This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between September 19, 2026 and September 26, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. Iranian leaders visited New York where the Iranian President Pezeshkian addressed the UN General Assembly and sat down for an interview with Fox News, while Foreign Minister Araghchi held talks with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff.

2. The Iranian Basij paramilitary organization opened a new “Jan-Fada” military training facility in Tehran for civilian volunteers as part of an effort to create new “national resistance battalions”.

The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. United Russia, the ruling party of Russian President Vladimir Putin, swept State Duma elections in a vote characterized by widespread fraud, renewing the Kremlin’s mandate to carry on the war in Ukraine.

4. Russia launched multiple attacks on Ukrainian data centers in an effort to disrupt digital commerce and degrade civilian morale.

Western Pacific Flashpoints - Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

5. The US hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for his first state visit since 2015. The mostly symbolic visit continued a US-China trade truce, initiated a strategic dialogue regarding AI, and seemingly saw the US adopt several Chinese positions on key issues affecting US interests in the Pacific.

6. North Korea announced the test of a new missile that bore the features of a hypersonic glide vehicle.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. IRANIAN LEADERS TRAVEL TO NEW YORK FOR UNGA AND INDIRECT TALKS WITH US

Iranian President Pezeshkian Addressed World Leaders at the UNGA and American People on Fox News

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23, 2026. Pezeshkian’s speech decried US and Israeli attacks as terrorism resulting in civilian casualties and pushed back against criticism of Iran’s own indiscriminate attacks on its neighbors and international commerce. Pezeshkian announced that Iran would not surrender in the face of threats but would nevertheless remain open to talks to end the war with the US.

Pezeshkian followed the address to world leaders with a direct appeal to the American people in a September 24, 2026, Fox News interview with Bret Baier. In the interview the Iranian leader reiterated that Iran did not seek the war and would not yield to threats but is willing to end hostilities by returning to the provisions of the Islamabad Memorandum. Pezeshkian deflected questions regarding threats to international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb Strait but notably suggested that Iran would be willing to negotiate an agreement to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and submit to inspections.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Conducted Talks with US Special Envoy in New York to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

On September 23, 2026, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York to discuss a mechanism for reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranian delegation proposed a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz over a seven-day period. The plan would be contingent upon the US resuming its obligations under the Islamabad Memorandum, namely, concluding its naval blockade of Iranian ports, ending hostilities against Iran and its proxies, and providing phased sanctions relief.

The US later rejected this formulation.

Takeaways:

1. Iran’s diplomatic efforts this week appear to signal that it believes it currently maintains a strong enough hand to secure a return to the previously favorable deal provided by the Islamabad Memorandum. However, a subtext of the Iranian pitch to return to the previous deal is uncertainty about whether such favorable conditions will last and whether the country will be able to secure a better outcome in a prolonged conflict. Even if the Republican Party suffers a rout in the midterm elections, US policy toward Iran will remain adversarial, and it is unlikely that a new Congress will support greater concessions than those already laid out in the Islamabad Memorandum. And if Iran’s advantages begin to erode as a result of deteriorating economic conditions and growing global pressure (like that exhibited in the wake of recent advances by the Houthis), it is unlikely that the increasingly hawkish regime will be able to agree to new compromises either. So a return to the Islamabad Memorandum now represents the best chance for Iran to de-escalate the war on its terms.

2. The suggestion by Iranian President Pezeshkian on Fox News that Iran would be willing to give up its stockpile of highly enriched uranium was a remarkable comment. While couched with a caveat of adhering to Iran’s responsibilities under international law, the remark undermined assertions that the country’s nuclear program was peaceful in nature and implied that the regime is currently violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In recent weeks, Iran has vigorously denied charges by the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has violated the NPT.

   The assertion that Iran would give up its stockpile of highly enriched uranium also likely overstepped the President’s authority, as responsibility for such decisions is left to the Supreme Leader. On September 25, 2026, Reuters reported that an unnamed senior Iranian official stated that Iran would make no concessions on its nuclear program even if a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz was reached, suggesting an effort to walk back Pezeshkian’s remarks.

2. NEW CIVILIAN PARAMILITARY TRAINING CENTER OPENS IN TEHRAN

On September 23, 2026, Iranian state media reported the opening of the first “Jan-Fada” military training center for civilian volunteers in Tehran. The Jan-Fada, short for “Jan-Faday-e Iran” (roughly: those willing to sacrifice for Iran), was launched by Iran’s Basij paramilitary in 2026 after the start of the US-Israeli war. The Jan-Fada are envisioned as an expansive irregular force of volunteers that are basically trained in combat skills and can be called upon as “national resistance battalions” to defend Iranian territory in the event of an invasion.

Speaking at the opening of the new center in Tehran’s Imam Hossein Square, Basij commander Hossein Taeb declared the Jan-Fada to be “the largest popular campaign in the history of the world’s wars,” and announced plans to develop 1,000 Jan-Fada battalions.

The opening of the new training center came days after the mustering of 313,000 Jan-Fada volunteers for demonstrations in the greater Tehran metropolitan area on September 18, 2026.

Takeaways:

1. The claims of a 313,000-strong demonstration in Tehran prior to the opening of the center appear to be exaggerated. PressTV acknowledges the figure as symbolic, stating:

   “The number 313 is not accidental. The 313,000 people taking part in the Tehran drill is a direct reference to the number of Imam Mahdi’s (AS) companions in Islamic narrations, the same 313 people who are identified in Shiite texts as the supporters of the Imam of the Age.”

   -PressTV, September 23, 2026

   Other claims of widespread support for the Jan-Fada campaign appear to be inflated as well. Independent Iranian fact-checking organization FactNameh has found that evidence provided by Jan-Fada organizers to support claims of 30 million online registrations for the movement suggested millions of fraudulent accounts. FactNameh has suggested the total number of legitimate registrations was well under 4 million.

2. Though of dubious value as a fighting force, the Jan-Fada provides legitimacy-boosting displays of grassroots support for the Iranian regime that help it undermine narratives of widespread public disaffection. Images of government security forces backed by thousands of armed citizens also help deter the mobilization of future anti-government protests.

3. Independent Iranian media organization IranWire reports that the Jan-Fada campaign is being viewed skeptically by some members of the Iranian government and security apparatus who consider it an attempt by Hossein Taeb to bolster his image and power. These reports merit close consideration for what they reveal about the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime, because they correspond with reporting by The New York Times earlier in September that Taeb has played an outsized role in subverting negotiations with the US and in continuing unauthorized attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

EASTERN FRONT

Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS RESULT IN VICTORY OF PUTIN’S UNITED RUSSIA PARTY

Russia concluded three days of voting for its State Duma elections on September 20, 2026.1 The election resulted in a victory for the ruling United Russia party. With approximately 58% of the vote, the party of President Vladimir Putin expanded its parliamentary majority to 355 of the 450 seats in the Duma.

