This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between May 9, 2026 and May 16, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: nationwide internet blackout continued; Iranian attacks threw BRICS+ meeting into disarray; Iranian leaders proposed demanding fees for undersea cables.

2. Russia held a subdued Victory Day Parade amid Ukrainian drone threats.

3. Russia demonstrated its offensive strike capability with massive drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, and the successful test of the Sarmat nuclear missile

4. China hosted a major US state visit.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Internet Blackout Extends into a Twelfth Week with No End in Sight

According to the internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, May 16 marked 78 days of a near-total internet blackout in Iran.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered a special committee to convene on restoring internet access within the next month. Pezeshkian appointed First Vice President Mohammadreza Aref to lead the new committee.

Iran Sparks Diplomatic Row with India over Attack on Cargo Ship.

On May 14, a suspected Iranian drone attack sank an Indian flagged cargo ship, the MSV Haji Ali BDI 1492, off the coast of Oman. The incident triggered condemnation from New Delhi, which called the attack “unacceptable.” All 14 Indian crew members of the ship were evacuated safely.

Iranian Leaders Suggest Monetizing Submarine Cables Crossing the Strait of Hormuz

Hossein Ali Hajideligani, a member of the Iranian parliament’s presiding board, suggested that Iran should extract fees for data passing through fiber optic cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz under Iran’s new management of the waterway.

Takeaways:

1. As previously noted on May 2, by risking further damage to the already shattered Iranian economy and exacerbating social stress, the continued internet shutdown, controlled at the highest level of government by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), demonstrates more surely than any other public statement that the Iranian regime is uncertain whether it has yet survived the war or has a path to transition to post-war reconstruction. The announcement that Pezeshkian—himself the chair of the SCC—would create a brand new committee for restoring internet access may have inadvertently underscored the fractured state of Iran’s government. Vocal opposition from multiple members of the Iranian parliament to the measure this week suggests the new committee may have been a blunder that undermined the projected unity of the regime and revealed broader confusion over how to govern the country's information environment going forward. Conservative Iranian parliamentarian Alireza Salimi underscored the perceived illegality of the move noting, “How is it possible for the president, who is himself the head of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, to transfer the council’s authority to a body outside the council?”

   -

   The appointment of Aref, a reformist, to lead the new committee suggests that the move may have been prompted by obstructionism on the SCC by security hardliners in the IRGC, who may prefer tiered access to the internet based on political loyalty.

2. Iran’s attacks on an Indian vessel, coming in addition to weeks of indiscriminate attacks on its neighbors, severely complicated the meeting of the BRICS+ Group in India from May 14-15. The UAE, another new member of the group along with Iran, used the occasion to publicly condemn Iranian "terrorist attacks" and to subtly assert the primacy of the US-led international order. It notably did so by invoking decisions by Western-based multilateral institutions including the London-based International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Canada-based International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council, and Switzerland-based UN Human Rights Council. In another eyebrow-raising statement, the UAE raised the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2817, a resolution backed by the US condemning Iranian attacks, which BRICS core members Russia and China both abstained from.

   

   The attacks and their fallout spilling into the BRICS+ meeting highlight serious contradictions at the heart of the group that raise questions about its viability as a coherent platform for constructing durable institutions capable of replacing systems of the current US-led international order. Underscoring these difficulties is the fact that the conference ended without even the signing of a joint statement due to tensions over Iranian behavior.

3. The suggestion that Iran should charge what amounts to protection money for the continued safety of the region’s fiber optic cables echoes an argument that appeared in the semi-official Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) media outlet Tasnim News on May 9. The Tasnim News article recommended Iranian leaders extract profit from the undersea cables through licensing deals and exclusive access for maintenance:

   “This report, based on Iran’s clear sovereignty over the seabed and water column of the Strait of Hormuz (according to Article 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), proposes three practical steps: first, charging initial license fees and annual renewals from foreign companies; second, requiring tech giants (Meta, Amazon, Microsoft) to operate under Iranian laws; third, granting exclusive rights for cable repair and maintenance to Iranian companies.”

   The recurring idea suggests Iran views the safety of the fiber optic cables as a form of leverage it can use in any future resumption of hostilities to deter attacks from its Arab neighbors and manage escalation with the US.

2. RUSSIA CONDUCTS SUBDUED VICTORY DAY CELEBRATION, HINTS AT WAR END

Russia Held Abbreviated Victory Day Celebration

On May 9, Russia held its 81st annual Victory Day celebrations. The Moscow Victory Day Parade, the hallmark of the state holiday held in Red Square, was substantially reduced in both time and in the scale of military hardware on display. In their place the Moscow parade notably featured the participation of a unit of North Korean soldiers, as well as videos of new Russian military technology including the Geran-5 drone/cruise missile hybrid.

Military parades in other major cities, such as St. Petersburg, were also reduced in scale.

Putin Suggested the War May End “Soon,” and Expressed Willingness to Meet Zelensky

On May 9, in a press conference following his appearance at the Moscow Victory Day Parade, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a heavily caveated statement that the war in Ukraine could be nearing its end and suggested he would be willing to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whom he called “Mr. Zelensky,” in a third country to sign a deal. Putin also named former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as a potential mediator for future talks between Russia and the European Union.

Takeaways:

1. This year’s truncated Victory Day Parade is an indisputable sign of weakness by the Kremlin. It is an indication, along with new reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin is spending unprecedented amounts of time in underground bunkers, that the decision making of Russian leaders is increasingly influenced by considerations of security threats emanating from Ukraine.

2. Vague statements aside, there are no substantive signs that the Kremlin plans to stop the war short of seizing the entirety of the Donbas. While Putin suggested a willingness to meet with Ukrainian President Zelensky, his uncharacteristically polite reference to the Ukrainian leader should not be seen as an extraordinary gesture as it still omits any reference to Zelensky’s legitimacy as leader. Further, Putin’s openness to meeting in a third country to conclude a peace agreement should also be viewed with skepticism as his remarks were quickly followed with a reference to his previous participation in the “Minsk Process,” suggesting Russian vassal state Belarus as the alternative venue for receiving Ukrainian capitulation. Taken together, Putin’s “openness” to ending the war, amid equally bizarre requests for Gerhard Schröder to take over negotiations, appears to be more of an effort to discombobulate Europe’s new push for diplomacy and re-engage with stalled US mediation after Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested the US would deprioritize its involvement in talks.

3. Russian President Vladimir Putin ultimately cannot end the war now without appearing to concede defeat. Released a year ago in May 2025, OPFOR Journal’s Situation Report: Ceasefire Negotiations with Russia identifies five of the Kremlin’s most conservative war aims, which still remain largely unachieved.

   1. “Permanently arrest Ukraine’s societal drift toward Europe. Foreclose paths to EU and NATO membership. Incorporation of Ukraine into Russian institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Commonwealth of Independent States. (Not achieved)”

   2. “Establish Russian political control of the country through the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv, (Not achieved)”

   3. “Resolve outstanding issues resulting from the seizure of Crimea and frozen conflict in the Donbas. These include establishing direct Russian annexation and administration of the Donbas territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, and de facto Russian control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to create a land bridge to Crimea, (Partially achieved)”

   4. “Prevent Ukraine from breaking free of Russian rule again through a systematic suppression of Ukrainian nationalism, resulting from a purge of Ukrainian national elites and institutions. (Not achieved)”

   5. “Leverage quick victory in Ukraine to re-assert Russia as an ascendant great power in contrast to declining West. (Partially achieved)”

   Remarkably, the Kremlin has made almost no progress on these war aims over the past year. It has arguably even lost ground on victory condition one as Ukrainian defense technology has become increasingly coveted in the West, adding a new dimension to Ukraine’s integration into the European security architecture.

3. RUSSIAN FLEXES ITS LONG-RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITY

Russia Conducted Successful Sarmat ICBM Test

On May 12, the Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces Sergei Karakayev announced to President Vladimir Putin the successful test launch of the “Sarmat” super heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Karakayev described the missile as the world’s most powerful ICBM, with four times the payload of equivalent US missiles. He further announced that the Sarmat can strike targets at a range of 35,000km from a suborbital trajectory that allows it to evade Western air defenses.

Russia Launches Heaviest Bombardment of the War

Between May 13 and May 14, Russia launched 1560 drones and 56 missiles at Ukrainian cities in the largest air assault of the war. The attacks resulted in at least 24 deaths.

Takeaways:

1. As Pavel Podvig notes, this is only the second successful test of the Sarmat ICBM, an achievement that follows a multi-year string of failures including two catastrophic launch disasters in September 2024 and November 2025. The mixed record means, that despite the Kremlin’s assurances of imminent operational deployment, the Sarmat will likely need additional test launches to ensure it can serve as a credible strategic deterrent.

2. While Russia is still working to expand its drone and missile production, the unprecedented size of the May 13-14 attack is best explained by the fact that it came shortly after a three-day ceasefire between May 9-11, which allowed for the stockpiling of an unusually high number of weapons.

3. Both moves appear to be efforts by the Kremlin to compensate for increasingly obvious shortcomings in defense exposed by relentless Ukrainian attacks on its critical infrastructure (which influenced decisions to shorten this year’s Victory Day Parade) with a display of offensive firepower. Pro-Kremlin military experts have been particularly keen to highlight the unique capability of the Sarmat to assert that Russia remains a great power despite its conventional military shortcomings. In an interview with Argumenti i Fakti, one such expert, Yuri Knutov, implied that the Sarmat alone could be Russia’s key to maintaining strategic parity with the West in the future.

   "A missile like the Sarmat is capable of penetrating the US's advanced Golden Dome missile defense system. If the Sarmat were used against a country like the UK, a single missile would be enough to destroy all major military installations within that country."

4. CHINA HOSTS US STATE VISIT

Between May 13-15, China received US President Donald Trump for a state visit. The visit marked President Trump’s first trip to China of his second term. A high-level delegation of political and business leaders joined the President on the visit including: Secretary of State Marco Rubio, War Secretary Pete Hegseth, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, Tesla/Space-X CEO Elon Musk, outgoing Apple CEO Tim Cook, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, and Trump family members Eric and Laura Trump.

Meetings between President Trump and President Xi touched on key issues of bilateral relations including the War in Iran, the status of Taiwan, trade issues and AI.

Takeaways:

1. The details of any trade agreements reached during the state visit remain murky. President Trump announced that China planned to buy “billions of dollars of soybeans,” and between 200-750 Boeing aircraft. Reuters reported that the President has green lit limited exports of Nvidia’s H200 AI chips to a select number of Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance, JD.com and Tencent. Despite the authorization, Trump acknowledged that any deal for the chips is in doubt as China is currently restricting imports of Nvidia chips on national security grounds.1

2. While statements by both leaders suggest the US and China have a shared interest in resolving major foreign policy challenges over Iran and Taiwan, no clear agreements were reached. Trump claims Xi backed the US’s position that Iran should never have a nuclear weapon and must reopen the Strait of Hormuz. This is not a new achievement as Beijing has repeatedly expressed an interest in countering nuclear non-proliferation and in keeping the Strait of Hormuz “open.” It is not clear, however, that China plans to do anything new to convince Iran to budge on either issue as Iran’s closure of the Strait largely does not target its exports to China, which are however more directly threatened by a US blockade. Trump for his part expressed an understanding of China’s position on Taiwan but his statements that the US did not support Taiwanese independence did not fundamentally alter the US’s position of strategic ambiguity. Trump notably did not pledge to reduce arms sales to Taiwan either.

3. One of the most consequential outcomes of the visit is an attempt by both sides to achieve strategic stability. As Bill Bishop notes, Chinese press releases paint the visit as an opportunity to reset relations with the US under the recognition that China is a co-equal power whose interests must be given great consideration.

   “The PRC leadership wants a period of strategic detente and this concept could realize that on terms favorable to them for the rest of Trump’s second term. Any future U.S. moves to address PRC industrial overcapacity, tighten technology controls, etc. could then be cast by Beijing as violations of the new “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” to which the two leaders personally agreed.

   “The formulation (tifa 提法) accepts that the US-China relationship is competitive — as Xi did in 2023 with the Biden administration — but it now insists that competition be kept “moderate” (有度) and that differences be “manageable” (可控). This may allow China to get to define what counts as acceptable competition. It also makes Xi and his team look like they have successfully stood their ground against the Trump Administration and are now negotiating from a position of equal strength.”

This week is going to be another break from the routine of churning out Weekly Significant Activity Reports, in part because it is a unique anniversary. Today marks one year since OPFOR Journal launched.

There are now quite a few more people subscribed to this page than when I started (1,332 to be exact), so I wanted to step back and give a quick recap of who I am and what this is all about.

Who I am:

My name is Dan White. Over the past two decades I have worked across a variety of roles in the military, foreign and public policy, the Washington DC think tank community, and now higher education. I hold master’s degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington, and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Central Florida. I am a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

Most of all I am a writer with a life-long calling to serve in the US national security enterprise.

Why I Started OPFOR Journal:

As I have previously discussed, the idea for OPFOR Journal came to me shortly after losing my position at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in the midst of mass federal layoffs in April 2025. My goal in starting this page was to continue writing and doing research on the topic I had been pursuing at the time as part of The Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, namely tracing Russia’s strategic partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea and assessing the consequences for US national security. Out of that came a broader idea: to cover them not simply as partners with Russia, but as individual actors with their own unique geopolitical interests, and as part of a broader “opposing force” (OPFOR) united by a shared overarching interest in overturning the US and US-led international order.

72 posts and 181,997 words later, the project has taken on life of its own. In no small part because significant geopolitical events over the past year have reinforced the project’s core thesis that contending with the rise of this opposing force of great powers will be the defining American national security challenge of our time.

A Labor of Love Made Possible By Generous Support:

OPFOR Journal has also become a significant part of my life. On average I have spent about 10 hours each week researching, writing, and editing each post, whether Weekly Significant Activity Reports covering a range of weekly events, Situation Reports on a specific topic, or monthly Homeland Security Briefs. That has meant a lot of late nights hunched over a laptop and more than a few days’ plans disrupted by my impulse to write. I am grateful to my wife Elin for always encouraging me to keep going. OPFOR Journal would simply not exist without her support.

I have tried to treat this journal as a labor of love, and have done my best to tease out the significance of events as much as possible, connect them with historical trends and the broader international context. Some weeks I have done that better than others, but I am always learning and improving over time. I am lucky that I have had so many people who continue to reach out with kind words of encouragement. I will continue to do my best to produce something worthy of your belief in me each week.

I am also incredibly grateful to everyone that has supported OPFOR Journal financially. My goal is to keep this content open to all, and everyone that has gone out of their way to voluntarily upgrade to a paid subscription, has helped me both cover the costs of running the page (domain name, email, etc.) and further professionalize the work (such as by buying a subscription to Canva to improve branding and graphics).

Looking Back:

While I look ahead to another year of growth, I also want to look back and highlight a few posts that are worth revisiting:

Favorite Post:

This is my favorite post because it captures, in one place, both the breadth and depth of Russia’s newest strategic arms programs and the broader context in which they were developed. It describes a moment in which Russia feels increasingly insecure about its position as a great power and its uncertainty as to how to approach a future of unrestrained competition with the US.

Most Viewed Post:

This post saw an unexpectedly large audience, in part because the events described were simultaneously highly significant in Southeast Asia and under covered in Western media.

Most Underrated Post:

This was a very early post, but its analysis of why US efforts to broker a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine were going nowhere last May is nevertheless as relevant as ever now.

Looking Forward:

Over the next year I hope to continue building on what I have learned so far, as well as experimenting with new ideas for formatting and content. I am looking forward to hearing from you all along the way.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between April 25, 2026 and May 2, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: nationwide internet blackout continued; new reports of a struggle for control over negotiations between factions of Iranian leaders; Iranian currency in freefall amid US economic pressure.

2. Russia has announced a subdued May 9 Victory Day celebration alongside enhanced security measures for the event and ceasefire proposals amid the increased threat of Ukrainian drone attacks.

3. Russia’s Africa Corps forces suffered significant defeats in Mali.

4. China conducted unusual naval patrols near Taiwan’s Penghu islands in the Taiwan Strait.

5. North Korea and Russia celebrated the anniversary of the retaking of the Kursk region with the inauguration of a new memorial museum in Pyongyang highlighting North Korea’s participation in the operation. The new memorial offers new insights into North Korea’s involvement in the war and the future of its partnership with Russia.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Internet Blackout Continues

According to internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, May 2 marked 64 days of a near-total internet blackout in Iran.

Leaders Competing for Influence Over Negotiations

According to an April 30 report by Iran International, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf are engaged in bureaucratic maneuvering with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi whom they view as less pragmatic and more aligned with the hardline factions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iranian Currency Slides to Record Low

On May 2, the Iranian rial fell to 1.83M tomans to the dollar on the open market, the lowest unofficial exchange rate for the currency ever recorded.

Takeaways:

1. On May 2, Iranian member of parliament Amirhossein Sabeti appeared to confirm the internet shutdown will continue indefinitely due to fears of a revival of the civil unrest seen in January, “If the internet is fully reopened, some mercenaries, who are also armed, may organize gatherings through these networks.”

   -
   Despite public bluster from members of the IRGC and low-level officials, the internet blackout—imposed by the Supreme Security Council—is a far more revealing signal as to the regime’s confidence in its standing in the war against the US and Israel. The continued throttling of the internet, which risks at least ten million jobs and the broader health of the entire Iranian economy, indicates that the regime does not believe that the war is either finished or won. Like amputating a limb to combat gangrene, the dramatic countermeasures show that top Iranian decision-makers believe US economic pressure, evidenced in the ongoing currency collapse, is sufficiently destabilizing to require costly measures to prevent civil unrest from reorganizing. Ironically, the longer the restrictions remain in place, the greater the risk that they will compromise the overall health of the Iranian economy and civil society and require additional interventions to manage their fallout over the long-term.

2. The internet blackout is also indicative of broader governance problems facing the regime. As noted in the April 12 Situation Report “Iran’s Strategic Position After 40 Days of Epic Fury,” Iran’s strategy for managing the end of the war faces serious challenges with the lack of a strong central leader who can manage competing factional interests and set a long-term vision for the country going forward. The accuracy of reports claiming Mojtaba Khamenei is involved in critical decisions is belied by the ongoing public bickering between officials over the terms of negotiations, and reports of political infighting between the top members of government including the Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Araghchi.

3. Caution still needs to be taken in reading these indications of deteriorating governance and economic conditions, however. A collapsing Iranian economy and intense internal infighting will not resolve the basic problems the war poses to the overall global economy and international order. Even a much diminished and disoriented regime will still be able to strangle maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz by exploiting the intense risk aversion of maritime shipping companies with the threat of attacks by small and inexpensive drones.

   -

   A collapsing Iranian economy and continued oil blockade may even further incentivize the regime to focus on monetizing threats to regional security. A hardline regime that survives could put off all economic reform and sustain itself like a Middle Eastern North Korea by extracting concessions from its neighbors for continued regional stability. Such actions could include demanding war-related indemnities well into the future, expanding protection fees on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, requiring humanitarian aid to prevent large-scale migration and other schemes.

2. RUSSIA DOWNGRADES VICTORY DAY CELEBRATIONS DUE TO FEAR OF UKRAINIAN ATTACKS

Military Equipment Pulled from Victory Day Parades

On April 28, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that this year’s Victory Day Anniversary Parade in Moscow’s Red Square will be held without the participation of military equipment or the military cadets due to the “current operational situation.”

St. Petersburg announced similar restrictions the following day, excluding both museum-piece vehicles and elite military academy cadets from its own celebration.

Putin Proposes Victory Day Ceasefire

On April 29, Russian President Vladimir Putin informed US President Donald Trump of his interest in conducting a temporary truce with Ukraine during the May 9 Victory Day holiday.

Moscow Will Throttle Cellular Networks on May 9

On April 29, the BBC’s Russian Service reported that Russia will restrict all mobile communications in Moscow ahead of the Victory Day parade.

Takeaways:

It is highly unusual that Russia would conduct its Victory Day celebration without the military vehicles in the parade which typically serve as a hallmark of the event. The decision to not include vehicles appears to be motivated less by the lack of availability of vehicles as not even museum pieces will be featured. The other indications, including Putin’s proposal of a one-day ceasefire and rumors of widespread mobile internet restrictions (rather than the more localized restrictions used last year) suggest the Kremlin fears a potential large-scale Ukrainian attack to disrupt the event.

3. RUSSIAN FORCES SUFFER SIGNIFICANT SETBACKS IN MALI

On April 25, units of Russia’s “Africa Corps” serving alongside the Malian army were attacked in a major offensive by a large contingent of rebel Tuareg and Islamist forces. The attacks, which killed the Malian Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, and seized multiple cities throughout the country, also forced the withdrawal of Russian forces from their main base in Kidal and allegedly downed a Russian helicopter with a shoulder-fired missile.

Africa Corps withdraws from its base in Kidal under the white flag of surrender. Source: TopWar.ru

Takeaways:

1. The setbacks to Russia’s allies in Mali represent another instance of the Kremlin struggling to advance its international interests while it remains consumed by the war in Ukraine. Russian “peacekeepers” previously failed to either deter or halt lightning offensives by Azerbaijan against Armenia’s disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, and by rebel forces against the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024.

2. The debacle in Mali is also an indication that the Kremlin’s effort to centralize control over the former Wagner Group’s activities since the Prigozhin-led mutiny of 2023 is not leading to a more coherent integration of Russia’s activities in Africa into Russia’s broader national security apparatus. The Africa Corps’ quick capitulation to rebel forces was preceded by previous catastrophic battlefield defeats, which demonstrates broader problems in Russia’s ability to conduct expeditionary operations and deploy combat power abroad.

   -

   An April 26 public rebuke issued by the Africa Corps regarding an “ambiguous” statement about its role in Mali by the Russian Ministry of Defense also indicates that the supposed takeover and rebranding of the organization has still not completely extinguished the resentments of the former Wagner Group.

4. CHINESE WARSHIPS PATROLLING NEAR TAIWANESE ISLANDS

On April 27, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it has been tracking two Chinese warships, a Type 052C Destroyer CNS Zhengzhou and a
Type 054A Frigate CNS Hebi, operating near the Penghu islands in the Taiwan Strait.

Takeaways:

The patrol represents an especially close approach by Chinese ships to Taiwanese territory and is the latest noteworthy Chinese naval operation near Taiwan in recent weeks. The moves coincide with a reduced US naval presence in the Indo-Pacific resulting from the demands of the war against Iran. Despite the increased profile of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy operations, and more limited US capability in the region, it is highly unlikely that China is preparing for any military action against Taiwan in the foreseeable future.

According to the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community published in March, “The IC [intelligence community] assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.” China is still likely years away from assembling a force capable of seizing Taiwan, and recent Chinese military publications suggest the PLA Navy is still evaluating the needs of such a force to cope with the evolving asymmetric military capabilities that have played a significant role in contesting the maritime domain in both the war in Ukraine and in the Middle East.

5. NORTH KOREA AND RUSSIA CELEBRATE AND EXPAND MILITARY ALLIANCE

Russian Delegation Attends Opening of New North Korean War Memorial and Vows to Expand Military Cooperation

This week a high-level Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Speaker of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin visited Pyongyang to celebrate the opening of the “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations” dedicated to North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In a follow-on meeting with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un on April 27, Defense Minister Belousov suggested that Russia is prepared to upgrade military ties with North Korea over agreements and cooperation already taking place under the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

“[The Russian Defense Ministry] and the Defense Ministry of the DPRK agreed to switch military cooperation to the lasting long-term basis. We are ready to sign a plan for Russian-Korean military interaction for 2027-2032 this year.”

Kim Jong-un Confirms Death Before Surrender Policy for North Korean Troops

At the April 27 inauguration of the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations, North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un appeared to confirm a suspected policy of suicide before surrender for North Korean troops deployed to Russia. Kim praised soldiers for heroically “self-blasting.”

North Korean Death Toll in War

An analysis of recent footage of the dedication of North Korea’s new war memorial by NK Pro has identified 2,288 individual names being memorialized, providing a rare glimpse into the battlefield losses acknowledged by North Korea.

Takeaways:

1. A figure of roughly 2,300 dead lines up with previous estimates of 6,000 total North Korean casualties (both dead and wounded) in the war provided by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS).1 It is still not clear if this represents the final total number of war dead as North Korea understands it or just the number it is prepared to acknowledge now. Kim Jong-un’s open boasting about soldier suicide suggests he is confident that the military operation is a historic success, and that its high costs can be acknowledged as a source of pride rather than buried as a state secret. North Korea may have a further incentive to highlight rather than downplay the true total number of casualties in order to emphasize to Russia its value as an ally and its entitlement to additional military and economic rewards.

2. While the exact details of the proposed expansion of long-term military ties between Russia and North Korea remain murky, we should expect any new agreement to include substantive follow through from both parties given the progression of their ties since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

   -

   One likely form of cooperation involves Russian technical assistance to North Korea’s drone program in exchange for increased North Korean labor in Russian drone factories. It has previously been reported that North Korea was preparing to send thousands of workers to Russia’s drone super factory in Tatarstan’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone. It is unclear whether these plans have yet materialized, and renewing them could be mutually beneficial. The Russian military has enormous demand for drones but faces significant labor shortages it needs to overcome to scale production. It has tried multiple schemes to recruit new workers by enticing foreigners and even children to work at Alabuga as part of vocational skills training programs like “Alabuga Start”.2 North Korean workers could fill the gap for Russian manufacturers and then use the knowledge and skills gained to upgrade the North’s own factories.

   -

   Russia could also become involved in helping the North implement the kind of modern reconnaissance strike complex against South Korea that it has employed against Ukraine. Reports that Russia provided targeting assistance to Iran to use against the US suggest the Kremlin may have an interest in developing a similar threat on the Korean peninsula. Russia would use the increased drone threat in North Korea to both gain leverage over the US in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and to keep the focus of the American military divided between multiple evolving threats in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed between March 2026 and April 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. A new report by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the US and more than a dozen allied nations warned that Russian military intelligence is exploiting vulnerabilities in home routers to harvest large volumes of user data from government and military officials.

2. A Chinese national was arrested for illegally photographing sensitive aircraft and facilities at multiple US Air Force Bases.

3. A new advisory by the FBI and CISA warned that hackers affiliated with the Iranian regime are attempting to target and disrupt computer operating systems used in US industry and critical infrastructure.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

4. Iranian proxies continued violent attacks targeting Jewish communities and American and Israeli interests across Europe.

1. RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITING VULNERABLE ROUTERS TO COLLECT DATA ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

On April 7, the US, Ukraine and more than a dozen allied nations announced the discovery and disruption of an elaborate plot by Russian military intelligence (GRU) to compromise small at-home routers to intercept the data of military and government officials worldwide.

According to the announcement by the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center the plot, conducted by cyber actors of the GRU’s 85th Main Special Service Center (85th GTsSS) including APT28, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard, have been: “collecting credentials and exploiting vulnerable routers worldwide, including compromising TP-Link routers using CVE-2023-50224.” The exploit allows the attackers to change the host configuration of a router to grant them visibility into the web traffic conducted by connected devices—including encrypted traffic when users ignore certificate error warning messages.

The scheme is part of a broader dragnet operation by the Russian intelligence services to collect mass amounts of user data worldwide and then filter it for information on specific high value targets. As the announcement states:

“The GRU has harvested passwords, authentication tokens, and sensitive information including emails and web browsing information normally protected by secure socket layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS) encryption. The GRU has indiscriminately compromised a wide pool of U.S. and global victims and then filtered down impacted users, especially targeting information related to military, government, and critical infrastructure.”

Additional Information:

This is the second warning in two months that Russian intelligence services are exploiting cyber vulnerabilities to steal credentials from government and military officials and conduct surveillance. On March 20, 2026, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint advisory warning that Russian hackers are conducting phishing attacks to compromise commercial encrypted messaging apps, such as Signal, used by “individuals of high intelligence value, including current and former US government officials, military personnel, political figures, and journalists.”

According to that advisory, once an account is compromised, the Russian attackers leverage the victim’s contact list to identify and target additional high-value individuals, while also collecting data to craft more convincing social engineering attacks in the future. This technically unsophisticated attack is a reminder that a user’s basic cyber security practices are just as important as end-to-end encryption for information security.

