our crushing blows in places you do not expect will bring you to utter ruin.

“We are men of war, and you will see our power on the battlefield, not in empty statements and social media pages.“

Takeaways:

1. On Iran’s Continued Internet Shutdown: Iran’s internet shutdown continues to wreak havoc on the Iranian economy with as much as 80% of online businesses in the country suffering sales declines of 50% or more according to the head of Iran’s Electronic Commerce Association, Nima Ghazi.

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   The deliberate self-harm inflicted by the continued internet shutdown, risking as many as 10 million jobs in an already deeply damaged economy, is a telling sign that the Iranian regime remains deeply insecure and is not yet convinced that it has emerged from the war victorious.

2. On Nuclear Power Plant Attacks: The attack on Barakah by Iranian proxies may have been a means of signaling that Iran is willing to launch dramatic new attacks against its Arab neighbors in the event of resumption of war. Tehran may even assess that such attacks are justified and proportional responses to strikes on its own nuclear facilities. However, it must be noted that attacks on nuclear power plants are qualitatively different and substantially more risky targets than the Iranian enrichment and research facilities that were attacked by the US and Israel in previous rounds of fighting. Iran’s single nuclear power plant at Bushehr has notably been spared by US and Israeli strikes. This is because, while highly enriched uranium is considerably more radioactive than naturally occurring uranium, the radiological hazards from any release of the material remain relatively localized. However, the risk increases dramatically once enriched uranium is converted into fuel rods and used to sustain nuclear fission in a reactor.

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   An imperfect but nevertheless constructive model for conceptualizing the difference in danger posed by attacks on an enrichment facility versus a nuclear power plant involves comparisons between accidents at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, and the Chornobyl and Fukushima nuclear power plants in Ukraine, and Japan respectively. Rocky Flats, a Cold War facility that produced plutonium "pits" for nuclear warheads, suffered hundreds of fires during its existence, including a dramatic six-hour long fire in 1969 that engulfed a storage area containing over 1,400 kg of plutonium.1 That fire, and the 41,000 gallons of water required to extinguish it, spread radioactive material into the surrounding air, soil, and water table. Yet despite occurring within the Denver metropolitan area, the accident did not produce a humanitarian catastrophe. The site has since been largely converted into a popular, publicly accessible wildlife refuge. Accidents at Chornobyl and Fukushima by contrast, resulted in major disasters that required the implementation of large government-mandated exclusion zones.

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   This does not suggest that strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites are without risk or should be taken lightly. Attacks on centrifuges and stockpiles of nuclear materials do carry non-negligible risks of localized radioactive fallout, though in Iran these risks are likely mitigated by the fact that such sites are buried deep underground. Nevertheless such actions are far less provocative and dangerous than the recent attack at Barakah, and Russia’s own pattern of attacks on the Chornobyl site and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.

3. On Iran’s Negotiating Position: It is difficult to assess whether Iran's public declarations of unwillingness to compromise, combined with its tightening grip on the Strait of Hormuz, reflect a negotiating tactic or genuinely irresolvable intransigence. This ambiguity is compounded by conflicting signals from regime officials, including reports refuting the claim that Supreme Leader Khamenei ordered the preservation of all nuclear materials, as well as uncertainty over who holds the authority to make final decisions given the Supreme Leader's prolonged public absence.

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   While the US and Iran have both claimed substantial progress in formulating an “Islamabad Declaration” to end hostilities and pave the way for negotiations on broader issues such as Iran’s nuclear stockpile, the two sides still appear set on achieving fundamentally different outcomes from the war. This dynamic, combined with mixed signals from Iranian officials and continued regional threats by Iranian proxies, raise the likelihood of a return to open conflict. Sunday, May 24 may be a decisive day which could see either a provisional agreement reached or a resumption of military operations.

4. On Threats to Expand War: According to Iranian independent media outlet IranWire, top Iranian clerics echoed the IRGC’s threats to expand Iranian retaliation beyond the Middle East during Friday prayers on May 22. The increasingly aggressive rhetoric may indicate that the Iranian regime believes that the US is moving toward resuming hostilities and represents an attempt to bolster waning deterrence.

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   It’s not clear to what extent Iran has either the capabilities or strategic interest in expanding the war beyond the current theater of operations. Iranian attacks on its non-Arab neighbors such as Turkey and Azerbaijan in March—likely the result of command and control issues stemming from US and Israeli decapitating strikes—triggered intense backlash from Ankara and Baku. The attacks notably prompted NATO to increase its force posture in southern Turkey. Recent reporting has suggested that Iran’s attacks on members of the Gulf Cooperation Council resulted in the UAE and Saudi Arabia increasing their military involvement in the US-Israeli war rather than backing down. Months of violent incidents by Iranian proxies in Europe have similarly hardened the position of many European countries against the Iranian regime and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These circumstances taken together suggest Iran could face significant blowback if it follows through on its threats to take a future war global.

2. RUSSIA CONDUCTS MAJOR NUCLEAR EXERCISES

The Russian military conducted major military exercises testing the readiness of its strategic nuclear forces between May 19-21. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the exercises involved, “64,000 troops, more than 7,800 units of military hardware, including over 200 missile launchers, more than 140 aircraft, 73 surface ships, and 13 submarines, including 8 strategic missile submarines,” spanning multiple military commands.

A key feature of the exercises was joint training with the Belarusian military on the territory of Belarus involving drills on pre-emptive strikes involving non-strategic nuclear weapons. Live Russian nuclear-armed Iskander-M missiles were deployed to field depots in Belarus as part of the training.

The Belarusian military training alongside the Russian military handling an alleged nuclear-armed Iskander-M ballistic missile. Source: Russian Ministry of Defense.

Takeaways:

1. On the Timing and Purpose of the Exercises: As prominent analyst of Russia’s strategic forces, Pavel Podvig, notes, the exercises were unusual in both their timing (conducted in the spring rather than in the fall) as well as in their declared objective of preparing a nuclear response “under conditions of a threat of aggression,” rather than in direct retaliation for an attack. The timing may be an aberration, however, as Podvig points out that airspace closures for the exercises were initially planned to coincide with Russia’s Victory Day celebrations between May 9-11. This suggests the exercises may have originally been planned as a show of force to compensate for Russia’s downgraded Victory Parades, but suffered unanticipated delays. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that Russia did conduct a successful test of its Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on May 12. The test of Russia’s much-vaunted, next generation ICBM may have been conceived as a grand finale for the exercises.

2. On Belarusian Involvement: Russia has used Belarus to stage its initial invasion of Ukraine, conduct strikes on Ukrainian territory, and threaten the West. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has for years resisted Russian pressure to enter the war and may be coming under additional pressure to do so to open a new front to relieve pressure on beleaguered Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. Lukashenko has good reason to want to avoid becoming engaged in the war as the Belarusian military is far less well equipped and experienced than that of Ukraine. Such a war would also likely become extremely unpopular in the country, and could result in the weakening and disillusionment of its military, conditions which could jeopardize the leader’s grip on power. Statements by Lukashenko to Belarusian state media on May 21 downplayed the risk of conflict with Ukraine and suggest he continues to seek to avoid direct involvement in the war.

3. CHINA HOSTS PUTIN FOR STATE VISIT

Russian President Vladimir Putin conducted a state visit to China between May 19-20. The visit coincided with the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the two countries. The visit came less than a week after a state visit by US President Donald Trump to Beijing.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Arrival in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Source: Kremlin Novosti on Telegram

Presidents Putin and Xi held talks spanning a broad range of issues central to their strategic partnership. Russian and Chinese officials signed around 40 documents during the visit, including agreements to expand trade, academic exchanges and joint research, as well as policy frameworks for expanding strategic cooperation.

Takeaways:

1. On The Growing Number of High Profile Diplomatic Gatherings in China: Chinese state media has used Putin’s visit—coming on the heels of President Trump's state visit a week earlier—to portray Xi Jinping as a paramount figure in global diplomacy, one sought out by the world's most powerful leaders to mediate disputes and counterbalance their rivals. To some extent, this is a reasonable assessment as global leaders have made their way to China in droves to seek more stable and economically advantageous ties amid increasing global economic uncertainty caused by expanding conflicts and protectionism. The US and Russia state visits follow previous major trips by leaders of Canada, the European Union, India, and the United Kingdom among others.

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   However, China has not committed itself to take any major actions to resolve major sources of global instability, including some it has helped foster. Despite these overtures, China is not poised to become more deeply involved in mediating the wars in either Ukraine or the Middle East or in pushing for a denuclearized Korean peninsula.2 It is unlikely to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz unless its own fuel supplies are seriously threatened, and may provide some dual-use materials to the regime that can be used to help rebuild its military capabilities. It will continue to provide some material and—as a May 19 report by Reuters indicated—training assistance to the Russian military, in order to bolster and maintain close relations with the Putin regime. In all cases such support is nevertheless likely to remain limited in scope and conducted through a web of region-level governments and private sector actors to avoid the appearance of direct involvement from Beijing.

2. On Agreements Reached: Russian state media has drawn particular attention to the signing of a new policy document, the “Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations,” as a noteworthy achievement during the trip and evidence that China is onboard with Russia’s push to undo the US-led international system. However, this is not a new or particularly significant development. Russia and China have been signing documents of this type for decades. 29 years ago to the day, on May 20, 1997, China and Russia—represented by current Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—issued a joint UN declaration announcing the “establishment of a new international system” and “multipolar world”.

3. On Agreements Not Reached: Arguably, the most consequential agreement for the trip was the one that wasn’t signed—an agreement to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. It is quite remarkable that China has not yet agreed to green light the new project despite years of negotiations with Russia, massive discounts on Russian natural gas, and growing demand for alternative energy sources given the current crisis with the Strait of Hormuz.

4. NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS IN RUSSIA INSPECTING DRONE PRODUCTION FACILITY

This week, new reporting by NK News announced that a delegation of officials from North Korea’s South Pyongan province toured Russia’s Center for Drone Competencies in the city of Belogorsk in the far eastern region of Amur on May 15. According to the report:

“The delegation reportedly observed ‘drone operations’ and learned how to control and maintain UAVs, with special attention paid to ‘training specialists in the operation of unmanned systems and developing educational programs for young people.’”

Takeaways:

1. On Exchanges Between Russia and North Korea: The visit comes amid intensified people-to-people exchanges between the two countries in recent months, aimed at strengthening economic and military ties that have flourished since the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in 2024. Illustrative of the growing ties is an announcement by Pyongyang that a new provincial level delegation from South Hwanghae would travel to Russia on the same day that officials from South Pyongan province returned home.

2. On the Prospect of Russian and North Korean Drone Cooperation: As previously discussed in the Weekly Significant Activity Report - May 2, 2026, Russia has ample incentive to export some of its drone hardware and know-how to North Korea as part of their expanding military cooperation. Russia has long sought North Korean workers to staff its drone production facilities to compensate for labor shortages, and may see significant strategic benefit from turning North Korea into an external producer of such weapons. Such an arrangement would mirror benefits the Russian military previously derived from buying large amounts of North Korean artillery. Drone factories in North Korea would carry an added benefit of being less vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, a consideration that has become more pressing as Russian drone manufacturers have come under increasing threat of Ukrainian drone and missile strikes in recent months. Ukrainian forces notably attacked and damaged the Atlant Aero drone factory in Taganrog on April 19.

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   Pyongyang has expressed keen interest in bolstering its indigenous production of drones in recent years. In September 2025 Kim Jong-un declared the development of AI-enabled drones to be a top strategic priority, a field in which Russia is a global leader. This week's visit by North Korean officials to the Center for Drone Competencies is likely one of several ongoing initiatives advancing that goal.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between May 9, 2026 and May 16, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: nationwide internet blackout continued; Iranian attacks threw BRICS+ meeting into disarray; Iranian leaders proposed demanding fees for undersea cables.

2. Russia held a subdued Victory Day Parade amid Ukrainian drone threats.

3. Russia demonstrated its offensive strike capability with massive drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, and the successful test of the Sarmat nuclear missile

4. China hosted a major US state visit.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Internet Blackout Extends into a Twelfth Week with No End in Sight

According to the internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, May 16 marked 78 days of a near-total internet blackout in Iran.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered a special committee to convene on restoring internet access within the next month. Pezeshkian appointed First Vice President Mohammadreza Aref to lead the new committee.

Iran Sparks Diplomatic Row with India over Attack on Cargo Ship.

On May 14, a suspected Iranian drone attack sank an Indian flagged cargo ship, the MSV Haji Ali BDI 1492, off the coast of Oman. The incident triggered condemnation from New Delhi, which called the attack “unacceptable.” All 14 Indian crew members of the ship were evacuated safely.

Iranian Leaders Suggest Monetizing Submarine Cables Crossing the Strait of Hormuz

Hossein Ali Hajideligani, a member of the Iranian parliament’s presiding board, suggested that Iran should extract fees for data passing through fiber optic cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz under Iran’s new management of the waterway.

Takeaways:

1. As previously noted on May 2, by risking further damage to the already shattered Iranian economy and exacerbating social stress, the continued internet shutdown, controlled at the highest level of government by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), demonstrates more surely than any other public statement that the Iranian regime is uncertain whether it has yet survived the war or has a path to transition to post-war reconstruction. The announcement that Pezeshkian—himself the chair of the SCC—would create a brand new committee for restoring internet access may have inadvertently underscored the fractured state of Iran’s government. Vocal opposition from multiple members of the Iranian parliament to the measure this week suggests the new committee may have been a blunder that undermined the projected unity of the regime and revealed broader confusion over how to govern the country's information environment going forward. Conservative Iranian parliamentarian Alireza Salimi underscored the perceived illegality of the move noting, “How is it possible for the president, who is himself the head of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, to transfer the council’s authority to a body outside the council?”

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   The appointment of Aref, a reformist, to lead the new committee suggests that the move may have been prompted by obstructionism on the SCC by security hardliners in the IRGC, who may prefer tiered access to the internet based on political loyalty.

2. Iran’s attacks on an Indian vessel, coming in addition to weeks of indiscriminate attacks on its neighbors, severely complicated the meeting of the BRICS+ Group in India from May 14-15. The UAE, another new member of the group along with Iran, used the occasion to publicly condemn Iranian "terrorist attacks" and to subtly assert the primacy of the US-led international order. It notably did so by invoking decisions by Western-based multilateral institutions including the London-based International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Canada-based International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council, and Switzerland-based UN Human Rights Council. In another eyebrow-raising statement, the UAE raised the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2817, a resolution backed by the US condemning Iranian attacks, which BRICS core members Russia and China both abstained from.

   

   The attacks and their fallout spilling into the BRICS+ meeting highlight serious contradictions at the heart of the group that raise questions about its viability as a coherent platform for constructing durable institutions capable of replacing systems of the current US-led international order. Underscoring these difficulties is the fact that the conference ended without even the signing of a joint statement due to tensions over Iranian behavior.

3. The suggestion that Iran should charge what amounts to protection money for the continued safety of the region’s fiber optic cables echoes an argument that appeared in the semi-official Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) media outlet Tasnim News on May 9. The Tasnim News article recommended Iranian leaders extract profit from the undersea cables through licensing deals and exclusive access for maintenance:

   “This report, based on Iran’s clear sovereignty over the seabed and water column of the Strait of Hormuz (according to Article 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), proposes three practical steps: first, charging initial license fees and annual renewals from foreign companies; second, requiring tech giants (Meta, Amazon, Microsoft) to operate under Iranian laws; third, granting exclusive rights for cable repair and maintenance to Iranian companies.”

   The recurring idea suggests Iran views the safety of the fiber optic cables as a form of leverage it can use in any future resumption of hostilities to deter attacks from its Arab neighbors and manage escalation with the US.

2. RUSSIA CONDUCTS SUBDUED VICTORY DAY CELEBRATION, HINTS AT WAR END

Russia Held Abbreviated Victory Day Celebration

On May 9, Russia held its 81st annual Victory Day celebrations. The Moscow Victory Day Parade, the hallmark of the state holiday held in Red Square, was substantially reduced in both time and in the scale of military hardware on display. In their place the Moscow parade notably featured the participation of a unit of North Korean soldiers, as well as videos of new Russian military technology including the Geran-5 drone/cruise missile hybrid.

Military parades in other major cities, such as St. Petersburg, were also reduced in scale.

Putin Suggested the War May End “Soon,” and Expressed Willingness to Meet Zelensky

On May 9, in a press conference following his appearance at the Moscow Victory Day Parade, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a heavily caveated statement that the war in Ukraine could be nearing its end and suggested he would be willing to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whom he called “Mr. Zelensky,” in a third country to sign a deal. Putin also named former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as a potential mediator for future talks between Russia and the European Union.

Takeaways:

1. This year’s truncated Victory Day Parade is an indisputable sign of weakness by the Kremlin. It is an indication, along with new reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin is spending unprecedented amounts of time in underground bunkers, that the decision making of Russian leaders is increasingly influenced by considerations of security threats emanating from Ukraine.