The result is widely seen as rigged and illegitimate. Statistical models of voting patterns analyzed using the “Shpilkin Method” by Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe estimated that United Russia only secured around 34% of the actual vote.

Takeaways:

1. Elections in Russia are taken seriously even if the outcome is predetermined, because voting provides valuable data on public sentiment. By weighing criteria such as expected turnout and voting patterns against actual results, Russian leaders are able to understand how different populations feel about government policy. This enables them to better anticipate the potential destabilizing effects of major changes to policy, such as tax increases, spending cuts, or, as is relevant now, major military mobilizations. Elections, even rigged ones, also serve as a collective ritual in validating the legitimacy of the Putin regime.

2. This election saw the elevation of 46 veterans of the war in Ukraine to the Duma. The move solidifies a pro-war constituency within the parliament that further ensures that the war in Ukraine remains the primary focus of government policy despite growing costs. Promoting military veterans also helps the Kremlin demonstrate tangible social benefits associated with wartime service.

4. RUSSIAN DRONE STRIKES TARGET DATA CENTERS IN KYIV

This week, Russian forces launched multiple attacks on Ukrainian data centers and telecommunications infrastructure. On September 23, 2026, Russian drones struck multiple co-location data centers in Kyiv, resulting in disruptions of internet service to 100,000 households across Kyiv Oblast. On September 25, 2026, Russian drones hit and damaged the Cosmonova data center in Kyiv, disrupting several national TV broadcasts before backups were restored.

This week’s strikes were preceded by attacks on facilities of Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest telecom provider, on September 11 and 17, 2026.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has confirmed that it has begun targeting data centers that it claims provide “data storage, processing, and transmission, including intelligence data, as well as the operation of network equipment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces”.

Takeaways:

Whatever its claimed justification, Russia’s true aim in targeting data centers is to disrupt digital commerce and upend the lives of Ukrainian civilians. The attacks are part of an effort by Russian forces to take advantage of Ukraine’s current vulnerability resulting from a diminished supply of air defense interceptors to degrade Ukrainian morale by destroying as much critical infrastructure as possible ahead of winter. Facing a stalemate, and even a growing series of setbacks on the front line, Russia’s strategic bombing campaign likely aims to trigger humanitarian crises in Ukrainian population centers that lead to new waves of migration and pressure Kyiv and its European allies into a settlement on Moscow’s terms.

WESTERN PACIFIC FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

5. US HOSTS CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING FOR STATE VISIT

Between September 23 and 25, 2026, US President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for a state visit. The visit, primarily held in Washington, DC, featured a banquet that included prominent US business and technology leaders, and a visit to the National Archives. The trip came four months after President Trump’s own state visit to China in May and marked the first time Xi has been in the US since 2015.

China announced eight deliverables resulting from the trip:

1. The two sides agree to build “a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity.”

2. China and the United States support each other in successfully hosting the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting and the G20 Summit. The two heads of state intend to attend each other’s meetings.

3. The two heads of state agree that Iran should honor its commitment to not developing nuclear weapons, and no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways. 

4. The two heads of state recall that China and the U.S. were allies in World War II and fought side by side to win the war. 

5. The two heads of state recognize the positive role of the China-U.S. economic and trade consultation mechanism, endorse the outcomes of the consultations between the two economic and trade teams, including establishing and taking forward the Board of Trade and other mechanisms, reaching an arrangement for a US$30 billion reciprocal tariff reduction, and the extension of the outcomes of economic and trade consultations in Kuala Lumpur, and give instructions that they be implemented. 

6. The two sides note that cooperation between the counter-narcotics and law enforcement agencies of China and the U.S. has produced visible outcomes. Recently, the two sides working closely together have jointly cracked multiple cases involving New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) and precursor chemicals, and apprehended dozens of relevant criminal suspects in the two countries. 

7. The two sides agree on the establishment of the China-U.S. AI Dialogue to exchange views on risks and benefits related to AI. The next exchange will occur in November 2026. China and the U.S. also agree to establish a bilateral communication channel for AI incidents.

8. The United States welcomes the arrival of two giant pandas, leased by China to Zoo Atlanta.

-Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2026

Takeaways:

1. The visit provided an opportunity for the US and China to stabilize economic ties over the near term. The continuation of the current trade truce was a positive development that allowed both leaders to maintain a status quo through a series of major events including the US midterm elections, China’s hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, and the G-20 summit in Miami. The announcement of the start of a joint AI dialogue was a similarly positive step that may yield a long-term institutional mechanism for setting guardrails on technological competition.

2. The visit did little to resolve other major issues inflaming Sino-US relations, such as China’s continued support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, its support for the Iranian regime, its transnational repression targeting US citizens, and increasingly aggressive activities in the Pacific directed at Taiwan and US treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. Official press releases by both sides detailing the outcomes of the visit suggest the US may have inadvertently signaled a lack of resolve on these issues.

   Emphasizing China as a key American ally of the Second World War undercut America’s current alliance with Japan at a time when Tokyo is under increasing Chinese pressure over its decision to rearm and play a more proactive role in regional security. The lack of a compelling response to China’s attempts to reframe the official US position on Taiwanese independence from “does not support” to outright opposition may, along with the administration’s current hesitancy to support congressionally-approved military assistance, reinforce doubts about the US commitment to deterring a Chinese invasion of the island. The US’s adoption of China’s preferred framing of Sino-US ties as “constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity,” also signals a significant retreat from a previous US policy of strategic competition that was initially articulated during the first Trump administration.

6. NORTH KOREA TESTS HYPERSONIC WEAPON

On September 20, 2026, North Korea launched two missiles from Wonsan approximately 450 km and 600 km, respectively, into the East Sea (Sea of Japan). North Korea followed the launch on September 22 with an announcement that the missiles tested represented a “new-type weapon, which is of great significance in the rapid technological development of weapon systems.”

Photos of the launch released by Korea Central News Agency suggest the missile, a Hwasong-11Ma (aka Hwasong-11E-1), was carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle.

Takeaways:

1. Most sophisticated ballistic missiles travel at hypersonic speeds, but true hypersonic weapons typically fall into one of two categories: hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). HCMs are continuously powered “air breathing” missiles that maintain hypersonic speed throughout their flight. HGVs, on the other hand, are unpowered glide weapons that are launched into the upper atmosphere by an initial rocket booster and use the lack of atmospheric pressure and resistance to maneuver at hypersonic speed toward a target. HCMs and HGVs are extremely sophisticated weapons, whose development has challenged the world’s most advanced militaries. As a result, it is unlikely that North Korea has developed a viable HGV.