2. CHINESE NATIONAL CHARGED WITH UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE OF STRATEGIC US AIRBASE

On April 24, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Chinese national, Tianrui Liang, for conducting unlawful surveillance of Offutt Air Force Base in Bellevue, Nebraska. Offutt Air Force Base is a major US airbase and headquarters of US Strategic Command which commands and controls America’s nuclear arsenal. Witnesses said Liang pulled off to the side of a public road along the perimeter of the base to take pictures of planes, including the RC-135 Rivet Joint signal intelligence aircraft, E-4B “Nightwatch” National Airborne Operations Center (AKA the “Doomsday Plane”), with a camera and telescopic lens.

Liang was arrested on April 7, at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York while attempting to leave the country for Europe. Court records indicate Liang admitted to taking photos of the base and possessed pictures of aircraft on his phone. Liang was also found to be in the possession of a small drone, which he denied using near the bases.

Liang also visited Ellsworth Air Force Base, the home of the US Air Force’s Global Strike Command, days prior to his trip to Offutt Air Force Base, with the apparent intent of viewing the base’s B-1B “Lancer” bombers.

Additional Information:

1. Liang, a B-1/B-2 visa holder traveling by car from British Columbia to New York may have visited other bases, and expressed an interest in also visiting Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.

2. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief - January 2026, Chinese nationals have been implicated in dozens—and potentially hundreds—of suspicious incidents near US military bases in recent years. While some of these cases involve misunderstandings by curious tourists, the sheer number of incidents, combined with individual cases involving suspicious circumstances like Tianrui Liang suggest a pattern of coordinated crowd-sourced intelligence collection by Chinese authorities.

   -

   Another recent case involved a Chinese national named Qilin Wu who was charged on January 7 for illegally photographing US B-2 “Spirit” Bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

3. IRANIAN HACKERS TARGETING INDUSTRIAL COMPUTERS USED FOR CRITICAL INDUSTRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

On April 7, a new joint cybersecurity advisory issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and co-signed by several federal agencies warned that since March 2026, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors affiliated with the Iranian regime have been attempting to use cyber operations to disrupt US critical industries and critical infrastructure. The Iranian APTs have focused their efforts on the exploitation of software vulnerabilities at the endpoints of programmable logic controllers (PLC)—large industrial computers typically used to automate complex productive processes. PLCs are widely used in manufacturing and in several sectors of critical infrastructure including waste water and sewage, government services and facilities and energy.

Iranian groups appear to have focused their efforts most closely on systems produced by Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley.

According to the advisory:

“Iranian-affiliated APT actors are targeting internet-exposed PLCs with the intent to cause disruptions—including maliciously interacting with project files, and manipulating data displayed on HMI and SCADA displays—to U.S. critical infrastructure organizations. Iranian-affiliated APT targeting campaigns against U.S. organizations have recently escalated, likely in response to hostilities between Iran, and the United States and Israel.”

Additional Information:

1. Iranian APTs have previously targeted the PLCs in US industry and infrastructure. Attacks beginning around November 2023 by Iranian group "CyberAv3ngers” compromised at least 75 PLC and human machine interface (HMI) devices made by Israeli company Unitronics used in multiple sectors of US critical infrastructure.

2. Water and wastewater systems appear to be a preferred target for Iranian APTs. In addition to the present attacks, the 2023 “CyberAv3ngers” campaign caused disruptions at the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in western Pennsylvania affecting over 6,000 customers. This is likely because the sector includes a large number of small operators that lack the robust IT support available to large municipalities and may be seen as easy targets.

4. IRANIAN PROXY ACTIVITIES CONTINUE IN EUROPE

There have been numerous additional violent or disruptive incidents linked to groups inspired by or associated with the Iranian regime since late March when OPFOR Journal published Homeland Security Brief - The Iranian Threat in the Wake of Operation Epic Fury.

March 23 - Jewish Ambulances Torched in London

On March 23, four ambulances from Hatzola, a volunteer Jewish emergency service, were destroyed in an arson attack in London. Pro-Iranian group “Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya” (HAYI) claimed credit for the attack.

March 28 - Attempted Bombing of Bank of America Headquarters in Paris

On March 28, police in Paris disrupted an attempt to detonate an improvised explosive device in front of the Bank of America headquarters. Three teenagers between 16-17 and a 21-year old man were subsequently arrested in the plot. The adult allegedly offered the three teens between 500-1000 euros to plant the explosive as well as additional opportunities for work conducting future attacks.

Police charged all four individuals for crimes including “criminal terrorist conspiracy” and “attempted destruction in connection with a terrorist enterprise.” French prosecutors have linked HAYI with the attempted bombing.

April 4 - Explosion at pro-Israel Charity in the Netherlands

On April 4, a small improvised explosive device detonated outside a pro-Israel Christian center in the Dutch city of Nijkerk. Investigation into the attack is ongoing, but the attack resembles previous attacks attributed to HAYI in the Netherlands.

April 9 - North London Synagogue Damaged by Arson

On April 9, London’s Kenton United Synagogue was targeted in an arson attack, resulting in minor smoke damage to the building’s interior. A 17-year old and 19-year old were arrested for the attack. The 17-year old has since pleaded guilty.

April 12 - Jewish Institutions in North Macedonian Capital of Skopje Attacked

On April 12, a Synagogue and German-Jewish restaurant were damaged in arson attacks in the North Macedonian capital of Skopje.

HAYI claimed credit for the attacks. The group further noted that it deliberately targets Jewish institutions unrelated to Israel due to shared religion and communal identity, “This center is not just a local place of worship, but a link in the chain of identity and mutual support between the Jewish community and the Zionist regime…Because of the crimes of the Zionist regime, no Jew anywhere will be safe.”

April 15- London Headquarters of Top Iranian Independent Media Outlet Attacked

On April 15, the London headquarters of the independent Persian-language media organization Iran International was attacked by multiple incendiary devices. The devices landed in the building’s parking lot and caused a small fire but did not result in significant damage. Three individuals, a boy aged 16 and two men aged 19 and 21 were arrested in connection and charged with arson.

April 16 - Drone Incident Near Israeli Embassy in London

On April 16, social media accounts associated with HAYI posted a video claiming to show a drone attack on the property of the Israeli embassy in London involving dangerous chemicals. The Israeli Embassy and London Metropolitan Police denied that such an attack occurred on the embassy grounds but noted that a security incident did take place at a nearby park.

April 18 - Attempted Arson at Jewish Charity in London

On April 18, a London building previously occupied by a Jewish charity called Jewish Futures was lightly damaged in an attempted arson attack. HAYI claimed credit for the attack.

April 28 - Attempted Arson at London Memorial to Iranian Protesters

On April 28, London Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Policing unit announced it was investigating an attempted arson at a memorial wall to Iranian protesters slain by the Iranian regime. Authorities said that the incident was not yet being treated as an act of terrorism but the rash of suspicious or violent incidents targeting the Jewish community in the Golders Green neighborhood where the memorial is located were prompting investigators to keep an open mind.

April 29 - Two Jewish Men Stabbed Outside London Synagogue;

On April 29, two Jewish men in London were stabbed by a 45-year-old man in what British authorities have deemed an act of terrorism. HAYI claimed credit for the attack.

Additional Information:

1. While the group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right) has claimed credit for many of the attacks, the actual existence of the group as an independent entity has increasingly been called into question. The group notably did not exist prior to the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran. Its ability to effectively coordinate seemingly disparate activities across Europe so quickly suggests the group is actually an operation conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. Further suggestive of the link is that the arson incidents bear hallmarks of similar incendiary attacks the IRGC coordinated against Jewish targets in Australia in 2024. Those attacks resulted in Australia expelling the Iranian ambassador in August 2025 and later labeling the IRGC a state sponsor of terrorism in November.

2. Nicolas Stockhammer, Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center, notes that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force often coordinates its activities to appear to be isolated acts of antisemitic hatred, or violent extremism:

   “Pro-Iranian networks drawing from ideological supporters among diaspora, radicalized teenagers, and even petty criminals form an inconspicuous facilitation web across Europe. At the epicenter of these structures, Iran’s IRGC-Quds Force pulls strings through sub-conventional proxies, enabling deniable hits on soft targets like synagogues or tourist spots, sparing Tehran direct blame and possible retaliation.”

   The IRGC pays these actors small bounties for the attacks, in what has been called a form of “gig economy” terrorism.

3. The IRGC has attempted to coordinate similar terrorist operations in North America with less success. It has, however, made multiple attempts in recent years to recruit members of organized crime to conduct assassinations of US and foreign government officials and Iranian dissidents within the US homeland as well as in Mexico and Canada. The pattern of attempted high profile violent attacks during peacetime suggests Iran is willing to carry out terror attacks now but not yet able to do so. Seemingly confirming this intent, the spokesperson for Iran’s Armed Forces General Abolfazl Shekarchi warned on March 20 that Iran would make "parks, recreational areas and tourist destinations" unsafe for its enemies.

   -

   The attempt by Mehdi Taj, the head of Iran’s football federation and former commander in the IRGC, to enter Canada illustrates potential security threats Iran may pose to the upcoming World Cup. Iran may use the events to insert operatives into North America, conduct recruitment of proxies, or in a worst-case scenario, carry out attacks of terrorism.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between April 18, 2026 - April 25, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: internet shutdown continued with no end in sight; Iran seized and fired on ships to keep the Strait of Hormuz shut; continued uncertainty over negotiations between US-Iran.

2. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu threatens Moldova over “suffering” of Russian citizens in Transnistria.

3. Putin tried to address concerns over intensifying crackdown on internet access in Russia.

4. Chinese pressure on African countries resulted in the cancelation of a planned state visit by Taiwanese President William Lai to Eswatini.

5. Chinese Navy ramped up operations in the Indo-Pacific amid a US drawdown in the region resulting from the war with Iran.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Regime Imposed Internet Shutdown Passes Eight Weeks

According to internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, April 25 marked 57 days of a near total internet blackout in Iran. The same day member of the Iranian parliament, Mostafa Pourdehghan, told semi-official media outlet ISNA that there is currently no timeline for restoring internet connectivity and that all decisions on the matter rest in the hands of the Supreme National Security Council.

Iran Seizes Vessels in Strait of Hormuz

On April 21, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy announced the seizure of two ships attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, the MSC Francesca and the Epaminodes. The IRGC Navy also fired on a third vessel.

IRGC Navy conducting the boarding and seizure of MSC Francesca. Source: Sepah Cybery on Telegram.

Uncertain Future of Negotiations

This week several developments cast doubt on the future of negotiations between the US and Iran in Pakistan. On April 24, reports emerged that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament and leader of the previous round of negotiations with the US in Islamabad, had allegedly stepped down from the negotiating team under pressure from hardline factions within the IRGC. Seemingly confirming this development, Iran dispatched a delegation to Islamabad led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The US prepared special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to meet with this team on April 27. However, these plans were scrapped after Araghchi departed Islamabad on April 25 after a brief meeting with Pakistani leaders.

Takeaways:

1. It’s not clear how much longer Iran intends to continue its current internet blackout without risking serious economic damage. Minister of Information and Communications Technology Sattar Hashemi warned that a continued blackout could imperil 10 million jobs stating, “The continued instability of the internet means a direct threat to the employment of this vast population; an issue that could have profound social and economic consequences.” The fact that the blackout continues despite the growing risk of irreversible harm indicates the Supreme National Security Council is not fully confident that the war is either won or over, and that the regime still faces considerable threats to its rule.

2. As long as Iran is able to control the flow of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz it will have objectively demonstrated that it has the upper hand over the US and its regional rivals. It will be hesitant to give up this power for two reasons:

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   First, and most obviously, control over the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran with leverage over the US that it can convert into a variety of concessions in negotiations. These may include financial indemnities for war damages—most likely paid in sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets—or an end to demands on its missile and nuclear programs.

   -

   Second, and arguably the deeper reason why negotiating a de-escalation in the war is so difficult, is that tormenting the US and its allies provides a means of reinvigorating the Iranian Revolution in the wake of serious domestic challenges to its legitimacy and a third and especially difficult succession. After years of setbacks and humiliations, regime hardliners will want to savor the ability to inflict pain on their arch rivals for both their own satisfaction and for the broader purpose of reinforcing the message to domestic audiences that they cannot be driven from power. As a result, the IRGC will continue to push the boundaries of the ceasefire, even at risk of a resumption of hostilities that could further devastate the Iranian economy.

   -

   The economic and social costs of the war, piled on top of the damage wrought by years of economic sanctions, are real and very severe. But rational economic management or even basic governance are ultimately lower priorities for a revolutionary government than achieving tangible victories against their ideological enemies. This raison d'être appears to be lost on the current US administration which appears to view regime collapse as inevitable over a long enough time horizon of economic and military pressure. But this is a highly uncertain proposition. Revolutionary governments have repeatedly demonstrated incredible resilience in worse economic conditions throughout history so long as they have maintained their devotion to their cause.1 Perversely, a confrontation with the US may impoverish the Iranian people, while helping to consolidate the regime and strengthen its monopoly on violence.

2. RUSSIA THREATENS MOLDOVA OVER TRANSNISTRIA BLOCKADE

In an April 21 interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, former Defense Minister and current Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, announced that Russia may be forced to take action—including use of military force—to protect Russians in Moldova’s breakaway province of Transnistria. Shoigu asserted that 220,000 Russian passport holders in Transnistria are currently being deprived of their rights under a “blockade” imposed by Moldova and Ukraine and backed by the European Union.

“These include restrictions on freedom of movement, illegal customs duties, arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, plans to introduce VAT and excise taxes for Transnistrian enterprises, and trade, banking, and transport barriers. It’s also alarming that the Moldovan leadership’s rhetoric regarding Transnistria increasingly resembles the statements made by the Ukrainian authorities regarding Donbas after 2014.”

[…]

“It has also closed Russian schools, banned Russian media broadcasts, repressed dissent, created deep economic problems, and is taking all the necessary steps to exacerbate them, including leaving the CIS.”

Takeaways:

1. Russian leaders have threatened Moldova on numerous occasions since the start of the Full Scale Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and attempted to destabilize the country by spreading disinformation, violating its territorial airspace with drones, and organizing coup plots against the government of Maia Sandu. This latest threat is nonetheless noteworthy as it comes as the Russian State Duma advances a new law (discussed in detail in last week’s Significant Activity Report) authorizing the President to launch military operations to protect Russian citizens facing unjust persecution abroad. It also comes at a time the Russian military faces enormous challenges advancing in Ukraine and may be searching for new fronts it can open to shift the focus of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and its NATO supporters.

2. Even if the Kremlin has the will to launch a new “special military operation” against Moldova, it will be hard pressed to organize the capabilities needed to do it successfully. The small contingent of Russian forces stationed in Transnistria from the separatist conflict that erupted in the early 1990s after the breakup of the Soviet Union are among the least combat ready in the Russian military and would need significant reinforcing to fend off a Moldovan military supported by the West and likely supplemented by Ukrainian forces. Even with a bridgehead already established in the country, Russia would find it difficult to ferry in the needed supplies or reinforcements due to Ukraine’s sophisticated anti-access area denial capabilities along the Black Sea.

3. PUTIN ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR INTERNET CRACKDOWN

At a meeting with government ministers on April 23, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed concerns about increasing restrictions on internet connectivity in Russia. Putin framed the months-long, multifaceted campaign to restrict access to websites, VPN’s and social media applications as needed to improve Russian security against Ukrainian drone attacks.

“But I can’t help but notice what people encounter in large cities as well—it’s not often, but unfortunately, it does happen. I’m referring to certain problems and disruptions in the internet in large metropolitan areas.

“Of course, if this is related to operational work to prevent terrorist attacks – and we know that, unfortunately, we sometimes miss such attacks – of course, ensuring the safety of people will always be a priority: our children, our loved ones, every citizen of Russia.”

Takeaways:

1. The accelerating restrictions on internet in Russia, notably the throttling of Telegram and Whatsapp, and punishment of web hosts that provide services to VPN users, has been a highly consequential story that has gone largely unnoticed in Western media due to the ongoing war with Iran. The fact that Putin felt the need to explain the rationale of the ongoing internet restrictions is indicative of the broad unpopularity of the measures and growing concern that the rollout has been poorly managed. A new poll by the government-owned Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) published on April 24 shows Putin’s approval rating has dropped seven points since February of this year (when the government campaign to take control of the internet intensified) and has reached its lowest point since the beginning of the war.

2. Russia's intensifying internet crackdown has expanded beyond previous efforts to push users toward the state messenger app “MAX,” and now appears to be aimed at a full sequestration of the Russian internet under state control. This new policy, while deeply unpopular, appears to be a major state priority that the Kremlin is unlikely to reverse course on. According to investigative reporting by Russian independent media outlet The Bell, the effort is being managed directly by the Second Service of the Russian FSB, the same unit responsible for conducting several of the Kremlin’s most important recent clandestine operations, including the poisoning of Alexey Navalny.

3. Though framed as a response to Ukrainian drone threats, the new restrictions are expansive enough to raise suspicions that they are being used for broader purposes of population control. The chief concerns about the restrictions are that they are being rapidly imposed to either suppress public discontent over the deteriorating economy, or to set the conditions for a successful new wave of mobilization that avoids the panic that swept Russian social media in the Fall 2022 when a "partial" mobilization was announced.

4. CHINESE PRESSURE CANCELS TAIWAN STATE VISIT TO ESWATINI

This week Taiwan was forced to cancel a state visit by President William Lai to Eswatini—the sole country in Africa with formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan—after three neighboring countries abruptly revoked clearance for Lai’s flight to travel through their airspace. The restrictions imposed by Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, are widely believed to have been prompted by overt Chinese diplomatic pressure. The moves were praised by Chinese officials including the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who announced that:

“China highly commends relevant countries’ commitment to the one-China principle which is fully consistent with international law and basic norms governing international relations. It’s very clear that there’s no longer a so-called ‘ROC president’ in the world anymore. Anyone who wears that false title is acting against history and will only invite disgrace upon themselves. The one-China principle is where the arc of history bends and public opinion trends, and to uphold it is the right thing to do.”

Takeaways:

This is the latest in an intensifying campaign by Beijing to isolate Taiwan from its remaining diplomatic partners. By demonstrating that it can deny Taiwan access to its partners it hopes to instill a sense of futility among Taipei’s allies in continuing to prefer ties with the island nation over the more powerful mainland.

5. NOTABLE ONGOING CHINESE NAVAL ACTIVITY

Liaoning Transits Taiwan Strait

On April 20, China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier transited the Taiwan Strait, the first crossing of the waterway by a Chinese aircraft carrier in 2026.

Sichuan Heading Out for Sea Trials

The PLA Navy announced this week that its new Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan would depart from Shanghai for sea trials in the South China Sea.

PLA Navy Navigates Strategic Waterway Between Japan and Taiwan

On April 22, the South China Morning Post reported that the PLA Navy conducted the first recorded transit of the Yonaguni-Iriomote Waterway between the Japanese southern islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote near Taiwan.

PLA Navy Task Force Conducts Exercise East of The Philippines

On April 24, The Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced that it had organized a task force to conduct training exercises east of the Philippine island of Luzon. The exercises, involving live-fire drills, were held in response to the ongoing Balikatan 2026 joint exercise held by the US and Philippines on Luzon which featured increased participation from Japan this year.

Takeaways:

1. According to Chinese military analyst Wu Peixin, the sea trials would test the Sichuan’s ability to operate for prolonged periods on the open seas and serve as a “drone carrier” capable of launching strategic aerial drones from its electromagnetic catapult system and deploying large unmanned surface vessels.

2. Even though the Sichuan is not fully operationally ready, the PLA Navy appears nevertheless to be using its sea trials, timed to coincide with the Balikatan 2026 exercises, as an opportunity to project power. The PLA Navy engaged in a similar tactic last year when it used the sea trials of the Fujian aircraft carrier to impose restrictions on South Korea in the Yellow Sea Provisional Measures Zone.

3. China may be eager to demonstrate its growing naval strength now amid Balikatan 2026 to contrast its expansive military presence in the region with the US’s own reduced footprint in the Indo-Pacific amid the war with Iran.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between April 11, 2026 - April 18, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: new estimates of war damages, country-wide internet shutdown continues, and uncertainty about the Strait of Hormuz.

2. Russia’s State Duma advanced a new law allowing the President to deploy troops abroad to defend the rights of Russians wrongfully imprisoned, setting up a potential pretext for invading the Baltic States.

3. Russia intensified its bombing of Ukrainian population centers and critical infrastructure as its ability to conduct large scale ground offensives diminishes amid heavy losses and improved Ukrainian defenses.

4. New reports suggested that China has been providing Iran with access to high resolution satellite imagery that would enable it to target US forces across the Middle East.

5. North Korea conducted multiple high profile live-fire exercises.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Iran Provides New Estimate of War Damages

In an interview this week with Russia’s RIA Novosti, spokesperson for the Iranian regime, Fatemeh Mohajerani, claimed that US and Israeli strikes caused over $270B in damage to the country.

Iranian Internet Shutdown Continues

According to internet connectivity monitoring organization Netblocks, April 18 marked 50 days of a near total internet blackout in Iran.

Iran Reopens then Immediately Closes the Strait of Hormuz

On April 17, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that Iran was ending its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in the wake of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. The announcement coincided with a similar declaration by US President Trump.

However, the policy was almost immediately thrown into question as other Iranian leaders including Ebrahim Azizi the head of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Commission stated that the Strait was only open to ships who followed the instructions and approved routes of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and paid a toll. Azizi posted a map of approved and restricted shipping lanes to drive home his point.

Less than 24 hours later, several Iranian leaders including the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters announced that Iran was reimposing its blockade of the Strait due to betrayals of trust by the US.1 The IRGC reportedly fired on two Indian flagged ships in the wake of the announcement. The attack drew a formal diplomatic protest from the Indian government.

Takeaways:

1. The ongoing internet blackout may have cost Iran close to $2B in direct economic losses, based on previous internal government estimates of the cost of the internet shutdown imposed during the December-January anti-government protests. That internet shutdown cost about $35.7M per day according to Iranian Minister of Communications Sattar Hashemi. Afshin Kolahi, head of the Knowledge-Based Commission of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, suggests the total costs could be even higher, as much as $80M per day, when accounting for the indirect effects of lost economic activity.

2. Iran’s continued internet blackout will further complicate any economic recovery from the war. The figure of $270B in war-related economic costs cited by spokesperson Mohajerani represents over half of Iran’s total annual GDP of $475B. The IMF has further estimated that Iran’s economy will contract over 6% this year. A projection provided by Iran’s central bank estimates that it will take Iran over 12 years to fully recover under these conditions, and that inflation could reach 180% in the interim.

   -
   The staggering economic toll of the war may be pushing some pragmatic Iranian leaders to seek a compromise settlement that ends the war in exchange for sanctions relief (in addition to concessions that preserve its other interests such as its nuclear program, proxy forces and ballistic missiles). However, hardline elements in the IRGC motivated by ideology and a sense of growing power may be largely indifferent to the material costs of the war.

3. It’s not immediately clear what has led to Iran’s apparent reversal of its announcement to open the Strait of Hormuz. It seems possible that the initial announcement by Foreign Minister Araghchi was a part of a diplomatic process between Iran and the US to end the war. The move may have encountered substantial push back from hardliners who viewed the policy as a capitulation amid a continued US naval blockade and triumphalist statements made by President Trump.

   -

   Whatever the policy, confusion over Iran’s intent to enforce a blockade is likely enough by itself to continue stalling maritime traffic. The policy reversal and public disagreement over it, voiced in official media outlets associated with the IRGC such as Fars News Agency and Tasnim News, portend the potential for serious discontent with any negotiated end to the war with the US. The new Supreme Leader’s continued public absence will make resolving these disputes more difficult.

2. RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT PAVES THE WAY FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF RUSSIANS ABROAD

On April 14, the Russian Duma advanced a new law (Bill 1181659-8) that would authorize the President to use military force to defend Russians at risk of prosecution and imprisonment abroad. The Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Andrei Kartapolov, promoted the bill as necessary to defend Russians from rampant international Russophobia,

“The State Duma Defense Committee supports the bill's concept, as the proposed regulation will help protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of Russian citizens, protect Russian organizations from foreign illegal attacks, and counter the rampant Russophobia campaign that continues internationally.”

Takeaways:

The timing of the new law may be seen as a provocation toward the Baltic States and Moldova, which have large Russian-speaking populations that Russia considers Russian nationals. Russia has intensified threats against the Baltic States in recent weeks, accusing the countries of permitting Ukraine to use their airspace for drone attacks on Russia’s Baltic oil and gas infrastructure. Russian affiliated actors appear to have also launched a cognitive warfare campaign suggesting the development of a “Narva People's Republic” in Estonia, alluding to the creation of a separatist Russian region of the country. The idea recalls similar “People’s Republics” announced in Georgia and Ukraine prior to their invasion by Russia in 2008 and 2014 respectively.

The threat implied by these actions is that Russia intends to establish a plausible casus belli for invasion. In the case of the “Narva People’s Republic,” Russia may intend to engineer a crisis between Estonian authorities and the country’s community of Russian speakers, potentially instigated by Russian intelligence services and armed proxies, which then provokes arrests that can be used as a pretext for invasion.

This is not without precedent. Russia engineered a similar crisis in Estonia in April 2007 in response to the removal of a large bronze monument to Soviet soldiers. In that incident, Russian leaders and state media inflamed the passions of the country's Russian-speaking minority for weeks in the lead up to the removal, while the Russian embassy allegedly recruited local criminals to foment unrest. The result was multiple nights of riots between April 26-29, 2007 that resulted in hundreds of arrests, dozens of injuries, and one death. The Russian Duma demanded that the Kremlin “punish” Estonia with economic sanctions in response to the crisis. Estonia then faced weeks of persistent cyberattacks from Russian based/affiliated actors targeting its critical infrastructure.

3. RUSSIA CONTINUES INTENSE WAVE OF BOMBARDMENTS

Russian Forces Strike Critical Dam in Kharkiv

On April 14, Russian forces launched six long-range glide bombs at the Pechenihy Reservoir dam in Ukraine’s Kharkiv oblast. Four of the bombs struck the ground near the dam’s gates while another two impacted the water.

Russia Conducts One of its Deadliest Air Raids of 2026

On April 15, Russia launched a massive bombardment of Ukrainian cities involving 44 missiles and 659 drones. The attack killed 17 and injured as many as 100, making it one of the deadliest attacks on Ukrainian civilians so far this year.

Takeaways:

1. Russia previously attacked and damaged the dam on multiple occasions including December 2025. The latest attack appears to be an attempt to further weaken the dam and trigger an environmental disaster that forces the displacement of Ukrainian civilians and the abandonment of Ukrainian frontline positions in Kharkiv.

2. Russia is attempting to intensify its bombardments of Ukrainian population centers and critical infrastructure to force an end to the war on its terms by breaking the will of the Ukrainian people. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha announced on April 17 at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum that Russia intends to conduct seven large-scale bombardments per month. While Russia has pursued this scorched earth strategy throughout the war, it appears to be emerging as the Kremlin’s primary theory of victory as alternatives become more difficult.

   -

   The expansion of Ukraine’s domestic defense industry and its increasingly automated defense in depth have hardened Ukraine’s lines and made continued incremental ground advances by Russian forces extremely costly. Compounding matters, estimated Russian losses have begun to consistently exceed assessed recruitment into the Russian military in recent months. UK Defense Secretary John Healey highlighted this trend during the April 15 meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group, announcing that Russian casualties had increased by more than a third in March 2026 over previous months, and that for the fourth month in a row the total number of Russian soldiers lost in combat had exceeded the number recruited. This persistent negative trend in Russian manpower is a first in the war and a sign that Russia’s offensive potential may be past its peak.

4. REPORTS SUGGEST CHINA PROVIDED IRAN ACCESS TO SATELLITE IMAGERY OF US FORCES

China Sold Iran Spy Satellite it Then Used to Target the US Military

An April 15 investigative report released by the Financial Times alleges that leaked Iranian military documents show that Chinese company Earth Eye Co sold a TEE-01B remote sensing satellite to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps via “in-orbit delivery” in late 2024.2 The deal also gave Iranian forces access to information from the commercial ground data transmission stations of an additional Chinese company Emposat. The satellite is believed to have been used to surveil and target US military forces in the Middle East.