2. Vague statements aside, there are no substantive signs that the Kremlin plans to stop the war short of seizing the entirety of the Donbas. While Putin suggested a willingness to meet with Ukrainian President Zelensky, his uncharacteristically polite reference to the Ukrainian leader should not be seen as an extraordinary gesture as it still omits any reference to Zelensky’s legitimacy as leader. Further, Putin’s openness to meeting in a third country to conclude a peace agreement should also be viewed with skepticism as his remarks were quickly followed with a reference to his previous participation in the “Minsk Process,” suggesting Russian vassal state Belarus as the alternative venue for receiving Ukrainian capitulation. Taken together, Putin’s “openness” to ending the war, amid equally bizarre requests for Gerhard Schröder to take over negotiations, appears to be more of an effort to discombobulate Europe’s new push for diplomacy and re-engage with stalled US mediation after Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested the US would deprioritize its involvement in talks.

3. Russian President Vladimir Putin ultimately cannot end the war now without appearing to concede defeat. Released a year ago in May 2025, OPFOR Journal’s Situation Report: Ceasefire Negotiations with Russia identifies five of the Kremlin’s most conservative war aims, which still remain largely unachieved.

   1. “Permanently arrest Ukraine’s societal drift toward Europe. Foreclose paths to EU and NATO membership. Incorporation of Ukraine into Russian institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Commonwealth of Independent States. (Not achieved)”

   2. “Establish Russian political control of the country through the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv, (Not achieved)”

   3. “Resolve outstanding issues resulting from the seizure of Crimea and frozen conflict in the Donbas. These include establishing direct Russian annexation and administration of the Donbas territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, and de facto Russian control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to create a land bridge to Crimea, (Partially achieved)”

   4. “Prevent Ukraine from breaking free of Russian rule again through a systematic suppression of Ukrainian nationalism, resulting from a purge of Ukrainian national elites and institutions. (Not achieved)”

   5. “Leverage quick victory in Ukraine to re-assert Russia as an ascendant great power in contrast to declining West. (Partially achieved)”

   Remarkably, the Kremlin has made almost no progress on these war aims over the past year. It has arguably even lost ground on victory condition one as Ukrainian defense technology has become increasingly coveted in the West, adding a new dimension to Ukraine’s integration into the European security architecture.

3. RUSSIAN FLEXES ITS LONG-RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITY

Russia Conducted Successful Sarmat ICBM Test

On May 12, the Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces Sergei Karakayev announced to President Vladimir Putin the successful test launch of the “Sarmat” super heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Karakayev described the missile as the world’s most powerful ICBM, with four times the payload of equivalent US missiles. He further announced that the Sarmat can strike targets at a range of 35,000km from a suborbital trajectory that allows it to evade Western air defenses.

Russia Launches Heaviest Bombardment of the War

Between May 13 and May 14, Russia launched 1560 drones and 56 missiles at Ukrainian cities in the largest air assault of the war. The attacks resulted in at least 24 deaths.

Takeaways:

1. As Pavel Podvig notes, this is only the second successful test of the Sarmat ICBM, an achievement that follows a multi-year string of failures including two catastrophic launch disasters in September 2024 and November 2025. The mixed record means, that despite the Kremlin’s assurances of imminent operational deployment, the Sarmat will likely need additional test launches to ensure it can serve as a credible strategic deterrent.

2. While Russia is still working to expand its drone and missile production, the unprecedented size of the May 13-14 attack is best explained by the fact that it came shortly after a three-day ceasefire between May 9-11, which allowed for the stockpiling of an unusually high number of weapons.

3. Both moves appear to be efforts by the Kremlin to compensate for increasingly obvious shortcomings in defense exposed by relentless Ukrainian attacks on its critical infrastructure (which influenced decisions to shorten this year’s Victory Day Parade) with a display of offensive firepower. Pro-Kremlin military experts have been particularly keen to highlight the unique capability of the Sarmat to assert that Russia remains a great power despite its conventional military shortcomings. In an interview with Argumenti i Fakti, one such expert, Yuri Knutov, implied that the Sarmat alone could be Russia’s key to maintaining strategic parity with the West in the future.

   "A missile like the Sarmat is capable of penetrating the US's advanced Golden Dome missile defense system. If the Sarmat were used against a country like the UK, a single missile would be enough to destroy all major military installations within that country."

4. CHINA HOSTS US STATE VISIT

Between May 13-15, China received US President Donald Trump for a state visit. The visit marked President Trump’s first trip to China of his second term. A high-level delegation of political and business leaders joined the President on the visit including: Secretary of State Marco Rubio, War Secretary Pete Hegseth, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, Tesla/Space-X CEO Elon Musk, outgoing Apple CEO Tim Cook, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, and Trump family members Eric and Laura Trump.

Meetings between President Trump and President Xi touched on key issues of bilateral relations including the War in Iran, the status of Taiwan, trade issues and AI.

Takeaways:

1. The details of any trade agreements reached during the state visit remain murky. President Trump announced that China planned to buy “billions of dollars of soybeans,” and between 200-750 Boeing aircraft. Reuters reported that the President has green lit limited exports of Nvidia’s H200 AI chips to a select number of Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance, JD.com and Tencent. Despite the authorization, Trump acknowledged that any deal for the chips is in doubt as China is currently restricting imports of Nvidia chips on national security grounds.1

2. While statements by both leaders suggest the US and China have a shared interest in resolving major foreign policy challenges over Iran and Taiwan, no clear agreements were reached. Trump claims Xi backed the US’s position that Iran should never have a nuclear weapon and must reopen the Strait of Hormuz. This is not a new achievement as Beijing has repeatedly expressed an interest in countering nuclear non-proliferation and in keeping the Strait of Hormuz “open.” It is not clear, however, that China plans to do anything new to convince Iran to budge on either issue as Iran’s closure of the Strait largely does not target its exports to China, which are however more directly threatened by a US blockade. Trump for his part expressed an understanding of China’s position on Taiwan but his statements that the US did not support Taiwanese independence did not fundamentally alter the US’s position of strategic ambiguity. Trump notably did not pledge to reduce arms sales to Taiwan either.

3. One of the most consequential outcomes of the visit is an attempt by both sides to achieve strategic stability. As Bill Bishop notes, Chinese press releases paint the visit as an opportunity to reset relations with the US under the recognition that China is a co-equal power whose interests must be given great consideration.

   “The PRC leadership wants a period of strategic detente and this concept could realize that on terms favorable to them for the rest of Trump’s second term. Any future U.S. moves to address PRC industrial overcapacity, tighten technology controls, etc. could then be cast by Beijing as violations of the new “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” to which the two leaders personally agreed.

   “The formulation (tifa 提法) accepts that the US-China relationship is competitive — as Xi did in 2023 with the Biden administration — but it now insists that competition be kept “moderate” (有度) and that differences be “manageable” (可控). This may allow China to get to define what counts as acceptable competition. It also makes Xi and his team look like they have successfully stood their ground against the Trump Administration and are now negotiating from a position of equal strength.”

This week is going to be another break from the routine of churning out Weekly Significant Activity Reports, in part because it is a unique anniversary. Today marks one year since OPFOR Journal launched.

There are now quite a few more people subscribed to this page than when I started (1,332 to be exact), so I wanted to step back and give a quick recap of who I am and what this is all about.

Who I am:

My name is Dan White. Over the past two decades I have worked across a variety of roles in the military, foreign and public policy, the Washington DC think tank community, and now higher education. I hold master’s degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington, and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Central Florida. I am a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

Most of all I am a writer with a life-long calling to serve in the US national security enterprise.

Why I Started OPFOR Journal:

As I have previously discussed, the idea for OPFOR Journal came to me shortly after losing my position at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in the midst of mass federal layoffs in April 2025. My goal in starting this page was to continue writing and doing research on the topic I had been pursuing at the time as part of The Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, namely tracing Russia’s strategic partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea and assessing the consequences for US national security. Out of that came a broader idea: to cover them not simply as partners with Russia, but as individual actors with their own unique geopolitical interests, and as part of a broader “opposing force” (OPFOR) united by a shared overarching interest in overturning the US and US-led international order.

72 posts and 181,997 words later, the project has taken on life of its own. In no small part because significant geopolitical events over the past year have reinforced the project’s core thesis that contending with the rise of this opposing force of great powers will be the defining American national security challenge of our time.

A Labor of Love Made Possible By Generous Support:

OPFOR Journal has also become a significant part of my life. On average I have spent about 10 hours each week researching, writing, and editing each post, whether Weekly Significant Activity Reports covering a range of weekly events, Situation Reports on a specific topic, or monthly Homeland Security Briefs. That has meant a lot of late nights hunched over a laptop and more than a few days’ plans disrupted by my impulse to write. I am grateful to my wife Elin for always encouraging me to keep going. OPFOR Journal would simply not exist without her support.

I have tried to treat this journal as a labor of love, and have done my best to tease out the significance of events as much as possible, connect them with historical trends and the broader international context. Some weeks I have done that better than others, but I am always learning and improving over time. I am lucky that I have had so many people who continue to reach out with kind words of encouragement. I will continue to do my best to produce something worthy of your belief in me each week.

I am also incredibly grateful to everyone that has supported OPFOR Journal financially. My goal is to keep this content open to all, and everyone that has gone out of their way to voluntarily upgrade to a paid subscription, has helped me both cover the costs of running the page (domain name, email, etc.) and further professionalize the work (such as by buying a subscription to Canva to improve branding and graphics).

Looking Back:

While I look ahead to another year of growth, I also want to look back and highlight a few posts that are worth revisiting:

Favorite Post:

This is my favorite post because it captures, in one place, both the breadth and depth of Russia’s newest strategic arms programs and the broader context in which they were developed. It describes a moment in which Russia feels increasingly insecure about its position as a great power and its uncertainty as to how to approach a future of unrestrained competition with the US.

Most Viewed Post:

This post saw an unexpectedly large audience, in part because the events described were simultaneously highly significant in Southeast Asia and under covered in Western media.

Most Underrated Post:

This was a very early post, but its analysis of why US efforts to broker a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine were going nowhere last May is nevertheless as relevant as ever now.

Looking Forward:

Over the next year I hope to continue building on what I have learned so far, as well as experimenting with new ideas for formatting and content. I am looking forward to hearing from you all along the way.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between April 25, 2026 and May 2, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: nationwide internet blackout continued; new reports of a struggle for control over negotiations between factions of Iranian leaders; Iranian currency in freefall amid US economic pressure.

2. Russia has announced a subdued May 9 Victory Day celebration alongside enhanced security measures for the event and ceasefire proposals amid the increased threat of Ukrainian drone attacks.

3. Russia’s Africa Corps forces suffered significant defeats in Mali.

4. China conducted unusual naval patrols near Taiwan’s Penghu islands in the Taiwan Strait.

5. North Korea and Russia celebrated the anniversary of the retaking of the Kursk region with the inauguration of a new memorial museum in Pyongyang highlighting North Korea’s participation in the operation. The new memorial offers new insights into North Korea’s involvement in the war and the future of its partnership with Russia.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Internet Blackout Continues

According to internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, May 2 marked 64 days of a near-total internet blackout in Iran.

Leaders Competing for Influence Over Negotiations

According to an April 30 report by Iran International, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf are engaged in bureaucratic maneuvering with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi whom they view as less pragmatic and more aligned with the hardline factions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iranian Currency Slides to Record Low

On May 2, the Iranian rial fell to 1.83M tomans to the dollar on the open market, the lowest unofficial exchange rate for the currency ever recorded.

Takeaways:

1. On May 2, Iranian member of parliament Amirhossein Sabeti appeared to confirm the internet shutdown will continue indefinitely due to fears of a revival of the civil unrest seen in January, “If the internet is fully reopened, some mercenaries, who are also armed, may organize gatherings through these networks.”

   -
   Despite public bluster from members of the IRGC and low-level officials, the internet blackout—imposed by the Supreme Security Council—is a far more revealing signal as to the regime’s confidence in its standing in the war against the US and Israel. The continued throttling of the internet, which risks at least ten million jobs and the broader health of the entire Iranian economy, indicates that the regime does not believe that the war is either finished or won. Like amputating a limb to combat gangrene, the dramatic countermeasures show that top Iranian decision-makers believe US economic pressure, evidenced in the ongoing currency collapse, is sufficiently destabilizing to require costly measures to prevent civil unrest from reorganizing. Ironically, the longer the restrictions remain in place, the greater the risk that they will compromise the overall health of the Iranian economy and civil society and require additional interventions to manage their fallout over the long-term.

2. The internet blackout is also indicative of broader governance problems facing the regime. As noted in the April 12 Situation Report “Iran’s Strategic Position After 40 Days of Epic Fury,” Iran’s strategy for managing the end of the war faces serious challenges with the lack of a strong central leader who can manage competing factional interests and set a long-term vision for the country going forward. The accuracy of reports claiming Mojtaba Khamenei is involved in critical decisions is belied by the ongoing public bickering between officials over the terms of negotiations, and reports of political infighting between the top members of government including the Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Araghchi.

3. Caution still needs to be taken in reading these indications of deteriorating governance and economic conditions, however. A collapsing Iranian economy and intense internal infighting will not resolve the basic problems the war poses to the overall global economy and international order. Even a much diminished and disoriented regime will still be able to strangle maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz by exploiting the intense risk aversion of maritime shipping companies with the threat of attacks by small and inexpensive drones.

   -

   A collapsing Iranian economy and continued oil blockade may even further incentivize the regime to focus on monetizing threats to regional security. A hardline regime that survives could put off all economic reform and sustain itself like a Middle Eastern North Korea by extracting concessions from its neighbors for continued regional stability. Such actions could include demanding war-related indemnities well into the future, expanding protection fees on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, requiring humanitarian aid to prevent large-scale migration and other schemes.

2. RUSSIA DOWNGRADES VICTORY DAY CELEBRATIONS DUE TO FEAR OF UKRAINIAN ATTACKS

Military Equipment Pulled from Victory Day Parades

On April 28, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that this year’s Victory Day Anniversary Parade in Moscow’s Red Square will be held without the participation of military equipment or the military cadets due to the “current operational situation.”

St. Petersburg announced similar restrictions the following day, excluding both museum-piece vehicles and elite military academy cadets from its own celebration.

Putin Proposes Victory Day Ceasefire

On April 29, Russian President Vladimir Putin informed US President Donald Trump of his interest in conducting a temporary truce with Ukraine during the May 9 Victory Day holiday.

Moscow Will Throttle Cellular Networks on May 9

On April 29, the BBC’s Russian Service reported that Russia will restrict all mobile communications in Moscow ahead of the Victory Day parade.

Takeaways:

It is highly unusual that Russia would conduct its Victory Day celebration without the military vehicles in the parade which typically serve as a hallmark of the event. The decision to not include vehicles appears to be motivated less by the lack of availability of vehicles as not even museum pieces will be featured. The other indications, including Putin’s proposal of a one-day ceasefire and rumors of widespread mobile internet restrictions (rather than the more localized restrictions used last year) suggest the Kremlin fears a potential large-scale Ukrainian attack to disrupt the event.

3. RUSSIAN FORCES SUFFER SIGNIFICANT SETBACKS IN MALI

On April 25, units of Russia’s “Africa Corps” serving alongside the Malian army were attacked in a major offensive by a large contingent of rebel Tuareg and Islamist forces. The attacks, which killed the Malian Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, and seized multiple cities throughout the country, also forced the withdrawal of Russian forces from their main base in Kidal and allegedly downed a Russian helicopter with a shoulder-fired missile.

Africa Corps withdraws from its base in Kidal under the white flag of surrender. Source: TopWar.ru

Takeaways:

1. The setbacks to Russia’s allies in Mali represent another instance of the Kremlin struggling to advance its international interests while it remains consumed by the war in Ukraine. Russian “peacekeepers” previously failed to either deter or halt lightning offensives by Azerbaijan against Armenia’s disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, and by rebel forces against the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024.

2. The debacle in Mali is also an indication that the Kremlin’s effort to centralize control over the former Wagner Group’s activities since the Prigozhin-led mutiny of 2023 is not leading to a more coherent integration of Russia’s activities in Africa into Russia’s broader national security apparatus. The Africa Corps’ quick capitulation to rebel forces was preceded by previous catastrophic battlefield defeats, which demonstrates broader problems in Russia’s ability to conduct expeditionary operations and deploy combat power abroad.

   -

   An April 26 public rebuke issued by the Africa Corps regarding an “ambiguous” statement about its role in Mali by the Russian Ministry of Defense also indicates that the supposed takeover and rebranding of the organization has still not completely extinguished the resentments of the former Wagner Group.

4. CHINESE WARSHIPS PATROLLING NEAR TAIWANESE ISLANDS

On April 27, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it has been tracking two Chinese warships, a Type 052C Destroyer CNS Zhengzhou and a
Type 054A Frigate CNS Hebi, operating near the Penghu islands in the Taiwan Strait.

Takeaways:

The patrol represents an especially close approach by Chinese ships to Taiwanese territory and is the latest noteworthy Chinese naval operation near Taiwan in recent weeks. The moves coincide with a reduced US naval presence in the Indo-Pacific resulting from the demands of the war against Iran. Despite the increased profile of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy operations, and more limited US capability in the region, it is highly unlikely that China is preparing for any military action against Taiwan in the foreseeable future.

According to the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community published in March, “The IC [intelligence community] assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.” China is still likely years away from assembling a force capable of seizing Taiwan, and recent Chinese military publications suggest the PLA Navy is still evaluating the needs of such a force to cope with the evolving asymmetric military capabilities that have played a significant role in contesting the maritime domain in both the war in Ukraine and in the Middle East.