2. Even if its progress is exaggerated, North Korea is likely making progress on developing HGVs nonetheless. North Korea has tested prototypes of hypersonic missiles for several years now. The September 15, 2021, launch of a ballistic missile that exhibited an unusual trajectory and flight characteristics represents the earliest known test of a North Korean HGV. That test, well preceding the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia, suggests North Korean advances in hypersonics have largely been driven by domestic research and development rather than outside technical assistance.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between September 12, 2026 and September 19, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. China attempted to mediate with Iran to rein in growing Houthi threats to Saudi Arabia and Red Sea shipping.

2. Iran conducted multiple attempts to seize or destroy US strategic drones in order to degrade the US’s ability to monitor and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. A months-long Ukrainian counteroffensive named “Operation Vivaldi” has collapsed a Russian salient near Lyman, shoring up the northern flank of Ukraine’s “Fortress Belt” and setting back Russia’s ability to seize the remainder of the Donbas region.

4. A new report by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team found that as many as 25,000 North Korean laborers are involved in building Russian drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in exchange for cash to fund North Korea’s own weapons programs.

Western Pacific Flashpoints - Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

5. The Head of China’s Ministry of State Security, Chen Yixin, published an article highlighting risks to domestic political stability as China’s chief concern in the development of frontier AI.

6. A China Coast Guard cutter deliberately rammed a Philippine government fisheries vessel near Sabina Shoal.

7. North Korea’s Vice Defense Minister announced that the country would expand and strengthen its nuclear arsenal at China’s Xiangshan Forum.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. CHINA ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN OVER HOUTHI ATTACKS

This week China reportedly made overtures to Iran at Saudi Arabia’s request, to rein in a growing Houthi threat to shipping in the Red Sea. Iran was reportedly non-committal to Chinese mediation, suggesting that regional stability would only be possible if the US war ends.

Takeaways:

1. To some extent the Iranian position is understandable. Iran can help supplement Houthi capabilities and coordinate its actions with its other proxy organizations to maximize pressure on Saudi Arabia and the US (as seen last week with the Houthi Red Sea coastal offensive combined with the Iraqi-origin drone attacks on the East-West pipeline), but the Houthis ultimately have agency and interests of their own. The Houthi movement has been a force in Yemen for decades and the driving forces of Houthi activities have primarily been Yemeni internal politics and external conflict with Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have also become much more militarily self-sufficient in recent years allowing for greater freedom of action.

2. Whether Iran is able to effectively rein in the Houthis is largely secondary at this point. Iran’s historic support for the Houthis, combined with previous explicit threats against Saudi shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and mounting reports of embedded IRGC advisors within the Houthis, has contributed to increasingly widespread perceptions that it is the chief instigator of the expansion of the war toward the Red Sea. In this sense, the dramatic Houthi seizures of Mokha and Perim, combined with attacks on key Saudi oil infrastructure, and even threats toward Mecca, may amount to a catastrophic success for Iran, which inflicts significant short-term pain on its adversaries but ultimately shifts international opinion against its continued threats toward the global economy. China’s new attempt at mediation this week, coming alongside UN Security Council denunciations of Houthi attacks, is an early indicator that such a shift may be underway.

2. IRAN RAMPS UP WAR ON US DRONES IN EFFORT TO KEEP STRAIT OF HORMUZ CLOSED

Iran Claimed the Destruction of Two More US MQ-series Drones

This week the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the destruction of two US MQ-series unmanned aerial systems, bringing the total number of US MQ-series drones Iran has claimed to have destroyed to 53.

US Destroyed Iranian Ships Attempting to Seize Unmanned Surface Vessel

On September 15, 2026, Axios reported that small ships belonging to the IRGC Navy attempted to seize a US unmanned surface vessel patrolling the waters of the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian ships were destroyed by missiles fired from a US aerial drone before they could complete the seizure.

Takeaways:

1. The exact number and type of US MQ-series drones destroyed by Iran are not clear. Reports this month suggest that losses range between 25 and 45 for all US systems, making Iranian claims plausible, though potentially exaggerated. Such losses would represent a significant portion of the US inventory of sophisticated unmanned aerial systems. Nevertheless, the US appears to have largely accepted the losses as an inevitable consequence of operating in contested airspace and is pivoting toward a long-term focus on more affordable and dispensable unmanned systems such as the Air Force’s Massed Modular Aircraft.

2. Iran has emphasized attacks on unmanned systems in recent weeks (including last week’s seizure of an Anduril Dive-LD submersible) for three reasons. First, Iran’s military capabilities have been severely degraded by the ongoing war, making relatively slow-moving, sophisticated unmanned systems priority targets that are still within reach of its forces. Second, attacks on unmanned systems impose near-term costs on the US that degrade its ability to monitor and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while also avoiding potential escalation spirals associated with attacks on US personnel. Third, Iran may seek to recover the systems in part or in whole to either reverse engineer or sell the underlying technology.

EASTERN FRONT

Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. RUSSIAN FORCES LOSE KEY POSITIONS IN LYMAN, PUTTING EFFORT TO SEIZE THE DONBAS IN DOUBT

This week, Ukrainian forces announced the culmination of a months-long effort to retake positions north of the city of Lyman in occupied Donetsk oblast as part of “Operation Vivaldi”. The Ukrainian advances have retaken approximately 240 square kilometers of territory since May and effectively reduced a salient around Lyman that the Russian army had spent a year to build.

Takeaways:

1. Though Russian forces continue to make incremental advances elsewhere along the front (for a net gain of 58 square miles in the past four weeks), the loss of positions around Lyman puts a chief Russian war aim of seizing the entirety of the Donbas region further out of reach. Lyman sits on the northern flank of the Ukrainian “Fortress Belt”, a network of strategically important cities and towns occupying defensible terrain along the H-20 highway running from Slovyansk in the north to Kostyantynivka in the south. The Fortress Belt is Russia’s primary obstacle to seizing the remaining 20% of Donetsk that Russia needs to complete its conquest of the Donbas. Ukrainian gains around Lyman shore up Ukrainian lines around this key territory.

2. Like Ukraine’s 2024 Kursk Offensive, the latest advances are perhaps most significant in what they reveal about Russian vulnerability. Both surprise reversals puncture Russian narratives that its offensives have been deliberately slow and methodical and driven by irreversible momentum. Ukrainian gains ultimately suggest that Russian logistics and reserves are stretched thin, even in key areas along the frontline.