According to Congress, China Obtained and Then Publicly Distributed Imagery of US Forces in the Middle East from Airbus

On April 16, Senator John Moolenaar, the Chairman of the Select Committee on China, sent a letter to the Pentagon alleging that the committee had obtained compelling evidence that imagery of US military forces in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific were provided to Chinese company MizarVision, by Airbus Space days before the start of Operation Epic Fury. MizarVision subsequently shared many of the images, including of US stealth fighters and carrier groups, on social media.

Takeaways:

1. This is not the first time the US has been alerted to problematic cooperation between top European aerospace company Airbus and civilian firms tied with the Chinese military industrial complex. A March 16, 2026 letter by the Senate Select Committee on China alleges that the French government has refused multiple requests for information about Airbus’s ties with Chinese entities.

2. The issues raised with Airbus exemplify a broader problem, how to effectively delineate and enforce redlines with China. As repeatedly noted in prior Significant Activity Reports, the national security threats posed by China are among the most complex for the West to negotiate (or even fully conceptualize) due to China’s pivotal role as a global manufacturing hub and the government-directed integration of its civilian technology sector with its military, a process known as military-civil fusion.

3. While the US has good reason to attempt to reduce threats to operational security posed by dual-use technology provided by allies and partners, attempting a total global embargo on high resolution satellite imagery is unlikely to be sustainable as such technology is now widely available and increasingly represents a public good. The US military will need to adapt to an increasingly transparent battlefield.

5. NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS MULTIPLE MAJOR MILITARY LIVE-FIRE DRILLS

North Korean Navy Test Fires Newest Destroyer

On April 12, North Korea conducted a live-fire exercise involving its newest and most advanced naval destroyer, the Choe Hyon. The Choe Hyon test fired two strategic cruise missiles and three anti-ship cruise missiles. Kim Jong-un personally supervised the exercise.

Kim Jong-un Oversees Artillery Contest on Grandfather’s Birthday

On April 16, Kim Jong-un oversaw an artillery firing competition conducted in celebration of the birthday of his grandfather, and nation’s founder, Kim Il-Sung. This was the first time Kim Jong-un attended a military event celebrating either his father or grandfather.

Takeaways:

The latest naval live-fire involving North Korea’s most advanced warship highlights the substantial progress Kim Jong-un has made in modernizing the North Korean military. The capabilities of the ship and its arsenal of precision guided munitions may also serve as an advertisement for potential global arms buyers. While sanctions have largely curbed North Korean arms exports, its sale of missiles and artillery shells to Russia in recent years has helped erode global taboos about doing business with Pyongyang—deals that South Korea's Korea Institute for National Security Strategy estimates are worth nearly $14.4 billion in total. Russia's assistance in subverting sanctions monitoring has set the stage for future growth in illicit North Korean arms deals, and may position Moscow as a key broker.

On April 11, the US and Iran held their highest-level diplomatic talks to date in Islamabad, Pakistan, following a ceasefire announced on April 7 that ended more than five weeks of combat.1 This Situation Report discusses Iran’s strategic position going into negotiations, and assesses how it may press its advantages and why it may be wise to seek a negotiated settlement.

This Situation Report is broken into two parts:

1. Iran’s Strategic Advantages

   1. The War Has Imposed Significant Operational Costs on US Military

   2. Iran Maintains Ongoing Control of the Strait of Hormuz

   3. Iran Continues to Pose Significant Threat to Gulf Infrastructure

   4. Iran Has Maintained Regime Integrity and Internal Stability

   5. Iran Has Established an Upper Hand in the Information Space

2. Iran’s Strategic Vulnerabilities

   1. Iran’s Control Over the Strait of Hormuz has Peaked

   2. War Has Worsened Iran’s Internal Crises

1. IRAN’S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES

The Iranian regime has survived 40 days of intense US strikes and re-entered negotiations confident that its strategic position has improved from before the war. Iran’s confidence derives from the success it has achieved in imposing significant operational costs on the US military, exerting control over the Strait of Hormuz, holding critical infrastructure at risk across the Middle East, warding off the threat of regime change, and establishing an upper hand in the information war.

The War Has Imposed Significant Operational Costs on the US Military

Iran has been able to impose non-negligible costs to the US military through five weeks of war, which have triggered serious questions about the sustainability of the US war effort including souring public opinion and concerns about the deficiency of the US defense industrial base’s capacity to sustain a protracted military campaign.

Iranian attacks have killed 13 US service members, and wounded 381. The war resulted in the loss of 39 US aircraft, including an E-3G Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), damage to an additional 10 aircraft, and the destruction of multiple sophisticated air defense radars. Defending against Iranian drone and missile attacks has depleted about a third of the US’s stocks of interceptors for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and a quarter of its supplies of Patriot Missiles.

Iran Maintains Ongoing Control over the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has succeeded in imposing total control on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Its indiscriminate strikes on targets throughout the region, while in some ways strategically counterproductive, ultimately succeeded in shutting down maritime traffic through the Strait. There are three reasons Iran has succeeded so far:

First, Iran demonstrated enough capability and willingness to attack commercial ships that shipping companies ultimately became extremely risk averse. While the US and Israel did succeed in degrading Iran’s capability to deploy sea mines and launch strikes on ships, Iran launched enough mines into the water and enough successful drone and missile attacks on tankers to ensure that no ship owners would risk transiting the Strait unless they received special security assurances to do so. The narrow shipping lanes, approximately two miles wide, located within range of a variety of land-based weapons systems also provided Iran with a narrow enough target area near its shores to effectively threaten with even severely degraded military capabilities.

Second, receiving Iranian permission to cross the Strait became the essential security assurance as no attempt has been made to force open the waterway thus far. The US Navy has only just begun attempting freedom of navigation operations in the Strait on April 11 amid the ongoing ceasefire, either because it deployed unready to do so, or because policy makers previously believed the operation was too risky. It remains to be seen whether the operations will continue if hostilities are renewed or whether they have an impact on restoring confidence in civilian mariners. The US and its allies have also not provided ship owners with sufficient supplementary insurance coverage to offset the increased risk either.

Source: CBS News on YouTube

Third, an overlapping reason behind both Iran’s capability to instill risk in maritime shipping operations, and the US Navy’s unwillingness to assume risky operations, is advances in unmanned weapons systems. The US’s air campaign has degraded Iran’s ability to launch missiles and deploy sea mines, but has not stopped the threat posed by drones. The US military, despite ample warning, has found defending against Iranian drones more difficult than conventional missiles.

Iran Continues to Pose a Threat to Gulf State’s Critical Infrastructure

The persistent threat posed by Iranian drones, and the US military's inability to effectively counter them, has further enabled the regime to restrict American operations by holding the critical infrastructure of Gulf State allies at existential risk.

Iranian strikes have targeted oil fields, pipelines and refineries throughout the Middle East. Iranian attacks have notably caused long-term disruptions to 5% of Saudi Arabia’s oil production and 17% of Qatar’s production of liquefied natural gas. The attacks have also caused extensive damage to ports and energy infrastructure in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

More worryingly, Iran has also begun limited attacks on desalination plants including in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE and threatened further strikes in retaliation for US bombing of its own critical infrastructure. According to an analysis by Reuters, the region is nearly completely dependent on desalination plants for freshwater, with 100% of potable water in Bahrain and Qatar coming from desalination, as well as 90% for Kuwait, 86% for Oman, 80% for the UAE, and 50% for Saudi Arabia.

As a result the US will have difficulty effectively following up on threats to coerce Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or surrender its nuclear program by exploiting Iran’s own critical vulnerabilities, such as by destroying its capacity to export oil from Kharg Island.

Iran Has Maintained Regime Integrity and Internal Stability

Despite continued attacks on its central leadership and sources of state power, the Iranian regime has succeeded in preventing another popular revolt, and closed off opportunities for the US to achieve victory through regime change through airpower alone. Reasons for the sustained internal stability are likely threefold:

First, Iran’s brutal suppression of protests in January killed and arrested unprecedented numbers of people. Credible estimates for the number of protesters killed range between 7,010 and more than 30,000. The crackdown injured an additional 25,845 protesters and resulted in at least 53,845 arrests. These actions could have crippled the Iranian public’s ability to mount another major challenge to the government by directly eliminating the threat posed by more than 100,000 people willing to confront the authorities, and instilling enough fear in countless others to deter further protest organizing.

Second, Iran has been able to maintain the appearance of government control through continued operations of internal security forces amid US and Israeli bombardment. Iranian proxy forces, which have by themselves not been a decisive factor in combating the US and Israel in this round of fighting, have nonetheless played a significant role in bolstering the public presence of the regime’s internal security forces and helped keep a lid on internal threats.

Finally, Iran has instituted a near total internet blackout since the start of the war. According to independent internet monitoring organization Netblocks, the Iranian regime has shutdown internet connectivity in the country for 43 days as of April 11. The current restrictions are likely the most extensive and prolonged imposed by any government since the Arab Spring. The restrictions have further suppressed the ability of remaining protesters to organize any new public uprising against the regime.

Iran Has Established an Upper Hand in the Information Space

Iran’s control of the internet has not only suppressed anti-government activities but has just as importantly prevented internal dissent from leaking out into the wider world. This has helped the Iranian regime maintain the appearance of national unity and resistance against the US and Israel and has helped it establish the upper hand in the information war against both countries.

The Iranian regime has further used its resilience to frustrate US leaders and trigger major unforced errors in the process. The regime’s willingness to accept severe blows to its central leadership without surrendering has posed a dilemma to US policy makers of either continuing an indecisive and expensive air campaign or committing to a more risky and expansive campaign inside Iranian territory that the US public is not prepared to accept.

The dilemma, worsened by Iran’s strangling of global energy and commodity markets through the Strait of Hormuz, appears to have caused US President Donald Trump to attempt to break the impasse through escalating threats to indiscriminately attack Iranian critical infrastructure to break the will of the regime. These threats culminated shortly before the April 7 ceasefire with the President’s declaration that future US military strikes would be aimed at destroying Iran as a civilization. The President’s statements created a global uproar that seriously alarmed US allies, eroded public support for the war in the US, and threatened to cede the moral high ground to a regime whose mass killing of innocent civilians in December and January was itself a major precipitating cause of the war.

The White House's erratic messaging has effectively undermined its justification for war—that a government willing to murder tens of thousands of its own people is too dangerous to be entrusted with the ability to build a nuclear weapon.

2. IRAN’S STRATEGIC VULNERABILITIES

While its current leverage going into the next round of diplomatic negotiations is considerable, Iran needs to be careful not to try to press its advantage too far. A long war, while undesirable for the US, would be increasingly ruinous for the regime and would cause its current strategic advantages to erode over time. This is chiefly because Iran’s current ability to control the Strait of Hormuz has likely peaked, and its ongoing internal stability is unlikely to last due to the mounting economic costs of the war and long-term disagreements about policy.

Iran’s Control Over the Strait of Hormuz has Already Peaked

Fewer than 10 ships have been able to transit the Strait of Hormuz each day amid the ongoing ceasefire, down from almost 130 per day in the month before the war. For all intents and purposes, it’s unlikely that the Strait will get any more closed than it is already. Iran’s partners like China will not tolerate measures to affect a more permanent long-term closure, such as widespread and indiscriminate mining (an action which may no longer be feasible anyway due to the US’s destruction of much of Iran’s fleet of minelayers).

The costs of accepting a negotiated settlement in which Iran continues to threaten traffic through the Strait will be difficult, even for an impatient US administration apprehensive about continuing the war to accept. Iran’s continued strangling of maritime traffic may inadvertently force the US to increase military deployments to the region and attempt dramatic combined arms operations to force the Strait open.

The transit of two US destroyers through the Strait of Hormuz on April 11, followed by a US Central Command statement announcing the beginning of operations to clear new shipping lanes in the Strait suggests the US is preparing for more aggressive naval action to re-establish control in the region. The move, likely timed to coincide with negotiations, is a warning to Iranian leaders that its leverage over the Strait will be contested and is likely to diminish over time in the absence of a negotiated settlement.

The War Has Worsened Iran’s Internal Crises

Battling the US and Israel has helped bolster the regime’s sense of purpose, but the war has fundamentally undermined Iran’s state capacity. While the Iranian regime maintains a monopoly on violence in the country, the war has ultimately weakened its overall military strength, by devastating its air force, air defenses, navy, and missile stocks.

Operation Epic Fury has been one of the most intense air campaigns in history. According to Pentagon estimates, the US military has struck 13,000 targets in 40 days including:

• 1,500 air defense targets representing 80% of Iran’s air defense systems

• More than 450 storage facilities for Iranian ballistic missiles and 800 storage facilities for attack drones.

• 150 naval vessels representing 90% of the regular Iranian fleet

• 50% of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy's small attack boats

• 20 Iranian naval production facilities

• 80% of facilities associated with Iran’s nuclear industry

• 90% of Iran’s weapons factories, including 80% of its missile factories

While some skepticism of the exact figures the Pentagon has provided is warranted, particularly given the current administration’s penchant for exaggeration and hyperbolic language, other independent analyses also assert extensive devastation of Iran’s military and defense industry. Rebuilding the capabilities lost in the war will take many years and may not even be achievable under the current international sanctions. Destruction across the entire supply chain for Iran’s missiles will likely force Iran to suspend production of ballistic missiles and focus efforts on producing smaller drones. While still problematic for regional security—given the effectiveness of drones in the current war—the dismantling of Iran’s missile production capacity would ultimately undermine its ability to assemble a viable nuclear arsenal.

The war has further battered Iran’s infrastructure and overall industrial capacity and will worsen the economic and potentially even the environmental crises that precipitated the December and January uprising against the government. A report by Al Arabiya suggests Iran has sustained as much as $145B in damage, equivalent to about a third of its entire GDP.

Iran’s largest bridge, the B1, connecting Tehran and Karaj destroyed by US strikes. Source: The Sun

The Iranian regime has nevertheless been able to ride out the onslaught in the short-term, but its current survival strategy may create unanticipated challenges to recovery. A combination of initiative and decentralization have been key reasons for the regime’s resilience amid popular upheaval and war. However, the regime’s future continuity depends on reversing these trends toward a restoration of central authority.

Reimposing top-down control of the country—a necessity in any authoritarian system—will be especially challenging given intensifying clashes between pragmatists and hardliners within the regime over policy and the terms of an enduring peace. The institution that would ordinarily serve as arbiter of such conflicts, the position of Supreme Leader, is now a key liability due to uncertainty about the status of Mojtaba Khamenei. While there are conflicting reports about the health of the new Supreme Leader, including that he is either incapacitated, or alert but severely wounded, the fact remains that the central authority in the country has not appeared in public in any form since the war began and has communicated entirely through written messages. Such an absence would raise serious questions about legitimacy for any leader, but it is especially striking in this case given that the current Supreme Leader had almost no public profile before his appointment and has made no public appearances since. A long-term absence by the Supreme Leader could cause the mounting governance challenges and disputes over policy to metastasize into open factional conflict.

Hi, this is Dan White,

Due to a hectic overseas travel schedule in West Africa, OPFOR Journal will be taking a break from new content for two weeks.

In the meantime, please check out this interview series I published this week at the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), “Defending Global Order Against China’s Maritime Insurgency,” where I speak with Hunter Stires, the former Maritime Strategist to the Secretary of the Navy during the tenure of Secretary Carlos Del Toro, about the US’s effort to counter China’s maritime insurgency to dominate the South China Sea, and discuss why the battle for the freedom of the seas should matter to us all.

OPFOR Journal will return in two weeks to discuss the state of the ongoing war with Iran.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by Iran since the start of Operation Epic Fury launched on February 28, 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. Lone-wolf actors inspired by Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted two attacks in the US in Texas and Michigan.

2. Iran is intensifying cyber attacks against US corporations and Iranian dissidents.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

3. There is mounting evidence that Iran has activated overseas terror sleeper cells to conduct attacks targeting Jewish communities, Iranian activists, and US and Israeli officials worldwide.

1. TWO LONE-WOLF ACTORS INSPIRED BY IRAN AND THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE LAUNCH TERROR ATTACKS IN US

Mass Shooting in Texas Linked to Sympathy for Iran

On February 29 at approximately 1:30 am, a US citizen, Ndiaga Diagne, launched a mass shooting at Buford’s bar in downtown Austin, Texas killing three and wounding 13. Diagne began shooting into the bar’s outdoor seating from his SUV before exiting his vehicle and shooting at bystanders on foot.

There are strong indications the attack was launched in support of the Iranian regime. The attack occurred within 24 hours of the start of Operation Epic Fury. Diagne also reportedly wore an Iranian flag shirt underneath a hoodie emblazoned with the words “Property of Allah” during the attack. Diagne’s social media activity also features several messages hinting at pro-regime sympathies.

Synagogue Attack in Michigan Linked to Hezbollah Sympathies

On March 12, a US citizen, Ayman Mohamad Ghazali, attacked the Temple Israel synagogue outside Detroit. Ghazali rammed a truck carrying improvised explosive devices into the synagogue’s school. He then engaged in a brief firefight with onsite security guards using a semi-automatic rifle, before committing suicide after becoming stuck in his burning vehicle. Ghazali was the attack's only fatality, though the vehicle ramming injured a security guard and smoke from the resulting fire caused injuries to multiple first responders. No children were present at the time.

Ghazali is believed to have carried out the attack in retaliation for an Israeli drone strike in southern Lebanon on March 5, which killed four of his relatives, including two brothers. Israel alleged one of those brothers, Ibrahim Mohamad Ghazali, was a Hezbollah commander. CBS News, citing local sources in Lebanon, confirmed that both brothers killed in the strike were members of Hezbollah's rocket forces.

Additional Information:

1. Iran is Using Religious Rulings to Instigate Lone-Wolf Attacks: Multiple Iranian clerics have ordered religious rulings (fatwas) calling for violence against Americans in the wake of Operation Epic Fury. Two fatwas issued on March 1 called on all Muslims to take revenge on Americans for the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These were followed on March 4 by a fatwa requiring violent attacks on Israelis and President Trump.

2. Attackers Were Known to be Mentally Unstable: Both assailants were reportedly known to be mentally unstable prior to their attacks, suggesting both men were self-radicalized and did not act as part of a broader network of Iranian sleeper cells and contract killers. Ayman Mohamad Ghazali’s ex-wife reportedly called 911 about an hour before the attack to warn local authorities that her ex-husband had become unstable after the deaths of his brothers in Lebanon and was potentially planning violence against himself and others.

3. Other Potential Lone-Wolf Attacks in North America: A series of additional drive-by shootings targeting synagogues and the US consulate in Toronto between March 6-10, may also be lone-wolf attacks inspired by Iran, though these incidents remain under investigation.

2. IRAN-LINKED CYBER THREATS TARGET IRANIAN DISSIDENTS AND US CORPORATIONS

Iranian Hackivists Target US Medical Device Giant Stryker

Between March 1-12, Handala, a pro-Tehran “hackivist” group linked to Iran’s intelligence apparatus, engaged in several cyber operations to intimidate Americans and disrupt American companies. The most significant of these was a malware attack on March 11 that disrupted the operations of US medical device manufacturer Stryker.

According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the attack targeted the company’s Microsoft Intune account (a cloud based corporate IT platform). Stryker reports the attack remained confined to its internal Microsoft environment and did not leak into or compromise any of its products, though some Stryker devices were disrupted by efforts to contain the malware.

Iranian Intelligence Targeting Dissidents with Malware on Telegram

On March 20, the FBI issued a flash cyber intelligence alert that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has escalated a cyber campaign on Telegram targeting overseas Iranian dissidents and journalists with malware. The cyber attacks used social engineering to trick victims into installing malicious applications disguised as common programs, such as security authenticators. Once installed, the malware activated Telegram bots that gave attackers remote command and control over victims' accounts and devices.

Additional Information:

1. Iranian Threat Actors Typically Attack Targets of Opportunity, Particularly Linked to Defense and Israel: According to CISA, Iranian hackers focus their efforts on exploiting poorly secured systems and network edge devices using,

   “unpatched or outdated software with known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) or the use of default or common passwords on internet-connected accounts and devices…These malicious cyber actors commonly use techniques such as automated password guessing, cracking password hashes using online resources, and inputting default manufacturer passwords. When specifically targeting operational technology (OT), these malicious cyber actors also use system engineering and diagnostic tools to target entities such as engineering and operator devices, performance and security systems, and vendor and third-party maintenance and monitoring systems.”

   ---

3. IRAN ACTIVATING OVERSEAS SLEEPER CELLS TO ATTACK JEWS, DISSIDENTS, AND US AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS

Iran Allegedly Activated Transnational Terrorist Sleeper Cells

US officials have reported that Iran has sent an encrypted operational trigger to activate overseas sleeper cells to begin preparations for terrorist attacks. The message is believed to have been relayed across Iranian networks in numerous countries shortly after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28.

New Iranian Transnational Terror Group Claims Responsibility for Attacks In Europe

A new Iran-linked transnational terror group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right) claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Jewish organizations in Europe since the start of March. Attacks include the bombing of a synagogue in Liege, Belgium on March 9; the bombing of a synagogue in the Netherlands city of Rotterdam on March 13; and the bombing of an Orthodox Jewish school in the Netherlands city of Amsterdam on March 14.

Iranian Nationals Arrested for Surveillance of Jewish Institutions and Military Bases in UK

On March 6, the London Metropolitan Police announced the arrest of one Iranian national, and three dual British-Iranian citizens suspected of spying on Jewish communities in the city for suspected future terror attacks.

On March 20, two suspected Iranian spies were arrested after attempting to enter HM Naval Base Clyde near Glasgow, the site of the UK’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Additional Information:

1. Questions Linger About the Authenticity of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia: While the group has claimed responsibility for several recent attacks, those incidents may have been carried out by lone-wolf actors or sleeper cells affiliated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rather than an organized network of pro-Iranian militants. The group has also claimed credit for an attack in Greece that may never have taken place. This suggests the group could in fact be a disinformation operation claiming a variety of attacks carried out by others in order to exaggerate the reach and organization of pro-Iranian terror networks in the West.

2. Iran Threatens to Launch Indiscriminate Attacks to Target American and Israeli Officials: On March 20, Spokesman for General Staff of Armed Forces Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, announced that Iran will not hesitate to attack “recreational areas, tourist destinations and leisure centers around the world” in order to kill its enemies.

3. Historical Cases Suggest Iran will Target Government Officials, Prominent Dissidents and Jewish Institutions Using Local Proxies: As noted in Homeland Security Brief - December 2025, Iranian overseas assassinations and terror operations follow similar tactics, techniques and procedures. These operations, coordinated by the elite Quds Force of the IRGC, have for years been conducted through layers of intermediaries with Quds Force operatives serving as operational planners who subcontract the plots through local proxies generally recruited from organized crime and disaffected members of marginalized groups.

   -

   For decades, the most common targets for these attacks have been Jewish and Israeli groups around the world. However, since 2020 Iranian actors have plotted to assassinate members of the first Trump administration including Donald Trump, John Bolton, and Mike Pompeo for the killing of former IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani. Iran has also engaged in transnational repression targeting prominent dissidents in recent years. Most notably, in 2022 it attempted to organize the assassination of high-profile Iranian-American activist Masih Alinejad, and in 2024 plotted to kill two Maryland-based Iranian dissidents, in both cases using contacts in organized crime.

   -

   There are numerous signs the IRGC may be redoubling its efforts to conduct overseas attacks. The new commander of the IRGC, Ahmad Vadhi, appointed on March 1, has experience serving in the Quds Force, and is accused by Argentina of plotting the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Mutual Aid Association in Buenos Aires that killed 85. Since the start of Operation Epic Fury, multiple prominent Iranian activists living abroad have been killed or injured under mysterious circumstances. On March 6, anti-regime activist Masoud Masjoudi was found dead near Vancouver BC. Two Iranian nationals living in Canada have been charged with his killing. Masjoudi had been conducting investigations into IRGC affiliates in Canada at the time of his death.1 On March 19, a Dutch police officer of Iranian descent known for holding critical views of the Iranian regime, was shot and wounded.

   

While much attention has focused on domestic and allied reactions to the US war against Iran, this Situation Report examines how the purpose and progress of the war is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from military strategists and political commentators in China and Russia. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are interpreting the war for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the merits of the war itself or the conclusions the foreign commentators reached.

This Situation Report is broken into four parts:

1. Interpretations of why the US launched the war

2. Interpretations of US strategy and its effectiveness

   1. On the US’s goals

   2. On the impact of the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

   3. On the use of new US military technology

3. Interpretations of Iranian strategy and its effectiveness

   1. On Iran’s goals

   2. On Iran’s ability to counter the US military

4. Forecasts of how the war might end

   1. On the likelihood of regime change in Iran

   2. On the long-term consequences for international order

1. INTERPRETATIONS OF WHY THE US LAUNCHED THE WAR

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators assert that the US and Israel have used the prospect of Iran eventually developing nuclear weapons as a convenient pretext for attacking Iran for the purpose of regime change. Perceptions of Iranian weakness, compounded by US military momentum from strikes on Iran in June 2025 and the seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, may have given American and Israeli policymakers the sense that a historic window of opportunity had opened to finalize a decades-long project of dominating the Middle East.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By An Gang, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Strategic and Security Studies, Tsinghua University in the Beijing Review, March 5, 2026

“On February 28, 2026, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, launched a military strike against Iran, killing Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and a number of high-ranking military and political officials who were convening a meeting at his residence that same day.

“This follows the January 3rd raid by U.S. special forces in Caracas, where Venezuelan President Maduro and his wife were abducted. This marks yet another instance in a short period of time that the Trump administration has trampled on basic norms of international relations and principles of international law, violated the sovereignty and security of another country, and committed atrocities against its leader. The Chinese government, along with many members of the international community, firmly opposes and strongly condemns this action.

“Trump and his administration, adhering to a policy of “beast-like realism” and the principle of ‘peace through strength,’ disdain to provide a full explanation for the reasons behind these two overseas military operations. In Venezuela, they claimed it was to ‘crack down on the ringleaders of drug cartels,’ while in Iran, they allegedly acted as a righteous indignation against its ‘crimes of massacring its people.’ However, the underlying logic of these two actions is interconnected. First, to create a chilling effect, breaking down the ‘anti-American arc’ formed by the most vocal left-wing regimes in Latin America and the ‘arc of resistance’ supported and manipulated by Iran in the Middle East, thereby deterring global ‘authoritarian anti-American forces.’ Second, to practice ‘energy greed,’ gain more control over oil pricing, manipulate the international crude oil market, and seize multiple benefits from economic, financial, and strategic perspectives, thus compressing the profit margins of export-oriented economies. Third, to create more ‘victories,’ pursue domestic political effects, confuse the base, and strive to reverse the increasingly obvious defeat of the Republican Party in the 2026 midterm elections.”

By Tang Zhichao, director of the Center for Middle East Development and Governance Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences via interview with China News Service, February 28, 2026

“First, Trump is ‘dissatisfied’ with the proposals put forward by Iran and believes that military pressure is needed to force Iran to make concessions, thus using force to promote negotiations. Second, the negotiations may be entirely a ‘smokescreen,’ just like in June 2025. As of the [February] 26th local time, the US military deployment, especially the second aircraft carrier, can be said to be fully in place, a result of careful planning by the US.

“He believes that these developments indicate that the United States and Israel have completely given up hope of negotiating with Iran, and that their goal is to achieve regime change in Iran.”

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 10

“The Iran War is the final phase of the liquidation of the Middle East, as it emerged in the twentieth century, in the process of decline and dismantling of colonial empires. The starting point of the current stage can probably be considered Operation Desert Storm 35 years ago - the first U.S. attack on Iraq to liberate Kuwait, occupied by Saddam Hussein. Those events came at a turning point in international: the end of the Cold War, the self-decommission of the USSR and the onset of a ‘unipolar moment’, in other words, hegemony in the world of the United States.

“Everything further: the Islamist attack on New York and Washington in September 2001, the global fight against terrorism, the retaliatory action in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the ‘Arab Spring’. the intervention in Libya, the stimulation of the civil war in Syria, etc. - meant being sucked into the funnel, control over the process was quickly lost. The policy of the United States (and behind it and all the rest) has turned into an ongoing response to rapid change, and the United States has squeezed between the need to get out of the trap created by itself and the inability to do it without the risk of losing influence not only in the Middle East.

“Retrospectively, it can be stated that almost all the decisions of the White House on the Middle East in recent decades have been situational. The possible consequences were not calculated at least two or three times ahead, although each individual step was presented as an ideologically and geopolitically thought-out strategy.”