5. NORTH KOREA AND RUSSIA CELEBRATE AND EXPAND MILITARY ALLIANCE

Russian Delegation Attends Opening of New North Korean War Memorial and Vows to Expand Military Cooperation

This week a high-level Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Speaker of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin visited Pyongyang to celebrate the opening of the “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations” dedicated to North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In a follow-on meeting with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un on April 27, Defense Minister Belousov suggested that Russia is prepared to upgrade military ties with North Korea over agreements and cooperation already taking place under the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

“[The Russian Defense Ministry] and the Defense Ministry of the DPRK agreed to switch military cooperation to the lasting long-term basis. We are ready to sign a plan for Russian-Korean military interaction for 2027-2032 this year.”

Kim Jong-un Confirms Death Before Surrender Policy for North Korean Troops

At the April 27 inauguration of the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations, North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un appeared to confirm a suspected policy of suicide before surrender for North Korean troops deployed to Russia. Kim praised soldiers for heroically “self-blasting.”

North Korean Death Toll in War

An analysis of recent footage of the dedication of North Korea’s new war memorial by NK Pro has identified 2,288 individual names being memorialized, providing a rare glimpse into the battlefield losses acknowledged by North Korea.

Takeaways:

1. A figure of roughly 2,300 dead lines up with previous estimates of 6,000 total North Korean casualties (both dead and wounded) in the war provided by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS).1 It is still not clear if this represents the final total number of war dead as North Korea understands it or just the number it is prepared to acknowledge now. Kim Jong-un’s open boasting about soldier suicide suggests he is confident that the military operation is a historic success, and that its high costs can be acknowledged as a source of pride rather than buried as a state secret. North Korea may have a further incentive to highlight rather than downplay the true total number of casualties in order to emphasize to Russia its value as an ally and its entitlement to additional military and economic rewards.

2. While the exact details of the proposed expansion of long-term military ties between Russia and North Korea remain murky, we should expect any new agreement to include substantive follow through from both parties given the progression of their ties since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

   -

   One likely form of cooperation involves Russian technical assistance to North Korea’s drone program in exchange for increased North Korean labor in Russian drone factories. It has previously been reported that North Korea was preparing to send thousands of workers to Russia’s drone super factory in Tatarstan’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone. It is unclear whether these plans have yet materialized, and renewing them could be mutually beneficial. The Russian military has enormous demand for drones but faces significant labor shortages it needs to overcome to scale production. It has tried multiple schemes to recruit new workers by enticing foreigners and even children to work at Alabuga as part of vocational skills training programs like “Alabuga Start”.2 North Korean workers could fill the gap for Russian manufacturers and then use the knowledge and skills gained to upgrade the North’s own factories.

   -

   Russia could also become involved in helping the North implement the kind of modern reconnaissance strike complex against South Korea that it has employed against Ukraine. Reports that Russia provided targeting assistance to Iran to use against the US suggest the Kremlin may have an interest in developing a similar threat on the Korean peninsula. Russia would use the increased drone threat in North Korea to both gain leverage over the US in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and to keep the focus of the American military divided between multiple evolving threats in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed between March 2026 and April 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. A new report by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the US and more than a dozen allied nations warned that Russian military intelligence is exploiting vulnerabilities in home routers to harvest large volumes of user data from government and military officials.

2. A Chinese national was arrested for illegally photographing sensitive aircraft and facilities at multiple US Air Force Bases.

3. A new advisory by the FBI and CISA warned that hackers affiliated with the Iranian regime are attempting to target and disrupt computer operating systems used in US industry and critical infrastructure.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

4. Iranian proxies continued violent attacks targeting Jewish communities and American and Israeli interests across Europe.

1. RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITING VULNERABLE ROUTERS TO COLLECT DATA ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

On April 7, the US, Ukraine and more than a dozen allied nations announced the discovery and disruption of an elaborate plot by Russian military intelligence (GRU) to compromise small at-home routers to intercept the data of military and government officials worldwide.

According to the announcement by the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center the plot, conducted by cyber actors of the GRU’s 85th Main Special Service Center (85th GTsSS) including APT28, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard, have been: “collecting credentials and exploiting vulnerable routers worldwide, including compromising TP-Link routers using CVE-2023-50224.” The exploit allows the attackers to change the host configuration of a router to grant them visibility into the web traffic conducted by connected devices—including encrypted traffic when users ignore certificate error warning messages.

The scheme is part of a broader dragnet operation by the Russian intelligence services to collect mass amounts of user data worldwide and then filter it for information on specific high value targets. As the announcement states:

“The GRU has harvested passwords, authentication tokens, and sensitive information including emails and web browsing information normally protected by secure socket layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS) encryption. The GRU has indiscriminately compromised a wide pool of U.S. and global victims and then filtered down impacted users, especially targeting information related to military, government, and critical infrastructure.”

Additional Information:

This is the second warning in two months that Russian intelligence services are exploiting cyber vulnerabilities to steal credentials from government and military officials and conduct surveillance. On March 20, 2026, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint advisory warning that Russian hackers are conducting phishing attacks to compromise commercial encrypted messaging apps, such as Signal, used by “individuals of high intelligence value, including current and former US government officials, military personnel, political figures, and journalists.”

According to that advisory, once an account is compromised, the Russian attackers leverage the victim’s contact list to identify and target additional high-value individuals, while also collecting data to craft more convincing social engineering attacks in the future. This technically unsophisticated attack is a reminder that a user’s basic cyber security practices are just as important as end-to-end encryption for information security.

2. CHINESE NATIONAL CHARGED WITH UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE OF STRATEGIC US AIRBASE

On April 24, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Chinese national, Tianrui Liang, for conducting unlawful surveillance of Offutt Air Force Base in Bellevue, Nebraska. Offutt Air Force Base is a major US airbase and headquarters of US Strategic Command which commands and controls America’s nuclear arsenal. Witnesses said Liang pulled off to the side of a public road along the perimeter of the base to take pictures of planes, including the RC-135 Rivet Joint signal intelligence aircraft, E-4B “Nightwatch” National Airborne Operations Center (AKA the “Doomsday Plane”), with a camera and telescopic lens.

Liang was arrested on April 7, at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York while attempting to leave the country for Europe. Court records indicate Liang admitted to taking photos of the base and possessed pictures of aircraft on his phone. Liang was also found to be in the possession of a small drone, which he denied using near the bases.

Liang also visited Ellsworth Air Force Base, the home of the US Air Force’s Global Strike Command, days prior to his trip to Offutt Air Force Base, with the apparent intent of viewing the base’s B-1B “Lancer” bombers.

Additional Information:

1. Liang, a B-1/B-2 visa holder traveling by car from British Columbia to New York may have visited other bases, and expressed an interest in also visiting Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.

2. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief - January 2026, Chinese nationals have been implicated in dozens—and potentially hundreds—of suspicious incidents near US military bases in recent years. While some of these cases involve misunderstandings by curious tourists, the sheer number of incidents, combined with individual cases involving suspicious circumstances like Tianrui Liang suggest a pattern of coordinated crowd-sourced intelligence collection by Chinese authorities.

   -

   Another recent case involved a Chinese national named Qilin Wu who was charged on January 7 for illegally photographing US B-2 “Spirit” Bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

3. IRANIAN HACKERS TARGETING INDUSTRIAL COMPUTERS USED FOR CRITICAL INDUSTRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

On April 7, a new joint cybersecurity advisory issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and co-signed by several federal agencies warned that since March 2026, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors affiliated with the Iranian regime have been attempting to use cyber operations to disrupt US critical industries and critical infrastructure. The Iranian APTs have focused their efforts on the exploitation of software vulnerabilities at the endpoints of programmable logic controllers (PLC)—large industrial computers typically used to automate complex productive processes. PLCs are widely used in manufacturing and in several sectors of critical infrastructure including waste water and sewage, government services and facilities and energy.

Iranian groups appear to have focused their efforts most closely on systems produced by Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley.

According to the advisory:

“Iranian-affiliated APT actors are targeting internet-exposed PLCs with the intent to cause disruptions—including maliciously interacting with project files, and manipulating data displayed on HMI and SCADA displays—to U.S. critical infrastructure organizations. Iranian-affiliated APT targeting campaigns against U.S. organizations have recently escalated, likely in response to hostilities between Iran, and the United States and Israel.”

Additional Information:

1. Iranian APTs have previously targeted the PLCs in US industry and infrastructure. Attacks beginning around November 2023 by Iranian group "CyberAv3ngers” compromised at least 75 PLC and human machine interface (HMI) devices made by Israeli company Unitronics used in multiple sectors of US critical infrastructure.

2. Water and wastewater systems appear to be a preferred target for Iranian APTs. In addition to the present attacks, the 2023 “CyberAv3ngers” campaign caused disruptions at the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in western Pennsylvania affecting over 6,000 customers. This is likely because the sector includes a large number of small operators that lack the robust IT support available to large municipalities and may be seen as easy targets.

4. IRANIAN PROXY ACTIVITIES CONTINUE IN EUROPE

There have been numerous additional violent or disruptive incidents linked to groups inspired by or associated with the Iranian regime since late March when OPFOR Journal published Homeland Security Brief - The Iranian Threat in the Wake of Operation Epic Fury.

March 23 - Jewish Ambulances Torched in London

On March 23, four ambulances from Hatzola, a volunteer Jewish emergency service, were destroyed in an arson attack in London. Pro-Iranian group “Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya” (HAYI) claimed credit for the attack.

March 28 - Attempted Bombing of Bank of America Headquarters in Paris

On March 28, police in Paris disrupted an attempt to detonate an improvised explosive device in front of the Bank of America headquarters. Three teenagers between 16-17 and a 21-year old man were subsequently arrested in the plot. The adult allegedly offered the three teens between 500-1000 euros to plant the explosive as well as additional opportunities for work conducting future attacks.

Police charged all four individuals for crimes including “criminal terrorist conspiracy” and “attempted destruction in connection with a terrorist enterprise.” French prosecutors have linked HAYI with the attempted bombing.

April 4 - Explosion at pro-Israel Charity in the Netherlands

On April 4, a small improvised explosive device detonated outside a pro-Israel Christian center in the Dutch city of Nijkerk. Investigation into the attack is ongoing, but the attack resembles previous attacks attributed to HAYI in the Netherlands.

April 9 - North London Synagogue Damaged by Arson

On April 9, London’s Kenton United Synagogue was targeted in an arson attack, resulting in minor smoke damage to the building’s interior. A 17-year old and 19-year old were arrested for the attack. The 17-year old has since pleaded guilty.

April 12 - Jewish Institutions in North Macedonian Capital of Skopje Attacked

On April 12, a Synagogue and German-Jewish restaurant were damaged in arson attacks in the North Macedonian capital of Skopje.

HAYI claimed credit for the attacks. The group further noted that it deliberately targets Jewish institutions unrelated to Israel due to shared religion and communal identity, “This center is not just a local place of worship, but a link in the chain of identity and mutual support between the Jewish community and the Zionist regime…Because of the crimes of the Zionist regime, no Jew anywhere will be safe.”

April 15- London Headquarters of Top Iranian Independent Media Outlet Attacked

On April 15, the London headquarters of the independent Persian-language media organization Iran International was attacked by multiple incendiary devices. The devices landed in the building’s parking lot and caused a small fire but did not result in significant damage. Three individuals, a boy aged 16 and two men aged 19 and 21 were arrested in connection and charged with arson.

April 16 - Drone Incident Near Israeli Embassy in London

On April 16, social media accounts associated with HAYI posted a video claiming to show a drone attack on the property of the Israeli embassy in London involving dangerous chemicals. The Israeli Embassy and London Metropolitan Police denied that such an attack occurred on the embassy grounds but noted that a security incident did take place at a nearby park.

April 18 - Attempted Arson at Jewish Charity in London

On April 18, a London building previously occupied by a Jewish charity called Jewish Futures was lightly damaged in an attempted arson attack. HAYI claimed credit for the attack.

April 28 - Attempted Arson at London Memorial to Iranian Protesters

On April 28, London Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Policing unit announced it was investigating an attempted arson at a memorial wall to Iranian protesters slain by the Iranian regime. Authorities said that the incident was not yet being treated as an act of terrorism but the rash of suspicious or violent incidents targeting the Jewish community in the Golders Green neighborhood where the memorial is located were prompting investigators to keep an open mind.

April 29 - Two Jewish Men Stabbed Outside London Synagogue;

On April 29, two Jewish men in London were stabbed by a 45-year-old man in what British authorities have deemed an act of terrorism. HAYI claimed credit for the attack.

Additional Information:

1. While the group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right) has claimed credit for many of the attacks, the actual existence of the group as an independent entity has increasingly been called into question. The group notably did not exist prior to the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran. Its ability to effectively coordinate seemingly disparate activities across Europe so quickly suggests the group is actually an operation conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. Further suggestive of the link is that the arson incidents bear hallmarks of similar incendiary attacks the IRGC coordinated against Jewish targets in Australia in 2024. Those attacks resulted in Australia expelling the Iranian ambassador in August 2025 and later labeling the IRGC a state sponsor of terrorism in November.

2. Nicolas Stockhammer, Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center, notes that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force often coordinates its activities to appear to be isolated acts of antisemitic hatred, or violent extremism:

   “Pro-Iranian networks drawing from ideological supporters among diaspora, radicalized teenagers, and even petty criminals form an inconspicuous facilitation web across Europe. At the epicenter of these structures, Iran’s IRGC-Quds Force pulls strings through sub-conventional proxies, enabling deniable hits on soft targets like synagogues or tourist spots, sparing Tehran direct blame and possible retaliation.”

   The IRGC pays these actors small bounties for the attacks, in what has been called a form of “gig economy” terrorism.

3. The IRGC has attempted to coordinate similar terrorist operations in North America with less success. It has, however, made multiple attempts in recent years to recruit members of organized crime to conduct assassinations of US and foreign government officials and Iranian dissidents within the US homeland as well as in Mexico and Canada. The pattern of attempted high profile violent attacks during peacetime suggests Iran is willing to carry out terror attacks now but not yet able to do so. Seemingly confirming this intent, the spokesperson for Iran’s Armed Forces General Abolfazl Shekarchi warned on March 20 that Iran would make "parks, recreational areas and tourist destinations" unsafe for its enemies.

   -

   The attempt by Mehdi Taj, the head of Iran’s football federation and former commander in the IRGC, to enter Canada illustrates potential security threats Iran may pose to the upcoming World Cup. Iran may use the events to insert operatives into North America, conduct recruitment of proxies, or in a worst-case scenario, carry out attacks of terrorism.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between April 18, 2026 - April 25, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: internet shutdown continued with no end in sight; Iran seized and fired on ships to keep the Strait of Hormuz shut; continued uncertainty over negotiations between US-Iran.

2. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu threatens Moldova over “suffering” of Russian citizens in Transnistria.

3. Putin tried to address concerns over intensifying crackdown on internet access in Russia.

4. Chinese pressure on African countries resulted in the cancelation of a planned state visit by Taiwanese President William Lai to Eswatini.

5. Chinese Navy ramped up operations in the Indo-Pacific amid a US drawdown in the region resulting from the war with Iran.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Regime Imposed Internet Shutdown Passes Eight Weeks

According to internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, April 25 marked 57 days of a near total internet blackout in Iran. The same day member of the Iranian parliament, Mostafa Pourdehghan, told semi-official media outlet ISNA that there is currently no timeline for restoring internet connectivity and that all decisions on the matter rest in the hands of the Supreme National Security Council.

Iran Seizes Vessels in Strait of Hormuz

On April 21, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy announced the seizure of two ships attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, the MSC Francesca and the Epaminodes. The IRGC Navy also fired on a third vessel.

IRGC Navy conducting the boarding and seizure of MSC Francesca. Source: Sepah Cybery on Telegram.

Uncertain Future of Negotiations

This week several developments cast doubt on the future of negotiations between the US and Iran in Pakistan. On April 24, reports emerged that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament and leader of the previous round of negotiations with the US in Islamabad, had allegedly stepped down from the negotiating team under pressure from hardline factions within the IRGC. Seemingly confirming this development, Iran dispatched a delegation to Islamabad led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The US prepared special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to meet with this team on April 27. However, these plans were scrapped after Araghchi departed Islamabad on April 25 after a brief meeting with Pakistani leaders.

Takeaways:

1. It’s not clear how much longer Iran intends to continue its current internet blackout without risking serious economic damage. Minister of Information and Communications Technology Sattar Hashemi warned that a continued blackout could imperil 10 million jobs stating, “The continued instability of the internet means a direct threat to the employment of this vast population; an issue that could have profound social and economic consequences.” The fact that the blackout continues despite the growing risk of irreversible harm indicates the Supreme National Security Council is not fully confident that the war is either won or over, and that the regime still faces considerable threats to its rule.

2. As long as Iran is able to control the flow of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz it will have objectively demonstrated that it has the upper hand over the US and its regional rivals. It will be hesitant to give up this power for two reasons:

   -

   First, and most obviously, control over the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran with leverage over the US that it can convert into a variety of concessions in negotiations. These may include financial indemnities for war damages—most likely paid in sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets—or an end to demands on its missile and nuclear programs.