4. REPORT: TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NORTH KOREAN LABORERS ARE HELPING RUSSIA MAKE DRONES

The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, dedicated to tracking compliance with UN resolutions on North Korea, issued a new report on September 16, 2026, which found 25,000 North Korean laborers are employed in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone making drones for the Russian military.1 The laborers have been deployed to Russia under fabricated student visas in order to evade UN sanctions monitoring. Compensation Russia has provided for the labor has largely funneled into North Korea’s military industry.

Takeaways:

1. Alabuga represents the point at which the axis of US adversaries converges to play a decisive role in sustaining Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is where over the past four years Iranian Shahed drones have been transformed into mass-produced jet-powered hybrid drone/cruise missiles through battlefield feedback built on advanced technological components provided by China and cheap labor provided by North Korea (and other foreign nationals).

2. Pyongyang’s provision of tens of thousands of laborers to support the Russian war effort not only provides the Kim regime with cash for its military programs, but also provides North Korean industry with technical expertise in the mass manufacturing of modern attack drones.

3. Prominent Russian military blogger Rybar suggested in a September 17, 2026, commentary on the report that the partnership at Alabuga is no longer just about transactional exchanges of labor for technology and cash but represents a more fundamental integration of the Russian and North Korean security structures.

   Russian-North Korean ties should no longer be viewed solely as an exchange of money for labor or ammunition for technology. Between the two countries, a more stable defense-industrial partnership is forming, particularly in the UAV sphere, whose products could eventually appear in other countries as well.

   -(Rybar, September 17, 2026)

WESTERN PACIFIC FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

5. CHINA’S TOP SPY WARNS THAT UNCONTROLLED AI DEVELOPMENT POSES RISK TO CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY RULE

On September 12, 2026, Chen Yixin, the head of China’s Ministry of State Security, published a new article in China Cyberspace magazine “Comprehensively Fortify the AI Security Barrier and Promote the Healthy and Orderly Development of AI” (translated here by Bill Bishop) describing the challenge of regulating the development of artificial intelligence.

In the article Chen identified six risks and challenges associated with the development of artificial intelligence. In contrast to recent apocalyptic commentary in the West, the majority of the key risks identified by Chen, were notably focused on threats to internal political stability caused by users and meddling foreign powers, as opposed to hypothetical risks of misaligned Artificial General Intelligence.

Various hostile forces and people with ulterior motives are abusing generative artificial intelligence technologies such as deepfake audio and video, AI-generated text and images, and intelligent bot armies to fabricate political rumors in low-cost, mass-produced fashion, spread harmful information and incite antagonistic emotions, carrying out public-opinion warfare and cognitive warfare against us and directly threatening our political security, system security and ideological security.

-(Chen Yixin, September 12, 2026)

Chen proposed that frontier AI models require greater government oversight and an expansion of international cooperation under Chinese global governance frameworks.

Takeaways:

1. As the official chiefly responsible for maintaining China’s domestic security apparatus, Chen Yixin’s opinion is not inherently surprising. However, Chen’s commentary is nonetheless significant in that it highlights divergent Chinese and American views on the main dangers associated with AI and suggests ways in which these differences in perspective may complicate future talks on safeguards. Washington’s view of AI risks is notably conflicted, with policy makers fearing apocalyptic outcomes from unrestrained development, while on the other hand concerned that a pause in development will irrevocably cede ground to Chinese competition. As Chen’s commentary reveals, Beijing similarly views global governance as a necessity—but primarily as a means of promoting domestic political stability. This dynamic puts fundamental American and Chinese interests at odds, reinforcing arms race dynamics in AI development. In this case, the US attempts to race ahead, while in the process unlocking potentially destabilizing features for AI, a development that in turn causes China to double down on trying to dominate global AI governance to shore up its domestic stability, which spurs increasing US suspicion of China.

2. Chen’s article was likely timed to lay out China’s national interests and perspectives on AI development ahead of President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US next week in order to frame discussions with US policymakers.

6. CHINA COAST GUARD SHIP RAMS PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT VESSEL NEAR PALAWAN

On September 18, 2026, a China Coast Guard cutter collided with a vessel belonging to the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources near Sabina Shoal. According to Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Rear Admiral Jay Tarriela, the incident constituted an act of aggression directed against a Filipino government vessel engaged in humanitarian support to local fishermen within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

The incident occurred approximately 54 nautical miles off the coast of Palawan, well within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. The BFAR vessel was engaged in a lawful civilian mission to support the livelihood of Filipino fisherfolk when China Coast Guard vessel CCG-21585 repeatedly executed hazardous maneuvers before deliberately making contact with the Philippine vessel, causing damage and placing the lives of its civilian crew at risk.

-(Jay Tarriela, X, September 18, 2026)

Takeaways:

As noted in previous Weekly Significant Activity Reports, the China Coast Guard regularly conducts aggressive ramming and water cannon attacks against Filipino vessels as part of an effort to enforce Beijing’s vast territorial claims to the entirety of the South China Sea. These efforts have been amplified in recent months in response to vigorous pushback by the Philippines on the ten-year anniversary of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that rejected China’s claims. This incident is particularly notable, however, in that it occurred much closer to the Philippines’ main islands than the typical flashpoints of Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals, suggesting growing Chinese determination to escalate the conflict closer to Philippine shores.

7. NORTH KOREA VOWS TO EXPAND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM AT CHINESE DEFENSE FORUM

Speaking at China’s 13th Xiangshan Forum in Beijing on September 17, North Korean Vice Defense Minister Kim Kang-il announced that the country would continue strengthening and expanding its nuclear arsenal. Kim cited the necessity to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent as a response to growing tripartite military cooperation between the US, South Korea, and Japan.

Takeaways:

1. North Korea’s decision to publicly vow to expand its nuclear program at China’s premier security conference, rather than through a separate press statement issued by state media, is quite remarkable. The statement signals growing confidence by Pyongyang that its nuclear arsenal is not only recognized but tolerated by China and Russia. A tolerance exemplified by the fact that China risked offering North Korea an opportunity to make such an inflammatory statement at its conference, immediately prior to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington.

2. Kim Kang-il’s remarks were reinforced a day later by Kim Yo-jong (sister and top deputy of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un) who condemned joint US-South Korean-Japanese military exercise Pacific Vanguard as preparation for war and attributed North Korea’s continued expansion of its nuclear arsenal to a need for deterrence.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between September 5, 2026 and September 12, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. The US struck multiple Iranian oil tankers in response to continued Iranian threats to shipping and the seizure of a US unmanned submersible, provoking Iranian attacks on a US airbase in Jordan.