By Zhou Xinping, Beijing Review columnist, March 5

“The apparent reason for the US and Israel’s military action against Iran is the ‘Iranian nuclear issue,’ but in reality, it is to curb Iran’s oil production. Looking at the core demands of the US regarding Middle Eastern oil over the past 80 years, its policy has never changed—it’s not simply about ‘stealing oil,’ but about controlling the pricing, settlement, and distribution channels of Middle Eastern oil, thereby maintaining the petrodollar’s hegemony and global dominance.

“Since Roosevelt’s 1945 agreement with Saudi Arabia for ‘military protection in exchange for control of oil,’ which led to the deployment of US troops to the Persian Gulf, successive US administrations have viewed the Middle East as America’s oil backyard. However, Iran’s resistance to the US has consistently displeased the US. In 1953, orchestrated by British and US intelligence agencies, a coup d’état occurred in Iran, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh, which advocated for the return of oil sovereignty. Anglo-American oil companies gained control of Iranian oil, pioneering the ‘regime change for oil’ strategy. After the US and Saudi Arabia agreed in 1974 to settle global oil transactions in US dollars, the dollar became deeply intertwined with oil. The Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003 were key US actions to eliminate anti-American forces in the Middle East and consolidate its dominance over Middle Eastern oil.”

“However, Iran, a major oil producer in the Middle East, has been free from US and British control since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. What bothers the US even more is that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil export route through the Middle East. Therefore, for decades, the US government has viewed Iran as a hostile nation and exerted pressure on it. In particular, recent US administrations have repeatedly imposed sanctions on Iran, attempting to reduce its oil exports and cripple its economy. In the last decade or so, Iran has largely determined its own oil production, deviating from the US-led OPEC production quotas. Furthermore, Iran has increasingly de-dollarized its oil exports, adopting multiple settlement methods such as its own currency, the renminbi, and the ruble—something the US cannot tolerate.”

By Vladimir Orlov, Director of the PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), Kommersant, March 1, 2026

“So, why? The June 2025 war ended in a draw. On the one hand, the Americans and Israelis inflicted serious damage on Iranian nuclear infrastructure facilities that could have played a critical role in Iran’s acquisition of nuclear material enriched enough to create a nuclear explosive device. Key Iranian scientists were sidelined.

“These are the conclusions contained in the PIR Center’s report, ‘The Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment of the Current Status and Capabilities,’ which will be made publicly available on March 2. On the other hand, as stated in the report, as of February of this year, ‘Iran retains the technical knowledge and experience resulting from more than three decades of nuclear development. More than 30 nuclear facilities remain operational throughout the country. Most importantly, the status of more than 440 kg of HEU, which could potentially be used to create a special munition, remains unclear. This amount is potentially sufficient to create 10 nuclear warheads with further enrichment.’

“And by the end of last year, the Israelis had become despondent: Trump, as authoritative Israeli sources told me then, was ‘losing interest’ in Iran, his thoughts, they said, preoccupied with Venezuela and the Ukrainian crisis; and he believed that ‘the Americans had done their job.’ Therefore, they told me, it took Netanyahu’s remarkable efforts to get Trump back on his combative side: ‘Until Iran is cleansed, it will remain a thorn in Trump’s side.’ Then came the options: what would ‘cleanse Iran’ mean? Apply the Republicans’ favorite tactic, ‘regime change’ (read: coup d’état); or limit themselves to ‘cleaning up’ with depth charges those nuclear facilities they missed last June.

“But, as the alarmed Israelis soon discovered, their concerns were unnecessary. Trump hadn’t forgotten about Iran. Yes, he’d become engrossed in Venezuela, practicing a new tactic there: partial ‘regime change.’ But he apparently considered a full-scale ‘cleansing’ and humiliation of Iran part of his mission, and this wasn’t just about Israel or its nuclear program. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage-taking at the US embassy in Iran that same year, Iran has remained the main uncontrollable irritant to the US globally.

“Not North Korea. Not Cuba. Not even Russia or China (although sending a clear signal to China by ‘cleansing Iran’ would also be a very timely move for Trump). Here in Russia, they’d say, ‘It was ruining the statistics,’ this Iran. It was ruining Trump’s mood. The Iranian negotiators turned out to be good negotiators. ‘They’re dragging their feet, leading you by the nose!’ the Israelis egged him on. And now it’s time for revenge.”

2. INTERPRETATIONS OF US STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators assert that the Trump administration is confused and divided about its overall strategy, particularly as its current campaign strategy, focused on decapitating strikes and targeting of military infrastructure, has so far failed to topple the regime. The division over strategy reflects a broader schism in Trump’s political base, which is willing to accept short and decisive military campaigns to achieve limited objectives, but is skeptical of prolonged and costly wars, particularly in the Middle East. As a result, they believe the administration is likely to buckle under pressure and seek a quick exit if Iran puts up long-term resistance or succeeds in strangling global energy exports. Caught between the need to claim a tangible victory and the desire to avoid an ignominious defeat, the US may be tempted to put boots on the ground—either to seize Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium at Isfahan or to occupy its oil facilities on Kharg Island as a bargaining chip.

Commentators further note that the US has come to appreciate the importance of high-performance strike drones, but nonetheless remains behind both Iran and Russia in capabilities and lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By An Gang, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Strategic and Security Studies, Tsinghua University in the Beijing Review, March 5, 2026

“The overconfident Trump administration’s reckless decision to launch a war against Iran may not have been well-considered, let alone based on any medium- to long-term strategic planning. Unlike previous US overseas military operations, the Trump administration tended to be a ‘hit-and-run’ approach, focusing on destruction rather than creation, and not aiming to reform Iran’s governance system. Iran is not a small or weak country; its internal situation is extremely complex. Currently, its military system has devolved into a situation where different branches and factions are fighting independently, leaving the US without a clear target and effective means to communicate with its adversary and control the intensity of the war. The US will now face the critical questions of how to win and how to withdraw. It is possible that the war will not go smoothly, losses will exceed expectations, and a swift victory will be impossible, forcing the US to continue investing more war resources.

“Even if the Trump administration declares itself victorious and leaves the Iranian battlefield, it will inevitably leave behind a mess in the Middle East: a locally radicalized Iran lacking effective central control will have a long-term negative impact on regional peace and stability, as well as on America’s hard and soft power and its alliance system. More importantly, the rapid and aggressive actions Trump has taken since taking office over a year ago are showing a pattern of ‘one wave of momentum, then a decline, and finally exhaustion,’ exacerbating political divisions and even internal divisions within the MAGA camp. Therefore, the likelihood of the US government taking new large-scale, risky actions against specific countries before the midterm elections is decreasing.”

By Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Valdai Discussion Club, March 10, 2026

“A window of opportunity has also opened for Washington to crush its long-standing adversary. Donald Trump's predecessors hesitated to undertake a campaign of this scale, preferring sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence operations. Like Israel, the United States could chalk up significant damage to Iran's military-industrial potential. Unlike Israel, the United States is virtually invulnerable to retaliatory strikes. Military losses are minimal. The psychological demonstration has a wider target audience than Iran. The campaign has demonstrated that the leaders of the vast majority of countries can be assassinated with political will and without any ethical qualms. The main problem is what to do next. The effects of the first round of fighting are already wearing off. Iran has not collapsed. This means it will be necessary to either engage in a risky ground operation or ‘stand back and watch.’ A ground operation is not ruled out, but it is not yet the baseline scenario. The United States may pause and launch another strike at an opportune moment. But the problem is that Iranian resistance will keep the region on edge. This will lead to high oil prices and problems for allies. Therefore, a wait-and-see approach is also risky. While the US has an extremely high margin of safety and can afford to play the long game, the Trump administration is in a more difficult position. A shaky victory, Iranian attacks, and rising gas prices are fraught with domestic problems for the Republicans.”

By Dmitry Novikov, Associate Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestiya, March 3, 2026

“Washington and Tel Aviv seek to destroy even the semblance of Iran's ambition for regional hegemony, which it has nurtured for decades. This will be facilitated either by regime change or, failing that, by a significant decline in Iranian military capabilities. Iran's minimum goal, therefore, is to endure and prevent critical long-term damage to its military and economic capabilities. It can do this, among other things, by raising the costs of continued military action for its opponents.”

By Cheng Tong, Dean of the School of Oriental Languages ​​at Shanghai International Studies University, via CCTV, March 4, 2026

“The UN Charter stipulates that the assassination of a foreign leader constitutes a serious violation of sovereignty. Treaties such as the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention also explicitly prohibit the assassination of national leaders. Khamenei was not only Iran's supreme political leader but also a Shiite religious leader. We have seen that after news of Khamenei's martyrdom spread, not only in Iran but also in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries, Shiite Muslims were outraged, taking to the streets and chanting slogans of revenge. It can be said that the consequences of this US-Israeli ‘targeted killing’ operation will be far-reaching, complex, and extremely destructive, potentially leading to a vicious cycle of deepening hatred and violence begetting violence.”

By Evgeny Fedorov, Russian nationalist politician and member of the State Duma, TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication), March 11, 2026

“Trump's first mistake was eliminating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Whatever anyone says about him, the old man didn't seize power in Iran, but was the elected spiritual leader of a nation of 80 million. It's a real Pandora's Box—now anyone has the moral right to assassinate legitimately elected heads of state. If Americans can do it, why shouldn't others try? Trump's terrorist act is a direct warning to Russia and China. The United States has crossed another red line, and this clearly needs to be taken into account.

”Now, regarding Iranians dissatisfied with the government, whom Trump proposed to seize power in the country. There were, of course, some celebrations of the ayatollah's death, but no one supported them. It's all about the Shiite perception of death. Khamenei died at the hands of the enemy, meaning he became a martyr. And that's a completely different balance of power in the Middle East. Such things are not forgiven, and they are avenged. Iranians, who only yesterday sympathized with the rebels, are sincerely mourning the Ayatollah and demanding more missiles from the IRGC for Israel and the United States. And the missiles have flown.”

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 2, 2026

“The Supreme Leader of Iran was not just destroyed by a targeted strike, but this destruction was also declared a great achievement and a benefit for the future resolution of the conflict. However, Ali Khamenei is a legitimate (according to the laws of his country) head of state - a member of the United Nations, recognized by almost everyone and a full participant in all forms of international relations. Including political negotiations with the organizers of the attack, which have continued until now.

“The killing of the head of one state by the forces of another state and by the decision of its leadership in accordance with the same model as the leaders of terrorist organizations or drug cartels are liquidated is a fundamentally different dimension of world politics.

“Even in comparison with previous cases of regime changes, including such brutal finals as the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya or the execution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Both episodes became possible thanks to external military intervention. But Gaddafi was killed by his Libyan opponents as a result of an act of internal turmoil, and Hussein was executed after the Iraqi court’s verdict trial, no matter how to assess his objectivity. The case of Iran is different, it is a reproduction of the method that Israel applied to the heads of Hezbollah and Hamas. And the United States fully supports this approach.”

By Tai Fengshun and Huang Lin, Special correspondents for The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group), March 3, 2026

“The US military had three objectives in using suicide drones, which had only been in service with the troops for a few months, in this airstrike against Iran.

“The first objective is to test the combat capabilities of the ‘LUCAS’ in actual combat. Iran is a medium-sized military power in the Middle East, and the intensity and scale of the war would far exceed those of some of the smaller countries that the United States has previously attacked. Through actual combat, the performance of the ‘LUCAS’ can be tested, providing more practical evidence for the accumulation of tactics and subsequent improvements.

“Although the ‘LUCAS’ is a copy of an Iranian drone, its design incorporates the US understanding and positioning of such weapons. Reportedly, the drone incorporates advanced collaborative capabilities. Some models are equipped with Starlink satellite communication terminals, enabling autonomous coordination and suitability for swarm tactics and network-centric warfare. This means multiple ‘LUCAS’ can share data, coordinate target allocation, dynamically adjust attack missions, and effectively resist electronic jamming, achieving a more intelligent and efficient swarm precision strike capability than the Iranian ‘Shahed-136’ drone.

“The second objective is to ‘fight fire with fire’ on the battlefield, thereby reducing operational costs. The US military’s first use of the Lucas suicide drone is a specific tactical action based on modern battlefield experience, aimed at countering the threat of low-cost drones and addressing the cost-effectiveness dilemma. Iran has equipped itself with a large number of long-range suicide drones such as the Witness and Arash, using them extensively since the start of the war. Combined with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range rocket artillery, they have repeatedly and successfully struck US bases in the Middle East, destroying facilities and causing personnel casualties at US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar.

“Each LUCAS drone costs approximately $35,000 to produce, making it a much cheaper beyond-visual-range weapon than missiles. It can provide the U.S. military with low-cost, scalable military capabilities in the Middle East. In this conflict, the U.S. quickly announced the use of this drone, which also sent a message to the U.S. domestically that the U.S. military no longer relies solely on expensive beyond-visual-range strike weapons on the battlefield, but is also fighting against adversaries with low-cost weapons.

“The U.S. military’s large-scale deployment of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems deserves close attention.

“The third objective is to accelerate the ‘Replicator’ program through real-world combat, driving a profound transformation in operational thinking and tactics, serving high-end warfare and great power competition, and thus warranting attention. In 2024, the US military drew lessons from the conflict between Ukraine and Russia—where both countries utilized a large number of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as for frontline operations and attacks on fixed targets deep within enemy territory, targeting fixed military installations, infrastructure, and factories to weaken the other’s war potential. The ‘Replicator’ program aims to deploy unmanned systems on a large scale, enabling the US military to distribute its combat power across a large number of relatively inexpensive systems. This is a multi-domain program that may include autonomous air, ground, surface, underwater, and/or space unmanned systems.

“The U.S. military believes that low-cost, high-performance, and rapidly producible unmanned systems are one of the key development trends in future weapons. Major powers like Russia have already begun to equip themselves with large numbers of low-cost, long-range lethal systems, while the United States lags behind in this area. The ‘Replicator’ program is a crucial project to catch up and address the challenges of future great power competition. The ‘Replicator’ program is essentially a large-scale integration of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and unmanned platforms. The ‘Replicator’ program marks a significant shift in the U.S. military’s strategic thinking: from relying on a few high-precision, expensive platforms and munitions to a combination of high-end platforms (including munitions) and the large-scale deployment of ‘consumable’ low-cost autonomous systems. Its core strategic objective is to create new military superiority through a combination of qualitative and quantitative advantages, attempting to leverage its industrial and technological capabilities to enable the U.S. military to adapt to both high-end combat and protracted wars of attrition, thereby reshaping the logic of deterrence and warfare.”

By Fighterbomber, leading pro-Kremlin Russian military blogger, on Telegram, March 11, 2026

“If we were preparing for the last war before the Special Military Operation (SMO), then the US and Israel prepared for the future war, so much so that they missed the present moment.

“Their reliance on robots and technological superiority reached its peak, and their desire to preserve the lives of their taxpayers was taken to the extreme. The attacking side decided to achieve its goals without infantry.

“As a result, the world’s first army, reinforced by the most cunning country on the planet, is now forced to invent new war goals and excuses every day to explain why everything went to hell.

“This sounds very familiar, doesn’t it?

“After reading Russian-Ukrainian channels, the Americans realized that today, the main weapon is drones, and so they launched a drone attack.

“Judging by the losses, the tactics of using aircraft in conditions of complete technological and numerical superiority are no different from the tactics of using aircraft in the SMO.

“They operate without entering the zone of destruction of even single air defense systems.

“But having a shitload of attack drones, Israel and the US launched a massive attack with Hermes and Reaper drones. Practically all the accurate hits of the day come from them. On the 12th day of the war, Iran continues to shoot them down gradually.”

3. INTERPRETATIONS OF IRANIAN STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Summary of Key Insights

Commentators believe that while Iran is capable of landing periodic strikes on US military bases, it cannot defeat the US military in a decisive engagement. Iran’s optimal strategy is to endure US and Israeli strikes while maintaining sufficient resistance to disrupt the global economy and frustrate US allies, and ultimately force the US to settle on its terms.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By Yuri Lyamin, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 13, 2026

"Despite all the destruction and losses, Iran continues to withstand attacks and continues to respond. Among other things, Iran has now established de facto complete control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

"The Iranian leadership is clearly demonstrating that it is prepared to continue fighting until the US agrees to terms acceptable to the Iranians. Iran wants to break the vicious cycle of negotiations, war, ceasefire, negotiations, and a new war at any cost, and is therefore pursuing its strategy of drawing the US into a protracted conflict. In other words, they are imposing a scenario that Trump clearly did not sign up for.”

By Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University via Global Times, March 8, 2026

“Unable to strike the US mainland, Iran has no choice but to target US bases, embassies, and other assets in the Middle East. However, this approach carries severe negative consequences, namely worsening relations with Gulf countries.

“Therefore, Iran has proactively sought understanding from Gulf states through an apology, he told the Global Times. From Iran’s perspective, it must carefully consider its own geopolitical environment. Particularly since restoring ties with Saudi Arabia in 2023, improving relations with Gulf countries has been a key direction in Iranian diplomacy, aimed at optimizing its external surroundings.”

By Roman Skomorokhov, Russian defense journalist, TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication), March 5, 2026

“And Iran, by destroying its neighbors' oil refineries with ballistic missiles and drones, and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, will ultimately drive oil prices to $200 per barrel. And then, truly, half the world will come to Trump and start beating him over the head with sticks, because they will have no other choice, especially those who don't have their own oil.

“It's clear that Uncle Donald will sell out; it's a question of price.

“But Iran will hold out; the country is so independent of the rest of the world that only North Korea will be more resilient. Yes, Iran won't be able to reach its main enemy (not Israel), but it can easily destroy everything within reach with ballistic missiles manufactured underground and launched from underground. And in the end, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain—they will all come crawling back to beg Trump to calm down. Because what the US is spending on this war pales in comparison to what the Gulf countries are losing from the halted production and transportation of oil and gas.

"So, Iran is not alone in its war. He has so many allies, and they say Oman and Jordan are next... Everything will depend solely on the accuracy and destructive power of the IRGC missiles. And yesterday's US allies will start to back off and raise questions about closing US military bases.”

By Anton Mamedov, Russian military analyst, Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 11, 2026

“As for defense, Iran has changed its tactics. They’ve realized they can’t survive a symmetrical war with the US. So now we’re seeing a classic ‘death defense’: minefields at sea, thousands of drones, mobile missile teams constantly shifting positions. Their goal is to make US presence in the region as costly as possible. They won’t allow the Americans to safely [extract] its uranium. Every kilometer of advance will come at a very high price.”

By Dmitry Novikov, Associate Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestiya, March 3, 2026

“Meanwhile, the dynamics of domestic political support could become a critical constraint on American involvement in the military operation. Unlike the Vietnam and Iraq wars, where it took years for domestic circumstances to change course, the current situation is more dynamic. The ruling administration is already entering the election cycle, with important midterm congressional elections looming. A defeat in these elections would turn the current president into a lame duck and negate the revolutionary momentum of the first year of his second term.

“American voters’ attitudes toward wars in the Middle East are overwhelmingly negative. This is well characterized by polls on attitudes toward the 2003 Iraq campaign. According to them, Republican supporters (and Trump is concerned about them) still consider the war just (Saddam Hussein was a bad guy), but clearly excessive in terms of the scale of its presence and the cost. In other words, a show of force is possible and necessary, but only as long as it doesn’t result in serious material costs and losses.

“This makes support for a major military operation in the Middle East highly volatile, even among Trump’s nuclear-armed base. The first operation against Iran was viewed positively by his supporters, primarily due to its swiftness and lack of casualties. The United States demonstrated superior power and achieved a concrete result (a strike on nuclear program facilities, their declared destruction). Israel initiated the military action, and the immediate outcome of American intervention was the end of the conflict.

[…]

“Under these circumstances, by maintaining resistance and raising the economic and political costs of continuing the war for Washington, Tehran could emerge from this phase of the confrontation, if not as a winner, then certainly not as a loser.

“Moreover, if Iran seriously expects to maintain or even strengthen its regional position, it would be in its interests not to let the United States out of the conflict so easily. Prolonging the conflict, even in a more sluggish form, will present Washington with increasingly difficult practical challenges and will ultimately force it to decide: retreat, sealing a less than favorable outcome, or face the quagmire of a protracted military campaign.”

By Zhang Junshe, Non-Resident Fellow at the People's Liberation Army Naval Academic Research Institute, via The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group), March 5, 2026

“‘Iran possesses a certain anti-carrier capability. It is equipped with multiple anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles capable of striking maritime targets, as well as suicide drones. Iran has also launched some reconnaissance satellites, which, when combined with drones, can also be used to reconnoiter and locate US aircraft carriers,’ Zhang Junshe explained.

“‘In terms of anti-carrier warfare, ballistic missiles are one of the most effective weapons. Anti-ship ballistic missiles, with their high speed and strong penetration capabilities, are more difficult for aircraft carriers to defend against,’ Zhang Junshe said. ‘Actions against US aircraft carriers can also boost the morale of domestic resistance.’

“‘I also believe that Iran has a certain anti-carrier capability, but its anti-carrier warfare system is not perfect and its threat to the US military is relatively limited,’ Han Dong pointed out. ‘Especially in the absence of air superiority, US carrier-based aircraft and drones will continue to suppress Iran’s anti-ship missile forces to reduce the threat of Iranian missiles to US aircraft carriers, and the contest between the two sides will continue.’”

By Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, prominent Russian ultranationalist, former Russian FSB officer and commander of separatist forces in Ukraine, on Telegram, March 12, 2026

“In my opinion (I have already written about this to some correspondents) without significant military participation of China (in the form of ‘volunteers’ with a large number of air defense and anti-aircraft missiles) Iran has no chance of resisting the prevailing air forces of the US and Israel coalition.

“Even if we assume that the number of missiles in Israel will be insufficient for a long (30-60 days or more) campaign, and Iran’s missiles can more or less unhindered reach Israeli territory (while, of course, Israel will have enough anti-aircraft and air defense missiles to protect the most important military objects) — this will not in any way affect the readiness/ability of the Israeli Air Force to maintain a high pace of bombing.

“All the more Iran will not be able to neutralize the three US aircraft carrier groups, because its fleet is completely ‘knocked out’, and there is no air force as such. The missile weapons against the aircraft carrier groups are not effective enough at the distances at which the US Navy ships are located.

“Day after day, week after week, the ‘coalition’ will strike all available targets in Iranian territory until Iran is completely destabilized and plunged into total chaos. (And the death of even several hundred in Israel... and even many thousands — this will not prevent it in any way. On the contrary — it will give the ‘allies’ the ‘moral justification’ they need to kill tens (and then hundreds) of thousands of Persians.

“No matter how many missiles Iran has, it will not be able to destroy even just one Israel. It can cause damage — but nothing more. Whereas the Americans and Israelis will sooner or later achieve the complete disorganization of the Iranian air defense and then begin to methodically and massively destroy bridges, communications, life-support systems, etc., which after a while will cause mass starvation and epidemics in major Iranian cities (Gaza will seem like a ‘children’s morning show’ compared to what Iran could ‘collapse into’ after 2-3 months of continuous massive bombing).”

4. FORECASTS OF HOW THE WAR MIGHT END AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators believe the war is unlikely to result in regime change in Iran. The regime retains more than enough support and military capacity to suppress any domestic challenge to its rule. The US appears unable and unwilling to commit to a full-scale invasion needed to topple the government.

Some commentators further argue that while the conflict may yield short-term advantages for China and Russia, the broader destabilization of the international order it produces is unlikely to serve the long-term interests of any major power.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

By Anton Mamedov, Russian military analyst, Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 11, 2026

“Despite the colossal losses and destruction, Iran is confident that the West’s main goal has failed. Washington and Tel Aviv’s bet on a ‘super-harsh strike’ intended to provoke panic among the elite and popular uprising has failed. The death of the Supreme Leader, contrary to expectations, did not destroy the state, and the ‘martyrdom’ factor merely consolidated the population.

“Iran has demonstrated the vulnerability of the US’s extensive military infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. Retaliatory strikes against US facilities are already calling into question the Arab monarchies’ continued military cooperation with Washington. US partners are beginning to question the wisdom of paying for costly ‘defense’ that provokes, rather than deters, aggression.

“On the other hand, Iran’s economy has suffered devastating damage: energy and infrastructure facilities have been destroyed. Rebuilding them under sanctions will take decades, which promises enormous social pressure for the country’s new leadership.”

By Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University via Global Times, March 7, 2026

“However, without launching a ground invasion, it is extremely difficult for US and Israel to achieve their objective of toppling the Iranian regime.

“Whether the US becomes mired in a quagmire depends on American strategic decision-making and the degree of damage inflicted on the US by Iran’s counterattacks, said Liu, judging from White House Middle East policy and Trump’s personal style, there is a risk of getting bogged down, but it may not be particularly high.

“It is possible that, once it becomes clear regime change in Iran is unattainable and the cost becomes extremely unaffordable, the US will seek to end the conflict and declare victory.”

By Vladimir Fitin, advisor to the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1, 2026

“The combat readiness of the regime’s main force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), remains high, which guarantees the suppression of anti-government protests… To prevent this, the Americans will have to launch a ground operation, but it’s unlikely they’ll decide to do so. Perhaps some airborne sorties will occur. But the coffins that would inevitably start arriving in the US would be the worst possible gift to Trump ahead of the upcoming midterm congressional elections in November.”

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, March 2

“The fundamental deterrents of international relations that have survived from previous eras are being dismantled. Recognition of the legitimacy of states is due to specific circumstances, and even the sympathies/antipathies of individual actors. This turns international relations into a likeness of Russian roulette. And knocks out the very base from under them. Not that everyone acted exclusively in accordance with the norms of law and morality (the latter is interpreted differently depending on the cultural tradition). But certain frames were present, now they are being removed.

“Since they went to this consistently and approached quite smoothly, many political elites do not seem to consider these events in such a dramatic way. They are considered, albeit a rather sharp, but generally an understandable manifestation of contradictions. However, not everyone thinks so. The conclusions that the opponents of the United States have the right to draw are begging.

“First of all, negotiating with the Americans makes almost no sense, the real question is either about surrender or imitation to prepare for a forceful decision.

“Secondly, the situation is quite plausible when there is nowhere to retreat and nothing to lose. And then any of the ‘last’ arguments is legitimate, the type of ‘red button’ that is available - literal or figurative.

“These conclusions persist, no matter what happens in Iran in the coming days. Even if there is an improved likeness of Venezuela with a backstage agreement on the transfer of power to some hands that suit everyone (the likelifess does not look high yet, but what can be ruled out now?), such social engineering will not calm other regimes that oppose the United States. The mechanism of change of control and putting under control is indicated, this is a much tougher option than even the “color revolutions” of the zero years, the opposition to it will strengthen and become more desperate. With consequences that become fatal under a certain scenario.”

By Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Valdai Discussion Club, March 10, 2026

“Iran is facing its most difficult situation in its history since the Islamic Revolution. The model the country has built over decades for open conflict with its adversaries is being severely tested. Recovering the potential lost as a result of the attacks will take years. There is no immediate resolution to the economic problems in sight. The blockade of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is also affecting Iran, as its oil supplies are also limited. The US naval blockade is unlikely to lift anytime soon, even if the intensity of the fighting subsides. Tehran is also at risk from the fact that it has entered into the conflict with the US and Israel virtually alone diplomatically. No other powers have made any firm commitments to defend the country. On the other hand, Iran has demonstrated its will to resist, and its society and political system have demonstrated the ability to consolidate in the face of an external threat. Although Iran possesses far fewer military and economic capabilities, it retains the potential to make the cost of the conflict even higher for its adversaries. For Iran, the war is much more existential in nature than for others. The first round of the military campaign against Iran once again reveals the old patterns of international relations: major players are less sensitive to crises, asymmetry of power is hardly an obstacle to resistance, a lack of allies is a problem, but as a junior partner, one can find oneself hostage to a major player's game. The most important question is how the current crisis will impact the transformation of the entire international system. Given its fragility, another jolt could transform the crumbling of the international structure into a full-blown collapse.”

The US and Israel have engaged in seven days of high-intensity combat operations against Iran. The joint military campaign has steadily intensified over the past week and has severely battered but not yet defeated the Iranian regime. While the war’s outcome remains uncertain, several trends in Iran’s response have now become visible that may be used to interpret and forecast its overall strategy. This Situation Report examines those trends to assess Iran's operational plans, evaluate their effectiveness, and identify pathways by which the Iranian regime might still survive and claim a form of victory.