   -

   Second, and arguably the deeper reason why negotiating a de-escalation in the war is so difficult, is that tormenting the US and its allies provides a means of reinvigorating the Iranian Revolution in the wake of serious domestic challenges to its legitimacy and a third and especially difficult succession. After years of setbacks and humiliations, regime hardliners will want to savor the ability to inflict pain on their arch rivals for both their own satisfaction and for the broader purpose of reinforcing the message to domestic audiences that they cannot be driven from power. As a result, the IRGC will continue to push the boundaries of the ceasefire, even at risk of a resumption of hostilities that could further devastate the Iranian economy.

   -

   The economic and social costs of the war, piled on top of the damage wrought by years of economic sanctions, are real and very severe. But rational economic management or even basic governance are ultimately lower priorities for a revolutionary government than achieving tangible victories against their ideological enemies. This raison d'être appears to be lost on the current US administration which appears to view regime collapse as inevitable over a long enough time horizon of economic and military pressure. But this is a highly uncertain proposition. Revolutionary governments have repeatedly demonstrated incredible resilience in worse economic conditions throughout history so long as they have maintained their devotion to their cause.1 Perversely, a confrontation with the US may impoverish the Iranian people, while helping to consolidate the regime and strengthen its monopoly on violence.

2. RUSSIA THREATENS MOLDOVA OVER TRANSNISTRIA BLOCKADE

In an April 21 interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, former Defense Minister and current Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, announced that Russia may be forced to take action—including use of military force—to protect Russians in Moldova’s breakaway province of Transnistria. Shoigu asserted that 220,000 Russian passport holders in Transnistria are currently being deprived of their rights under a “blockade” imposed by Moldova and Ukraine and backed by the European Union.

“These include restrictions on freedom of movement, illegal customs duties, arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, plans to introduce VAT and excise taxes for Transnistrian enterprises, and trade, banking, and transport barriers. It’s also alarming that the Moldovan leadership’s rhetoric regarding Transnistria increasingly resembles the statements made by the Ukrainian authorities regarding Donbas after 2014.”

[…]

“It has also closed Russian schools, banned Russian media broadcasts, repressed dissent, created deep economic problems, and is taking all the necessary steps to exacerbate them, including leaving the CIS.”

Takeaways:

1. Russian leaders have threatened Moldova on numerous occasions since the start of the Full Scale Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and attempted to destabilize the country by spreading disinformation, violating its territorial airspace with drones, and organizing coup plots against the government of Maia Sandu. This latest threat is nonetheless noteworthy as it comes as the Russian State Duma advances a new law (discussed in detail in last week’s Significant Activity Report) authorizing the President to launch military operations to protect Russian citizens facing unjust persecution abroad. It also comes at a time the Russian military faces enormous challenges advancing in Ukraine and may be searching for new fronts it can open to shift the focus of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and its NATO supporters.

2. Even if the Kremlin has the will to launch a new “special military operation” against Moldova, it will be hard pressed to organize the capabilities needed to do it successfully. The small contingent of Russian forces stationed in Transnistria from the separatist conflict that erupted in the early 1990s after the breakup of the Soviet Union are among the least combat ready in the Russian military and would need significant reinforcing to fend off a Moldovan military supported by the West and likely supplemented by Ukrainian forces. Even with a bridgehead already established in the country, Russia would find it difficult to ferry in the needed supplies or reinforcements due to Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-access area denial capabilities along the Black Sea.

3. PUTIN ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR INTERNET CRACKDOWN

At a meeting with government ministers on April 23, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed concerns about increasing restrictions on internet connectivity in Russia. Putin framed the months-long, multifaceted campaign to restrict access to websites, VPN’s and social media applications as needed to improve Russian security against Ukrainian drone attacks.

“But I can’t help but notice what people encounter in large cities as well—it’s not often, but unfortunately, it does happen. I’m referring to certain problems and disruptions in the internet in large metropolitan areas.

“Of course, if this is related to operational work to prevent terrorist attacks – and we know that, unfortunately, we sometimes miss such attacks – of course, ensuring the safety of people will always be a priority: our children, our loved ones, every citizen of Russia.”

Takeaways:

1. The accelerating restrictions on internet in Russia, notably the throttling of Telegram and Whatsapp, and punishment of web hosts that provide services to VPN users, has been a highly consequential story that has gone largely unnoticed in Western media due to the ongoing war with Iran. The fact that Putin felt the need to explain the rationale of the ongoing internet restrictions is indicative of the broad unpopularity of the measures and growing concern that the rollout has been poorly managed. A new poll by the government-owned Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) published on April 24 shows Putin’s approval rating has dropped seven points since February of this year (when the government campaign to take control of the internet intensified) and has reached its lowest point since the beginning of the war.

2. Russia's intensifying internet crackdown has expanded beyond previous efforts to push users toward the state messenger app “MAX,” and now appears to be aimed at a full sequestration of the Russian internet under state control. This new policy, while deeply unpopular, appears to be a major state priority that the Kremlin is unlikely to reverse course on. According to investigative reporting by Russian independent media outlet The Bell, the effort is being managed directly by the Second Service of the Russian FSB, the same unit responsible for conducting several of the Kremlin’s most important recent clandestine operations, including the poisoning of Alexey Navalny.

3. Though framed as a response to Ukrainian drone threats, the new restrictions are expansive enough to raise suspicions that they are being used for broader purposes of population control. The chief concerns about the restrictions are that they are being rapidly imposed to either suppress public discontent over the deteriorating economy, or to set the conditions for a successful new wave of mobilization that avoids the panic that swept Russian social media in the Fall 2022 when a "partial" mobilization was announced.

4. CHINESE PRESSURE CANCELS TAIWAN STATE VISIT TO ESWATINI

This week Taiwan was forced to cancel a state visit by President William Lai to Eswatini—the sole country in Africa with formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan—after three neighboring countries abruptly revoked clearance for Lai’s flight to travel through their airspace. The restrictions imposed by Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, are widely believed to have been prompted by overt Chinese diplomatic pressure. The moves were praised by Chinese officials including the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who announced that:

“China highly commends relevant countries’ commitment to the one-China principle which is fully consistent with international law and basic norms governing international relations. It’s very clear that there’s no longer a so-called ‘ROC president’ in the world anymore. Anyone who wears that false title is acting against history and will only invite disgrace upon themselves. The one-China principle is where the arc of history bends and public opinion trends, and to uphold it is the right thing to do.”

Takeaways:

This is the latest in an intensifying campaign by Beijing to isolate Taiwan from its remaining diplomatic partners. By demonstrating that it can deny Taiwan access to its partners it hopes to instill a sense of futility among Taipei’s allies in continuing to prefer ties with the island nation over the more powerful mainland.

5. NOTABLE ONGOING CHINESE NAVAL ACTIVITY

Liaoning Transits Taiwan Strait

On April 20, China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier transited the Taiwan Strait, the first crossing of the waterway by a Chinese aircraft carrier in 2026.

Sichuan Heading Out for Sea Trials

The PLA Navy announced this week that its new Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan would depart from Shanghai for sea trials in the South China Sea.

PLA Navy Navigates Strategic Waterway Between Japan and Taiwan

On April 22, the South China Morning Post reported that the PLA Navy conducted the first recorded transit of the Yonaguni-Iriomote Waterway between the Japanese southern islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote near Taiwan.

PLA Navy Task Force Conducts Exercise East of The Philippines

On April 24, The Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced that it had organized a task force to conduct training exercises east of the Philippine island of Luzon. The exercises, involving live-fire drills, were held in response to the ongoing Balikatan 2026 joint exercise held by the US and Philippines on Luzon which featured increased participation from Japan this year.

Takeaways:

1. According to Chinese military analyst Wu Peixin, the sea trials would test the Sichuan’s ability to operate for prolonged periods on the open seas and serve as a “drone carrier” capable of launching strategic aerial drones from its electromagnetic catapult system and deploying large unmanned surface vessels.

2. Even though the Sichuan is not fully operationally ready, the PLA Navy appears nevertheless to be using its sea trials, timed to coincide with the Balikatan 2026 exercises, as an opportunity to project power. The PLA Navy engaged in a similar tactic last year when it used the sea trials of the Fujian aircraft carrier to impose restrictions on South Korea in the Yellow Sea Provisional Measures Zone.

3. China may be eager to demonstrate its growing naval strength now amid Balikatan 2026 to contrast its expansive military presence in the region with the US’s own reduced footprint in the Indo-Pacific amid the war with Iran.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between April 11, 2026 - April 18, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: new estimates of war damages, country-wide internet shutdown continues, and uncertainty about the Strait of Hormuz.

2. Russia’s State Duma advanced a new law allowing the President to deploy troops abroad to defend the rights of Russians wrongfully imprisoned, setting up a potential pretext for invading the Baltic States.

3. Russia intensified its bombing of Ukrainian population centers and critical infrastructure as its ability to conduct large scale ground offensives diminishes amid heavy losses and improved Ukrainian defenses.

4. New reports suggested that China has been providing Iran with access to high resolution satellite imagery that would enable it to target US forces across the Middle East.

5. North Korea conducted multiple high profile live-fire exercises.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Iran Provides New Estimate of War Damages

In an interview this week with Russia’s RIA Novosti, spokesperson for the Iranian regime, Fatemeh Mohajerani, claimed that US and Israeli strikes caused over $270B in damage to the country.

Iranian Internet Shutdown Continues

According to internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, April 18 marked 50 days of a near total internet blackout in Iran.

Iran Reopens then Immediately Closes the Strait of Hormuz

On April 17, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that Iran was ending its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in the wake of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. The announcement coincided with a similar declaration by US President Trump.

However, the policy was almost immediately thrown into question as other Iranian leaders including Ebrahim Azizi the head of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Commission stated that the Strait was only open to ships who followed the instructions and approved routes of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and paid a toll. Azizi posted a map of approved and restricted shipping lanes to drive home his point.

Less than 24 hours later, several Iranian leaders including the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters announced that Iran was reimposing its blockade of the Strait due to betrayals of trust by the US.1 The IRGC reportedly fired on two Indian flagged ships in the wake of the announcement. The attack drew a formal diplomatic protest from the Indian government.

Takeaways:

1. The ongoing internet blackout may have cost Iran close to $2B in direct economic losses, based on previous internal government estimates of the cost of the internet shutdown imposed during the December-January anti-government protests. That internet shutdown cost about $35.7M per day according to Iranian Minister of Communications Sattar Hashemi. Afshin Kolahi, head of the Knowledge-Based Commission of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, suggests the total costs could be even higher, as much as $80M per day, when accounting for the indirect effects of lost economic activity.

2. Iran’s continued internet blackout will further complicate any economic recovery from the war. The figure of $270B in war-related economic costs cited by spokesperson Mohajerani represents over half of Iran’s total annual GDP of $475B. The IMF has further estimated that Iran’s economy will contract over 6% this year. A projection provided by Iran’s central bank estimates that it will take Iran over 12 years to fully recover under these conditions, and that inflation could reach 180% in the interim.

   -
   The staggering economic toll of the war may be pushing some pragmatic Iranian leaders to seek a compromise settlement that ends the war in exchange for sanctions relief (in addition to concessions that preserve its other interests such as its nuclear program, proxy forces and ballistic missiles). However, hardline elements in the IRGC motivated by ideology and a sense of growing power may be largely indifferent to the material costs of the war.

3. It’s not immediately clear what has led to Iran’s apparent reversal of its announcement to open the Strait of Hormuz. It seems possible that the initial announcement by Foreign Minister Araghchi was a part of a diplomatic process between Iran and the US to end the war. The move may have encountered substantial push back from hardliners who viewed the policy as a capitulation amid a continued US naval blockade and triumphalist statements made by President Trump.

   -

   Whatever the policy, confusion over Iran’s intent to enforce a blockade is likely enough by itself to continue stalling maritime traffic. The policy reversal and public disagreement over it, voiced in official media outlets associated with the IRGC such as Fars News Agency and Tasnim News, portend the potential for serious discontent with any negotiated end to the war with the US. The new Supreme Leader’s continued public absence will make resolving these disputes more difficult.

2. RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT PAVES THE WAY FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF RUSSIANS ABROAD

On April 14, the Russian Duma advanced a new law (Bill 1181659-8) that would authorize the President to use military force to defend Russians at risk of prosecution and imprisonment abroad. The Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Andrei Kartapolov, promoted the bill as necessary to defend Russians from rampant international Russophobia,

“The State Duma Defense Committee supports the bill's concept, as the proposed regulation will help protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of Russian citizens, protect Russian organizations from foreign illegal attacks, and counter the rampant Russophobia campaign that continues internationally.”

Takeaways:

The timing of the new law may be seen as a provocation toward the Baltic States and Moldova, which have large Russian-speaking populations that Russia considers Russian nationals. Russia has intensified threats against the Baltic States in recent weeks, accusing the countries of permitting Ukraine to use their airspace for drone attacks on Russia’s Baltic oil and gas infrastructure. Russian affiliated actors appear to have also launched a cognitive warfare campaign suggesting the development of a “Narva People's Republic” in Estonia, alluding to the creation of a separatist Russian region of the country. The idea recalls similar “People’s Republics” announced in Georgia and Ukraine prior to their invasion by Russia in 2008 and 2014 respectively.

The threat implied by these actions is that Russia intends to establish a plausible casus belli for invasion. In the case of the “Narva People’s Republic,” Russia may intend to engineer a crisis between Estonian authorities and the country’s community of Russian speakers, potentially instigated by Russian intelligence services and armed proxies, which then provokes arrests that can be used as a pretext for invasion.

This is not without precedent. Russia engineered a similar crisis in Estonia in April 2007 in response to the removal of a large bronze monument to Soviet soldiers. In that incident, Russian leaders and state media inflamed the passions of the country's Russian-speaking minority for weeks in the lead up to the removal, while the Russian embassy allegedly recruited local criminals to foment unrest. The result was multiple nights of riots between April 26-29, 2007 that resulted in hundreds of arrests, dozens of injuries, and one death. The Russian Duma demanded that the Kremlin “punish” Estonia with economic sanctions in response to the crisis. Estonia then faced weeks of persistent cyberattacks from Russian based/affiliated actors targeting its critical infrastructure.

3. RUSSIA CONTINUES INTENSE WAVE OF BOMBARDMENTS

Russian Forces Strike Critical Dam in Kharkiv

On April 14, Russian forces launched six long-range glide bombs at the Pechenihy Reservoir dam in Ukraine’s Kharkiv oblast. Four of the bombs struck the ground near the dam’s gates while another two impacted the water.

Russia Conducts One of its Deadliest Air Raids of 2026

On April 15, Russia launched a massive bombardment of Ukrainian cities involving 44 missiles and 659 drones. The attack killed 17 and injured as many as 100, making it one of the deadliest attacks on Ukrainian civilians so far this year.

Takeaways:

1. Russia previously attacked and damaged the dam on multiple occasions including December 2025. The latest attack appears to be an attempt to further weaken the dam and trigger an environmental disaster that forces the displacement of Ukrainian civilians and the abandonment of Ukrainian frontline positions in Kharkiv.

2. Russia is attempting to intensify its bombardments of Ukrainian population centers and critical infrastructure to force an end to the war on its terms by breaking the will of the Ukrainian people. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha announced on April 17 at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum that Russia intends to conduct seven large-scale bombardments per month. While Russia has pursued this scorched earth strategy throughout the war, it appears to be emerging as the Kremlin’s primary theory of victory as alternatives become more difficult.

   -

   The expansion of Ukraine’s domestic defense industry and its increasingly automated defense in depth have hardened Ukraine’s lines and made continued incremental ground advances by Russian forces extremely costly. Compounding matters, estimated Russian losses have begun to consistently exceed assessed recruitment into the Russian military in recent months. UK Defense Secretary John Healey highlighted this trend during the April 15 meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group, announcing that Russian casualties had increased by more than a third in March 2026 over previous months, and that for the fourth month in a row the total number of Russian soldiers lost in combat had exceeded the number recruited. This persistent negative trend in Russian manpower is a first in the war and a sign that Russia’s offensive potential may be past its peak.

4. REPORTS SUGGEST CHINA PROVIDED IRAN ACCESS TO SATELLITE IMAGERY OF US FORCES

China Sold Iran Spy Satellite it Then Used to Target the US Military

An April 15 investigative report released by the Financial Times alleges that leaked Iranian military documents show that Chinese company Earth Eye Co sold a TEE-01B remote sensing satellite to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps via “in-orbit delivery” in late 2024.2 The deal also gave Iranian forces access to information from the commercial ground data transmission stations of an additional Chinese company Emposat. The satellite is believed to have been used to surveil and target US military forces in the Middle East.

According to Congress, China Obtained and Then Publicly Distributed Imagery of US Forces in the Middle East from Airbus

On April 16, Senator John Moolenaar, the Chairman of the Select Committee on China, sent a letter to the Pentagon alleging that the committee had obtained compelling evidence that imagery of US military forces in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific were provided to Chinese company MizarVision, by Airbus Space days before the start of Operation Epic Fury. MizarVision subsequently shared many of the images, including of US stealth fighters and carrier groups, on social media.