2. Yemen’s Houthi forces, supported and coordinated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), consolidated control of Red Sea shipping with the seizure of the port of Mokha and island of Perim.

3. The International Atomic Energy Agency voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for the first time in 20 years over continued noncompliance with UN nuclear safeguards.

The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

4. According to a new report, a joint Norwegian, UK, and US operation tracked and disrupted a Russian deep sea exercise near the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard testing the deployment of a new weapon to cut undersea cables without a trace.

5. On September 8, a suspected Russian Shahed-type drone violated Moldovan airspace near the country’s airport as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane prepared to depart.

Western Pacific Flashpoints - Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

6. North Korea launched multiple missiles and rockets into the Sea of Japan in an apparent protest of US-South Korea-Japan “Freedom Edge” maritime military exercises.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. IRAN AND US RESUME RECIPROCAL ATTACKS

Beginning on September 8, 2026, Iran and the US resumed multiple days of limited reciprocal strikes in response to continued Iranian threats to shipping and US warships near the Strait of Hormuz and the seizure of a US autonomous undersea vehicle (later identified as an Anduril Industries LD-Dive drone).

US airstrikes destroyed five Iranian oil tankers, while Iran claimed attacks on at least ten ships near the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in the apparent destruction of a US sail drone. Iran also struck the US’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, resulting in significant damage to an A-10 and light damage to eight F-15 fighters.

^{US strikes on Iranian tankers on September 8, 2026. Source: US Central Command}

Takeaways:

1. The US and Iran appear to have competing strategies for using incremental strikes to gain leverage in negotiations.

   The US strategy has shifted from retaliatory attacks on military targets in response to continued Iranian threats to shipping near the Strait of Hormuz to inflicting damage on Iran’s ability to export oil as part of Operation Economic Outcast. The strikes have focused on Iran’s fleet of tankers, a vulnerable node in the Iranian oil industry, whose overall capacity can be effectively reduced in repeated limited strikes without risking unrestrained Iranian retaliation against Gulf infrastructure. So far, US strikes have disabled 16 of the estimated 53-64 Iranian-flagged tankers that Tehran relies on to export oil. US policymakers likely assume that repeated attacks against a shrinking fleet will compel Iran to reassess the wisdom of its threats to the Strait of Hormuz. There is wisdom in this approach as US pressure has reduced Iran’s oil loadings in August by nearly 80% year-on-year. However, Iran’s exports are supported by a broader “shadow fleet” of at least 90 tankers, which are harder to track and disable, giving it greater runway for outlasting US pressure than official figures might suggest.

   Like the US strategy, Iran’s continued limited strikes on shipping near the Strait of Hormuz are designed to raise economic pressure on the US by perpetuating uncertainty in global oil and gas markets. The strikes also increase pressure on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to cut separate peace deals with Tehran in an attempt to fragment the US coalition and displace US regional influence. This broader Iranian effort to reduce the US military presence in the region is reinforced by repeated “de-basification” strikes that incrementally degrade US bases and force the US to prioritize the use of its limited air defense interceptors to defend a smaller number of bases farther from Iranian borders.

2. Iranian ballistic missile attacks on US warships appear to have become substantially more accurate in recent weeks. The Wall Street Journal reported on September 9 that US officials have become more certain that the gains in accuracy are the result of targeting assistance provided to Iran by Russia and China. The officials believe that it is still beyond Iranian capacity to organically collect near-real-time location data on US ships, and that Russia and China are likely providing the intelligence to allow Iran’s most advanced ballistic missiles to home in on targets with electro-optical sensors. A follow-on report by the Wall Street Journal on September 11, 2026, said that US officials believe a series of Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan that killed three American service members on July 17, 2026, was facilitated by Chinese satellite imagery.

2. ADVANCES AND ATTACKS BY IRANIAN PROXIES SQUEEZE SAUDI ARABIA

On September 10, 2026, Reuters reported that the Iranian IRGC provided coordination and support which helped facilitate the rapid Houthi advances this week along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The offensive by the Iranian proxy led to the capture of the key port city of Mokha and the island of Perim near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The Houthi advance coincided with attacks on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline on September 10, 2026. The attacks damaged multiple pumping stations along the pipeline and led to its shutdown for repairs. Saudi Arabia identified Iraq as the point of origin for the attacks and US President Donald Trump later suggested probable Iranian involvement in the attacks.

Takeaways:

1. The Iran-backed Houthi offensive appears to represent Iran’s major counterstroke to the ongoing US naval blockade which has strangled Iran’s own oil exports. The seizure of Mokha and Perim allows the IRGC and Houthis to more effectively block Saudi oil exports from exiting the Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. With both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb Strait contested, Saudi Arabia is forced to direct its oil exports through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean, adding considerable time to shipments and driving up the cost of oil worldwide.

2. The combined Houthi offensive and attacks on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline (presumably by Iran-backed Iraqi militias) indicate growing Iranian coordination across the axis of resistance to raise pressure on Saudi Arabia and the US by attempting to again throttle global oil exports. The operation likely represents Iran’s counterstroke to the ongoing US naval blockade to regain leverage ahead of the US midterm election and ongoing Iranian talks with the GCC.

3. IRAN REFERRED TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL BY IAEA OVER CONTINUED NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION CONCERNS

On September 9, 2026, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for continued noncompliance with reporting and inspection requirements for its nuclear program. The vote, championed by the US, UK, France, and Germany, marks the first time the IAEA has elevated the issue of Iranian nuclear nonproliferation concerns to the UN Security Council in 20 years.

Takeaways:

1. The vote is largely symbolic, as China and Russia have indicated that they will use their veto power on the UN Security Council to block any further UN actions against Iran. However, even as a symbolic gesture, the vote is still a valuable means of refocusing international attention back to Iran’s long history of violating UN nuclear safeguards, an issue that has been overshadowed in recent months by growing distrust of the US over its decision to go to war and the war’s fallout for the global economy.

2. A new report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) raised new concerns over continued clandestine nuclear activities conducted by Iran. The report identified a significant uptick in construction around the suspected undeclared nuclear site known as “Pickaxe Mountain” (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La in Farsi) in recent months. Pickaxe Mountain is believed to be a deeply buried nuclear research complex under construction beneath a granite mountain near the Natanz Nuclear Facility. Satellite imagery reviewed by CSIS showed more road activity around Pickaxe Mountain in 2026 than at any other time in its history, suggesting that Iran is rapidly preparing to shift its nuclear research to the site.