This Situation Report is broken into two parts:

1. Interpretations of the components and effectiveness of Iranian strategy

   1. On Iran’s long-range retaliatory strike campaign

   2. On Iran’s use of proxy forces

   3. On Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

2. Prospects for Iranian Victory

   1. Through triggering a global economic crisis

   2. Through a prolonged campaign of destabilizing low-intensity attacks

Components and Effectiveness of Iranian Strategy

Iran’s military response has centered on three elements: long-range drone and missile strikes, the activation of proxy forces across the Middle East and beyond, and a maritime blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The strategic rationale behind these operations is to escalate the war horizontally in order to create a regional conflagration that roils the global economy, frightens US allies, and triggers a domestic political crisis in the United States. The end goal is to force the US to end the war short of its objectives and, in doing so, preserve the Iranian regime.

Iranian Long-Range Strikes Have Created Chaos but Are Losing Their Effectiveness and Have Generated Unexpected Backlash

As anticipated, Iran has launched drone and ballistic missile strikes against US military bases across the Middle East as well as against Israeli territory. But Iran has also gone further, striking the territory and in some cases civilian populations of 12 countries throughout the region, including several close US Arab allies such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, and Iraq. It has also targeted US partners farther removed from the conflict including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and Oman. The widespread strikes appear aimed to endanger the core national interests of Iran’s neighbors and create regional chaos that pressures the US and Israel into ending the war.

Iranian drone attack on Dubai International Airport on March 7. Source: Noel Reports (@noel_reports) on Telegram

This long-range strike campaign has been far more extensive and devastating than previous Iranian retaliatory strikes against Israel and US military bases in 2020, 2024, and 2025. According to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine, Iran launched at least 500 missiles and 2,000 drones at its neighbors between February 28 and March 3 alone, with several hundred additional drones and missiles fired since then. The majority of strikes have targeted the UAE, which as of March 5, reported detecting 196 ballistic missiles and 1,072 drones, of which 181 and 1,001 were intercepted respectively.

Iran has seen some significant operational successes in these attacks. Iran has struck multiple US military bases in the region, damaging at least five sophisticated US air defense radars in the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and killing six US service members in an attack on an army operations center in Kuwait. Iran has landed additional blows against multiple US diplomatic and intelligence sites in Iraq, the US Consulate in Dubai, UAE, and the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Iran has also struck oil and gas infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.

A fire at Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura oil refinery resulting from an Iranian drone strike Source: Mamlekate (@mamlekate) on Telegram

Three incidents of US F-15E fighters brought down by friendly fire in Kuwait on March 3 are evidence that fear of Iranian long-range strikes haunts US allies and has shaken their decision-making. However, in many ways Iran’s long-range strike strategy has fallen short of its goals. The intensity and indiscriminate nature of Iran’s response has decisively turned its neighbors against it, served to increase the solidarity of the US coalition, and expanded the number of potential foreign threats to the Iranian regime.

Iranian strikes have pushed Azerbaijan to downgrade diplomatic ties with Iran, raise the readiness of its armed forces, and break up potential threats to Israeli interests in the country. Qatar has shot down Iranian bombers in response to threats to US bases. Saudi Arabia has invoked elements of its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan in response to attacks. The UAE, the country most seriously and persistently attacked by Iran, is reportedly considering more dramatic retaliation against Iran, including joining the US military campaign as well as freezing billions of dollars in Iranian assets.

Further evidence that Iran’s initial long-range strike campaign has not gone as planned can be found in remarks by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who on March 7 apologized for attacks on neighboring countries and claimed to have ordered their cessation (though attacks have since continued).

An additional trade-off inherent in Iran’s strategy of widely dispersed attacks is that it has hindered its ability to mass firepower. Drone and missile attacks have come in salvos of dozens rather than hundreds of munitions, and have been spread across multiple targets rather than concentrated against single objectives. This poor coordination and prioritization of effort—likely resulting from US and Israeli efforts to degrade Iranian command and control—has limited damage and reduced the overall effectiveness of its attacks.

There is also good reason to believe that the threat of Iranian long-range strikes is diminishing as the war continues. US and Israeli strikes have severely degraded Iran's ballistic missile capability by targeting munitions stockpiles and, more importantly, the far more limited supply of transporter erector launchers (TELs) and trained technicians needed to deploy them. The Israel Defense Forces estimated on March 6 that their strikes had destroyed at least 300 TELs, leaving Iran with only an estimated 100–200 launch systems remaining. The effects of these strikes are now visible in what US Central Command reports as a 90% drop in the overall number of Iranian missile attacks as of March 5. Iran’s missile launch capability will be further curtailed as the US gains greater air superiority in coming days and is able to more freely employ strategic bombers against underground “missile cities,” where much of Iran’s arsenal is stored.

A new underground missile city belonging to the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unveiled in March 2025. Source: IranPress

It will be more difficult for the US and Israel to completely stop the threat posed by smaller Iranian drones however. Iran’s stockpiles of attack drones are much larger and more dispersed than its ballistic missiles. Iran’s ability to deploy drones is not limited by complex mobile launch systems. Drones have also proven more effective in penetrating US and allied defenses and striking significant military targets so far in the conflict. Low-cost Iranian drones are also highly inefficient for the US and its allies to counter with their limited supplies of sophisticated missile interceptors.

Nevertheless, Iran's drones are far less lethal than its ballistic missiles, and the impact of future drone attacks is likely to diminish as the US establishes air supremacy over Iran and deploys a broader array of aerial intelligence assets in the region to identify launch sites and drone networks. The US’s ability to destroy drones in flight is also set to improve as it begins employing Merops drone interceptors. Merops, produced by Perennial Autonomy—a defense startup backed by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt—have proven themselves on the battlefield in Ukraine, allegedly downing as many as 1,000 Russian variants of Iran’s Shahed drone. Further technical expertise and drone defense systems imported from Ukraine are also likely to further mitigate the threats to the US and its regional allies.

Iran’s Proxy Forces Have Helped Widen the War but Their Contributions Have Been Uneven and Largely Insignificant

Iran has also attempted to mobilize its proxy forces, with Lebanese Hezbollah resuming attacks on Israel and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacking US and Kurdish forces in Iraq and threatening retaliation against Europe. Hezbollah has also launched drone attacks on the UK’s Royal Air Force Base Akrotiri in Cyprus, straining relations between the two countries and throwing Cyprus's rotating EU Council presidency into disarray.

Still, at present the threat posed by Iranian proxy forces has remained limited and largely containable. Hezbollah, still reeling from years of Israeli strikes, has failed to land any significant blows and has instead triggered a major crackdown by both the Israeli and Lebanese militaries. Proxy groups in Iraq such as Kataeb Hezbollah have been similarly ineffective, and have failed to disrupt US combat operations. Interestingly, the Houthis, among Iran’s most loyal and aggressive proxies, have thus far remained out of the war, apparently deterred by previous US and Israeli attacks.

Iran could still attempt to activate sleeper cells of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated proxy networks to carry out terrorist attacks across the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, though it remains unclear at what point Iran would choose to invoke this option. The scale of this threat has come into sharper focus over the past week, as law enforcement in Azerbaijan, Qatar, and the UK announced the arrest of Iranian terrorist networks in their respective countries.

Iranian clerics have also attempted to incite “lone-wolf” attacks against the US and Israel through religious declarations. On March 4, Senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Javad Amoli issued a fatwa requiring devout Shi’ite Muslims to launch attacks against Israelis and the US President. While such decrees are unlikely to lead to a massive new jihadist threat—particularly given the deep unpopularity of the clerical regime with much of Iran’s population—they are still likely to motivate isolated attacks against the US, Israel, and other Western countries, which could further reduce support for the already unpopular war. The apparent Iran-inspired mass shooting incident in Austin, Texas on February 29 may be a harbinger of things to come.

Ndiaga Diagne reportedly wore an Iranian flag shirt underneath a sweatshirt emblazoned with the words “Property of Allah” during a February 29 shooting rampage in Austin, Texas that left three dead. The attack occurred within 24 hours of the beginning of Operation Epic Fury. Diagne’s social media history also included posts supportive of the Iranian regime. Source: CBS News on YouTube

A Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Has Created a Serious Geopolitical Pain Point

Iran’s naval capabilities have been severely degraded by US strikes, which have damaged or destroyed at least 43 ships and devastated its major naval bases. Iran has nevertheless been able to effectively impose a blockade of maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz at a distance through threat of land-based military strikes, sea drones, and undersea mines. Between February 28 and March 6, Iranian forces launched at least 13 attacks on maritime shipping through the Strait. Some ships continue to transit the Strait, but maritime traffic in the region has largely ground to a halt, and threatened to choke off 20% of the world’s oil and gas supply.

US President Trump has ordered the US Navy to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. This will take time to achieve as the primary Iranian threats to shipping come from dispersed, often land-based drones and missiles that will need to be neutralized as part of the US’s broader air campaign against the Iranian military. The sheer volume of vessels transiting the Strait also makes individual maritime escorts difficult to sustain effectively. These operations will become more difficult if Iranian forces are able to deploy its inventory of 5,000-6,000 sea mines to totally close the Strait.

However, a total closure of the Strait of Hormuz may not be a feasible strategy for Iran either. Indiscriminately targeting maritime trade through the region would endanger some of Iran’s top allies, including China, which receives 40% of its oil and 30% of its liquefied natural gas shipments through the Strait.

Prospects for Iranian Victory

The Iranian regime has been brutalized by US and Israeli strikes and any end to the war is likely to see the Islamic Republic’s ability to project power beyond its borders severely degraded for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime will consider any scenario in which it survives and forces the US and Israel to end the war short of their ultimate objectives to be a kind of partial victory. Two paths to that outcome are currently foreseeable, through either triggering a global economic crisis by strangling Middle Eastern energy exports, and indefinitely destabilizing the region through a protracted low-level campaign.

Iran Triggers Global Energy Catastrophe That Forces US Retreat

In a March 6 interview with the Financial Times, Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi warned that a global energy crisis could result in weeks if exports through the Strait of Hormuz don’t resume. While the precise timeline remains uncertain, a prolonged closure of the Strait, combined with broader war-induced disruptions to Gulf energy exports caused by Iranian attacks, could ultimately pressure the US into seeking to de-escalate the war and accept a settlement with the Iranian regime short of its stated goals.

This path to victory is the less likely of the two for several reasons: First, Iran’s capacity for disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is set to diminish as the US gains greater control over Iranian airspace and is able to use a greater variety of air and naval capabilities to focus on neutralizing threats near the Strait. The coming influx of new counter-drone systems will similarly reduce, though not completely eliminate, threats to critical oil and gas infrastructure in the region.

Second, Iran itself will feel increasing pressure from its own partners to permit traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, prolonged closure of the Strait and continued attacks on Gulf energy exports could also see the Gulf States officially join the US military effort, as well as pull additional foreign powers into the war against Iran.

Finally, the US has signaled it is likely to prop up global energy markets at nearly any cost, including by offering additional insurance for ships transiting the Strait, as well as considering permitting a resumption of some Russian oil and gas exports (likely by authorizing more exceptions to October 2025 sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft and allowing exports to India).

The Regime Refuses to Concede and Prepares Indefinite Campaign of Asymmetric Attacks

The Iranian regime's most plausible path to a partial victory is to concentrate all available resources on political survival while sustaining enough resistance to appear to outlast the US and Israel.

Even if Iran is unable to maintain its more sophisticated long-range ballistic missile strikes or keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, it could still wage a protracted low-level conflict through drones, proxy forces, and cyber attacks on regional critical infrastructure, that over time becomes a severe obstacle to the US’s broader regional interests. If Iran is able to sustain such a campaign for many months—potentially bolstered by Russia—the accumulating costs could compel the US and its allies to seek some negotiated settlement with whatever remains of the regime in order to restore regional stability.

A prolonged conflict would also become a major political liability for the Trump administration going into the midterm elections. The 2026 elections will be highly consequential for the US President, who acknowledges that a loss of control of Congress could lead to his impeachment and possible prosecution. The President will want to avoid the appearance of a new “forever war” in the Middle East that would directly contradict his often repeated promise to avoid prolonged, indecisive foreign entanglements.

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israeli militaries launched a wave of airstrikes on Iran in Operation Epic Fury.

According to US Central Command (CENTCOM), the attacks launched at 1:15 am ET included “precision munitions launched from air, land, and sea,” as well as “low-cost one-way attack drones for the first time in combat,” launched from the “largest regional concentration of American military firepower in a generation.”

According to the Israeli Defense Forces, the initial wave of attacks also involved the largest ever air operation in the history of the Israeli Air Force, involving over 200 aircraft.

Initial wave of US airstrikes on Iran Source: US Central Command

The initial strikes targeted top leaders of the Iranian regime, the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Defense Ministry, and National Security Council as well as other military and intelligence targets. Emerging reporting has suggested that the strikes killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran has responded by attacking US and Israeli targets in the Middle East as well as US regional allies in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait.

While events are still unfolding and their outcome is deeply uncertain, this Situation Report evaluates what led to war and how the preceding events may shape what follows.

WHY DID WAR BREAK OUT?

Anti-Government Protests and Subsequent Crackdown Mobilized US Response

The precipitating factor in the current war appears to be the Iranian anti-government protests which began on December 28, and Iran’s subsequent brutal crackdown.

President Trump signaled as early as January 2 that the US would “come to the rescue” of Iranian protestors, should the Iranian regime suppress them violently.

This statement may have helped set in motion both the regime’s crackdown and ongoing US military strikes.

On January 3, Ayatollah Khamenei seized on Trump’s remarks to declare the protests as riots instigated by foreign forces. On the same day, Iranian security forces began the first of a growing number of attacks on protesters with live ammunition in the Western city of Malekshahi, killing 4 and wounding at least 30.

The protests grew in the subsequent days, reaching their climax on January 8th and 9th, coinciding with calls to action from US-exiled Iranian Prince Reza Pahlavi. On both days, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij militia, and allied proxy groups carried out widespread massacres of protesters across the country.

The crackdown resulted in a high death toll according to any source. The Iranian regime itself acknowledged over 3,000 deaths, while the leading Iranian human rights group Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI) confirmed at least 7,000 with another 11,000-12,000 fatalities under investigation. Some Western estimates placed the possible total as high as 20,000–30,000 deaths.

The massacres presented a direct challenge to President Trump’s credibility. In a January 13 post on Truth Social, the US President doubled down on his support for the protesters, urging them to 'TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!!' and promising US-led retribution against the regime.

President Trump made a similar call for the Iranian people to “take over your government…The hour of your freedom is at hand,” when announcing the onset of Operation Epic Fury.

The scale and extreme brutality of the crackdown also reinforced broader beliefs in the US that the Iranian regime, while weakened in the short-term, remained an exceptionally dangerous regional power—one with no qualms killing tens of thousands of innocent people—which would not hesitate to target US forces and US allies with proxy groups, ballistic missiles, and potentially one day, nuclear weapons once it reconstituted its power.

The Iranian Regime Could Not Back Down Under Pressure in Negotiations

The US effort to end this perceived long-term threat through negotiations—if sincere—was likely doomed to failure long before they finally broke down on February 27 due to mutually incompatible interests.

The raison d’être for the Iranian regime is resistance to the West, specifically born out of a revolution against the US. The regime ultimately could not concede to any of the US demands to end its domestic uranium enrichment, put limits on its ballistic missile program, or curb its support for proxy organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis without appearing to surrender the cause for which the Iranian regime serves.

The 86-year old Ayatollah Khamenei, signaled he was unwilling to capitulate in the final days of his rule and had begun hinting that martyrdom would be a means of ensuring his legacy.

The Iranian regime had apparently anticipated the likelihood of resumed hostilities with the US and Israel following the 12-Day War, viewing the reimposition of sanctions in August as the next phase of a broader conflict preceding an eventual return to open warfare. In response, the regime had hardened its inner national security circle, elevating figures such as Ali Larijani, signaling a preference for resistance over accommodation. That preference likely reflected not only the deeply ingrained ideological instincts alluded to above, but also a calculation that the Trump administration was ultimately determined to eventually institute regime change whether through incremental pressure or through direct military action.

The Trump administration probably reinforced these suspicions through suggestions that regime change was "the best thing that could happen" in negotiations, and secret outreach to Reza Pahlavi.

Iran Could Not Credibly Deter US and Israeli Strikes

War ultimately became a possible option for US policymakers to resolve the ongoing perceived threat posed by Iran, because Iran’s obvious internal divisions and diminished military deterrent rendered it vulnerable.

Years of US and Israeli strikes against Iranian proxy organizations across the Middle East, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, and the December 2024 toppling of the Assad regime in Syria, reduced many of the Iranian regime’s previous options for waging a regional war.

Iran's previous missile and drone attacks on Israel had also shown significant limits to Iran’s potential for launching long-range retaliatory strikes. Operation True Promise 1, launched in April 2024 following Israel's bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, and Operation True Promise 2, launched in October 2024 in response to Israel's killings of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and IRGC General Abbas Nilforoushan in Lebanon, proved ineffective and were largely repulsed by Israeli air defenses backed by the US and regional allies. Iran’s drone and missile strikes against Israel in the 12-Day War were more effective, but its overall capacity to launch future retaliation, and its ability to defend against US and Israeli air strikes was further degraded in the conflict.

The 12-Day War also demonstrated Israel's ability to conduct clandestine ground operations targeting ballistic missile stockpiles inside Iran, and to carry out precision strikes against senior Iranian leaders, pointing to a deep penetration of the Iranian government by Israeli intelligence and suggesting significant internal divisions within the regime. Those divisions were re-emphasized in the wake of the protest crackdown, as hardline elements of the Iranian judiciary moved to arrest Reformist political leaders aligned with the Iranian president.

This moment of weakness was unlikely to last for long as Iran was making progress in rebuilding its long-range strike capacity and air defenses and may have convinced US policymakers that a unique window for strikes was at hand.

New reports this week showed Iran was bolstering its military with support from China and Russia. The Financial Times reported on February 22 that Iran has agreed to purchase 500 Verba man portable air defenses (MANPADS) from Russia as well as an additional 2,500 rockets for the systems. The deliveries were set to take place between 2027-2029 but some of the rockets may have been able to arrive in Iran sooner. A February 24 report by Reuters, Iran similarly alleged that Iran was in the process of closing a deal to buy CM-302 anti-ship cruise missiles from China. These latest reports followed a broader pattern of growing Russian and Chinese support for Iran in recent months. Notable contributions included Chinese provisions of materials for Iranian ballistic missiles as well as intelligence support to root out Israeli spies and cyber penetration.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

It is too early to say with certainty how this war will end, but the road to war points to a more prolonged and deadly conflict with the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime, while weak, still commands a monopoly on violence in the country and is unlikely to be easily dislodged by protestors alone. As noted in the Weekly Significant Activity Report - January 31, 2026, a plausible means of toppling the regime would come from a split between the conventional, conscript-driven Iranian military “Artesh” and the more ideologically loyal Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, possibly driven by anger over the January massacres of Iranian civilians. However, this outcome is far from certain as there are no obvious signs of a break between the two military forces.

Another possibility is that US and Israeli strikes eliminate enough Iranian leaders and cripple the regime’s ability to retaliate with ballistic missiles so thoroughly that remaining Iranian leaders opt to surrender. This outcome is still a major gamble however, as the January massacres have likely hardened the resolve of regime members across the board who may fear that loosening their grip on power would leave them vulnerable to reprisals from disaffected members of the Iranian public. Any surviving regime leaders are still likely to view the preservation of Iran’s ballistic missile program and proxy forces as a strategic imperative.

In any case, the Iranian regime is likely to pursue far less restrained retaliation against the US, Israel, and American allies than it has in the past. Facing what it perceives as an existential threat, Tehran may direct proxy forces to carry out cyber attacks and terrorist strikes against civilian targets across the Middle East, Europe, and the US homeland.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed between January 2026 and February 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. New cyber threats observed from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea targeting US critical infrastructure and defense industry.

2. A Californian political operator was sentenced for serving as an illegal Chinese foreign agent.

3. Three Silicon Valley engineers charged with conspiracy to sell Google trade secrets to Iran.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

4. A Russian cargo ship engaged in suspicious behavior near transatlantic submarine cables off the coast of the UK, amid ongoing campaign by Russian shadow fleet vessels targeting European underwater infrastructure.

5. Iran is reportedly developing options for attacking US interests in the event of war amid rising US-Iran tensions.

1. CHINA, RUSSIA, IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA POSE NEW CYBER THREATS

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea Conducting Cyber Campaigns Against the US Defense Industry

In a February 10 report, Google Threat Intelligence Group identified multiple state-sponsored hacking groups associated with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea targeting the US defense industrial base.

Google researchers have observed social engineering campaigns by Russian actors associated with UNC5792 and UNC5976, Iranian hacking groups UNC1549 and UNC6446, Chinese actors associated with APT5, and North Korean actors associated with APT43 and UNC2970, all targeting US defense contractor employees. Common to these campaigns was the use of spoofed login pages to harvest credentials. Notable distinguishing features include UNC5792 and UNC5976's targeting of employees via Signal chat groups; UNC6446's use of resume-building tools and personality test applications to deliver malware; UNC2970's use of Google's Gemini AI to conduct reconnaissance on potential targets; and APT5's development of highly tailored phishing lures.

The report documents the following granular details found in APT5's phishing emails:

“Emails referencing a ‘Community service verification form’ from a local high school near one of the contractor’s headquarters.

“Phishing emails using ‘Alumni tickets’ for a university minor league baseball team, targeting employees who attended the university.

“Emails purporting to be ‘open letters’ to Boy Scouts of America camp or troop leadership, targeting employees known to be volunteers or parents.

“Fake guides and registration information leveraging the 2024 election cycle for the state where the employees lived.

Google also observed actors associated with Chinese hacking group UNC3236 conducting reconnaissance on the login portals of US and Canadian militaries and defense contractors.

Chinese and Iranian Hackers Embedding in US Critical Infrastructure

On February 17, operational technology cybersecurity firm Dragos announced that it had observed indications that Chinese and Iranian state-linked advanced persistent threat groups are attempting to infiltrate and proposition themselves for attacks on US critical infrastructure and critical industries. The groups include Chinese threat actors Voltzite, Sylvanite, and Azurite, as well as a suspected Iranian threat actor group Pyroxene.

All groups are believed to be engaged in efforts to map the operational processes of US companies and industries to exfiltrate data and lay the groundwork for future debilitating attacks. Voltzite and Sylvanite have been observed targeting critical civilian infrastructure such as US public utilities. Azurite has been identified targeting US companies in the manufacturing, oil and gas, pharmaceutical, and defense industries. Pyroxene has been observed targeting US maritime, aerospace and defense companies.

Additional Information:

1. Chinese threat actors UNC3236 and Voltzite are associated with the Volt Typhoon threat group, identified by the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance as responsible for widespread intrusions into critical sectors of US and allied civilian critical infrastructure, primarily in communications, energy, transportation, and water systems in preparation for attacks in the event of conflict over Taiwan.1 The new reports suggest that Volt Typhoon operations continue unabated despite high-level warnings delivered by the Biden administration to China in 2024 that the group’s tactics pose an unacceptable threat to US national security, and subsequent claims by the FBI to have shut down the group’s operations.

   -

   China has publicly denied any association with Volt Typhoon, but has reportedly privately acknowledged that the group’s operations are meant to pressure the US to concede to Chinese interests on Taiwan.

2. In a follow-on report released February 12, Google researchers documented Chinese threat actors APT31, APT41, and UNC795, as well as Iranian threat actor APT42, using Gemini AI to plan and execute automated offensive cyber operations via AI agents. Notably, APT31 used Gemini in conjunction with Hexstrike penetration testing tools to automate intelligence gathering on network vulnerabilities.

   

2. CALIFORNIA POLITICAL CAMPAIGNER SENTENCED FOR CARRYING OUT ORDERS OF CHINESE INTELLIGENCE

On February 9, Yaoning “Mike” Sun, was sentenced to four years in federal prison for serving as an illegal agent of the People’s Republic of China. Sun had been secretly acting on orders of the Chinese government while acting as senior political advisor to a local politician—allegedly the mayor of the city of Arcadia in Los Angeles County, California, Eileen Wang. Sun used his position to spread pro-PRC propaganda and serve Chinese national interests. According to the US Department of Justice, Sun also conducted surveillance and intimidation of local Chinese communities on behalf of PRC intelligence officers based at the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles, targeting individuals perceived as sympathetic to Taiwan.

“Throughout 2023 and 2024, Sun communicated with an official at the consulate general of the People’s Republic of China in Los Angeles regarding activities in Southern California related to Taiwan.

“In April 2023, President Tsai Ing-Wen of Taiwan visited Southern California. Sun sent real-time updates on President Tsai’s movements to a Los Angeles-based PRC consular official and sought approval from this official to publish an article about President Tsai’s visit on the website he operated with Individual 1. Sun also took photographs of individuals protesting in support of and opposition to President Tsai and sent those photographs to the consular official.”

Follow-on report connecting Mike Sun to Arcadia Mayor Eileen Wang. Source: CBS LA

Additional Information:

1. Sun operated with another co-conspirator, Chen Jun (aka John Chen). Chen, a former high-level Chinese intelligence officer, was sentenced to 20 months in prison in November 2024 in a separate case. In that case, Chen, along with another unregistered Chinese foreign agent, Lin Feng, tried to bribe IRS officials to revoke the tax exempt status of the Falun Gong dissident group in the US.2

   

2. In a July 2022 bulletin, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center warned that China has identified state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments as levels of government especially vulnerable to United Front Work operations. According to the bulletin the PRC uses a variety of official and covert means to cultivate and leverage influence among SLTT leaders to advance PRC national interests inside the United States over the long term including:

   “Collecting information, including PII. To find potential opportunities and targets for influence, the PRC may methodically collect and analyze information, including personally identifiable information (PII), on U.S. state and local leaders and those close to them.

   […]

   “Targeting officials to exploit later. The PRC may target U.S. state and local leaders early in their careers and seek to use them to advocate for PRC interests should they achieve higher office.

   […]

   “Exploiting partnerships. The PRC may also exploit city-to-city partnerships between the United States and China, which are managed on the Chinese side by CPAFFC. Often called “sister” relationships, they can include business, technical, cultural, and educational exchanges between U.S. and Chinese communities. Last year, a PRC diplomat said China had 50 pairs of sister provinces and 231 pairs of sister cities with the United States. While there is nothing inherently nefarious about such partnerships, which have brought benefits to many U.S. communities and are used by various nations to promote international friendship, the PRC may exploit these pacts to press its agendas.

   […]

   “Creating dependencies: The PRC may also view a U.S. state or localities’ economic or other challenges as a key opportunity to create a dependency, thereby gaining influence. The PRC or its proxies may use financial rewards and punishments, such as promising or withdrawing access to Chinese markets, to cultivate and leverage business and government leaders at the U.S. state and local level.

   […]

   “Shaping policy via the business community. The PRC may view the U.S. business community as an especially important vector to influence local, state, and national leaders, given that companies are key constituents of and often contributors to politicians at all levels. The PRC may use market access, investments, or economic dependency as leverage, and overtly press U.S. business leaders, particularly those with commercial interests in China, to lobby Washington for policies Beijing favors.”

3. SILICON VALLEY ENGINEERS CAUGHT SELLING SECRET GOOGLE TECH TO IRAN

On February 19, the US Department of Justice announced charges against three San Jose tech engineers, working for unspecified top companies in Silicon Valley for conspiracy to sell trade secrets to Iran. The three conspirators, Samaneh Ghandali, Mohammad Khosravi, and Soroor Ghandali, allegedly leveraged previous employment at Google to obtain proprietary information from the company on mobile processor security and cryptography. According to the indictment, the group transferred hundreds of files worth of the confidential information to third parties in Iran beginning in 2023.

Additional Information:

Iran has for years attempted to obtain advanced US technology through industrial espionage in order to thwart its international isolation and spur economic development. As a 2018 report on economic espionage in cyberspace by the US National Counterintelligence and Security Center notes:

“Iran’s economy—still driven heavily by petroleum revenue—will depend on growth in nonoil industries and we expect Iran will continue to exploit cyberspace to gain advantages in these industries. Iran will remain committed to using its cyber capabilities to attain key economic goals, primarily by continuing to steal intellectual property, in an effort to narrow the science and technology gap between Iran and Western countries.”