Takeaways:

1. This is not the first time the US has been alerted to problematic cooperation between top European aerospace company Airbus and civilian firms tied with the Chinese military industrial complex. A March 16, 2026 letter by the Senate Select Committee on China alleges that the French government has refused multiple requests for information about Airbus’s ties with Chinese entities.

2. The issues raised with Airbus exemplify a broader problem, how to effectively delineate and enforce redlines with China. As repeatedly noted in prior Significant Activity Reports, the national security threats posed by China are among the most complex for the West to negotiate (or even fully conceptualize) due to China’s pivotal role as a global manufacturing hub and the government-directed integration of its civilian technology sector with its military, a process known as military-civil fusion.

3. While the US has good reason to attempt to reduce threats to operational security posed by dual-use technology provided by allies and partners, attempting a total global embargo on high resolution satellite imagery is unlikely to be sustainable as such technology is now widely available and increasingly represents a public good. The US military will need to adapt to an increasingly transparent battlefield.

5. NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS MULTIPLE MAJOR MILITARY LIVE-FIRE DRILLS

North Korean Navy Test Fires Newest Destroyer

On April 12, North Korea conducted a live-fire exercise involving its newest and most advanced naval destroyer, the Choe Hyon. The Choe Hyon test fired two strategic cruise missiles and three anti-ship cruise missiles. Kim Jong-un personally supervised the exercise.

Kim Jong-un Oversees Artillery Contest on Grandfather’s Birthday

On April 16, Kim Jong-un oversaw an artillery firing competition conducted in celebration of the birthday of his grandfather, and nation’s founder, Kim Il-Sung. This was the first time Kim Jong-un attended a military event celebrating either his father or grandfather.

Takeaways:

The latest naval live-fire involving North Korea’s most advanced warship highlights the substantial progress Kim Jong-un has made in modernizing the North Korean military. The capabilities of the ship and its arsenal of precision guided munitions may also serve as an advertisement for potential global arms buyers. While sanctions have largely curbed North Korean arms exports, its sale of missiles and artillery shells to Russia in recent years has helped erode global taboos about doing business with Pyongyang—deals that South Korea's Korea Institute for National Security Strategy estimates are worth nearly $14.4 billion in total. Russia's assistance in subverting sanctions monitoring has set the stage for future growth in illicit North Korean arms deals, and may position Moscow as a key broker.

On April 11, the US and Iran held their highest-level diplomatic talks to date in Islamabad, Pakistan, following a ceasefire announced on April 7 that ended more than five weeks of combat.1 This Situation Report discusses Iran’s strategic position going into negotiations, and assesses how it may press its advantages and why it may be wise to seek a negotiated settlement.

This Situation Report is broken into two parts:

1. Iran’s Strategic Advantages

   1. The War Has Imposed Significant Operational Costs on US Military

   2. Iran Maintains Ongoing Control of the Strait of Hormuz

   3. Iran Continues to Pose Significant Threat to Gulf Infrastructure

   4. Iran Has Maintained Regime Integrity and Internal Stability

   5. Iran Has Established an Upper Hand in the Information Space

2. Iran’s Strategic Vulnerabilities

   1. Iran’s Control Over the Strait of Hormuz has Peaked

   2. War Has Worsened Iran’s Internal Crises

1. IRAN’S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES

The Iranian regime has survived 40 days of intense US strikes and re-entered negotiations confident that its strategic position has improved from before the war. Iran’s confidence derives from the success it has achieved in imposing significant operational costs on the US military, exerting control over the Strait of Hormuz, holding critical infrastructure at risk across the Middle East, warding off the threat of regime change, and establishing an upper hand in the information war.

The War Has Imposed Significant Operational Costs on the US Military

Iran has been able to impose non-negligible costs to the US military through five weeks of war, which have triggered serious questions about the sustainability of the US war effort including souring public opinion and concerns about the deficiency of the US defense industrial base’s capacity to sustain a protracted military campaign.

Iranian attacks have killed 13 US service members, and wounded 381. The war resulted in the loss of 39 US aircraft, including an E-3G Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), damage to an additional 10 aircraft, and the destruction of multiple sophisticated air defense radars. Defending against Iranian drone and missile attacks has depleted about a third of the US’s stocks of interceptors for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and a quarter of its supplies of Patriot Missiles.

Iran Maintains Ongoing Control over the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has succeeded in imposing total control on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Its indiscriminate strikes on targets throughout the region, while in some ways strategically counterproductive, ultimately succeeded in shutting down maritime traffic through the Strait. There are three reasons Iran has succeeded so far:

First, Iran demonstrated enough capability and willingness to attack commercial ships that shipping companies ultimately became extremely risk averse. While the US and Israel did succeed in degrading Iran’s capability to deploy sea mines and launch strikes on ships, Iran launched enough mines into the water and enough successful drone and missile attacks on tankers to ensure that no ship owners would risk transiting the Strait unless they received special security assurances to do so. The narrow shipping lanes, approximately two miles wide, located within range of a variety of land-based weapons systems also provided Iran with a narrow enough target area near its shores to effectively threaten with even severely degraded military capabilities.

Second, receiving Iranian permission to cross the Strait became the essential security assurance as no attempt has been made to force open the waterway thus far. The US Navy has only just begun attempting freedom of navigation operations in the Strait on April 11 amid the ongoing ceasefire, either because it deployed unready to do so, or because policy makers previously believed the operation was too risky. It remains to be seen whether the operations will continue if hostilities are renewed or whether they have an impact on restoring confidence in civilian mariners. The US and its allies have also not provided ship owners with sufficient supplementary insurance coverage to offset the increased risk either.

Source: CBS News on YouTube

Third, an overlapping reason behind both Iran’s capability to instill risk in maritime shipping operations, and the US Navy’s unwillingness to assume risky operations, is advances in unmanned weapons systems. The US’s air campaign has degraded Iran’s ability to launch missiles and deploy sea mines, but has not stopped the threat posed by drones. The US military, despite ample warning, has found defending against Iranian drones more difficult than conventional missiles.

Iran Continues to Pose a Threat to Gulf State’s Critical Infrastructure

The persistent threat posed by Iranian drones, and the US military's inability to effectively counter them, has further enabled the regime to restrict American operations by holding the critical infrastructure of Gulf State allies at existential risk.

Iranian strikes have targeted oil fields, pipelines and refineries throughout the Middle East. Iranian attacks have notably caused long-term disruptions to 5% of Saudi Arabia’s oil production and 17% of Qatar’s production of liquefied natural gas. The attacks have also caused extensive damage to ports and energy infrastructure in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

More worryingly, Iran has also begun limited attacks on desalination plants including in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE and threatened further strikes in retaliation for US bombing of its own critical infrastructure. According to an analysis by Reuters, the region is nearly completely dependent on desalination plants for freshwater, with 100% of potable water in Bahrain and Qatar coming from desalination, as well as 90% for Kuwait, 86% for Oman, 80% for the UAE, and 50% for Saudi Arabia.

As a result the US will have difficulty effectively following up on threats to coerce Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or surrender its nuclear program by exploiting Iran’s own critical vulnerabilities, such as by destroying its capacity to export oil from Kharg Island.

Iran Has Maintained Regime Integrity and Internal Stability

Despite continued attacks on its central leadership and sources of state power, the Iranian regime has succeeded in preventing another popular revolt, and closed off opportunities for the US to achieve victory through regime change through airpower alone. Reasons for the sustained internal stability are likely threefold:

First, Iran’s brutal suppression of protests in January killed and arrested unprecedented numbers of people. Credible estimates for the number of protesters killed range between 7,010 and more than 30,000. The crackdown injured an additional 25,845 protesters and resulted in at least 53,845 arrests. These actions could have crippled the Iranian public’s ability to mount another major challenge to the government by directly eliminating the threat posed by more than 100,000 people willing to confront the authorities, and instilling enough fear in countless others to deter further protest organizing.

Second, Iran has been able to maintain the appearance of government control through continued operations of internal security forces amid US and Israeli bombardment. Iranian proxy forces, which have by themselves not been a decisive factor in combating the US and Israel in this round of fighting, have nonetheless played a significant role in bolstering the public presence of the regime’s internal security forces and helped keep a lid on internal threats.

Finally, Iran has instituted a near total internet blackout since the start of the war. According to independent internet monitoring organization Netblocks, the Iranian regime has shutdown internet connectivity in the country for 43 days as of April 11. The current restrictions are likely the most extensive and prolonged imposed by any government since the Arab Spring. The restrictions have further suppressed the ability of remaining protesters to organize any new public uprising against the regime.

Iran Has Established an Upper Hand in the Information Space

Iran’s control of the internet has not only suppressed anti-government activities but has just as importantly prevented internal dissent from leaking out into the wider world. This has helped the Iranian regime maintain the appearance of national unity and resistance against the US and Israel and has helped it establish the upper hand in the information war against both countries.

The Iranian regime has further used its resilience to frustrate US leaders and trigger major unforced errors in the process. The regime’s willingness to accept severe blows to its central leadership without surrendering has posed a dilemma to US policy makers of either continuing an indecisive and expensive air campaign or committing to a more risky and expansive campaign inside Iranian territory that the US public is not prepared to accept.

The dilemma, worsened by Iran’s strangling of global energy and commodity markets through the Strait of Hormuz, appears to have caused US President Donald Trump to attempt to break the impasse through escalating threats to indiscriminately attack Iranian critical infrastructure to break the will of the regime. These threats culminated shortly before the April 7 ceasefire with the President’s declaration that future US military strikes would be aimed at destroying Iran as a civilization. The President’s statements created a global uproar that seriously alarmed US allies, eroded public support for the war in the US, and threatened to cede the moral high ground to a regime whose mass killing of innocent civilians in December and January was itself a major precipitating cause of the war.

The White House's erratic messaging has effectively undermined its justification for war—that a government willing to murder tens of thousands of its own people is too dangerous to be entrusted with the ability to build a nuclear weapon.

2. IRAN’S STRATEGIC VULNERABILITIES

While its current leverage going into the next round of diplomatic negotiations is considerable, Iran needs to be careful not to try to press its advantage too far. A long war, while undesirable for the US, would be increasingly ruinous for the regime and would cause its current strategic advantages to erode over time. This is chiefly because Iran’s current ability to control the Strait of Hormuz has likely peaked, and its ongoing internal stability is unlikely to last due to the mounting economic costs of the war and long-term disagreements about policy.

Iran’s Control Over the Strait of Hormuz has Already Peaked

Fewer than 10 ships have been able to transit the Strait of Hormuz each day amid the ongoing ceasefire, down from almost 130 per day in the month before the war. For all intents and purposes, it’s unlikely that the Strait will get any more closed than it is already. Iran’s partners like China will not tolerate measures to affect a more permanent long-term closure, such as widespread and indiscriminate mining (an action which may no longer be feasible anyway due to the US’s destruction of much of Iran’s fleet of minelayers).

The costs of accepting a negotiated settlement in which Iran continues to threaten traffic through the Strait will be difficult, even for an impatient US administration apprehensive about continuing the war to accept. Iran’s continued strangling of maritime traffic may inadvertently force the US to increase military deployments to the region and attempt dramatic combined arms operations to force the Strait open.

The transit of two US destroyers through the Strait of Hormuz on April 11, followed by a US Central Command statement announcing the beginning of operations to clear new shipping lanes in the Strait suggests the US is preparing for more aggressive naval action to re-establish control in the region. The move, likely timed to coincide with negotiations, is a warning to Iranian leaders that its leverage over the Strait will be contested and is likely to diminish over time in the absence of a negotiated settlement.

The War Has Worsened Iran’s Internal Crises

Battling the US and Israel has helped bolster the regime’s sense of purpose, but the war has fundamentally undermined Iran’s state capacity. While the Iranian regime maintains a monopoly on violence in the country, the war has ultimately weakened its overall military strength, by devastating its air force, air defenses, navy, and missile stocks.

Operation Epic Fury has been one of the most intense air campaigns in history. According to Pentagon estimates, the US military has struck 13,000 targets in 40 days including:

• 1,500 air defense targets representing 80% of Iran’s air defense systems

• More than 450 storage facilities for Iranian ballistic missiles and 800 storage facilities for attack drones.

• 150 naval vessels representing 90% of the regular Iranian fleet

• 50% of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy's small attack boats

• 20 Iranian naval production facilities

• 80% of facilities associated with Iran’s nuclear industry

• 90% of Iran’s weapons factories, including 80% of its missile factories

While some skepticism of the exact figures the Pentagon has provided is warranted, particularly given the current administration’s penchant for exaggeration and hyperbolic language, other independent analyses also assert extensive devastation of Iran’s military and defense industry. Rebuilding the capabilities lost in the war will take many years and may not even be achievable under the current international sanctions. Destruction across the entire supply chain for Iran’s missiles will likely force Iran to suspend production of ballistic missiles and focus efforts on producing smaller drones. While still problematic for regional security—given the effectiveness of drones in the current war—the dismantling of Iran’s missile production capacity would ultimately undermine its ability to assemble a viable nuclear arsenal.

The war has further battered Iran’s infrastructure and overall industrial capacity and will worsen the economic and potentially even the environmental crises that precipitated the December and January uprising against the government. A report by Al Arabiya suggests Iran has sustained as much as $145B in damage, equivalent to about a third of its entire GDP.

Iran’s largest bridge, the B1, connecting Tehran and Karaj destroyed by US strikes. Source: The Sun

The Iranian regime has nevertheless been able to ride out the onslaught in the short-term, but its current survival strategy may create unanticipated challenges to recovery. A combination of initiative and decentralization have been key reasons for the regime’s resilience amid popular upheaval and war. However, the regime’s future continuity depends on reversing these trends toward a restoration of central authority.

Reimposing top-down control of the country—a necessity in any authoritarian system—will be especially challenging given intensifying clashes between pragmatists and hardliners within the regime over policy and the terms of an enduring peace. The institution that would ordinarily serve as arbiter of such conflicts, the position of Supreme Leader, is now a key liability due to uncertainty about the status of Mojtaba Khamenei. While there are conflicting reports about the health of the new Supreme Leader, including that he is either incapacitated, or alert but severely wounded, the fact remains that the central authority in the country has not appeared in public in any form since the war began and has communicated entirely through written messages. Such an absence would raise serious questions about legitimacy for any leader, but it is especially striking in this case given that the current Supreme Leader had almost no public profile before his appointment and has made no public appearances since. A long-term absence by the Supreme Leader could cause the mounting governance challenges and disputes over policy to metastasize into open factional conflict.

Hi, this is Dan White,

Due to a hectic overseas travel schedule in West Africa, OPFOR Journal will be taking a break from new content for two weeks.

In the meantime, please check out this interview series I published this week at the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), “Defending Global Order Against China’s Maritime Insurgency,” where I speak with Hunter Stires, the former Maritime Strategist to the Secretary of the Navy during the tenure of Secretary Carlos Del Toro, about the US’s effort to counter China’s maritime insurgency to dominate the South China Sea, and discuss why the battle for the freedom of the seas should matter to us all.

OPFOR Journal will return in two weeks to discuss the state of the ongoing war with Iran.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by Iran since the start of Operation Epic Fury launched on February 28, 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. Lone-wolf actors inspired by Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted two attacks in the US in Texas and Michigan.

2. Iran is intensifying cyber attacks against US corporations and Iranian dissidents.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

3. There is mounting evidence that Iran has activated overseas terror sleeper cells to conduct attacks targeting Jewish communities, Iranian activists, and US and Israeli officials worldwide.

1. TWO LONE-WOLF ACTORS INSPIRED BY IRAN AND THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE LAUNCH TERROR ATTACKS IN US

Mass Shooting in Texas Linked to Sympathy for Iran

On February 29 at approximately 1:30 am, a US citizen, Ndiaga Diagne, launched a mass shooting at Buford’s bar in downtown Austin, Texas killing three and wounding 13. Diagne began shooting into the bar’s outdoor seating from his SUV before exiting his vehicle and shooting at bystanders on foot.

There are strong indications the attack was launched in support of the Iranian regime. The attack occurred within 24 hours of the start of Operation Epic Fury. Diagne also reportedly wore an Iranian flag shirt underneath a hoodie emblazoned with the words “Property of Allah” during the attack. Diagne’s social media activity also features several messages hinting at pro-regime sympathies.

Synagogue Attack in Michigan Linked to Hezbollah Sympathies

On March 12, a US citizen, Ayman Mohamad Ghazali, attacked the Temple Israel synagogue outside Detroit. Ghazali rammed a truck carrying improvised explosive devices into the synagogue’s school. He then engaged in a brief firefight with onsite security guards using a semi-automatic rifle, before committing suicide after becoming stuck in his burning vehicle. Ghazali was the attack's only fatality, though the vehicle ramming injured a security guard and smoke from the resulting fire caused injuries to multiple first responders. No children were present at the time.

Ghazali is believed to have carried out the attack in retaliation for an Israeli drone strike in southern Lebanon on March 5, which killed four of his relatives, including two brothers. Israel alleged one of those brothers, Ibrahim Mohamad Ghazali, was a Hezbollah commander. CBS News, citing local sources in Lebanon, confirmed that both brothers killed in the strike were members of Hezbollah's rocket forces.