EASTERN FRONT

Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

4. REPORT: RUSSIA ATTEMPTED TO PRACTICE USE OF COVERT TELECOM CABLE CUTTER IN SPRING EXERCISE NEAR SVALBARD

On September 10, 2026, Reuters reported that the Russian military attempted to rehearse the use of a submarine-deployed device designed to covertly cut undersea cables during an April training exercise near the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard. The exercise, conducted by Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI), was disrupted by a joint operation by Norway, the UK, and the US.

Takeaways:

1. Russia has used threats to undersea cables as a means of testing the solidarity of the NATO alliance and disrupting European commerce and communications in recent years. The threats have become particularly pronounced since 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was immediately preceded by Russian naval drills near a cluster of transatlantic cables within Ireland’s exclusive economic zone. Since then, vessels of Russia’s “shadow fleet” have been suspected of involvement in more than a dozen instances of damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, though each incident only caused minor disruption. Russia’s attempt to test a clandestine cable-cutting device suggests it is looking for a means to conduct plausibly deniable attacks that leave more lasting damage.

2. Svalbard represents a potential flashpoint for war between NATO and Russia due to its unique status as both a part of Norway and a territory with visa-free travel to Russia and more than 40 other nations stipulated by the Svalbard Treaty. Analysts have warned for years that the combination of growing Russian military capability in the Arctic and uncertainties regarding NATO’s capacity to defend the region, due to prohibitions on military fortifications under Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty and enduring ambiguities on the applicability of NATO Article 5 guarantees, has made Svalbard a potential target for Russian provocations designed to test the unity of the NATO alliance.

5. RUSSIAN DRONES VIOLATE MOLDOVAN AND ROMANIAN AIRSPACE AND THREATEN ZELENSKY’S PLANE

On September 8, 2026, a suspected Russian Shahed-type drone launched from occupied Crimea engaged in a prolonged violation of Moldovan and Romanian airspace. According to Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, the drone passed near Moldova’s Chișinău International Airport at approximately the same time Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane prepared to depart for Oslo.

Takeaways:

1. Officials from Ukraine, Moldova, and the European Union have subsequently downplayed the risk to Zelensky’s aircraft, suggesting intelligence that the drone was either not armed or not directly targeting the Ukrainian President.

2. As noted in previous Weekly Significant Activity Reports, the number of Russian drones violating Moldovan and Romanian airspace has dramatically increased in recent months. The drone incursions form part of an intensifying Russian irregular warfare campaign to raise pressure on Moldova through a combination of military threats and influence operations to derail it from its ambitions to join the European Union.

   The incursions increasingly involve drones carrying explosives. The most recent example occurred on September 12, 2026, when a Russian attack drone flew through northern Moldova before crashing in a Romanian cornfield and exploding. The growing frequency of incursions has also corresponded with recent Russian attacks on Ukrainian border checkpoints near Moldova, including a September 9 attack on the Starokazache–Tudora border crossing near Odesa. Viewed together, these activities appear to form a concerted effort to erase territorial distinctions between the two countries and incrementally encompass Moldova in Russia’s “special military operation”. Moldovan President Maia Sandu warned of this trend in a September 9, 2026, post on X, stating:

   “Yesterday a Russian drone forced us to close our airspace temporarily. Today Russia is striking the points where people cross into Moldova. Russia's frontline is moving further west — which is why air defence for Ukraine is urgent.”

   -(Maia Sandu, September 9)

WESTERN PACIFIC FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

6. NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS NEW MISSILE TEST IN PROTEST OF US-SOUTH KOREA DRILLS

North Korea conducted a new missile test on September 12, 2026, launching multiple projectiles about 250 km into the East Sea (Sea of Japan). The test appeared to involve both Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles and 600mm rockets.

Takeaways:

The missile launches coincided with the end of the five-day “Freedom Edge” maritime military exercise conducted by the US, South Korea, and Japan near Jeju Island, suggesting a North Korean protest of the joint military drills which proceeded despite previous overtures by President Donald Trump to Kim Jong-un in August. North Korea previously declared Freedom Edge to be a threat to the country, given that it unites all three of its principal adversaries.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed in August 2026.

Executive Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. The US Department of Justice indicted 17 Iranian nationals for their involvement in cyber espionage operations targeting American universities, companies, and research institutions as part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Mabna Institute.

2. A Chinese national pleaded guilty to violating the US Arms Export Control Act for attempting to smuggle encrypted US military satellite radio systems to China through Mexico.

3. A CNN investigative report highlighted a surging number of suspicious incidents involving Chinese nationals near US military bases. The incidents involve surveillance, increasingly facilitated by drones, and collectively appear to form a decentralized Chinese intelligence campaign.

4. A new report by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party highlighted threats to US critical infrastructure posed by the continued presence of components sourced from banned Chinese companies in US internet networks.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

5. Germany blamed Russian military intelligence for an attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport involving multiple armed drones.

6. The Telegraph reported disclosures by British officials that an Iran-linked cyber attack shut down a small power plant in the country for four days.

1. SEVENTEEN IRANIANS INDICTED FOR CYBER ESPIONAGE CAMPAIGN AGAINST US INSTITUTIONS

On August 18, 2026, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced charges against 17 Iranians for an expansive state-directed cyber espionage and theft campaign targeting US companies, government agencies, and universities. The indicted Iranian hackers were affiliated with the Mabna Institute, an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated company founded in 2013 to steal foreign research for Iranian universities. According to the indictment, since its founding, the Mabna Institute has targeted as many as “144 U.S.-based universities, 178 foreign universities, at least 42 U.S.-based private sector companies, at least 11 foreign private sector companies, at least five U.S. federal and state government agencies, and at least two non-governmental organizations (NGOs)”, and stolen 31 terabytes of data and intellectual property.

The Mabna Institute hackers specifically sought research in medical and scientific fields and sold acquired data to Iranian academic publishing houses Megapaper.ir (Megapaper) and Gigapaper.ir (Gigapaper). The DOJ estimated that the value of the stolen research could have amounted to $3.4B.

Additional Information:

1. It is likely that the Mabna Institute specifically targeted universities due to their perceived value as the easiest targets within the US’s broader scientific research community. The hackers targeted 100,000 professors worldwide and successfully compromised at least 8,000 email accounts.

2. The Mabna Institute is only one of a number of Iranian actors targeting US research and intellectual property in recent years, motivated in part by a desire to circumvent the country’s global isolation. A May 22, 2026, report by cybersecurity firm Palo Alto Networks identified several clusters associated with the Iranian government-linked “Screening Serpens” advanced persistent threat group (AKA Nimbus Manticore, Smoke Sandstorm, UNC1549) that have targeted critical industries in the US, UK, and Middle East since late 2025. That campaign has utilized sophisticated lures, including personalized fake job postings for IT and software engineering positions, used to gain access to an individual’s devices and credentials.