4. RUSSIAN CARGO SHIP STALKED TRANSATLANTIC CABLES

Between January 27-28, the Sinegorsk, a Russian-flagged cargo ship, sailed up the UK's Bristol Channel and anchored for approximately half a day off the northern coast of Somerset. The vessel anchored itself in close proximity to the landing points for a cluster of transatlantic cables, including the TGN-Atlantic cables that link the US and UK, before turning around and heading back out to sea. British Royal Navy and Coast Guard vessels monitored the unusual journey amid concerns that the Russian ship intended to damage the underwater cables.

Additional Information:

1. Russia is widely suspected of using civilian vessels as cover to surveil and sabotage undersea cables. Russian actors have been implicated in approximately a dozen incidents of damage to telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea since 2023. The most recent incident occurred on December 31, 2025 involving the Russian flagged cargo ship Fitburg, which according to Finnish authorities dragged its anchor across the sea bed in Finnish territorial waters for “tens of kilometers” until it cut the Elisa data cable connecting Finland and Estonia.

2. Disruption to the TGN-Atlantic and other transatlantic cables connecting the US and UK would cause chaos in global financial markets by disrupting the flow of data between the world’s largest banks and stock exchanges in London and New York.

5. IRAN EYEING WIDESPREAD STRIKES ON US INTERESTS IN EVENT OF WAR

The New York Times reported February 22 that US intelligence and national security officials have received a growing number of indicators suggesting an Iranian response to US strikes would involve attacks by proxy groups against US and allied targets across the Middle East and potentially in Europe.

The report comes after repeated threats by Iran to conduct widespread retaliation against the US in the event of war.

Additional Information:

1. While the Iranian regime has not explicitly threatened the US homeland, the dynamics of the intensifying conflict with Iran suggest it is likely to attempt strikes on US territory in the event of war.

   -

   Unlike in the 12-Day War, a coming war with Iran would probably be far bloodier and provoke a more unrestrained response by Iranian leaders. The Iranian regime is likely to see such a war as threatening its existence as President Trump has previously encouraged Iranian protestors to topple the government and—along with other high-level US officials—openly expressed the belief that regime change would be an ideal outcome of pressure on Iran. US special envoy Steve Witkoff is also reported to have met with exiled Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi at President Trump’s direction, a move the Iranian regime is likely to see as particularly threatening.

2. As an August 2025 article in the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point’s CTC Sentinel journal by Matthew Leavitt notes, while the capabilities of Iranian proxies have been degraded in recent years, Iran has invested heavily in options for conducting attacks on the US homeland and has attempted at least 17 such attacks over the past five years alone. These plots were organized by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah and targeted US officials such as Donald Trump, Mike Pompeo, and John Bolton, as well as outspoken dissidents such as Masih Alinejad.

   One disrupted plot targeting US officials involving a Pakistani national Asif Merchant. Source: NBC News

3. According to a June 22, 2025 National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin, an additional avenue for Iranian retaliation against US-based targets would likely come from lone wolf assailants acting on religious rulings issued by Iranian leaders calling for retaliatory violence. The August 2022 stabbing of Salman Rushdie, inspired by an outstanding fatwa issued by Iranian authorities for the author’s 1989 book “The Satanic Verses,” is a testament to the potential for similar declarations to incite violence.

   

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between February 14, 2026 - February 21, 2026.

Summary:

1. Ukraine and Moldova disrupted a major Russian plot to assassinate prominent Ukrainian officials.

2. New reports highlighted the growing size and capability of China’s nuclear submarine fleet.

3. The US provided new details of China’s alleged June 2020 explosive nuclear test.

4. Iran conducted joint naval drills with Russia in preparation for potential conflict with the US.

5. North Korea highlighted its growing strategic rocket force ahead of the Ninth Party Congress.

1. UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA THWART RUSSIAN ASSASSINATION PLOT

On February 20, Ukrainian and Moldovan officials announced that they had disrupted a major plot to assassinate prominent Ukrainian officials. The announcement followed twenty coordinated raids by law enforcement in Ukraine and Moldova, which led to a total of ten arrests, including seven conspirators in Ukraine and three in Moldova, along with the seizure of caches of weapons, explosives and electronics.

According to Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General, the plot was coordinated with Russian intelligence services and targeted at least five high level government officials, allegedly including Andrii Yusov, a strategic communications representative at Defence Intelligence of Ukraine and Deputy Head of Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Russian agents promised a bounty of up to $100,000 for each assassination.

Takeaways:

1. This most recent plot is the latest in a series of Russian-organized assassination attempts targeting Ukrainian officials, carried out through disaffected citizens of Ukraine and surrounding countries. On July 9, 2025, a Russia-linked assailant shot and killed Ivan Voronych, a colonel in the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), in Kyiv. On August 30, 2025, prominent Ukrainian politician Andriy Parubiy was assassinated in Lviv. On February 3, 2026, Poland sentenced a Polish national known as Pavel K. to three and a half years in prison for his role in a Russian-backed plot to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2024.

2. These plots, relying on poorly trained local proxies acting on their own initiative, can achieve some localized successes as noted above. They are however, far less effective than covert operations carried out by specialists, and as this case demonstrates, more vulnerable to disruption. Russia has not achieved the same level of sophistication in covert actions that Ukraine has evidenced in Operation Spider Web and other attacks, in part because of the SBU’s success in dismantling Russian intelligence networks, and because of added Western intelligence support.

2. NEW CHINESE SUBMARINE CAPABILITIES FURTHER NARROWING GAP WITH US

China Exceeding the US in Nuclear Submarine Production

According to a February 16 analysis by Henry Boyd and Tom Waldwyn of the UK’s Institute for International Strategic Studies, China has decisively surpassed the US in its production of nuclear submarines. According to the authors, China produced greater numbers of submarines as well as greater total tonnage of submarines than the US between 2021-2025. The growth in production has been facilitated by significant expansion of the Bohai shipyard, in the port city of Huludao in Liaoning province.

China Outfitting Attack Submarines with Hypersonic Missiles

According to a report by Naval News, China has announced that it will soon be equipping its fleet of Type-039B Yuan-B-class submarines with YJ-19 hypersonic missiles. The YJ-19 are a new class of anti-ship missiles first publicly displayed on September 3, 2025 at the 80th anniversary military parade celebrating victory of Japan in the Second World War.

Takeaways:

1. As noted in Weekly Significant Activity Report - February 14, 2026, China now possesses the world’s second largest fleet of nuclear submarines, with at least 32 boats compared with the US’s 71. China’s rapid pace of development, combined with the US’s own sluggish production, means that the gap will continue to close in the coming decade.

2. China’s growing fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines nevertheless is still much less advanced than the US and Russia. The deployment of the YJ-19 is significant in that it represents a major step forward in retrofitting these less advanced subs with modern weapons. The YJ-19 is specially designed to deploy from the antiquated horizontal launch tubes used by China’s fleet of Type 093 subs, thereby greatly expanding the number of hypersonic missiles the Chinese military can bring to bear against the US Navy in a conflict.

3. US PROVIDES NEW DETAILS OF ALLEGED 2020 CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

Speaking at the Hudson Institute on February 17, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw elaborated on accusations first made by Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno on February 6, alleging that China conducted secret explosive nuclear testing in June 2020. According to Assistant Secretary Yeaw, seismic monitoring stations in Kazakhstan near China’s Lop Nur nuclear site observed data suggestive of a decoupled nuclear explosion on June 22, 2020.

“Certainly, going back to Under Secretary DiNanno’s remarks in Geneva, we are aware of yield-producing nuclear explosive testing in China. We are aware that they are using decoupling, which is essentially a method to reduce the effectiveness of seismic apparatus to detect this. We’ve been paying very close attention to this. Obviously a very important issue. On June 22, 2020, we are aware that China conducted a nuclear explosive test. The probable explosion occurred right near the Lop Nur nuclear test site. That’s China’s nuclear test site. A few details. I’ve noticed on X, and et cetera, folks are really looking hard for this. I’m going to make it a little easier. Zero-nine-one-eight, 9:18 zulu, Greenwich Mean Time, Kazakhstan station PS23. And it detected a 2.75 magnitude. That is in Makanchi, Kazakhstan.

“Looking at the data, and I’ve looked at additional data since then, there is very little possibility, I would say, that it is anything but an explosion. A singular explosion. It’s not consistent with the ripple fire explosion that you get in mining. It’s also entirely not consistent with an earthquake. It is quite consistent with what you would expect from a nuclear explosive test of some certain yield. That would be obviously super critical, and not sub-critical as the United States tests currently.”

Takeaways:

1. As noted in Weekly Significant Activity Report - February 7, 2026, a “de-coupled” test occurs when a nuclear device is detonated inside an underground cavern—ideally one created by a previous nuclear test. The open space essentially helps muffle the blast. There is an ongoing debate as to how much seismic activity a small decoupled nuclear explosion in Lop Nur would generate. Some experts have suggested a de-coupled explosion would reduce the seismic signature of the blast by 20-40 times. Other experts have argued that the effect could be even more dramatic, shrinking the signature 70-100 times. Much depends on the size and composition of the cavity the test is conducted in and the yield of the explosion.

2. Most monitoring stations associated with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization may have failed to pick up the test as they are calibrated to pick up seismic events of a magnitude of 2.8 or greater. As arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey notes:

   “The 3.4 number, by the way, is for three seismic stations to each have a 90% chance of detection. That's very hight [sic] and many smaller events are detected. That data set above includes events as small as Mb=2.9 or twenty-eight tons. Regional networks can confidently detect down to about that number (2.8 actually) for Lop Nor.”

3. Under Secretary DiNanno previously suggested, but did not explicitly say that the 2020 test involved an explosive yield exceeding 100 tons of TNT. (His exact words were: “China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons.”) The phrasing suggests the test that took place on June 22, 2020 was smaller than other tests that were being prepared, and may not have exceeded 100 tons after all. Estimates of the planned size of the explosive yield of the tests are likely based on intelligence obtained through other means such as human or signals intelligence, and it is not clear if they correspond with the actual size of the June 22, 2020 test. A fully coupled nuclear test (nuclear explosive wedged into rock) of between 90-220 tons would result in a seismic event of approximately 3.4 magnitude. A de-coupled test of the same yield would result in a much smaller signature.

4. IRAN CONDUCTS JOINT NAVAL EXERCISES

This week Iran conducted a series of naval exercises in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz.

Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy conducting maritime security exercises. Source: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB News)

Russian and allegedly Chinese naval forces joined the Iranian drills under the banner of "Maritime Security Belt 2026," the seventh iteration of an annual joint maritime exercise.1 On February 19, Russian and Iranian forces carried out joint ship-boarding drills as part of Maritime Security Belt 2026 in waters south of Bandar Abbas, near the Strait.

Naval commandos from Russia and Iran conduct ship-boarding drills. Source: PressTV.ir

Takeaways:

1. The exercises near the Strait of Hormuz were meant to showcase Iran's readiness to contest the strategic waterway in the event of war with the US. However, the drills appeared highly scripted and called into question Iran's ability to conduct the operations that would ultimately be needed to deny the US Navy access to the Strait. As one Iranian military observer, Iranian Naval Force on Telegram noted:

   “The purpose of holding exercises is not just to unload weapons that are nearing their expiration date. Rather, the main goal of conducting exercises should be to create a simulation situation close to real conflict for our forces. Unfortunately, in our armed forces, the procedure for creating exercises has always been based on precise planning programs. They place a boat in a fixed position, have its exact coordinates from the start, deliver them to the missile unit (the missile unit’s position is predetermined), then fire, hit, and that’s it! Such exercises do not result in readiness for war.”

2. Russia will not intervene to protect Iran in the event of conflict with the US, but its presence at the exercise is meant to display solidarity with Iran and help delay US action.

5. NORTH KOREA DISPLAYS DOZENS OF NEW ROCKET LAUNCHERS AT START OF MAJOR PARTY CONGRESS

On February 18, North Korea displayed 50 launch vehicles for 600mm rockets in a ceremony at the House of Culture in Pyongyang ahead of the Ninth Party Congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.

Takeaways:

1. The large caliber rocket launchers are a new weapon system that was tested in a live fire exercise on January 27, where they hit targets at a range of over 350km.

2. The display is likely intended to highlight the achievements Kim Jong-un has made in strengthening the ruling Worker’s Party of Korea ahead of its Ninth Party Congress. The Party Congress, occurring once every five years, sets the strategic direction for the country.

3. The launchers are allegedly capable of deploying rockets armed with Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warheads. The display of 50 launchers—each fitted with five rocket pods—may signal that North Korea could produce as many as 250 tactical nuclear weapons absent an understanding with the US.

   

   Pyongyang has expressed a willingness to negotiate with the Trump administration on measures to achieve strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula, but has first demanded that Washington recognize it as a nuclear power. The new display may serve as another subtle hint that North Korea is a de-facto nuclear power and that recognition of the fact is a necessary first step toward building a security relationship in which Pyongyang feels secure enough that it need not mass produce nuclear weapons.

   -
   A growing number of indicators suggest that North Korea may indeed be capable of rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal to outfit its new rocket launchers and more. The North's main enrichment facility, the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, is currently undergoing expansion. In November 2025, Lee Sang-kyu, Director of the Nuclear Security Research Office at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, estimated that North Korea could produce as many as 400 nuclear warheads by 2040.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between February 7, 2026 - February 14, 2026.

Summary:

1. This week Russia instituted significant new restrictions on international social media platforms including Telegram, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp as part of an effort to force Russian citizens to use its state-sponsored messaging service.

2. Russia signaled a resumption of hardline negotiating tactics with the US through repeated criticisms by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the reappointment of a belligerent ideologue to lead negotiations.

3. Five European governments issued a joint statement accusing Russia of poisoning former opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

4. Satellite imagery suggests China has completed the development of the first of its new Type 095 nuclear attack submarines.

5. Prominent Chinese AI company DeepSeek faced serious new allegations of intellectual property theft and promotion of anti-Western disinformation ahead of the launch of its newest V4 model.

6. China dealt a decisive blow to Hong Kong's democracy, sentencing Jimmy Lai, a media mogul and prominent leader of the city’s democratic movement, to 20 years in prison for political offenses.

7. Iran expanded its crackdown on anti-regime opposition, with thousands of new arrests including of Reformist politicians.

8. A new report by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service assessed that Kim Jong-un is prepared to officially name his daughter Kim Ju-ae as his heir and future supreme leader of the country.

1. RUSSIA CRACKS DOWN ON FOREIGN SOCIAL MEDIA TO CREATE A “SOVEREIGN INTERNET”

This week Russian telecom regulator Roskomnadzor intensified an effort to restrict access to international social media platforms including Telegram, WhatsApp, Instagram, and YouTube.

On February 10, Roskomnadzor announced it would begin efforts to “partially restrict” connectivity to Telegram in Russia. Roskomnadzor claimed the restrictions on Telegram stemmed from ongoing non-compliance with state-mandated counter terrorism measures.

On the same day, Roskomnadzor also removed YouTube from the Russian Domain Name Service (DNS). According to independent Russian internet and technology media outlet “Exploit,” which was first to report on the outage, the removal of YouTube occurred nearly simultaneously with the restrictions on Telegram.

“Exclusive: Roskomnadzor has taken advantage of the confusion to crack down on YouTube. Our sources among ISPs report that the video hosting domain has completely disappeared from Roskomnadzor's DNS servers. What this means is that now, when you try to access YouTube, your router simply can't associate the site's address with its IP address, and you get an error. As a result, the service will be completely inaccessible without a VPN. By the way, Happy Safer Internet Day.”

Additional websites have also been removed from Russia's DNS servers, including social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp; news outlets such as the UK's BBC Russia, Germany's DW Russia, the US's Svoboda (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), and Russian independent media outlets Current Time and The Moscow Times; as well as VPN websites such as Tor Project and Windscribe.

Takeaways:

1. The restrictions are part of a broader Russian effort to create a “sovereign internet,” to centralize control of the digital information space in a similar fashion to China. A key component of this strategy is MAX, Russia's new state-controlled messaging platform modeled after WeChat, which the government can more easily regulate and surveil. The throttling of Telegram—the most popular Russian social media platform—in particular appears intended to force Russian users to migrate to MAX.

   

2. The restrictions on Telegram have generated widespread outrage among influential Russian military bloggers, and some Russian officials, who have expressed concern that Telegram is a key source of information and communication for Russian troops. Independent Russian media outlet Astra collected numerous appeals by Russian troops to the Russian government on February 10 to undo the restrictions, citing military necessity.

   “‘I am appealing to RKN. My call sign is DJ. And right now I am on combat duty. I am a member of the Albatross group. We are fighting against enemy UAVs so that they don’t reach our beloved homeland of Russia. And Telegram is our only communication channel. Don’t deprive us of it!’, said the first military personnel.”

   “‘Hello, brothers and sisters! I am a man who is on combat duty, a military serviceman. I want to appeal through you to the comrades from Roskomnadzor, the comrades who oversee this very Roskomnadzor. At the moment, we need a tool like Telegram. Don’t slow it down or block it. It allows us to exchange information quite quickly in order to intercept drones. That’s all,’ said the second military personnel.”

   “‘We, the fighters who are part of the Albatross group for countering UAVs, appeal to the leadership of the RKN services not to slow down and block the work of Telegram, at least in the new territories, as this will lead to a drop in the effectiveness of our work in countering UAVs,’ said the third fighter.”

   Prominent mil-blogger, Fighterbomber further complained to his over 538,000 followers that the restrictions were especially egregious coming on the heels of recent Western efforts to stop Russian forces from using Starlink satellite communications.

   “Unfortunately, we can’t disable ‘Starlink’ for the Ukrainians. But we can disable ‘Telegram’ for the Russians ! And since we can, why not do it? )”

3. The restrictions on so many communications channels used by Russian troops will inevitably have a deleterious effect on the Russian military's ability to conduct offensive operations. According to a February 12 assessment by the Institute for the Study of War, Ukraine has begun exploiting the degraded communications to consolidate their defenses and make localized gains:

   “Ukrainian forces are conducting localized and opportunistic counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, likely to take advantage of recent blocks on Starlink terminals and Telegram.”

2. RUSSIA SIGNALING A RETURN TO HARDLINE DIPLOMACY WITH THE US

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Launches Multi-Day Tirade Against US

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made critical remarks about the ongoing trilateral peace negotiations and US diplomacy in interviews and public statements on at least three separate occasions this week, in a marked break with the more positive assessments of US-Russia relations made by other Russian officials. Lavrov rejected proposed security guarantees for Ukraine, accused the US of turning its back on agreements made earlier in the peace process, and stated that he does not believe that the prospects of US and Russian economic cooperation are very bright.

Russia Re-appoints Ideologue to Lead Negotiations with US and Ukraine

On February 13, the Kremlin announced that Presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky will lead the next round of trilateral negotiations with US and Ukraine in Geneva on February 17-18. Medinsky will replace the commander of Russia’s military intelligence (GRU), Igor Kostyukov, as the head of the Russian delegation. Medinsky is a hardliner and ideologue who has acted belligerently at previous talks, drawing the ire of both the US and Ukraine.

Takeaways:

1. The reappointment of Medinsky is an especially ominous sign for any prospective deal with Russia to end the war, as his primary credentials for leading negotiations stem from his years of experience shaping Russia's ultranationalist political ideology and his overwhelming hostility toward Ukraine. Medinsky, a former Minister of Culture, has played a leading role in the Kremlin's effort to rehabilitate Stalin and brand Ukraine as a neo-Nazi state. He is known for espousing inaccurate—and at times bizarre—beliefs, such as suggesting that natural selection has bestowed the Russian people with an extra chromosome.

2. In his criticisms, Sergei Lavrov continues referring to a US-Russia "Anchorage Formula" for resolving the war in Ukraine, which he accuses the US of violating at the behest of Ukraine and Europe. The exact details of this framework remain unclear. However, Lavrov appears to allude to an agreement forcing Ukraine to cede the Donbas region, which the US is now reneging on. The US has never acknowledged that such an agreement exists, and multiple reports indicate that the August meeting between Putin and Trump in Anchorage, where any agreement would have been concluded, ended early and unsatisfactorily. The cession of the Donbas appears to have been first formally suggested months later in a 28-point peace plan principally proposed by Russian Special Envoy Kirill Dmitriev.

   -

   Whether or not any such framework exists, Lavrov and other Kremlin officials continue to emphasize the idea of a secret deal in order to portray the US and Russian leaders as the principal agents in negotiating an end to the war in an effort to drive a wedge between the US, Ukraine, and Europe.

3. The new hardline approach signals two possibilities. First, the Kremlin may be dissatisfied with the progress that Kirill Dmitriev—a Western-educated financier who has built rapport with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff—has made in negotiations and is preparing to return to a more overtly belligerent posture. This may partly reflect a perceived need to push back more firmly against what Moscow views as bullying by the Trump administration, which has intensified pressure in recent weeks by seizing Russian shadow fleet vessels and seeking to further restrict Russia’s oil sales. Lavrov’s recent outspoken criticism may indicate that he is leading the effort to demote Dmitriev, who he is believed to have been feuding with for months.

   -

   Alternatively, the Kremlin may not intend to demote Dmitriev but rather to develop a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic that exploits the Trump administration’s growing desire to quickly secure what it views as the best deal for itself (rather than for Ukraine) to end the war. Dmitriev, acting as good cop, has proposed a multi-trillion-dollar joint economic development package, culminating in Kremlin approval for Russia to reverse its drive toward de-dollarization. The more outwardly ideological and antagonistic Lavrov and Medinsky, serve as the bad cops, signaling the window for a deal, and broader US-Russia rapprochement, is rapidly closing.

3. EUROPE FORMALLY ACCUSES RUSSIA OF POISONING NAVALNY

On February 14, the governments of the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and The Netherlands issued a joint statement accusing Russia of killing opposition leader Alexei Navalny with epibatidine, a lethal toxin found in South American poison dart frogs. The governments based their assessment on an analysis of multiple pieces of tissue recovered from Navalny's body that tested positive for the toxin.

Takeaways:

The new allegations affirm the widespread belief that the Kremlin ordered the killing of Navalny, who had died under sudden and unusual circumstances at age 47 while imprisoned at Russia’s “Polar Wolf” penal colony in Kharp on February 16, 2024. Navalny was Russia’s most prominent political opposition leader during the Putin era, and subject of a previous poisoning with Novochuk nerve agent in August 2020.

4. CHINA LAUNCHES NEW NUCLEAR SUB

This week, global naval developments tracker Naval News reported that satellite imagery of China’s Bohai shipyard in Huludao, Liaoning province appears to show the launch of the first of a new class of nuclear-powered submarine, the Type 09V (Type 095).

Takeaways:

1. The UK's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) characterizes the Type 095 as China's answer to US Virginia-class (SSN-774) attack submarines. However, RUSI questions whether the Type 095 is a true match for Virginia-class, noting that recent statements by Chinese naval officers suggest its propulsion system remains less sophisticated than even modern Russian designs and is likely louder and easier to detect than US subs.

2. The new Type 095 is the latest development in China's generational push to rapidly expand its submarine fleet. A 2016 report by Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment suggests this expansion has been part of an effort to create "bastions" of fortified submarine bases that would enable Beijing to maintain a continuously deployed fleet of nuclear submarines to defend the Chinese mainland and project power across its regional waters. Since then, further evidence of this "bastion strategy" has emerged in the development of a massive submarine base in Yulin on the island of Hainan.

3. In January, prior to the launch of the Type 095, China was reported to have surpassed Russia to achieve the world's second-largest fleet of nuclear submarines with 32 boats. China still lags behind the US, which maintains 71 nuclear submarines.

5. SERIOUS NEW ALLEGATIONS LEVELED AGAINST CHINA’S DEEPSEEK AI

OpenAI Claims DeepSeek’s Development Free-rides on American Research and Promotes Pro-CCP Talking Points

In a February 12, 2026 memo to the US House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, OpenAI alleged that DeepSeek, one of China’s top AI companies, has made itself a technological competitor of the US companies primarily by exploiting American research and development. OpenAI specifically accused DeepSeek of leveraging a technique called “distillation” to massively probe ChatGPT and other Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for proprietary information.

“We have observed accounts associated with DeepSeek employees developing methods to circumvent OpenAI’s access restrictions and access models through obfuscated third-party routers and other ways that mask their source. We also know that DeepSeek employees developed code to access US AI models and obtain outputs for distillation in programmatic ways. We believe that DeepSeek also uses third-party routers to access frontier models from other US labs.”

OpenAI notes that the distillation efforts are becoming much more extensive and sophisticated suggesting a coordinated effort involving the Chinese state.

“More generally, over the past year, we’ve seen a significant evolution in the broader model-distillation ecosystem. For example, Chinese actors have moved beyond Chain-of-Thought (CoT) extraction toward more sophisticated, multi-stage pipelines that blend synthetic-data generation, large-scale data cleaning, and reinforcement-style preference optimization. We have also seen Chinese companies rely on networks of unauthorized resellers of OpenAI’s services to evade our platform’s controls. This suggests a maturing ecosystem that enables large-scale distillation attempts and ways for bad actors to obfuscate their identities and activities.”

Estonian Intelligence Claims DeepSeek is Driving Anti-Western Disinformation

A new report released this week by Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service alleges that DeepSeek is programmed to promote pro-Russian and pro-Chinese disinformation that threaten Estonia's national security. The report found that DeepSeek regularly provided either non-answers to questions concerning the sovereignty of Estonia and other former Soviet republics or parroted the talking points of Chinese officials. DeepSeek regularly directly repeated China’s official narratives—sometimes word for word—on Ukraine, even in inquiries that did not mention China at all.

“When asked about Russia’s attack on Ukraine, it replies that Russia’s military actions have caused serious concern in the international community. The response also emphasises that China remains objective and fair, supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and urges all sides to show restraint, avoid further escalation and resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation. Additionally, it claims that China is willing to play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement.

“Note that the question did not mention China. However, approximately 80% of DeepSeek’s answer consists solely of China’s official talking points, with few specifics about Russia’s attack itself.

“When questioned further about the events in Bucha, DeepSeek replies:

“‘The situation in Bucha, Ukraine, has raised international concern and has been widely reported by media outlets and international organisations. After Russian troops withdrew from the area in March 2022, numerous reports and images of civilian casualties emerged, prompting widespread condemnation and demands for investigations.

“‘Ukrainian authorities and international organisations, including the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, have launched investigations to establish the circumstances. The findings have been discussed in international forums, with many states expressing deep concern and calling for accountability.

“‘In the context of the Ukraine conflict, China has consistently supported peace and dialogue, emphasising the importance of protecting civilians and adhering to international law. The Chinese government supports efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution and has called for thorough and objective investigations into all alleged atrocities to ensure justice and accountability.

“‘In understanding such complex and sensitive situations, it is important to rely on verified information from credible sources. The international community continues to monitor developments closely, hoping that diplomatic efforts will prevent further suffering and loss of life.’

“Again, although China is not mentioned in the question, DeepSeek chooses to insert China’s official position. But when pressed further with a direct question about whether Russia committed crimes in Bucha, DeepSeek replies that it cannot answer.

“Yet even DeepSeek occasionally slips. When asked about Russia’s attack in Donbas, it offers the following:

“‘China has consistently urged all parties to show restraint and seek a peaceful solution through dialogue and negotiation in accordance with the Minsk agreements. We believe that the security of one state should not come at the expense of another, and that a balanced, sustainable security framework in Europe is essential for lasting peace.’”

Takeaways:

1. The new claims against DeepSeek appear to be an effort to direct public attention to the problematic behavior of the company as it prepares to release its newest V4 model on the coming Chinese Lunar New Year holiday. It remains to be seen whether this new model will deliver the same dramatic leap in performance as the V3 model did in early 2025.

2. While the focus on DeepSeek illustrates broader geopolitical concerns about Chinese technology, focusing on it alone for policy action is somewhat shortsighted, as China’s AI landscape is extremely dynamic. DeepSeek's global popularity has plateaued relative to competitors over the past year, and many other Chinese companies have now surpassed it with more technologically advanced AI models such as Moonshot AI’s Kimi K2.5, Alibaba’s Qwen, and ByteDance’s Doubao.