Additional Information:

1. Iran is Using Religious Rulings to Instigate Lone-Wolf Attacks: Multiple Iranian clerics have ordered religious rulings (fatwas) calling for violence against Americans in the wake of Operation Epic Fury. Two fatwas issued on March 1 called on all Muslims to take revenge on Americans for the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These were followed on March 4 by a fatwa requiring violent attacks on Israelis and President Trump.

2. Attackers Were Known to be Mentally Unstable: Both assailants were reportedly known to be mentally unstable prior to their attacks, suggesting both men were self-radicalized and did not act as part of a broader network of Iranian sleeper cells and contract killers. Ayman Mohamad Ghazali’s ex-wife reportedly called 911 about an hour before the attack to warn local authorities that her ex-husband had become unstable after the deaths of his brothers in Lebanon and was potentially planning violence against himself and others.

3. Other Potential Lone-Wolf Attacks in North America: A series of additional drive-by shootings targeting synagogues and the US consulate in Toronto between March 6-10, may also be lone-wolf attacks inspired by Iran, though these incidents remain under investigation.

2. IRAN-LINKED CYBER THREATS TARGET IRANIAN DISSIDENTS AND US CORPORATIONS

Iranian Hackivists Target US Medical Device Giant Stryker

Between March 1-12, Handala, a pro-Tehran “hackivist” group linked to Iran’s intelligence apparatus, engaged in several cyber operations to intimidate Americans and disrupt American companies. The most significant of these was a malware attack on March 11 that disrupted the operations of US medical device manufacturer Stryker.

According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the attack targeted the company’s Microsoft Intune account (a cloud based corporate IT platform). Stryker reports the attack remained confined to its internal Microsoft environment and did not leak into or compromise any of its products, though some Stryker devices were disrupted by efforts to contain the malware.

Iranian Intelligence Targeting Dissidents with Malware on Telegram

On March 20, the FBI issued a flash cyber intelligence alert that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has escalated a cyber campaign on Telegram targeting overseas Iranian dissidents and journalists with malware. The cyber attacks used social engineering to trick victims into installing malicious applications disguised as common programs, such as security authenticators. Once installed, the malware activated Telegram bots that gave attackers remote command and control over victims' accounts and devices.

Additional Information:

1. Iranian Threat Actors Typically Attack Targets of Opportunity, Particularly Linked to Defense and Israel: According to CISA, Iranian hackers focus their efforts on exploiting poorly secured systems and network edge devices using,

   “unpatched or outdated software with known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) or the use of default or common passwords on internet-connected accounts and devices…These malicious cyber actors commonly use techniques such as automated password guessing, cracking password hashes using online resources, and inputting default manufacturer passwords. When specifically targeting operational technology (OT), these malicious cyber actors also use system engineering and diagnostic tools to target entities such as engineering and operator devices, performance and security systems, and vendor and third-party maintenance and monitoring systems.”

   ---

3. IRAN ACTIVATING OVERSEAS SLEEPER CELLS TO ATTACK JEWS, DISSIDENTS, AND US AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS

Iran Allegedly Activated Transnational Terrorist Sleeper Cells

US officials have reported that Iran has sent an encrypted operational trigger to activate overseas sleeper cells to begin preparations for terrorist attacks. The message is believed to have been relayed across Iranian networks in numerous countries shortly after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28.

New Iranian Transnational Terror Group Claims Responsibility for Attacks In Europe

A new Iran-linked transnational terror group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right) claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Jewish organizations in Europe since the start of March. Attacks include the bombing of a synagogue in Liege, Belgium on March 9; the bombing of a synagogue in the Netherlands city of Rotterdam on March 13; and the bombing of an Orthodox Jewish school in the Netherlands city of Amsterdam on March 14.

Iranian Nationals Arrested for Surveillance of Jewish Institutions and Military Bases in UK

On March 6, the London Metropolitan Police announced the arrest of one Iranian national, and three dual British-Iranian citizens suspected of spying on Jewish communities in the city for suspected future terror attacks.

On March 20, two suspected Iranian spies were arrested after attempting to enter HM Naval Base Clyde near Glasgow, the site of the UK’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Additional Information:

1. Questions Linger About the Authenticity of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia: While the group has claimed responsibility for several recent attacks, those incidents may have been carried out by lone-wolf actors or sleeper cells affiliated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rather than an organized network of pro-Iranian militants. The group has also claimed credit for an attack in Greece that may never have taken place. This suggests the group could in fact be a disinformation operation claiming a variety of attacks carried out by others in order to exaggerate the reach and organization of pro-Iranian terror networks in the West.

2. Iran Threatens to Launch Indiscriminate Attacks to Target American and Israeli Officials: On March 20, Spokesman for General Staff of Armed Forces Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, announced that Iran will not hesitate to attack “recreational areas, tourist destinations and leisure centers around the world” in order to kill its enemies.

3. Historical Cases Suggest Iran will Target Government Officials, Prominent Dissidents and Jewish Institutions Using Local Proxies: As noted in Homeland Security Brief - December 2025, Iranian overseas assassinations and terror operations follow similar tactics, techniques and procedures. These operations, coordinated by the elite Quds Force of the IRGC, have for years been conducted through layers of intermediaries with Quds Force operatives serving as operational planners who subcontract the plots through local proxies generally recruited from organized crime and disaffected members of marginalized groups.

   -

   For decades, the most common targets for these attacks have been Jewish and Israeli groups around the world. However, since 2020 Iranian actors have plotted to assassinate members of the first Trump administration including Donald Trump, John Bolton, and Mike Pompeo for the killing of former IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani. Iran has also engaged in transnational repression targeting prominent dissidents in recent years. Most notably, in 2022 it attempted to organize the assassination of high-profile Iranian-American activist Masih Alinejad, and in 2024 plotted to kill two Maryland-based Iranian dissidents, in both cases using contacts in organized crime.

   -

   There are numerous signs the IRGC may be redoubling its efforts to conduct overseas attacks. The new commander of the IRGC, Ahmad Vadhi, appointed on March 1, has experience serving in the Quds Force, and is accused by Argentina of plotting the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Mutual Aid Association in Buenos Aires that killed 85. Since the start of Operation Epic Fury, multiple prominent Iranian activists living abroad have been killed or injured under mysterious circumstances. On March 6, anti-regime activist Masoud Masjoudi was found dead near Vancouver BC. Two Iranian nationals living in Canada have been charged with his killing. Masjoudi had been conducting investigations into IRGC affiliates in Canada at the time of his death.1 On March 19, a Dutch police officer of Iranian descent known for holding critical views of the Iranian regime, was shot and wounded.

   

While much attention has focused on domestic and allied reactions to the US war against Iran, this Situation Report examines how the purpose and progress of the war is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from military strategists and political commentators in China and Russia. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are interpreting the war for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the merits of the war itself or the conclusions the foreign commentators reached.

This Situation Report is broken into four parts:

1. Interpretations of why the US launched the war

2. Interpretations of US strategy and its effectiveness

   1. On the US’s goals

   2. On the impact of the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

   3. On the use of new US military technology

3. Interpretations of Iranian strategy and its effectiveness

   1. On Iran’s goals

   2. On Iran’s ability to counter the US military

4. Forecasts of how the war might end

   1. On the likelihood of regime change in Iran

   2. On the long-term consequences for international order

1. INTERPRETATIONS OF WHY THE US LAUNCHED THE WAR

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators assert that the US and Israel have used the prospect of Iran eventually developing nuclear weapons as a convenient pretext for attacking Iran for the purpose of regime change. Perceptions of Iranian weakness, compounded by US military momentum from strikes on Iran in June 2025 and the seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, may have given American and Israeli policymakers the sense that a historic window of opportunity had opened to finalize a decades-long project of dominating the Middle East.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By An Gang, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Strategic and Security Studies, Tsinghua University in the Beijing Review, March 5, 2026

“On February 28, 2026, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, launched a military strike against Iran, killing Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and a number of high-ranking military and political officials who were convening a meeting at his residence that same day.

“This follows the January 3rd raid by U.S. special forces in Caracas, where Venezuelan President Maduro and his wife were abducted. This marks yet another instance in a short period of time that the Trump administration has trampled on basic norms of international relations and principles of international law, violated the sovereignty and security of another country, and committed atrocities against its leader. The Chinese government, along with many members of the international community, firmly opposes and strongly condemns this action.

“Trump and his administration, adhering to a policy of “beast-like realism” and the principle of ‘peace through strength,’ disdain to provide a full explanation for the reasons behind these two overseas military operations. In Venezuela, they claimed it was to ‘crack down on the ringleaders of drug cartels,’ while in Iran, they allegedly acted as a righteous indignation against its ‘crimes of massacring its people.’ However, the underlying logic of these two actions is interconnected. First, to create a chilling effect, breaking down the ‘anti-American arc’ formed by the most vocal left-wing regimes in Latin America and the ‘arc of resistance’ supported and manipulated by Iran in the Middle East, thereby deterring global ‘authoritarian anti-American forces.’ Second, to practice ‘energy greed,’ gain more control over oil pricing, manipulate the international crude oil market, and seize multiple benefits from economic, financial, and strategic perspectives, thus compressing the profit margins of export-oriented economies. Third, to create more ‘victories,’ pursue domestic political effects, confuse the base, and strive to reverse the increasingly obvious defeat of the Republican Party in the 2026 midterm elections.”

By Tang Zhichao, director of the Center for Middle East Development and Governance Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences via interview with China News Service, February 28, 2026

“First, Trump is ‘dissatisfied’ with the proposals put forward by Iran and believes that military pressure is needed to force Iran to make concessions, thus using force to promote negotiations. Second, the negotiations may be entirely a ‘smokescreen,’ just like in June 2025. As of the [February] 26th local time, the US military deployment, especially the second aircraft carrier, can be said to be fully in place, a result of careful planning by the US.

“He believes that these developments indicate that the United States and Israel have completely given up hope of negotiating with Iran, and that their goal is to achieve regime change in Iran.”

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 10

“The Iran War is the final phase of the liquidation of the Middle East, as it emerged in the twentieth century, in the process of decline and dismantling of colonial empires. The starting point of the current stage can probably be considered Operation Desert Storm 35 years ago - the first U.S. attack on Iraq to liberate Kuwait, occupied by Saddam Hussein. Those events came at a turning point in international: the end of the Cold War, the self-decommission of the USSR and the onset of a ‘unipolar moment’, in other words, hegemony in the world of the United States.

“Everything further: the Islamist attack on New York and Washington in September 2001, the global fight against terrorism, the retaliatory action in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the ‘Arab Spring’. the intervention in Libya, the stimulation of the civil war in Syria, etc. - meant being sucked into the funnel, control over the process was quickly lost. The policy of the United States (and behind it and all the rest) has turned into an ongoing response to rapid change, and the United States has squeezed between the need to get out of the trap created by itself and the inability to do it without the risk of losing influence not only in the Middle East.

“Retrospectively, it can be stated that almost all the decisions of the White House on the Middle East in recent decades have been situational. The possible consequences were not calculated at least two or three times ahead, although each individual step was presented as an ideologically and geopolitically thought-out strategy.”

By Zhou Xinping, Beijing Review columnist, March 5

“The apparent reason for the US and Israel’s military action against Iran is the ‘Iranian nuclear issue,’ but in reality, it is to curb Iran’s oil production. Looking at the core demands of the US regarding Middle Eastern oil over the past 80 years, its policy has never changed—it’s not simply about ‘stealing oil,’ but about controlling the pricing, settlement, and distribution channels of Middle Eastern oil, thereby maintaining the petrodollar’s hegemony and global dominance.

“Since Roosevelt’s 1945 agreement with Saudi Arabia for ‘military protection in exchange for control of oil,’ which led to the deployment of US troops to the Persian Gulf, successive US administrations have viewed the Middle East as America’s oil backyard. However, Iran’s resistance to the US has consistently displeased the US. In 1953, orchestrated by British and US intelligence agencies, a coup d’état occurred in Iran, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh, which advocated for the return of oil sovereignty. Anglo-American oil companies gained control of Iranian oil, pioneering the ‘regime change for oil’ strategy. After the US and Saudi Arabia agreed in 1974 to settle global oil transactions in US dollars, the dollar became deeply intertwined with oil. The Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003 were key US actions to eliminate anti-American forces in the Middle East and consolidate its dominance over Middle Eastern oil.”

“However, Iran, a major oil producer in the Middle East, has been free from US and British control since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. What bothers the US even more is that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil export route through the Middle East. Therefore, for decades, the US government has viewed Iran as a hostile nation and exerted pressure on it. In particular, recent US administrations have repeatedly imposed sanctions on Iran, attempting to reduce its oil exports and cripple its economy. In the last decade or so, Iran has largely determined its own oil production, deviating from the US-led OPEC production quotas. Furthermore, Iran has increasingly de-dollarized its oil exports, adopting multiple settlement methods such as its own currency, the renminbi, and the ruble—something the US cannot tolerate.”

By Vladimir Orlov, Director of the PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), Kommersant, March 1, 2026

“So, why? The June 2025 war ended in a draw. On the one hand, the Americans and Israelis inflicted serious damage on Iranian nuclear infrastructure facilities that could have played a critical role in Iran’s acquisition of nuclear material enriched enough to create a nuclear explosive device. Key Iranian scientists were sidelined.

“These are the conclusions contained in the PIR Center’s report, ‘The Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment of the Current Status and Capabilities,’ which will be made publicly available on March 2. On the other hand, as stated in the report, as of February of this year, ‘Iran retains the technical knowledge and experience resulting from more than three decades of nuclear development. More than 30 nuclear facilities remain operational throughout the country. Most importantly, the status of more than 440 kg of HEU, which could potentially be used to create a special munition, remains unclear. This amount is potentially sufficient to create 10 nuclear warheads with further enrichment.’

“And by the end of last year, the Israelis had become despondent: Trump, as authoritative Israeli sources told me then, was ‘losing interest’ in Iran, his thoughts, they said, preoccupied with Venezuela and the Ukrainian crisis; and he believed that ‘the Americans had done their job.’ Therefore, they told me, it took Netanyahu’s remarkable efforts to get Trump back on his combative side: ‘Until Iran is cleansed, it will remain a thorn in Trump’s side.’ Then came the options: what would ‘cleanse Iran’ mean? Apply the Republicans’ favorite tactic, ‘regime change’ (read: coup d’état); or limit themselves to ‘cleaning up’ with depth charges those nuclear facilities they missed last June.

“But, as the alarmed Israelis soon discovered, their concerns were unnecessary. Trump hadn’t forgotten about Iran. Yes, he’d become engrossed in Venezuela, practicing a new tactic there: partial ‘regime change.’ But he apparently considered a full-scale ‘cleansing’ and humiliation of Iran part of his mission, and this wasn’t just about Israel or its nuclear program. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage-taking at the US embassy in Iran that same year, Iran has remained the main uncontrollable irritant to the US globally.

“Not North Korea. Not Cuba. Not even Russia or China (although sending a clear signal to China by ‘cleansing Iran’ would also be a very timely move for Trump). Here in Russia, they’d say, ‘It was ruining the statistics,’ this Iran. It was ruining Trump’s mood. The Iranian negotiators turned out to be good negotiators. ‘They’re dragging their feet, leading you by the nose!’ the Israelis egged him on. And now it’s time for revenge.”

2. INTERPRETATIONS OF US STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators assert that the Trump administration is confused and divided about its overall strategy, particularly as its current campaign strategy, focused on decapitating strikes and targeting of military infrastructure, has so far failed to topple the regime. The division over strategy reflects a broader schism in Trump’s political base, which is willing to accept short and decisive military campaigns to achieve limited objectives, but is skeptical of prolonged and costly wars, particularly in the Middle East. As a result, they believe the administration is likely to buckle under pressure and seek a quick exit if Iran puts up long-term resistance or succeeds in strangling global energy exports. Caught between the need to claim a tangible victory and the desire to avoid an ignominious defeat, the US may be tempted to put boots on the ground—either to seize Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium at Isfahan or to occupy its oil facilities on Kharg Island as a bargaining chip.

Commentators further note that the US has come to appreciate the importance of high-performance strike drones, but nonetheless remains behind both Iran and Russia in capabilities and lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By An Gang, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Strategic and Security Studies, Tsinghua University in the Beijing Review, March 5, 2026

“The overconfident Trump administration’s reckless decision to launch a war against Iran may not have been well-considered, let alone based on any medium- to long-term strategic planning. Unlike previous US overseas military operations, the Trump administration tended to be a ‘hit-and-run’ approach, focusing on destruction rather than creation, and not aiming to reform Iran’s governance system. Iran is not a small or weak country; its internal situation is extremely complex. Currently, its military system has devolved into a situation where different branches and factions are fighting independently, leaving the US without a clear target and effective means to communicate with its adversary and control the intensity of the war. The US will now face the critical questions of how to win and how to withdraw. It is possible that the war will not go smoothly, losses will exceed expectations, and a swift victory will be impossible, forcing the US to continue investing more war resources.

“Even if the Trump administration declares itself victorious and leaves the Iranian battlefield, it will inevitably leave behind a mess in the Middle East: a locally radicalized Iran lacking effective central control will have a long-term negative impact on regional peace and stability, as well as on America’s hard and soft power and its alliance system. More importantly, the rapid and aggressive actions Trump has taken since taking office over a year ago are showing a pattern of ‘one wave of momentum, then a decline, and finally exhaustion,’ exacerbating political divisions and even internal divisions within the MAGA camp. Therefore, the likelihood of the US government taking new large-scale, risky actions against specific countries before the midterm elections is decreasing.”

By Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Valdai Discussion Club, March 10, 2026

“A window of opportunity has also opened for Washington to crush its long-standing adversary. Donald Trump's predecessors hesitated to undertake a campaign of this scale, preferring sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence operations. Like Israel, the United States could chalk up significant damage to Iran's military-industrial potential. Unlike Israel, the United States is virtually invulnerable to retaliatory strikes. Military losses are minimal. The psychological demonstration has a wider target audience than Iran. The campaign has demonstrated that the leaders of the vast majority of countries can be assassinated with political will and without any ethical qualms. The main problem is what to do next. The effects of the first round of fighting are already wearing off. Iran has not collapsed. This means it will be necessary to either engage in a risky ground operation or ‘stand back and watch.’ A ground operation is not ruled out, but it is not yet the baseline scenario. The United States may pause and launch another strike at an opportune moment. But the problem is that Iranian resistance will keep the region on edge. This will lead to high oil prices and problems for allies. Therefore, a wait-and-see approach is also risky. While the US has an extremely high margin of safety and can afford to play the long game, the Trump administration is in a more difficult position. A shaky victory, Iranian attacks, and rising gas prices are fraught with domestic problems for the Republicans.”

By Dmitry Novikov, Associate Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestiya, March 3, 2026

“Washington and Tel Aviv seek to destroy even the semblance of Iran's ambition for regional hegemony, which it has nurtured for decades. This will be facilitated either by regime change or, failing that, by a significant decline in Iranian military capabilities. Iran's minimum goal, therefore, is to endure and prevent critical long-term damage to its military and economic capabilities. It can do this, among other things, by raising the costs of continued military action for its opponents.”

By Cheng Tong, Dean of the School of Oriental Languages ​​at Shanghai International Studies University, via CCTV, March 4, 2026

“The UN Charter stipulates that the assassination of a foreign leader constitutes a serious violation of sovereignty. Treaties such as the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention also explicitly prohibit the assassination of national leaders. Khamenei was not only Iran's supreme political leader but also a Shiite religious leader. We have seen that after news of Khamenei's martyrdom spread, not only in Iran but also in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries, Shiite Muslims were outraged, taking to the streets and chanting slogans of revenge. It can be said that the consequences of this US-Israeli ‘targeted killing’ operation will be far-reaching, complex, and extremely destructive, potentially leading to a vicious cycle of deepening hatred and violence begetting violence.”

By Evgeny Fedorov, Russian nationalist politician and member of the State Duma, TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication), March 11, 2026

“Trump's first mistake was eliminating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Whatever anyone says about him, the old man didn't seize power in Iran, but was the elected spiritual leader of a nation of 80 million. It's a real Pandora's Box—now anyone has the moral right to assassinate legitimately elected heads of state. If Americans can do it, why shouldn't others try? Trump's terrorist act is a direct warning to Russia and China. The United States has crossed another red line, and this clearly needs to be taken into account.

”Now, regarding Iranians dissatisfied with the government, whom Trump proposed to seize power in the country. There were, of course, some celebrations of the ayatollah's death, but no one supported them. It's all about the Shiite perception of death. Khamenei died at the hands of the enemy, meaning he became a martyr. And that's a completely different balance of power in the Middle East. Such things are not forgiven, and they are avenged. Iranians, who only yesterday sympathized with the rebels, are sincerely mourning the Ayatollah and demanding more missiles from the IRGC for Israel and the United States. And the missiles have flown.”

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 2, 2026

“The Supreme Leader of Iran was not just destroyed by a targeted strike, but this destruction was also declared a great achievement and a benefit for the future resolution of the conflict. However, Ali Khamenei is a legitimate (according to the laws of his country) head of state - a member of the United Nations, recognized by almost everyone and a full participant in all forms of international relations. Including political negotiations with the organizers of the attack, which have continued until now.

“The killing of the head of one state by the forces of another state and by the decision of its leadership in accordance with the same model as the leaders of terrorist organizations or drug cartels are liquidated is a fundamentally different dimension of world politics.

“Even in comparison with previous cases of regime changes, including such brutal finals as the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya or the execution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Both episodes became possible thanks to external military intervention. But Gaddafi was killed by his Libyan opponents as a result of an act of internal turmoil, and Hussein was executed after the Iraqi court’s verdict trial, no matter how to assess his objectivity. The case of Iran is different, it is a reproduction of the method that Israel applied to the heads of Hezbollah and Hamas. And the United States fully supports this approach.”

By Tai Fengshun and Huang Lin, Special correspondents for The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group), March 3, 2026

“The US military had three objectives in using suicide drones, which had only been in service with the troops for a few months, in this airstrike against Iran.

“The first objective is to test the combat capabilities of the ‘LUCAS’ in actual combat. Iran is a medium-sized military power in the Middle East, and the intensity and scale of the war would far exceed those of some of the smaller countries that the United States has previously attacked. Through actual combat, the performance of the ‘LUCAS’ can be tested, providing more practical evidence for the accumulation of tactics and subsequent improvements.

“Although the ‘LUCAS’ is a copy of an Iranian drone, its design incorporates the US understanding and positioning of such weapons. Reportedly, the drone incorporates advanced collaborative capabilities. Some models are equipped with Starlink satellite communication terminals, enabling autonomous coordination and suitability for swarm tactics and network-centric warfare. This means multiple ‘LUCAS’ can share data, coordinate target allocation, dynamically adjust attack missions, and effectively resist electronic jamming, achieving a more intelligent and efficient swarm precision strike capability than the Iranian ‘Shahed-136’ drone.

“The second objective is to ‘fight fire with fire’ on the battlefield, thereby reducing operational costs. The US military’s first use of the Lucas suicide drone is a specific tactical action based on modern battlefield experience, aimed at countering the threat of low-cost drones and addressing the cost-effectiveness dilemma. Iran has equipped itself with a large number of long-range suicide drones such as the Witness and Arash, using them extensively since the start of the war. Combined with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range rocket artillery, they have repeatedly and successfully struck US bases in the Middle East, destroying facilities and causing personnel casualties at US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar.

“Each LUCAS drone costs approximately $35,000 to produce, making it a much cheaper beyond-visual-range weapon than missiles. It can provide the U.S. military with low-cost, scalable military capabilities in the Middle East. In this conflict, the U.S. quickly announced the use of this drone, which also sent a message to the U.S. domestically that the U.S. military no longer relies solely on expensive beyond-visual-range strike weapons on the battlefield, but is also fighting against adversaries with low-cost weapons.

“The U.S. military’s large-scale deployment of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems deserves close attention.

“The third objective is to accelerate the ‘Replicator’ program through real-world combat, driving a profound transformation in operational thinking and tactics, serving high-end warfare and great power competition, and thus warranting attention. In 2024, the US military drew lessons from the conflict between Ukraine and Russia—where both countries utilized a large number of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as for frontline operations and attacks on fixed targets deep within enemy territory, targeting fixed military installations, infrastructure, and factories to weaken the other’s war potential. The ‘Replicator’ program aims to deploy unmanned systems on a large scale, enabling the US military to distribute its combat power across a large number of relatively inexpensive systems. This is a multi-domain program that may include autonomous air, ground, surface, underwater, and/or space unmanned systems.

“The U.S. military believes that low-cost, high-performance, and rapidly producible unmanned systems are one of the key development trends in future weapons. Major powers like Russia have already begun to equip themselves with large numbers of low-cost, long-range lethal systems, while the United States lags behind in this area. The ‘Replicator’ program is a crucial project to catch up and address the challenges of future great power competition. The ‘Replicator’ program is essentially a large-scale integration of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and unmanned platforms. The ‘Replicator’ program marks a significant shift in the U.S. military’s strategic thinking: from relying on a few high-precision, expensive platforms and munitions to a combination of high-end platforms (including munitions) and the large-scale deployment of ‘consumable’ low-cost autonomous systems. Its core strategic objective is to create new military superiority through a combination of qualitative and quantitative advantages, attempting to leverage its industrial and technological capabilities to enable the U.S. military to adapt to both high-end combat and protracted wars of attrition, thereby reshaping the logic of deterrence and warfare.”

By Fighterbomber, leading pro-Kremlin Russian military blogger, on Telegram, March 11, 2026

“If we were preparing for the last war before the Special Military Operation (SMO), then the US and Israel prepared for the future war, so much so that they missed the present moment.

“Their reliance on robots and technological superiority reached its peak, and their desire to preserve the lives of their taxpayers was taken to the extreme. The attacking side decided to achieve its goals without infantry.

“As a result, the world’s first army, reinforced by the most cunning country on the planet, is now forced to invent new war goals and excuses every day to explain why everything went to hell.

“This sounds very familiar, doesn’t it?

“After reading Russian-Ukrainian channels, the Americans realized that today, the main weapon is drones, and so they launched a drone attack.

“Judging by the losses, the tactics of using aircraft in conditions of complete technological and numerical superiority are no different from the tactics of using aircraft in the SMO.

“They operate without entering the zone of destruction of even single air defense systems.

“But having a shitload of attack drones, Israel and the US launched a massive attack with Hermes and Reaper drones. Practically all the accurate hits of the day come from them. On the 12th day of the war, Iran continues to shoot them down gradually.”

3. INTERPRETATIONS OF IRANIAN STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Summary of Key Insights

Commentators believe that while Iran is capable of landing periodic strikes on US military bases, it cannot defeat the US military in a decisive engagement. Iran’s optimal strategy is to endure US and Israeli strikes while maintaining sufficient resistance to disrupt the global economy and frustrate US allies, and ultimately force the US to settle on its terms.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By Yuri Lyamin, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 13, 2026

"Despite all the destruction and losses, Iran continues to withstand attacks and continues to respond. Among other things, Iran has now established de facto complete control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

"The Iranian leadership is clearly demonstrating that it is prepared to continue fighting until the US agrees to terms acceptable to the Iranians. Iran wants to break the vicious cycle of negotiations, war, ceasefire, negotiations, and a new war at any cost, and is therefore pursuing its strategy of drawing the US into a protracted conflict. In other words, they are imposing a scenario that Trump clearly did not sign up for.”

By Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University via Global Times, March 8, 2026

“Unable to strike the US mainland, Iran has no choice but to target US bases, embassies, and other assets in the Middle East. However, this approach carries severe negative consequences, namely worsening relations with Gulf countries.

“Therefore, Iran has proactively sought understanding from Gulf states through an apology, he told the Global Times. From Iran’s perspective, it must carefully consider its own geopolitical environment. Particularly since restoring ties with Saudi Arabia in 2023, improving relations with Gulf countries has been a key direction in Iranian diplomacy, aimed at optimizing its external surroundings.”

By Roman Skomorokhov, Russian defense journalist, TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication), March 5, 2026

“And Iran, by destroying its neighbors' oil refineries with ballistic missiles and drones, and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, will ultimately drive oil prices to $200 per barrel. And then, truly, half the world will come to Trump and start beating him over the head with sticks, because they will have no other choice, especially those who don't have their own oil.

“It's clear that Uncle Donald will sell out; it's a question of price.

“But Iran will hold out; the country is so independent of the rest of the world that only North Korea will be more resilient. Yes, Iran won't be able to reach its main enemy (not Israel), but it can easily destroy everything within reach with ballistic missiles manufactured underground and launched from underground. And in the end, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain—they will all come crawling back to beg Trump to calm down. Because what the US is spending on this war pales in comparison to what the Gulf countries are losing from the halted production and transportation of oil and gas.

"So, Iran is not alone in its war. He has so many allies, and they say Oman and Jordan are next... Everything will depend solely on the accuracy and destructive power of the IRGC missiles. And yesterday's US allies will start to back off and raise questions about closing US military bases.”

By Anton Mamedov, Russian military analyst, Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 11, 2026

“As for defense, Iran has changed its tactics. They’ve realized they can’t survive a symmetrical war with the US. So now we’re seeing a classic ‘death defense’: minefields at sea, thousands of drones, mobile missile teams constantly shifting positions. Their goal is to make US presence in the region as costly as possible. They won’t allow the Americans to safely [extract] its uranium. Every kilometer of advance will come at a very high price.”

By Dmitry Novikov, Associate Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestiya, March 3, 2026

“Meanwhile, the dynamics of domestic political support could become a critical constraint on American involvement in the military operation. Unlike the Vietnam and Iraq wars, where it took years for domestic circumstances to change course, the current situation is more dynamic. The ruling administration is already entering the election cycle, with important midterm congressional elections looming. A defeat in these elections would turn the current president into a lame duck and negate the revolutionary momentum of the first year of his second term.

“American voters’ attitudes toward wars in the Middle East are overwhelmingly negative. This is well characterized by polls on attitudes toward the 2003 Iraq campaign. According to them, Republican supporters (and Trump is concerned about them) still consider the war just (Saddam Hussein was a bad guy), but clearly excessive in terms of the scale of its presence and the cost. In other words, a show of force is possible and necessary, but only as long as it doesn’t result in serious material costs and losses.

“This makes support for a major military operation in the Middle East highly volatile, even among Trump’s nuclear-armed base. The first operation against Iran was viewed positively by his supporters, primarily due to its swiftness and lack of casualties. The United States demonstrated superior power and achieved a concrete result (a strike on nuclear program facilities, their declared destruction). Israel initiated the military action, and the immediate outcome of American intervention was the end of the conflict.

[…]

“Under these circumstances, by maintaining resistance and raising the economic and political costs of continuing the war for Washington, Tehran could emerge from this phase of the confrontation, if not as a winner, then certainly not as a loser.

“Moreover, if Iran seriously expects to maintain or even strengthen its regional position, it would be in its interests not to let the United States out of the conflict so easily. Prolonging the conflict, even in a more sluggish form, will present Washington with increasingly difficult practical challenges and will ultimately force it to decide: retreat, sealing a less than favorable outcome, or face the quagmire of a protracted military campaign.”

By Zhang Junshe, Non-Resident Fellow at the People's Liberation Army Naval Academic Research Institute, via The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group), March 5, 2026

“‘Iran possesses a certain anti-carrier capability. It is equipped with multiple anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles capable of striking maritime targets, as well as suicide drones. Iran has also launched some reconnaissance satellites, which, when combined with drones, can also be used to reconnoiter and locate US aircraft carriers,’ Zhang Junshe explained.

“‘In terms of anti-carrier warfare, ballistic missiles are one of the most effective weapons. Anti-ship ballistic missiles, with their high speed and strong penetration capabilities, are more difficult for aircraft carriers to defend against,’ Zhang Junshe said. ‘Actions against US aircraft carriers can also boost the morale of domestic resistance.’

“‘I also believe that Iran has a certain anti-carrier capability, but its anti-carrier warfare system is not perfect and its threat to the US military is relatively limited,’ Han Dong pointed out. ‘Especially in the absence of air superiority, US carrier-based aircraft and drones will continue to suppress Iran’s anti-ship missile forces to reduce the threat of Iranian missiles to US aircraft carriers, and the contest between the two sides will continue.’”

By Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, prominent Russian ultranationalist, former Russian FSB officer and commander of separatist forces in Ukraine, on Telegram, March 12, 2026

“In my opinion (I have already written about this to some correspondents) without significant military participation of China (in the form of ‘volunteers’ with a large number of air defense and anti-aircraft missiles) Iran has no chance of resisting the prevailing air forces of the US and Israel coalition.

“Even if we assume that the number of missiles in Israel will be insufficient for a long (30-60 days or more) campaign, and Iran’s missiles can more or less unhindered reach Israeli territory (while, of course, Israel will have enough anti-aircraft and air defense missiles to protect the most important military objects) — this will not in any way affect the readiness/ability of the Israeli Air Force to maintain a high pace of bombing.

“All the more Iran will not be able to neutralize the three US aircraft carrier groups, because its fleet is completely ‘knocked out’, and there is no air force as such. The missile weapons against the aircraft carrier groups are not effective enough at the distances at which the US Navy ships are located.

“Day after day, week after week, the ‘coalition’ will strike all available targets in Iranian territory until Iran is completely destabilized and plunged into total chaos. (And the death of even several hundred in Israel... and even many thousands — this will not prevent it in any way. On the contrary — it will give the ‘allies’ the ‘moral justification’ they need to kill tens (and then hundreds) of thousands of Persians.

“No matter how many missiles Iran has, it will not be able to destroy even just one Israel. It can cause damage — but nothing more. Whereas the Americans and Israelis will sooner or later achieve the complete disorganization of the Iranian air defense and then begin to methodically and massively destroy bridges, communications, life-support systems, etc., which after a while will cause mass starvation and epidemics in major Iranian cities (Gaza will seem like a ‘children’s morning show’ compared to what Iran could ‘collapse into’ after 2-3 months of continuous massive bombing).”

4. FORECASTS OF HOW THE WAR MIGHT END AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators believe the war is unlikely to result in regime change in Iran. The regime retains more than enough support and military capacity to suppress any domestic challenge to its rule. The US appears unable and unwilling to commit to a full-scale invasion needed to topple the government.