2. CHINESE NATIONAL PLEADS GUILTY TO SMUGGLING US MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT THROUGH MEXICO

On August 10, 2026, 29-year old Chinese citizen Dingwei Chen pleaded guilty to violating the US Arms Export Control Act. Chen worked as part of a network of Chinese actors to purchase US military communications equipment, including encrypted satellite radios, and smuggle them back to China through Mexico.

Chen arranged for the purchase of 10 systems using encrypted messaging apps and a combination of cash and cryptocurrency:

“After making an initial down payment of over $40,000 U.S. dollars, Chen and his co-conspirators switched to cryptocurrency, noting that “cold wallets are essentially anonymous bank accounts. Each transaction processed through them is private and untraceable.” They went on to pay roughly $30,000 worth of USDT, which is a type of cryptocurrency.”

- (US Department of Justice, August 10, 2026)

Additional Information:

The guilty plea represents only the latest instance of Chinese smuggling of US military equipment abroad, and not just to supply the Chinese military but onward to partner nations such as North Korea and Iran:

1. In January 2024, four Chinese nationals—Liu Baoxia (刘保霞/ 劉保霞), also known as Emily Liu; Li Yongxin (李永欣), also known as Emma Lee; Yung Yiu Wa (耀華 容), also known as Stephen Yung; and Zhong Yanlai (鐘硯來), also known as Sydney Chung—were indicted by the US Department of Justice for a years-long operation smuggling controlled US-origin technology products through front companies in Hong Kong and mainland China to entities affiliated with the Iranian IRGC. In March 2025, the US Department of State announced a $15M reward for information leading to the arrest of the group.

2. In August 2025, a Chinese national was sentenced to eight years in US federal prison for smuggling $2M worth of US firearms, ammunition, and sensitive dual-use technology to North Korea via intermediaries in China. The US Department of Justice subsequently charged five additional Chinese nationals and one US citizen for their role in the scheme in January 2026.

3. NEW REPORT HIGHLIGHTS UNUSUAL AND GROWING CHINESE INTELLIGENCE CAMPAIGN TARGETING US MILITARY BASES

An August 31, 2026, report by CNN detailed a multi-agency effort to identify and counter growing drone intrusions at US military installations by Chinese nationals believed to be operating on behalf of Chinese intelligence. The report was particularly noteworthy for its depiction of such operations as a mix of targeted intelligence gathering and what officials termed “nuisance surveillance” conducted by amateurs and “intelligence entrepreneurs”.

Additional Information:

OPFOR Journal’s Homeland Security Brief - January 2026 noted that there have been dozens and possibly hundreds of cases of suspicious incidents involving Chinese nationals near US military bases in recent years. Many of the incidents appear individually innocuous, involving misunderstandings by enthusiastic tourists and hobbyists. However, when viewed collectively they suggest a pattern of coordinated crowd-sourced intelligence collection by Chinese authorities. As noted in the CNN article, the less professional “nuisance” operations may be intended to confuse US authorities and complicate efforts to identify and disrupt more sophisticated intelligence-gathering operations.

4. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT: BANNED CHINESE TELECOM COMPANIES MAINTAIN PRESENCE IN US CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

On August 4, 2026, the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party released a new investigative report “Stranger Pings: Chinese Telecom Companies Infiltrate U.S. Infrastructure” detailing the continued presence of components sourced from banned Chinese companies in US internet networks. The report specifically identified China Telecom Americas (CTA), China Mobile International USA (CMI USA), and China Unicom Americas (CUA), which previously had their Section 214 telecommunications licenses denied or revoked. The report states that the companies’ equipment has remained in place throughout US critical infrastructure due to loopholes in regulation that did not require the physical removal of affected Chinese components.

Of particular concern are Chinese components present in critical data chokepoints, including landing stations for submarine cables. According to the report:

CTA’s 2025 production to the Select Committee identified ten active points of presence (PoPs) across seven U.S. metro areas known for their concentration of data centers, submarine cable landings, or both: Ashburn, VA, Chicago, IL, Hillsboro, OR, Los Angeles, CA, Miami, FL, New York, NY, and San Jose, CA. CTA stated that it “only owns network equipment in the PoPs” with sites located in facilities operated by U.S. and PRC digital infrastructure companies.

CUA had the most extensively documented footprint. Witness 6 confirmed that the company owned equipment at leased facilities, and Witness 7 described roughly ten data centers after two closures. The company’s representations to the Select Committee document active colocation cages, power allocations, and live cross-connects across Ashburn, Chicago, Dallas, Hillsboro, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Reston, San Jose, Seattle, and Palo Alto among various providers. Notably, CUA retained active interconnections with major U.S. backbone providers.

CMI USA’s posture was different because the FCC denied China Mobile USA’s Section 214 application before the company received authority to provide covered international common-carrier services. Even so, CMI USA’s records identified 39 U.S. PoP entries across 27 distinct data center and interconnection facilities operated by U.S. digital infrastructure companies. This vast physical footprint allows the company to bypass the regular public internet and handle staggering amounts of data. Anchored inside major internet hubs across Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago, CMI USA commands an immense total network capacity of up to 1,380 gigabits per second. An internal interconnection inventory produced by the company details how the company uses its physical presence inside these facilities to plug directly into global telecom backbones, public data exchanges, and the private networks of major American tech giants operating right next to them. This is consistent with the Select Committee’s Shodan scans at the time, which identified at least 143 active China Mobile network assets across U.S. facilities.

- (“Stranger Pings”, House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, August 4, 2026.)

Additional Information:

The report suggests that the affected technology in US systems opens networks to intrusions by Chinese state-affiliated cyber actors such as “Salt Typhoon”, a notorious group that has targeted US critical infrastructure since 2021. While a definitive link between Salt Typhoon and China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom has not been independently established, previous reporting has suggested that the group appears to utilize inside knowledge of network architecture to evade detection and conduct operations, potentially facilitated by compromised hardware. Investigations into previous Salt Typhoon intrusions have traced its attacks on US government and defense industry networks, through US telecom companies, back to an apparent origin in Chinese infrastructure.