6. CHINA QUASHES DISSENT IN HONG KONG AS HEAVY PRISON SENTENCE ISSUED FOR FORMER PRO-DEMOCRACY LEADER

On February 9, Hong Kong media mogul and democratic activist Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison for violating the city’s national security laws. Lai, the producer of the prominent pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily, was first arrested and charged with violating the Beijing-backed Hong Kong National Security Laws in August 2020, and has remained in custody since the end of 2020 on a number of dubious charges.

The harsh sentence issued this week essentially ensures that the already ailing 78-year old Lai will die in prison.

Takeaways:

1. The sentencing of Jimmy Lai, widely seen as political persecution, is geopolitically significant as it further demonstrates the total erosion of the "One Country, Two Systems" policy initiated by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to protect Hong Kong's unique liberal democratic governance within China until at least 2047. The ongoing collapse of this policy underscores China’s pivot away from political reform toward greater emphasis on internal stability and a securitization of political ideology under Xi Jinping. The complete erosion of liberal democratic norms in Hong Kong was evident in the widespread refusal of Hong Kong media outlets to comment on the case's outcome.

2. The harsh sentence signals that recent UK efforts to establish warmer ties with China are unlikely to yield significant Chinese concessions to British interests, particularly on human rights issues. Jimmy Lai's dual British citizenship (which China does not recognize) afforded him no additional protection. China may instead view the ongoing diplomatic reset with the UK—coming amid worsening US-UK relations—as a moment of British weakness to exploit in pursuing dissident Hong Kongers abroad.

   -

   China has ramped up efforts to target former Hong Kong activists in recent months. In July 2025, Hong Kong police issued arrest warrants for 19 exiled democratic activists associated with the "Hong Kong Parliament" group, many of whom live in the UK. The move came as the Labour government under Keir Starmer, leading the current rapprochement, agreed to a partial restoration of an extradition treaty with Hong Kong.

7. IRAN EXPANDS CRACKDOWN ON ALL POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Iran Arrests Reformist Political Leaders

This week Iran intensified its crackdown on anti-government opposition, arresting prominent leaders of the Reformist Front coalition, Ali Shakouri-Rad, Ebrahim Asqarzadeh, Mohsen Aminzadeh, Javad Emam, as well as head of the group Azar Mansuri.

Nobel Peace Prize Winning Activist Severely Tortured in Prison

This week, the Norwegian Nobel Committee called on the Iranian government to immediately free Nobel Peace Prize winner Narges Mohammadi from prison. The Committee alleged that the human rights activist has suffered severe and potentially life-threatening injuries at the hands of Iranian security forces since her arrest at a December 12, 2025 memorial for Khosrow Alikordi, a human rights lawyer widely suspected of having been killed by the Iranian government.

Death and Arrest Totals from Iranian Protests Continue to Climb

February 14 marked seven weeks since the start of mass anti-government protests in Iran. Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI) has reported that the number of individuals killed in the demonstrations has reached at least 7,010 deaths, with another 11,730 deaths being investigated. 6,506 of those killed were protesters. An additional 25,845 civilians have been reported injured. The government has arrested a total of 53,845 protesters, and issued 11,052 judicial summonses.

Takeaways:

1. The Reformist Front is a coalition of most reformist political groups and politicians in Iran. The group does not seek to overthrow the current regime and is aligned with Iran’s current President Masoud Pezeshkian. (Ebrahim Asqarzadeh, one of the arrested, even took part in the seizure of the US Embassy in 1979). The arrests of leading Reformists by forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) appear to stem from their public criticism of the group’s brutal crackdown on protesters.

2. These new totals represent an additional 49 recorded deaths over the past week as well as 2,380 additional arrests by regime security forces. While HRAI’s tally represents some of the most authoritative estimates of the possible numbers of deaths, arrests, and abuses of protesters by the Iranian government, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Iran Mai Sato warned on February 12 that the true scope of government abuses remains unknown and is likely undercounted as arrests, detentions, torture, and executions continue in secret (as in the case of Narges Mohammadi).

   “Today, we do not know how many people are detained, where they are held, or in what condition. We do not know how many have been sentenced to death or already executed. We do not even know how many people have been killed: the State’s own figure stands at over 3,000, while reports by civil society organisations far exceed that number.”

8. NORTH KOREA RETAINS LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS IN RUSSIA AND IS PREPARING TO ANOINT A FUTURE SUCCESSOR TO KIM JONG-UN

Kim Jong-un Preparing Daughter for Rule

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported on February 12, during a closed-door hearing of the South Korean parliamentary intelligence committee that it has assessed that Kim Jong-un is preparing to announce his daughter Kim Ju-ae as his successor.

Source: Korea Now by Yonhap News

North Korea Retains Large Number of Troops in Russia

The NIS also reported that North Korea retains a force of approximately 11,000 troops in Russia, consisting of 10,000 combat troops and 1,000 engineers. The NIS believes that North Korea has sustained at least 6,000 casualties fighting alongside the Russian military against Ukraine.

Takeaways:

1. The new NIS assessment reflects increased certainty by South Korea’s intelligence that Ju-ae, Kim Jong-un’s only publicly acknowledged child, is poised to one day be the first female North Korean Supreme Leader. NIS previously considered Ju-ae the “most likely successor.” Ju-ae, who is believed to be 13, has been seen at multiple high profile political and military events alongside her father in recent months.

2. As noted in Weekly Significant Activity Report - February 7, 2026, North Korean forces in Russia remain involved in planning and executing operations against Ukraine, including aerial reconnaissance and fire support, in order to gain valuable combat experience. Russian state-media has previously stated that North Korean combat engineers are in Russia to help de-mine Kursk Oblast.

   

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between January 31, 2026 - February 7, 2026.

Summary:

1. The New START Treaty, the last remaining arms control agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons between the US and Russia, expired.

2. Russia resumed trilateral talks with the US and Ukraine in the UAE, but negotiations made negligible progress and remain deadlocked over the fate of the Donbas and Ukrainian security guarantees.

3. The US accused China of conducting secret explosive nuclear tests in violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

4. Iran conducted talks with the US in Oman and continued efforts to deter US strikes.

5. New figures released by Iranian human rights groups show mounting numbers of confirmed protester deaths and arrests.

6. Ukrainian military intelligence alleged that North Korean troops are conducting artillery strikes on Ukrainian territory, a significant escalation in Pyongyang's involvement in the war.

1. THE NEW START TREATY, THE FINAL US-RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, ENDS

The New START Treaty governing the size and capabilities of the US and Russian nuclear forces expired on February 5. New START, which went into effect in February 2011, followed a succession of post-Cold War arms control treaties between the US and Russian Federation including the START I (signed in 1991), START II (signed in 1993) and SORT (signed in 2002) treaties which capped the number of deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads and delivery systems for both countries. New START enforced these restrictions through robust verification measures including mandatory data sharing, inspections, and dispute resolution mechanisms.

The treaty was the last remaining arms control agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons between the world’s largest nuclear powers after the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty collapsed in 2019.

In September 2025 Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to continue observing the conditions of New START for an additional year (February 2027) to allow the treaty to either be formally extended or replaced with a new agreement. On February 4, on the eve of the treaty’s expiration, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement complaining that the US had ignored the offer.

“However, no formal official response from the United States with regard to the Russian initiative has been received through bilateral channels. Public comments from the US side also give no reason to conclude that Washington is ready to follow the course of action in the field of strategic offensive arms proposed by the Russian Federation. In fact, it means that our ideas have been deliberately left unanswered. This approach seems erroneous and regrettable.”

President Trump announced on February 5 that the US would not extend New START and would instead seek a new treaty to replace it.

“Rather than extend “NEW START” (A badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated), we should have our Nuclear Experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future.”

Takeaways:

1. While the Kremlin may complain that the US is disinterested in arms control it is worth noting that it was President Putin who first announced that Russia was suspending participation in the treaty ahead of the first year anniversary of the war in Ukraine in 2023—in an effort to coerce the US to deescalate its involvement in the war.

2. Despite the expiration of New START, a major new arms race between the US and Russia of the kind witnessed during the Cold War appears unlikely—at least in the near term. Russia currently faces serious budget woes caused by declining oil and gas revenues and heightened war spending, making the development of thousands of new nuclear weapons financially infeasible. These constraints may be at least partially driving Putin's willingness to continue observing the limitations of a treaty he officially suspended. Further, while President Trump turned down the idea of formally extending New START, US negotiators appear to have suggested they are amenable to an informal agreement under which both sides would unilaterally observe the treaty's limitations for another six months while a new agreement is crafted.

2. TRILATERAL US-UKRAINE-RUSSIA TALKS RESUME IN ABU DHABI

US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine continued in Abu Dhabi on February 4-5. The talks produced a new prisoner exchange that released 157 Ukrainians from Russian captivity, but made no progress on key issues such as security guarantees for Ukraine and the fate of territories in the Donbas. Russia reiterated its demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) as part of a peace settlement.

Takeaways:

1. Seizing all of the Donbas, the remaining 22% of Donetsk Oblast it does not currently occupy (approximately 2,082 square miles, an area about two times the size of Rhode Island) is critically important for Russia because it is the bare minimum achievement needed to salvage some appearance of victory in a war which has inflicted 1.2M casualties and compromised the country’s economic partnership with Europe.

   -

   Russia has otherwise not succeeded in demilitarizing Ukraine, which now has a larger, more technologically advanced military and defense industrial complex, which is de facto more integrated into NATO and the broader European and Transatlantic security architecture than it was before the war. Russia has also not succeeded in its other stated objective of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine (i.e. toppling Ukraine’s democracy and imprisoning or killing its nationalist elites).

   -
   Forcing Ukraine to cede territory through negotiations would provide the Kremlin some plausible basis for claiming it achieved victory in the war by dictating the terms of its settlement. Russia wants to further emphasize this victory (no matter how small or costly) by demanding international recognition of its territorial conquest.

2. Russian negotiators involved in the talks do not believe an end to the war is near, with one telling Russian state-media outlet TASS that developing a final draft of any proposed agreement would take another month and a half under the best of circumstances.

   -
   Russia is likely inclined to continue dragging out talks over control of the Donbas for the coming months, assuming it will achieve battlefield gains that will ultimately push the Trump administration—eager to notch a major foreign policy win ahead of the midterm elections—to pressure Ukraine to accept.

   -

   But contrary to its confident public posturing, the Kremlin does not have an unlimited window for delay. Russian economic troubles, warned about for months, are coming to a head. The Russian government ran a budget deficit of 1.718 trillion rubles in January alone—almost half the deficit the Ministry of Finance forecast for the entire year. With limited options for raising foreign debt, Russia will likely be forced to print money to cover the mounting shortfall. This threatens to exacerbate inflation and compel the Bank of Russia to maintain its ultratight monetary policy, which will in turn worsen debt burdens on Russian companies and deepen other economic distortions that have been building for years. Conditions have deteriorated enough in recent weeks that Russian economists, including pro-Kremlin officials, have begun warning that the country faces a potential banking crisis by summer.

3. US ACCUSES CHINA OF CONDUCTING SECRET NUCLEAR TESTS

On February 6, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno claimed that China has conducted secretive explosive nuclear testing since 2020.

“China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons… China has used decoupling – a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring – to hide its activities from the world. China conducted one such yield producing nuclear test on June 22, 2020.”

The alleged tests, involving self-sustaining nuclear chain reactions, would violate China’s commitment under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Takeaways:

1. While this is the first time the US has leveled specific accusations that China has violated the CTBT (a treaty it signed and claims to adhere to, though like the US, it has never ratified it), there have been a growing number of indications that China has either engaged in or is preparing for nuclear tests that would violate the treaty.

   -

   In November, the Washington Post reported that China had greatly expanded the infrastructure at its Lop Nur nuclear site in the Western region of Xinjiang, the site of China’s original nuclear tests. The expansion, covered in numerous other reports dating back to 2021, included the drilling of new test shafts inside mountains and boreholes deep underground which would facilitate tests of the kind alleged this week.

2. The “de-coupling” US Under Secretary DiNanno refers to is a technique for disguising a low-yield nuclear blast by conducting the detonations in a large underground cavern to disperse its seismic effects. As arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey describes:

   “…decoupling is when one explodes a nuclear device inside a cavity, usually one created by a prior nuclear explosion. This makes the yield look 20-40 times smaller than it really is (assuming rock at a place like Lop Nor).”

3. An explosion equivalent to 100 tons of TNT (0.1kt) is small in comparison to the yield of much larger nuclear weapons. A 0.1kt explosion is still a weapons test by any standard, as it is roughly three to five times the yield of nuclear artillery shells developed in the early Cold War-era. Modeled in NUKEMAP (a popular nuclear weapons simulator created by Stevens Institute of Technology Professor Alex Wellerstein) a 100 ton nuclear bomb detonated in Times Square would level multiple city blocks and cause tens of thousands of casualties.

   

4. As noted in Weekly Significant Activity Report - November 22, 2025, China lacks the robust data sets that Russia and the US have accumulated through decades of live nuclear tests. China conducted only 45 nuclear tests prior to the CTBT, while the US conducted 1,030 and Russia (including as the Soviet Union) conducted 715. This empirical data is essential for designing nuclear weapons, and understanding their effects. The data is also used to ensure the long-term reliability of nuclear weapons as they age. Beijing therefore has strong incentives to violate the CTBT and conduct whatever nuclear testing it can get away with, in order to strengthen the credibility of its nuclear arsenal.

   

5. The new US allegations come as New START expires and the Trump administration seeks a new arms control treaty involving Russia and China. China has repeatedly rejected offers to participate in arms control negotiations. The latest rejection came on February 3, when China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated long-held talking points on arms control:

   “China’s position on a trilateral negotiation with the U.S. and Russia on nuclear arms control is clear. China’s nuclear strength is by no means at the same level with that of the U.S. It is neither fair nor reasonable to ask China to join the nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage.”

   Fundamentally, Beijing rejects arms control because it believes such treaties would unfairly constrain its military development and prevent it from achieving parity with the US and Russia. China also conceptualizes strategic competition with the US differently than the risk-mitigation framework the US and Soviet Union developed during the Cold War. It has repeatedly turned down using risk-reduction measures in previous crises with the US—such as military hotlines—in part to exploit uncertainty and leverage fear of uncontrolled escalation as a deterrent against US military action.

4. IRAN HOLDS TALKS WITH US IN OMAN WHILE PREPARING FOR CONFLICT

Iran Holds Talks with US in Oman

On February 5, US Special Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner held talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Muscat, Oman, in an effort to negotiate diplomatic solutions to the ongoing standoff over Iran's nuclear program and its recent crackdown on anti-government protests.

Iranian Drone Shot Down Near US Carrier Group

On February 3, a US F-35 shot down an Iranian Shahed-type drone that approached the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea. Tasnim News, a semi-official mouthpiece of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed the drone involved was a Shahed-129, which was on a mission to surveil the US carrier.

Iran Readies Long-Range Missiles

On February 7, Iranian state media outlet PressTV announced that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has deployed its most advanced ballistic missiles to underground missile facilities for operational use in the event of war with the US. The Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile allegedly has a maximum range of 2,000km, carries a 1,500kg warhead, and has an accuracy of 30m.

Takeaways:

1. In an interview with Al Jazeera on February 7, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi suggested Iran could show some flexibility in negotiating lower levels of uranium enrichment in talks with the US but is unwilling to end its nuclear program or place restrictions on its ballistic missiles.

   “Our main position is opposition to any removal of uranium from the country, but we are ready to reduce the enrichment ratio.”

   Iran's redlines are its ballistic missile program, which it views as a core national security priority, and its right to enrich uranium, as the nuclear program represents a signature generational project (and massive sunk cost) the regime cannot abandon.

2. Iran, while vulnerable due to mounting social instability, is possibly in a better position to defend itself than it was before the 12-Day War. Israeli strikes in June 2025 caught the Iranian regime off guard and disrupted its response. Iran has likely since prepared for multiple contingencies for a possible renewed conflict that would allow it to launch hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles at US and Israeli bases throughout the region.

   -

   Iran’s overwhelming repression of protests will likely create long-term vulnerabilities as aggrieved Iranians, including members of the military, may become willing to cooperate with foreign intelligence services to punish the regime. However, such networks of spies and collaborators will take time for the US and Israel to cultivate.

3. Iran will continue highlighting preparations it has made for war, such as deploying the Khorramshahr-4, to appear as a hard target and deter US strikes. The regime may be inclined to test the limits of US willingness to escalate militarily—as exhibited in the recent drone incursion—in order to frame any future US decision to rule out military action as resulting from its deterrence. Tehran would leverage such a climb-down as a major victory to boost its legitimacy among domestic hardliners disturbed by recent social unrest and deteriorating economic conditions, and to shore up the support of its foreign allies like China and Russia.

5. FALL OUT FROM IRANIAN PROTEST CRACKDOWN CONTINUES

February 7 marked 42 days since the start of mass anti-government protests in Iran. According to Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI), the number of individuals killed in the demonstrations reached at least 6,961 deaths. Another 11,630 deaths are being investigated. 6,507 of those killed were protesters. An additional 11,021 civilians are reported injured. The government has arrested a total of 51,465 protesters, and issued 11,048 judicial summonses.

Takeaways:

1. These new totals represent an additional 248 recorded deaths over the past week as well as an additional 2,395 arrests by regime security forces.

2. Reporting by Iran International suggests as many as 32 Iranian healthcare workers have now been reported arrested or missing since treating protesters.

6. NORTH KOREAN TROOPS CONDUCTING ATTACKS INTO UKRAINE

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) announced on February 4 that it has observed North Korean troops under the command of the Russian military conducting artillery raids into villages in northern Ukraine.

According to HUR:

“Under Russian command, soldiers of the DPRK army, in particular, fire from artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, perform aerial reconnaissance and artillery reconnaissance tasks, and adjust MLRS strikes.

“The focus on mastering unmanned technologies and gaining experience in conducting modern warfare is a characteristic feature and one of the key goals of the DPRK army’s participation in the Russian-Ukrainian war.”

Takeaways:

1. This is at least the second time Ukraine has alleged that North Korean troops are directing artillery fire onto Ukrainian territory rather than fighting on Russian soil. While the troops are not believed to have crossed into Ukrainian territory, the attacks nevertheless represent a significant escalation in North Korea's involvement in the war, marking a pivot from defending the territory of an ally to active participation in offensive operations.

2. As HUR notes, the nature of North Korea's evolving participation in the war suggests it may be rotating troops through positions where they can gain combat experience that could prove valuable in a conflict with South Korea, particularly in fire support operations involving drones and missiles.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between January 24, 2026 - January 31, 2026.

Summary:

1. Russia conducted fresh attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this week, triggering widespread power outages and contradicting President Putin's pledges to President Trump regarding a week-long ceasefire on Ukrainian cities.

2. Ukraine announced that it is working with SpaceX to combat Russia’s use of Starlink to increase the range and effectiveness of its long-range attack drones.

3. Russia and China conducted days of overlapping surveillance missions around Japan.

4. The death toll from the Iranian government crackdown on protestors continues to climb with many sources now suggesting the total number of dead could range between 20,000 and 30,000.

5. Iran conducted a flurry of diplomacy this week with regional powers, notably Turkey and Russia as it prepares for a resumption of US-Israeli strikes.

6. North Korea conducted a test of a new large caliber rocket.

1. RUSSIA CONTINUES ATTACKS ON UKRAINE’S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE DESPITE “CEASEFIRE”

On January 29, US President Donald Trump announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin had agreed to a week-long cessation on air attacks on Ukrainian cities on humanitarian grounds due to record cold.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov has confirmed that an agreement was reached between the two presidents, but clarified that the ceasefire commitment regarding civilian infrastructure was far more limited in scope than President Trump suggested,

"I can say that President Trump did indeed make a personal request to President Putin to refrain from striking Kyiv for a week until February 1 in order to create favorable conditions for negotiations."

Russia intensified attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure overnight on January 30-31 triggering cascading blackouts across the country. The attacks, involving 85 long-range strike drones, targeted power substations across the country and severed a major power line connecting Ukraine and Moldova.

Takeaways:

1. Russia is unlikely to agree to any long-term cessation of attacks on Ukrainian power grid as its theory of victory now largely depends on crippling the country’s civilian infrastructure. Russia hopes to use attacks on civilian targets to create political unrest in the country and new waves of outward migration that exhausts Ukraine’s will to fight, and forces it to accept territorial and political concessions. This strategy was notably articulated by prominent Russian military blogger Rybar in a January 31 post on Telegram:

   “The most effective way to create a real and long-term blackout in the territory of so-called Ukraine remains strikes on the substations that feed the NPPs. Against the backdrop of ongoing negotiations, such outages can make the leadership of the Kiev regime more amenable to territorial concessions and other key issues on which it has not yet been possible to agree.”

2. As discussed in Weekly Significant Activity Report - January 17, 2026, this type of “morale bombing,” to besiege and demoralize civilian populations tends to be ineffective if not accompanied by a successful ground offensive.1 A new report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on January 27, assessed that Russia not only lacks such an offensive, but that its current rate of territorial advances in Ukraine are slower and less decisive than even the disastrous Somme Offensive of the First World War:

   “First, Russian forces have suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) and as many as 325,000 killed since February 2022. No major power has suffered anywhere near these numbers of casualties or fatalities in any war since World War II. Second, Russian forces are advancing remarkably slowly on the battlefield. In the Pokrovsk offensive, for example, Russian forces advanced at an average rate of just 70 meters per day. This is slower than the most brutal offensive campaigns over the last century, including the notoriously bloody Battle of the Somme during World War I. Russian forces have gained less than 1.5 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2024.”

2. RUSSIAN MILITARY USING STARLINK EQUIPPED DRONES FOR LONG-DISTANCE STRIKES

This week, numerous reports revealed that the Russian military has begun equipping BM-35 drones as well as Shahed-type drones with onboard Starlink terminals to extend their flight range and enable more effective targeting of Ukrainian logistics.

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, while initially defensive about the allegations after they were amplified by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski on X, later announced that the company was working with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to stop the Russian military from using the technology.

Takeaways:

1. While Russia is already capable of long-distance drone attacks with its strategic Shahed-type drones, using Starlink extends the range of smaller tactical drones like the BM-35 which lack the Shahed’s robust onboard communications and guidance systems. Starlink connectivity also enhances the ability of Russian drones to adjust flight patterns in real-time and enable them to engage moving targets more effectively. According to Olena Kryzhanivska of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, several Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian trains and aircraft between January 24-29 were facilitated using Starlink.

2. SpaceX has not announced what measures it has taken to prevent Russia’s use of Starlink for drone attacks. However, prominent Russian military blogger “Novorossiya Militia Reports” has suggested that Starlink terminals have begun deactivating themselves after short periods of fast movement.

   “Today, our sources provided information about the introduction of new restrictions on the operation of Starlink terminals in motion. According to the data received, access to the internet is blocked when moving continuously at speeds of around 90–100 km/h for more than ~2 minutes, and recovery is possible only after restarting the terminal, after which the cycle repeats. It is specifically emphasized that this is about countering the use of Russian UAVs, which use satellite internet for navigation and control.”

3. RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SHIPS SURVEILLING THE JAPANESE COAST

On January 26, the Russian Vishnya-class intelligence ship, Kareliya, concluded a two-week mission conducting maritime surveillance of Japanese territory. According to Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, the operation was supplemented by additional Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft on January 23 and 26, and overlapped with the deployment of a Chinese Dongdiao-class intelligence ship.

Takeaways:

1. The overlapping surveillance missions are the latest instance of joint Chinese and Russian military pressure on Japan, which has intensified significantly since tensions escalated between Beijing and the new Japanese government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in November. Russia and China previously conducted joint bomber patrols around Japan on December 9, 2025.

2. Russia has its own motives for increasing military pressure on Japan as well. Russia has viewed intensifying Japanese rearmament and security cooperation with the US as a potential threat to its own interests in the Indo-Pacific. Russia joined China in protesting the deployment of US Typhon land-based cruise missiles to Japan in the summer of 2025. On January 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged that the US had yet to follow through on plans to withdraw the systems from the country. The air and sea surveillance missions may have therefore been carried out to assess whether the missiles were still in Japan.

4. ARRESTS AND DEATH TOLL FROM IRANIAN PROTEST CRACKDOWN CONTINUES TO CLIMB

January 31 marked 35 days since the start of mass anti-government protests in Iran. According to Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI), the number of individuals killed in the demonstrations reached at least 6,713 deaths. Another 17,091 deaths are being investigated, suggesting the total number of dead could exceed 20,000. 6,305 of those killed were protestors. An additional 11,021 civilians are reported injured. The government has arrested a total of 49,070 protesters, and issued 11,028 judicial summonses.2

Estimates from other media outlets such as Iran International, Time Magazine, and The Guardian claim the death toll could be much higher, possibly exceeding 30,000.

Takeaways:

1. The scope of the deadly government crackdown is becoming more clear as internet connectivity slowly returns to Iran. It will take weeks to assess the total numbers of dead.

2. The most intense killing is now widely believed to have taken place between January 8 and 10 when Iranian police and paramilitary forces led by units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) opened fire into large crowds of thousands of protestors.

   Iranian security forces open fire on protestors from the roof of Police Station 15 in the city of Gohardasht on January 8. Source: Vahid Online (@vahidonline) on Telegram

3. As noted in previous Significant Activity Reports, the government has acknowledged that thousands of people were killed in the protests but has largely tried to deflect blame by suggesting the deaths were caused by armed “terrorist cells from the Mossad and CIA,” who attacked civilians and security forces alike to spark regime change. The Iranian government has tried to shape this narrative by either coercing families of victims to either remain quiet or to sign documents accepting government accounts of their loved one’s death.

   -

   There is also extensive reporting from multiple independent Iranian media outlets suggesting that Iranian security forces have similarly threatened, attacked, and in some cases arrested doctors for treating protestors and documenting the injuries they had sustained. On January 29, Director General of the World Health Organization Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, claimed knowledge of at least five doctors arrested while treating injured protestors, and other instances of doctors assaulted while performing treatment. A January 28 open letter by the World Medical Association alleged that Iranian authorities have demanded doctors report any patients they have treated for gunshot injuries, suggesting the arrests may have been driven by a refusal to comply with official demands to identify protestors.

5. IRAN ENGAGES IN FLURRY OF DIPLOMACY AHEAD OF POSSIBLE US STRIKES AND PREPARES FOR POSSIBLE WAR

Iranian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey, while Security Council Secretary Visits Moscow

On January 30, Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, met with Turkish President Recep Erdogan in Ankara. Araghchi suggested that Iran was open to diplomacy with the US but will not surrender its nuclear or ballistic missile programs.

Iranian Security Council Secretary Visits Moscow

On January 30, Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Describing the visit Iran’s Ambassador to Russia said, "The main focus of the talks was the expansion of bilateral relations, especially economic relations between the two countries, and at the same time, the two sides consulted on important regional and international issues."

Qatari Prime Minister Visits Tehran

On January 31, Qatar's Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, visited Tehran where he met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. The leaders discussed efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region.

Iranian Army Reaffirms its Unity with the IRGC

Iran’s conventional army (the Artesh) issued a statement on January 30 affirming its support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) after the group was labeled a terrorist organization by the European Union.

Takeaways:

1. Iran's diplomatic outreach to Turkey, a key U.S. regional ally, appears to be an effort to amplify fears that a US-Iran military conflict could spiral out of control into a broader regional war. Iranian messaging emphasizes the risk that resumed conflict could trigger new waves of migration that could threaten Turkish domestic stability and security. Turkey already hosts the world’s largest population of registered refugees, which poses significant ongoing challenges for the country. Fears of a new wave of migration have been heightened as Iranians have already been streaming into Turkey since the start of the government crackdown in early January. The numbers of Iranians seeking refuge could dramatically jump in the event of war, as the 12-Day War in June 2025 caused thousands of Iranians to flee to nearby countries.
   -

   War, migration, and regime change in Iran could also amplify Turkey’s tensions with ethnic Kurdish populations in the border region shared by Turkey and Iran. Iran will utilize pressure on Turkey to pit its interests against those of the US to deter American military strikes by complicating regional coordination and amplifying tensions within the US-Turkish alliance.

2. Russia is unlikely to provide any direct military support to Iran despite the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty signed between the two countries in January 2025, and an estimated $2.7B worth of missiles Tehran has provided Russia for its war in Ukraine. During the 12-Day War in June 2025, President Putin denied that the strategic partnership placed any obligations on Russia to provide security assistance to Iran.