Some commentators further argue that while the conflict may yield short-term advantages for China and Russia, the broader destabilization of the international order it produces is unlikely to serve the long-term interests of any major power.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By Anton Mamedov, Russian military analyst, Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 11, 2026

“Despite the colossal losses and destruction, Iran is confident that the West’s main goal has failed. Washington and Tel Aviv’s bet on a ‘super-harsh strike’ intended to provoke panic among the elite and popular uprising has failed. The death of the Supreme Leader, contrary to expectations, did not destroy the state, and the ‘martyrdom’ factor merely consolidated the population.

“Iran has demonstrated the vulnerability of the US’s extensive military infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. Retaliatory strikes against US facilities are already calling into question the Arab monarchies’ continued military cooperation with Washington. US partners are beginning to question the wisdom of paying for costly ‘defense’ that provokes, rather than deters, aggression.

“On the other hand, Iran’s economy has suffered devastating damage: energy and infrastructure facilities have been destroyed. Rebuilding them under sanctions will take decades, which promises enormous social pressure for the country’s new leadership.”

By Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University via Global Times, March 7, 2026

“However, without launching a ground invasion, it is extremely difficult for US and Israel to achieve their objective of toppling the Iranian regime.

“Whether the US becomes mired in a quagmire depends on American strategic decision-making and the degree of damage inflicted on the US by Iran’s counterattacks, said Liu, judging from White House Middle East policy and Trump’s personal style, there is a risk of getting bogged down, but it may not be particularly high.

“It is possible that, once it becomes clear regime change in Iran is unattainable and the cost becomes extremely unaffordable, the US will seek to end the conflict and declare victory.”

By Vladimir Fitin, advisor to the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1, 2026

“The combat readiness of the regime’s main force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), remains high, which guarantees the suppression of anti-government protests… To prevent this, the Americans will have to launch a ground operation, but it’s unlikely they’ll decide to do so. Perhaps some airborne sorties will occur. But the coffins that would inevitably start arriving in the US would be the worst possible gift to Trump ahead of the upcoming midterm congressional elections in November.”

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 2

“The fundamental deterrents of international relations that have survived from previous eras are being dismantled. Recognition of the legitimacy of states is due to specific circumstances, and even the sympathies/antipathies of individual actors. This turns international relations into a likeness of Russian roulette. And knocks out the very base from under them. Not that everyone acted exclusively in accordance with the norms of law and morality (the latter is interpreted differently depending on the cultural tradition). But certain frames were present, now they are being removed.

“Since they went to this consistently and approached quite smoothly, many political elites do not seem to consider these events in such a dramatic way. They are considered, albeit a rather sharp, but generally an understandable manifestation of contradictions. However, not everyone thinks so. The conclusions that the opponents of the United States have the right to draw are begging.

“First of all, negotiating with the Americans makes almost no sense, the real question is either about surrender or imitation to prepare for a forceful decision.

“Secondly, the situation is quite plausible when there is nowhere to retreat and nothing to lose. And then any of the ‘last’ arguments is legitimate, the type of ‘red button’ that is available - literal or figurative.

“These conclusions persist, no matter what happens in Iran in the coming days. Even if there is an improved likeness of Venezuela with a backstage agreement on the transfer of power to some hands that suit everyone (the likelifess does not look high yet, but what can be ruled out now?), such social engineering will not calm other regimes that oppose the United States. The mechanism of change of control and putting under control is indicated, this is a much tougher option than even the “color revolutions” of the zero years, the opposition to it will strengthen and become more desperate. With consequences that become fatal under a certain scenario.”

By Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Valdai Discussion Club, March 10, 2026

“Iran is facing its most difficult situation in its history since the Islamic Revolution. The model the country has built over decades for open conflict with its adversaries is being severely tested. Recovering the potential lost as a result of the attacks will take years. There is no immediate resolution to the economic problems in sight. The blockade of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is also affecting Iran, as its oil supplies are also limited. The US naval blockade is unlikely to lift anytime soon, even if the intensity of the fighting subsides. Tehran is also at risk from the fact that it has entered into the conflict with the US and Israel virtually alone diplomatically. No other powers have made any firm commitments to defend the country. On the other hand, Iran has demonstrated its will to resist, and its society and political system have demonstrated the ability to consolidate in the face of an external threat. Although Iran possesses far fewer military and economic capabilities, it retains the potential to make the cost of the conflict even higher for its adversaries. For Iran, the war is much more existential in nature than for others. The first round of the military campaign against Iran once again reveals the old patterns of international relations: major players are less sensitive to crises, asymmetry of power is hardly an obstacle to resistance, a lack of allies is a problem, but as a junior partner, one can find oneself hostage to a major player's game. The most important question is how the current crisis will impact the transformation of the entire international system. Given its fragility, another jolt could transform the crumbling of the international structure into a full-blown collapse.”

The US and Israel have engaged in seven days of high-intensity combat operations against Iran. The joint military campaign has steadily intensified over the past week and has severely battered but not yet defeated the Iranian regime. While the war’s outcome remains uncertain, several trends in Iran’s response have now become visible that may be used to interpret and forecast its overall strategy. This Situation Report examines those trends to assess Iran's operational plans, evaluate their effectiveness, and identify pathways by which the Iranian regime might still survive and claim a form of victory.

This Situation Report is broken into two parts:

1. Interpretations of the components and effectiveness of Iranian strategy

   1. On Iran’s long-range retaliatory strike campaign

   2. On Iran’s use of proxy forces

   3. On Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

2. Prospects for Iranian Victory

   1. Through triggering a global economic crisis

   2. Through a prolonged campaign of destabilizing low-intensity attacks

Components and Effectiveness of Iranian Strategy

Iran’s military response has centered on three elements: long-range drone and missile strikes, the activation of proxy forces across the Middle East and beyond, and a maritime blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The strategic rationale behind these operations is to escalate the war horizontally in order to create a regional conflagration that roils the global economy, frightens US allies, and triggers a domestic political crisis in the United States. The end goal is to force the US to end the war short of its objectives and, in doing so, preserve the Iranian regime.

Iranian Long-Range Strikes Have Created Chaos but Are Losing Their Effectiveness and Have Generated Unexpected Backlash

As anticipated, Iran has launched drone and ballistic missile strikes against US military bases across the Middle East as well as against Israeli territory. But Iran has also gone further, striking the territory and in some cases civilian populations of 12 countries throughout the region, including several close US Arab allies such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, and Iraq. It has also targeted US partners farther removed from the conflict including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and Oman. The widespread strikes appear aimed to endanger the core national interests of Iran’s neighbors and create regional chaos that pressures the US and Israel into ending the war.

Iranian drone attack on Dubai International Airport on March 7. Source: Noel Reports (@noel_reports) on Telegram

This long-range strike campaign has been far more extensive and devastating than previous Iranian retaliatory strikes against Israel and US military bases in 2020, 2024, and 2025. According to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine, Iran launched at least 500 missiles and 2,000 drones at its neighbors between February 28 and March 3 alone, with several hundred additional drones and missiles fired since then. The majority of strikes have targeted the UAE, which as of March 5, reported detecting 196 ballistic missiles and 1,072 drones, of which 181 and 1,001 were intercepted respectively.

Iran has seen some significant operational successes in these attacks. Iran has struck multiple US military bases in the region, damaging at least five sophisticated US air defense radars in the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and killing six US service members in an attack on an army operations center in Kuwait. Iran has landed additional blows against multiple US diplomatic and intelligence sites in Iraq, the US Consulate in Dubai, UAE, and the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Iran has also struck oil and gas infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.

A fire at Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura oil refinery resulting from an Iranian drone strike Source: Mamlekate (@mamlekate) on Telegram

Three incidents of US F-15E fighters brought down by friendly fire in Kuwait on March 3 are evidence that fear of Iranian long-range strikes haunts US allies and has shaken their decision-making. However, in many ways Iran’s long-range strike strategy has fallen short of its goals. The intensity and indiscriminate nature of Iran’s response has decisively turned its neighbors against it, served to increase the solidarity of the US coalition, and expanded the number of potential foreign threats to the Iranian regime.

Iranian strikes have pushed Azerbaijan to downgrade diplomatic ties with Iran, raise the readiness of its armed forces, and break up potential threats to Israeli interests in the country. Qatar has shot down Iranian bombers in response to threats to US bases. Saudi Arabia has invoked elements of its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan in response to attacks. The UAE, the country most seriously and persistently attacked by Iran, is reportedly considering more dramatic retaliation against Iran, including joining the US military campaign as well as freezing billions of dollars in Iranian assets.

Further evidence that Iran’s initial long-range strike campaign has not gone as planned can be found in remarks by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who on March 7 apologized for attacks on neighboring countries and claimed to have ordered their cessation (though attacks have since continued).

An additional trade-off inherent in Iran’s strategy of widely dispersed attacks is that it has hindered its ability to mass firepower. Drone and missile attacks have come in salvos of dozens rather than hundreds of munitions, and have been spread across multiple targets rather than concentrated against single objectives. This poor coordination and prioritization of effort—likely resulting from US and Israeli efforts to degrade Iranian command and control—has limited damage and reduced the overall effectiveness of its attacks.

There is also good reason to believe that the threat of Iranian long-range strikes is diminishing as the war continues. US and Israeli strikes have severely degraded Iran's ballistic missile capability by targeting munitions stockpiles and, more importantly, the far more limited supply of transporter erector launchers (TELs) and trained technicians needed to deploy them. The Israel Defense Forces estimated on March 6 that their strikes had destroyed at least 300 TELs, leaving Iran with only an estimated 100–200 launch systems remaining. The effects of these strikes are now visible in what US Central Command reports as a 90% drop in the overall number of Iranian missile attacks as of March 5. Iran’s missile launch capability will be further curtailed as the US gains greater air superiority in coming days and is able to more freely employ strategic bombers against underground “missile cities,” where much of Iran’s arsenal is stored.

A new underground missile city belonging to the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unveiled in March 2025. Source: IranPress

It will be more difficult for the US and Israel to completely stop the threat posed by smaller Iranian drones however. Iran’s stockpiles of attack drones are much larger and more dispersed than its ballistic missiles. Iran’s ability to deploy drones is not limited by complex mobile launch systems. Drones have also proven more effective in penetrating US and allied defenses and striking significant military targets so far in the conflict. Low-cost Iranian drones are also highly inefficient for the US and its allies to counter with their limited supplies of sophisticated missile interceptors.

Nevertheless, Iran's drones are far less lethal than its ballistic missiles, and the impact of future drone attacks is likely to diminish as the US establishes air supremacy over Iran and deploys a broader array of aerial intelligence assets in the region to identify launch sites and drone networks. The US’s ability to destroy drones in flight is also set to improve as it begins employing Merops drone interceptors. Merops, produced by Perennial Autonomy—a defense startup backed by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt—have proven themselves on the battlefield in Ukraine, allegedly downing as many as 1,000 Russian variants of Iran’s Shahed drone. Further technical expertise and drone defense systems imported from Ukraine are also likely to further mitigate the threats to the US and its regional allies.

Iran’s Proxy Forces Have Helped Widen the War but Their Contributions Have Been Uneven and Largely Insignificant

Iran has also attempted to mobilize its proxy forces, with Lebanese Hezbollah resuming attacks on Israel and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacking US and Kurdish forces in Iraq and threatening retaliation against Europe. Hezbollah has also launched drone attacks on the UK’s Royal Air Force Base Akrotiri in Cyprus, straining relations between the two countries and throwing Cyprus's rotating EU Council presidency into disarray.

Still, at present the threat posed by Iranian proxy forces has remained limited and largely containable. Hezbollah, still reeling from years of Israeli strikes, has failed to land any significant blows and has instead triggered a major crackdown by both the Israeli and Lebanese militaries. Proxy groups in Iraq such as Kataeb Hezbollah have been similarly ineffective, and have failed to disrupt US combat operations. Interestingly, the Houthis, among Iran’s most loyal and aggressive proxies, have thus far remained out of the war, apparently deterred by previous US and Israeli attacks.

Iran could still attempt to activate sleeper cells of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated proxy networks to carry out terrorist attacks across the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, though it remains unclear at what point Iran would choose to invoke this option. The scale of this threat has come into sharper focus over the past week, as law enforcement in Azerbaijan, Qatar, and the UK announced the arrest of Iranian terrorist networks in their respective countries.

Iranian clerics have also attempted to incite “lone-wolf” attacks against the US and Israel through religious declarations. On March 4, Senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Javad Amoli issued a fatwa requiring devout Shi’ite Muslims to launch attacks against Israelis and the US President. While such decrees are unlikely to lead to a massive new jihadist threat—particularly given the deep unpopularity of the clerical regime with much of Iran’s population—they are still likely to motivate isolated attacks against the US, Israel, and other Western countries, which could further reduce support for the already unpopular war. The apparent Iran-inspired mass shooting incident in Austin, Texas on February 29 may be a harbinger of things to come.

Ndiaga Diagne reportedly wore an Iranian flag shirt underneath a sweatshirt emblazoned with the words “Property of Allah” during a February 29 shooting rampage in Austin, Texas that left three dead. The attack occurred within 24 hours of the beginning of Operation Epic Fury. Diagne’s social media history also included posts supportive of the Iranian regime. Source: CBS News on YouTube

A Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Has Created a Serious Geopolitical Pain Point

Iran’s naval capabilities have been severely degraded by US strikes, which have damaged or destroyed at least 43 ships and devastated its major naval bases. Iran has nevertheless been able to effectively impose a blockade of maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz at a distance through threat of land-based military strikes, sea drones, and undersea mines. Between February 28 and March 6, Iranian forces launched at least 13 attacks on maritime shipping through the Strait. Some ships continue to transit the Strait, but maritime traffic in the region has largely ground to a halt, and threatened to choke off 20% of the world’s oil and gas supply.

US President Trump has ordered the US Navy to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. This will take time to achieve as the primary Iranian threats to shipping come from dispersed, often land-based drones and missiles that will need to be neutralized as part of the US’s broader air campaign against the Iranian military. The sheer volume of vessels transiting the Strait also makes individual maritime escorts difficult to sustain effectively. These operations will become more difficult if Iranian forces are able to deploy its inventory of 5,000-6,000 sea mines to totally close the Strait.

However, a total closure of the Strait of Hormuz may not be a feasible strategy for Iran either. Indiscriminately targeting maritime trade through the region would endanger some of Iran’s top allies, including China, which receives 40% of its oil and 30% of its liquefied natural gas shipments through the Strait.

Prospects for Iranian Victory

The Iranian regime has been brutalized by US and Israeli strikes and any end to the war is likely to see the Islamic Republic’s ability to project power beyond its borders severely degraded for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime will consider any scenario in which it survives and forces the US and Israel to end the war short of their ultimate objectives to be a kind of partial victory. Two paths to that outcome are currently foreseeable, through either triggering a global economic crisis by strangling Middle Eastern energy exports, and indefinitely destabilizing the region through a protracted low-level campaign.

Iran Triggers Global Energy Catastrophe That Forces US Retreat

In a March 6 interview with the Financial Times, Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi warned that a global energy crisis could result in weeks if exports through the Strait of Hormuz don’t resume. While the precise timeline remains uncertain, a prolonged closure of the Strait, combined with broader war-induced disruptions to Gulf energy exports caused by Iranian attacks, could ultimately pressure the US into seeking to de-escalate the war and accept a settlement with the Iranian regime short of its stated goals.

This path to victory is the less likely of the two for several reasons: First, Iran’s capacity for disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is set to diminish as the US gains greater control over Iranian airspace and is able to use a greater variety of air and naval capabilities to focus on neutralizing threats near the Strait. The coming influx of new counter-drone systems will similarly reduce, though not completely eliminate, threats to critical oil and gas infrastructure in the region.

Second, Iran itself will feel increasing pressure from its own partners to permit traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, prolonged closure of the Strait and continued attacks on Gulf energy exports could also see the Gulf States officially join the US military effort, as well as pull additional foreign powers into the war against Iran.

Finally, the US has signaled it is likely to prop up global energy markets at nearly any cost, including by offering additional insurance for ships transiting the Strait, as well as considering permitting a resumption of some Russian oil and gas exports (likely by authorizing more exceptions to October 2025 sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft and allowing exports to India).

The Regime Refuses to Concede and Prepares Indefinite Campaign of Asymmetric Attacks

The Iranian regime's most plausible path to a partial victory is to concentrate all available resources on political survival while sustaining enough resistance to appear to outlast the US and Israel.

Even if Iran is unable to maintain its more sophisticated long-range ballistic missile strikes or keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, it could still wage a protracted low-level conflict through drones, proxy forces, and cyber attacks on regional critical infrastructure, that over time becomes a severe obstacle to the US’s broader regional interests. If Iran is able to sustain such a campaign for many months—potentially bolstered by Russia—the accumulating costs could compel the US and its allies to seek some negotiated settlement with whatever remains of the regime in order to restore regional stability.

A prolonged conflict would also become a major political liability for the Trump administration going into the midterm elections. The 2026 elections will be highly consequential for the US President, who acknowledges that a loss of control of Congress could lead to his impeachment and possible prosecution. The President will want to avoid the appearance of a new “forever war” in the Middle East that would directly contradict his often repeated promise to avoid prolonged, indecisive foreign entanglements.