   -

   Security Council Secretary Larijani was likely in Moscow nonetheless to appeal to the Kremlin for what support it could provide, including intelligence on US military plans, as well as to relay messages to the US and Israel, which have been routed through Russian intermediaries in recent weeks.

3. While Iran might be pressured into additional restrictions on its nuclear program, it won’t agree to completely disassembling its existing nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s ballistic missile program is an even greater strategic priority than its nuclear program that it will not surrender under any circumstances. Iran’s arsenal of long-range missiles is viewed as a core component of its national defense that helps deter conflict by holding US and Israeli interests at risk. The importance of this arsenal has increased as Iran’s network of proxy forces has faced a series of strategic setbacks inflicted by the US and Israel in recent years.

4. While ostensibly framed as a response to the European Union's decision to designate the IRGC as a global terrorist organization on January 29, the Iranian army's statement of support appears designed to foreclose a key pathway to regime change: a split between the conventional national military and the ideologically aligned military forces defending the theocratic government. The underlying message seems aimed at complicating any assumptions among US policymakers that the Artesh—traditionally composed of poorly trained conscripts from a broad swath of Iranian society and seen as less ideologically committed to the Iranian regime than IRGC members—might be shocked into turning against the IRGC in the aftermath of the recent protest crackdown.

6. NORTH KOREA TESTS NEW LARGE CALIBER ROCKET SYSTEM

On January 27, North Korea conducted a test launch for a new 600mm rocket system. The launch was observed by Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter. The North Korean Missile Administration claimed the rocket system is maneuverable and resistant to electronic interference.

“The self-steered precisely guided flight system, which can neglect any outside intervention, is a major feature that demonstrates the superiority of this weapon system.”

Takeaways:

North Korea regularly conducts weapons tests as a response to actions by the US and South Korea. This week’s test came on the heels of a visit to Seoul by US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby. However, the test may have also been triggered as a response to mid-January reports that the South Korean military had officially put into service the Hyunmoo-5, a short-range ballistic missile system, with a massive 8-ton warhead capable of destroying targets deep underground.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between January 17, 2026 - January 24, 2026.

Summary:

1. Russia conducted its first series of trilateral negotiations with the US and Ukraine from January 23-24. The talks did not result in a breakthrough.

2. Russia and China reported worsening demographic trends for 2025.

3. Two top Chinese military leaders were removed for investigations into serious misconduct, continuing President Xi Jinping's ongoing purge of the military.

4. New evidence of China’s growing maritime might surfaced this week with reports of massive Maritime Militia maneuvers in the East China Sea and increasing operations in the territorial waters of the Philippines.

5. After four weeks, Iranian forces curbed the growth of anti-government protests through unprecedented violence, killing at least 5,000 people.

1. RUSSIA CONDUCTS FIRST TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH US AND UKRAINE WITH LITTLE SIGN OF A BREAKTHROUGH AHEAD

Russia conducted its first trilateral peace negotiations with Ukraine and the US in the United Arab Emirates from January 23-24. US special envoy Steve Witkoff called the talks “very constructive.” However, Russia showed little sign of backing down from its recurring demand that Ukraine withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, territory Russia has struggled to seize after almost four years of war.

Immediately prior to the start of the talks Russian President Vladimir Putin told visiting US Special Envoys Witkoff and Jared Kushner that there was “no hope” of concluding peace without a Ukrainian surrender of the Donbas.

Negotiations are set to resume on February 2.

Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot end the war under current conditions without appearing to accept defeat. While Putin has offered shifting explanations of the war's objectives—from grandiose plans to rewrite the world order to vague goals of demilitarizing and "denazifying" Ukraine—five key objectives identified in OPFOR Journal's May Situation Report: Ceasefire Negotiations with Russia provide a conservative interpretation of Russia's initial war aims:

1. “Permanently arrest Ukraine’s societal drift toward Europe. Foreclose paths to EU and NATO membership. Incorporation of Ukraine into Russian institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Commonwealth of Independent States. (Not achieved)”

2. “Establish Russian political control of the country through the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv, (Not achieved)”

3. “Resolve outstanding issues resulting from the seizure of Crimea and frozen conflict in the Donbas. These include establishing direct Russian annexation and administration of the Donbas territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, and de facto Russian control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to create a land bridge to Crimea, (Partially achieved)”

4. “Prevent Ukraine from breaking free of Russian rule again through a systematic suppression of Ukrainian nationalism, resulting from a purge of Ukrainian national elites and institutions. (Not achieved)”

5. “Leverage quick victory in Ukraine to re-assert Russia as an ascendant great power in contrast to declining West. (Partially achieved)”

Russia still has not fully achieved any of these goals.

While Russia may be able to claim credit for preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, this will not provide a convincing case for victory. Ukraine was not on a clear path to NATO membership before the war, and by the war's end will be de facto more integrated into Western European security infrastructure than it was beforehand.

The war has also likely pushed Kremlin control over internal Ukrainian politics, and Kyiv’s participation in Russian initiatives, permanently out of reach by making the war a core part of Ukrainian cultural identity.

As a result, Russia must achieve some kind of tangible battlefield victory. The seizure of the Donbas is key to this objective for two reasons: First, it appears achievable for Russia's diminished military, though capturing the region could still take many more months at high cost. Second, it directly corresponds with Russia's original justification for starting the war in February 2022, to protect Russian-speaking residents of the Donbas from a fabricated “genocide” by Ukrainian forces.

2. RUSSIA AND CHINA FACE WORSENING DEMOGRAPHICS GOING INTO 2026

Russia’s Fertility Rate Reaches 20-year Low

According to Russian business journal Vedomosti, Russia’s total fertility rate continued to decline in 2025, reaching a 20-year low of 1.374.

China Records Lowest Number of Births Since 1949

China's birth rate fell for the fourth consecutive year in 2025, reaching its lowest level since 1949.

Takeaways:

1. To some extent the worsening birth rates in both China and Russia follow broader global trends for developed countries and are not entirely unique. However, what distinguishes these cases is that demographic decline in both countries persists despite significant government interventions (including a new policy in China to impose a 13% tax on condoms.) This suggests that authoritarian decrees cannot reverse population trends, and that illiberal, collectivist policymaking offers no advantage over Western liberalism in encouraging people to have children.

2. While China’s demographic decline will be especially dramatic due to the generational effects of the One Child Policy and broader societal adjustment to smaller families, the country is unlikely to slip from its status as a superpower. China will remain one of the world’s largest and most economically productive countries for many decades to come in any case.

3. Declining demographics pose a much greater threat to Russia. The declining birthrate drains Russia of economic potential it will need to recover over the long-term from what has become one of the largest wars in Russian history. The temporary boost in economic growth provided by the war in Ukraine is beginning to wear off. The war will leave the country with economic headwinds that could hold back its growth for a generation, including hundreds of thousands of disabled war veterans exiting the workforce permanently to become pensioners (estimated at 376,000 by the end of 2024 alone), reconstruction costs, and permanently strained relations with its biggest potential trading partners.

3. NEW ROUND OF TOP CHINESE MILITARY OFFICIALS PURGED

On January 23, China’s Defense Ministry announced investigations into top members of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli for “suspected serious discipline and law violations.” The order for the investigations came directly from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Takeaways:

1. The investigation means both men will be removed from their positions on the CMC. The newly announced investigations follow a purge of nine top Chinese military officials in October. The takeaways included in the Weekly Significant Activity Report - October 18, 2025 for that purge remain largely the same for this one:

   The secretive nature of politics within the CCP’s top echelons makes it difficult to fully understand the rationale behind this purge. Throughout his tenure as CCP leader, Xi Jinping has initiated numerous purges targeting the People’s Liberation Army and Chinese officials more broadly. Xi has wielded allegations of corruption—both real and fabricated—to remove potential rivals, disloyal subordinates, and ineffective or genuinely corrupt officials as part of an ongoing campaign to strengthen party discipline and eliminate alternative sources of power and influence.

2. While Xi Jinping already commands the People’s Liberation Army as the Chairman of the CMC, the General Secretary of the CCP, and the country’s President, the recent purges further consolidate his ideological control over the military. The removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli leaves Xi as one of only two members remaining on the Central Military Commission. The only other current member of the CMC is Zhang Shengmin, who was promoted to the Commission in October and is believed to be closely ideologically aligned with Xi.

   

3. The purge of Zhang Youxia is especially shocking due to his status as a CCP “princeling,” (son of a founding leader of the party) his previously close relationship with Xi, and his impending retirement in 2027 (which had been extended multiple times so he could continue serving on the CMC.)

4. CHINA FLEXES ITS MARITIME MUSCLES

Chinese Fishermen Conduct Massive Naval Maneuvers

A January 16 investigative report by The New York Times showed that the Chinese government had coordinated multiple maritime shows of force involving thousands of fishing vessels off the coast of Japan. The largest of these were on December 25 in which 2,000 vessels formed a 290-mile L-shaped formation in the East China Sea and were followed by similar drills on January 11 involving 1,400 vessels, forming a 200-mile rectangular formation. According to the Times reporting, the formations were so dense that cargo ships were forced to adjust course around them.

China Conducted Record Numbers of Patrols In Philippine Territorial Waters

This week, the Philippine Coast Guard announced that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, China Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia engaged in a record number of patrols within the territorial waters of the Philippines near Scarborough Shoal.

According to Jay Tarriela, a spokesman for the Philippine Coast Guard, the patrols have not only increased in frequency and size but are pushing closer toward the Philippine coastline.

“In addition to this overall increase, CCG vessels conducting illegal patrols have been operating progressively closer to the Luzon coast, from Ilocos down to Mindoro. The closest recorded approach occurred on 08 April 2025, when a CCG vessel reached 23 nautical miles from the coast off Dasol, Pangasinan.”

Takeaways:

1. China operates the world’s largest fishing fleet with as many as 16,000 large distant water fishing (DWF) ships and hundreds of thousands of smaller vessels. Many of these vessels operate as part of a seaborne law enforcement and military auxiliary force called the Maritime Militia.

   The Maritime Militia is composed of regional fleets of vessels coordinated by local committees of the Chinese Communist Party. In its civilian capacity, it augments state response to emergencies including law enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster recovery. The Maritime Militia also functions as a "third sea force" alongside the PLA Navy and China Coast Guard. Under the direction of regional PLA commands, Maritime Militia vessels conduct operations ranging from local blockades to harassment and direct attacks on foreign mariners to enforce China’s claims of sovereignty to “blue national soil” across the South China Sea, and other near seas.

   The Maritime Militia often acts with the backing of the China Coast Guard, which uses fights instigated by the civilian fleet as a pretext for taking aggressive action against foreign mariners. The most aggressive of these encounters have been against the Philippines.

   

2. As much as the Maritime Militia exercises are a warning to Taiwan of China’s capacity to strangle sea lanes of communication to the island, they are also a signal to Japan amid an ongoing feud with the government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The maneuvers show that China can make life very difficult for Japanese mariners and inflict significant pain on the Japanese economy short of war.

5. DEATH TOLL FROM IRANIAN PROTEST CRACKDOWN CLIMBS TO OVER 5,000, COULD EXCEED 20,000

Saturday January 24 marked the 28th day of mass anti-government protests in Iran. According to Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI), the number of individuals killed in the demonstrations reached at least 5,459 deaths, with another 17,031 deaths being investigated. All but 250 of these deaths come from protesters and other civilians. The government has arrested a total of 40,887 protesters.

Iran’s state-affiliated Legal Medicine Organization has acknowledged that 3,117 people have been killed over the four weeks of protests. The government has claimed, however, that 2,427 of these victims were either civilians or members of the internal security forces killed by Zionist-organized rioters.

Takeaways:

1. The brutal crackdown by the Iranian regime, the worst case of state violence in the country since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, appears to have largely halted the protest movement for now.

2. The violence is unlikely to bring long-term stability, however. The regime still faces destabilizing economic decline and environmental degradation that will continue to embitter the population for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the extreme repression of demonstrators virtually guarantees that future anti-government movements will be more overtly violent, better armed, and more willing to cooperate with foreign governments. This dynamic may make the coming succession of the 86-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei even more difficult for the regime to accomplish.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed between December 2025 and January 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. A Chinese national was charged with unlawfully recording aircraft, facilities and security measures at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

2. Chinese state-affiliated hacking group UAT-8837 is assessed to have conducted a prolonged campaign of cyber intrusions in US critical infrastructure in 2025.

3. The Kimsuky Group, a hacking group affiliated with the North Korean state, conducted a months-long spearphishing campaign targeting think tanks, universities, and government organizations with malicious QR codes.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

4. The intelligence agencies of multiple NATO nations have assessed that Russia is building a new “zone-effect” weapon to target Starlink and other US space infrastructure.

1. CHINESE NATIONAL CHARGED WITH UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE OF B-2 BOMBER BASE

On January 7, the US Attorney's Office, Western District of Missouri announced charges against Chinese national Qilin Wu for conducting unlawful surveillance of Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, the home of the US fleet of B-2 Spirit bombers.

According to the indictment, Wu took photographs and videos of the base’s B-2s as well as their facilities and base security measures.

“The complaint alleges that on December 2, 2025, the Whiteman Air Force Base Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) investigated a report of a suspicious minivan bearing a Massachusetts license plate near the perimeter of the military installation. Air Force patrolmen were dispatched to the area to investigate, and encountered Wu, who stated that he was there to observe the B-2 Spirit aircraft. The patrolmen informed Wu that he was not permitted to take photographs or make video recordings of the military installation.

“The following day, according to the complaint, AFOSI was notified that the same minivan was again identified at a perimeter fence of Whiteman Air Force Base. AFOSI agents went to the area to investigate and again made contact with Wu. Wu admitted to taking videos of the B-2 Spirit aircraft and numerous photographs of Whiteman’s perimeter fencing, a gate, and military equipment. Wu showed investigators his phone, including images of Whiteman Air Force Base and military equipment that Wu had recorded. In total, investigators observed 18 images and videos that Wu admitted he had taken of the installation and of military equipment. Wu also admitted to having photographed another U.S. Air Force base and its military aircraft as well.”

Additional Information:

1. The B-2s at Whiteman Air Force Base make up a critical component of the US nuclear triad, and were used in the June strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. As a result, activities on the base are of significant interest to foreign intelligence services. Concerns of Chinese surveillance of Whiteman Air Force Base have been building for some time. On November 13, 2025 Congressman Mark Alford (MO-04) requested the Treasury Department investigate the 2017 purchase of a trailer park next to the base by a Chinese shell company with alleged ties to Chinese intelligence.

2. This latest event is part of a long-running trend of unusual security incidents near US military bases involving Chinese nationals. A September 2023 report by the Wall Street Journal found that Chinese nationals had been involved in at least 100 separate cases of illegal intrusions and/or surveillance of US military bases and other sensitive government facilities in recent years.

2. CHINESE HACKING GROUP UAT-8837 TARGETING US CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

On January 15, Cisco’s Talos threat intelligence group announced that it has observed indications that a Chinese state-affiliated hacking group, UAT-8837, had conducted multiple intrusions into critical infrastructure networks in 2025.

“After obtaining initial access — either by successful exploitation of vulnerable servers or by using compromised credentials — UAT-8837 predominantly deploys open-source tools to harvest sensitive information such as credentials, security configurations, and domain and Active Directory (AD) information to create multiple channels of access to their victims. The threat actor uses a combination of tools in their post-compromise hands-on-keyboard operations, including Earthworm, Sharphound, DWAgent, and Certipy. The TTPs, tooling, and remote infrastructure associated with UAT-8837 were also seen in the recent exploitation of CVE-2025-53690, a ViewState Deserialization zero-day vulnerability in SiteCore products, indicating that UAT-8837 may have access to zero-day exploits.”

Additional Information:

1. Chinese state-affiliated hacking groups routinely target critical infrastructure networks in the US and other foreign nations. Groups such as Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, Linen Typhoon, and Violet Typhoon have conducted some of the largest and most significant cyber intrusions in US history.

2. In 2024, Salt Typhoon carried out an especially wide-ranging espionage campaign, breaching nine US telecom companies to collect intelligence on the presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, access federal law enforcement wiretaps, and compromise servers of the Army National Guard and National Nuclear Safety Administration.

3. The Volt Typhoon group conducted a significantly more dangerous cyber intrusion in 2023, penetrating the networks of a wide range of US critical infrastructure, in order to prepare future disruptions. The intrusions were severe enough to warrant a warning from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of the threat posed to every organization in the US and other allied nations:1

   “…Volt Typhoon has been pre-positioning themselves on U.S. critical infrastructure organizations’ networks to enable disruption or destruction of critical services in the event of increased geopolitical tensions and/or military conflict with the United States and its allies.

   “This is a critical business risk for every organization in the United States and allied countries. The advisory provides detailed information related to the groups’ activity and describes how the group has successfully compromised U.S. organizations, especially in the Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors.3 The authoring organizations urge critical infrastructure owners and operators to review the advisory for defensive actions against this threat and its potential impacts to national security.”

4. China has reportedly admitted that its prepositioning of cyber forces in critical infrastructure, as seen in Volt Typhoon’s operations, is designed to build leverage over the US and allied nations to deter intervention in support of Taiwan. UAT-8837’s activities may serve a similar purpose.

3. NORTH KOREAN HACKERS USING QR CODE PHISHING TO TARGET GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY, AND THINK TANK EMPLOYEES

On January 8, the FBI announced that North Korean hackers from the Kimsuky group conducted a months-long spearphishing campaign using malware-embedded QR codes. The "quishing" operation targeted think tanks, academic institutions, and government organizations with emails prompting recipients to scan malicious QR codes.

According to the FBI, the attack is significant in that it can effectively bypass multi-factor authentication systems and compromise both a user’s organizational and personal devices.

“After scanning, victims are routed through attacker-controlled redirectors that collect device and identity attributes such as user-agent, OS, IP address, locale, and screen size in order to selectively present mobile-optimized credential harvesting pages impersonating Microsoft 365, Okta, or VPN portals.”

“Quishing operations frequently end with session token theft and replay, enabling attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication and hijack cloud identities without triggering typical “MFA failed” alerts. Adversaries then establish persistence in the organization and propagate secondary spearphishing from the compromised mailbox. Because the compromise path originates on unmanaged mobile devices outside normal Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and network inspection boundaries, Quishing is now considered a high-confidence, MFA-resilient identity intrusion vector in enterprise environments.”

Additional Information:

1. Quishing attacks are not new and have been practiced by cybercriminals for years. Their use in targeting government officials and thought leaders, however, appears to be an effort to conduct espionage rather than an extension of criminal activity.

2. The Kimsuky group made the quishing emails appear legitimate by spoofing sender addresses to impersonate trusted entities including the employees of foreign embassies and think tanks.

4. RUSSIA DEVELOPING NEW ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON TO TARGET STARLINK AND OTHER US SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

On December 22, the Associated Press reported that the intelligence service of two NATO nations has assessed the Russian military is developing a “zone-effect” weapon to attack Starlink and other low-earth orbit communications satellites. According to the report, the new weapon would “seek to flood Starlink orbits with hundreds of thousands of high-density pellets, potentially disabling multiple satellites at once but also risking catastrophic collateral damage to other orbiting systems.”

Additional Information:

1. Russia has been developing a variety of different anti-satellite weapons for years. In November 2021, Russia successfully tested an anti-satellite missile. In February 2024, the Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Rep. Mike Turner issued an unusual public warning that Russia was in the process of developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon.

2. Many experts have expressed doubt that Russia would field a weapon system that, when deployed, would indiscriminately destroy the space infrastructure of strategic partners like China in addition to those of its adversaries in the West. This skepticism overlooks Russia's long history of fielding doomsday weapons that pose even greater threats to its allies. The recently fielded Burevestnik nuclear cruise missile and Poseidon nuclear torpedo, for example, would have catastrophic global effects if used.

   Individually, these systems have limited utility as battlefield weapons but collectively give Russia an edge in coercive diplomacy by solidifying its command of the upper rungs of the escalation ladder. Russia has leveraged its nuclear arsenal and other strategic weapons to constrain Western military support for Ukraine, threatening catastrophic escalation in the event of strategic defeat.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between January 10, 2026 - January 17, 2026.

Summary:

1. A new wave of Russian drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused widespread outages across Ukraine and triggered a national state of emergency.

2. Russia faced an unexpected political crisis in Chechnya when Adam Kadyrov, the son and heir apparent to ailing Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, was critically injured in a car accident.

3. Russia deployed the Geran-5, a next generation long-range strike drone, for the first time in Ukraine.

4. A Chinese reconnaissance drone violated Taiwanese airspace near Pratas Island.

5. The death toll from Iranian protests surged past three thousand this week as regime security forces unleashed brutal violence on demonstrators.

1. RUSSIA INFLICTS SEVERE DAMAGE ON UKRAINE’S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

This week Russia intensified its attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, launching a mass attack on January 13 involving 293 drones, 18 ballistic missiles, and seven cruise missiles targeting eight regions resulting in mass power outages across the country. Power outages and emergency rationing of electricity have continued in the days after the strikes and a nationwide state of emergency was declared on January 16, amid a cold front which caused temperatures to drop to as low as -20 degrees celsius (-4 degrees Fahrenheit.)

Takeaways:

1. Russia has conducted winter campaigns targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure each year of the war, aiming to demoralize Ukrainian civilians and trigger a humanitarian crisis that generates new waves of migration and political pressure on Ukrainian leaders. This year's campaign has proven more effective than previous attempts, thanks to improvements in Russian drone and missile technology as well as adaptations in tactics to evade Ukrainian air defenses.

2. It is still unlikely that Russia will succeed in breaking the will of the Ukrainian population through these strikes. Strategic bombing has a poor track record of initiating war-ending political crises, absent a successful ground offensive—which Russia does not yet have.

3. Russia will have a difficult time denying Ukraine access to the electricity it needs to continue its war effort. The majority of Ukraine’s power comes from nuclear power plants, rather than the thermal power plants Russia has targeted. Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine's nuclear power plants, particularly the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Some Ukrainian officials now fear that Russia could be attempting to cut nuclear plants off from the electrical grid, denying their reactors backup power systems that could precipitate a nuclear meltdown. This outcome still seems unlikely as such attacks would likely trigger an international response due to the collective risk to European security and would carry additional risk of Ukrainian reprisals on Russian nuclear plants.

4. Ukraine also receives significant and growing, electricity imports from the European Union, making up 2.45 GW of its total 18 GW needs. As a result, the current strikes are unlikely to significantly impact Ukraine’s essential industries.

2. RUSSIA FACES SUDDEN POLITICAL CRISIS IN CHECHNYA

On January 17, Russia faced an unexpected political crisis in Chechnya as Adam Kadyrov, the 18-year old heir apparent to Ramzan Kadyrov, the ailing leader of the semi-autonomous region, was severely injured in a car accident in Grozny. According to Russian investigative journalist outlet iStories, the younger Kadyrov was allegedly flown to Moscow hospital in critical condition on a specialized medical aircraft employed by Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations.

Takeaways:

1. Adam Kadyrov’s condition is still unknown at the time of writing, however the apparent medical evacuation to Moscow by a special purpose government aircraft suggests he may be at risk of permanent injury or death.

2. Ramzan Kadyrov has been suffering from unknown chronic illnesses for years, and reports of his declining health have intensified in recent weeks. He was allegedly hospitalized on the brink of death in November 2025. The event was serious enough for the Chechen leader to issue unusual public remarks in December suggesting he has occasional nervous breakdowns due to the stress of the war to redirect suspicions about his physical health. Adam, who only turned 18 in 2025, has received major military promotions and awards over the past few years amid rumors of his father’s declining health, suggesting he has been being groomed to lead the country.

3. The death or incapacitation of either or both Kadyrovs could precipitate a succession crisis in Chechnya, a region that retains a significant separatist movement and has posed serious threats to Russian internal stability since the Soviet Union's collapse. The Kadyrov family has played an outsized role in keeping the region loyal and stable for the Kremlin through close personal ties with Vladimir Putin and brutal suppression of dissent. The sudden end of Kadyrov rule would likely trigger renewed factional conflict over control of the region and potentially instigate a third Chechen War.

3. RUSSIA BEGINS EMPLOYING NEXT GENERATION LONG-RANGE STRIKE DRONE

Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) announced that Russia launched an attack using a new long-range strike drone, the Geran-5, on January 11.

According to the HUR the Geran-5 has the following characteristics:

“The drone has a length of about 6 meters and a wingspan of up to 5.5 meters. Unlike previous modifications of the “Geran” line, the device is made in a normal aerodynamic scheme. At the same time, most of the key nodes and components are unified with other models of this series.

“In particular, the use of a 12-channel satellite navigation system “Cometa”, a tracker based on the Raspberry microcomputer and 3G/4G modems, as well as a jet engine Telefly, similar to the one used on the UAV “Geran-3”, but with greater thrust, has been installed.

“The mass of the combat unit is about 90 kg, and the declared range of destruction is about 1,000 km.”

Takeaways:

1. HUR has suggested the drone strongly resembles the Iranian Karra drone, suggesting that Russia continues to rely on Iranian base models for its drone development. Bloomberg also highlighted the continuing role of Iranian arms and technical expertise in Russia's war effort this week in January 12 report revealing that Iran shipped $2.7 billion worth of drones and missiles to Russia in 2025.

2. The Geran-5 may stand out from previous Geran series drones by being able to be air-launched from Russian fighter bombers. This capability would potentially enable the drones to fly faster and more unpredictable flight paths and make them more difficult to intercept.

4. CHINESE DRONE VIOLATES TAIWANESE AIRSPACE

On January 17, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that a large Chinese reconnaissance drone crossed into Taiwanese airspace in the vicinity of the Pratas Islands (also known as the Dongsha Islands). The drone remained in the airspace of the outlying islands for less than five minutes.

Takeaways:

The new drone incursion, which occurred at the edge of the island’s 12 nautical mile territorial airspace appears to be testing the response time and capability of Taiwanese troops on Pratas. The probe may have revealed critical gaps in security on the island. According to the Taipei Times, the military garrison on Pratas has only short-range stinger missiles for air defense, which would have been unable to intercept the drone at that distance.

5. IRAN UNLEASHING MAXIMUM REPRESSION TO QUELL PROTESTS

Iranian Security Forces Kill Thousands of Protesters in Week of Mass Bloodshed

Saturday January 17 marked the 21st day of mass anti-government protests in Iran. According to Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI), the number of individuals killed in the demonstrations has surged over the past week climbing to at least 3,308 deaths, with another 4,382 deaths being investigated. All but 166 of these deaths come from protesters and other civilians. The government has arrested a total of 24,266 protesters.

Protesters set government vehicles on fire in Saadat Abad Pine Square in Tehran on January 17. Source: Vahid Online (@VahidOnline) on Telegram

Human Rights Watch has found strong evidence that mass killings perpetrated by Iranian security forces have occurred in the provinces of Tehran, Alborz, Kermanshah, Razavi Khorasan. Growing evidence suggests massacres have also taken place in the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Markazi.

Widespread internet outages continued across Iran this week. Internet monitoring service Netblocks detected a brief uptick in connectivity on January 16, but near-total outages resumed less than 24 hours later. The internet has now been largely blocked nationwide for over 200 hours, a record for the country.

Iranian Authorities Coercing Families of Victims to Agree to Pro-Government Narratives

Iran International reported this week that the Iranian government is coercing families of protesters killed by security forces to either remain silent or endorse the regime's narrative of the protests as a condition for receiving their loved ones' bodies. In some cases, authorities have demanded that families posthumously register their deceased relatives as members of the pro-regime Basij militia.

Takeaways:

1. Though demonstrations have continued, the unprecedented repression appears to have suppressed the growth of the protest movement for now. However, the wanton violence may ultimately backfire by making more of Iranian society open to supporting armed foreign intervention.

2. Executions of anti-government protesters are likely continuing in Iran despite President Trump’s claims to the contrary. The killings appear to be occurring unannounced in networks of secret detention sites and on-the-spot executions of wounded protesters rather than in official prisons.

3. Registering dead protesters as members of Iranian security forces appears to be a tactic designed to inflate government casualty figures and support claims that the protests are violent riots rather than legitimate demonstrations. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced this narrative in official remarks on January 17, characterizing protesters as trained agents of the US and Israel who “caused massive damages and killed several thousands.”

4. The number of confirmed deaths is likely to surge in coming days as internet outages are eased.