5. ATTEMPTED RUSSIAN DRONE ATTACK THREATENS GERMANY’S LEIPZIG/HALLE AIRPORT

On August 4, 2026, an employee at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport discovered a drone carrying an explosive device on the tarmac next to a Ukrainian An-124 cargo aircraft. The drone was part of an attempted sabotage attack that both the US and Germany have attributed to Russian military intelligence (GRU). DNA recovered from the drone matched evidence recovered from another suspected Russian plot involving incendiary packages aboard DHL commercial flights at the same airport in July 2024. Another armed drone was later recovered in a field west of the airport.

Additional Information:

1. The July 2024 plot involved at least four packages shipped through DHL from Lithuania to the UK and Poland. The plot has been assessed as a trial run for larger explosives to detonate in flight and destroy the DHL aircraft.

2. According to German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, a confidential situation report by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) has identified as many as 165 suspected cases of sabotage and 747 suspicious drone incidents in Germany in 2026. Russian involvement is suspected in many of the cases.

6. IRANIAN-LINKED CYBER ATTACK SHUTS DOWN UK POWER PLANT

On August 23, 2026, The Telegraph reported disclosures by British officials that Iranian regime-linked hackers targeted and effectively shut down a small power plant in the UK for four days. The location of the power plant was not identified, and officials claimed there was no lasting damage to the power grid or supply of electricity. The attack is believed to be the most successful of its kind targeting power generation infrastructure in the UK.

Additional Information:

1. The UK cyber attack occurred at roughly the same time as the series of Iranian-linked cyber attacks on US water systems in late July. These attacks are discussed in detail in the Situation Report: “US Water Systems Hit by Suspected Iranian Cyber Attacks”. On August 26, 2026, TechCrunch reported that officials at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) observed as many as 100 systems in the Water and Wastewater sector targeted by the attacks.

2. Both the UK and US attacks suggest Iran is becoming much more aggressive and sophisticated in its cyber operations and that such operations may increasingly be facilitated with AI tools to discover and exploit vulnerabilities. According to CISA, threat actors are using AI tools and open source software libraries to more rapidly scan systems and iterate attacks against operational technology (OT) running critical infrastructure using the following techniques:

   • Using Internet scanning services (e.g., Censys, ZoomEye) to identify Internet-exposed or insufficiently segmented Siemens S7 Series PLCs [T1596.005]

   • Rapidly iterating exploit code through AI-assisted development, lowering technical barriers to ICS attacks [T1587.004, T1588.007]

   • Taking advantage of insecure credentials to access exposed devices that have unconfigured (default) or minimally configured authentication [T1694]

   • Deploying AI-generated Python scripts that incorporate the snap7.dll library from public repositories [T0834] to gain read/write access to the PLC and mimic legitimate tools

   • Masquerading malicious scripts as legitimate monitoring tools to evade detection by security teams [T0849]

   • Conducting read/write operations on data blocks, potentially for reconnaissance, capability testing, or pre-positioning for effects operations [T0893, T0821]

     -(CISA, Alert Code: AA26-231A, August 19, 2026)

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

Hi, this is Dan White,

Due to overseas travel, there will be a two-week break from Weekly Significant Activity Reports. I will be in Bosnia and Herzegovina to attend the Sarajevo Security Conference 2026 where I have the privilege of joining a distinguished panel to discuss the Future of NATO and the Western Balkans.

The next Weekly Significant Activity Report will be on September 12. The Homeland Security Brief for August will be released in the first week of September as well.

NEW EXTERNAL PUBLICATION:

In the meantime, please check out this essay I co-authored with Gabriella Calder in Small Wars Journal entitled “Russia’s Baltic Maritime Insurgency”

This article is our contribution to maritime insurgency theory, whose contemporary study has focused mostly on China’s actions in the South China Sea. We make the case that Russia is conducting a similar water-borne insurgency in the Baltic Sea involving an increasingly militarized shadow fleet. We contend that the Kremlin’s use of this force to collect intelligence and disrupt regional commerce and connectivity goes beyond the defense of its oil trade and opportunistic attacks and has the characteristics of a campaign to alter the balance of power in the region and to set favorable conditions for a possible future land campaign against the Baltic States.

UPDATES:

You will also notice some changes coming to OPFOR Journal:

More Focused and Organized Weekly Significant Activity Reports:

When I started last May I had expansive ideas of covering all the ways in which China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea build and wield geopolitical power across the board. I have found that this is a noble aspiration, but one that is very difficult for one person with limited time to achieve effectively. So, I have continued to narrow the focus of what is significant in weekly reports. As you might have noticed, Weekly Significant Activity Reports now sort significant activities into overarching categories based on their relevance to geopolitical flashpoints. Right now these are:

1. US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

2. The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. Western Pacific Flashpoints - Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

One or two additional categories will likely be introduced in the near future, including one dedicated to developments in the nuclear and strategic weapons programs of each country.

A Refreshed Look:

Thanks to the generosity of paid subscribers, I have bought a membership to Canva Pro, which I will be putting to use updating OPFOR Journal’s branding. Below is a before and after for changes to Weekly Significant Activity Reports and Homeland Security Briefs.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between August 15, 2026 and August 22, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. Threats of “Economic D-Day” by US President Trump provoked divided responses from Iranian leaders in a sign of a renewed public rift over government policy between pragmatists and hardliners.

2. European officials have assessed that Russia is shipping explosives, weapons, and drone components to Iran through the Caspian Sea to help it prepare for renewed fighting with the US.

The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. Multiple suspected Russian drones and one missile landed in Romania and Moldova this week, the latest incidents in an increasingly brazen hybrid warfare campaign directed at both countries.

4. Ukrainian intelligence has assessed that Russia has received at least 50 ballistic missiles from North Korea, including supplies of new Hwasong-11C models.

Western Pacific Flashpoints - Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

5. China approved the construction of a new “Marine Ecological and Environmental Field Observation and Research Station” near Scarborough Shoal, in a new measure to wrest the territory from the Philippines.

6. North Korea responded to dramatic new overtures by US President Trump to resume official talks with a series of ambivalent press releases and missile launches.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. IRANIAN LEADERS DIVIDED OVER RESPONSE TO US “ECONOMIC D-DAY” THREAT

Iranian leaders provided mixed responses to President Donald Trump’s August 19, 2026, Truth Social announcement that the US would impose an “ECONOMIC D-DAY” against Iran with the “MOST CRUSHING ECONOMIC OPERATION EVER TAKEN AGAINST ANY COUNTRY!”

As expected, many Iranian leaders provided defiant responses to the new US threats, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claiming the new announcement was ultimately a distraction from the US’s own economic woes, including historic levels of debt.

However, key Iranian leaders voiced concern that a prolonged standoff could inflict lasting damage on the Iranian economy. In remarks to the Islamic Association of the Iranian Medical Society on August 21, 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called for ending the war with the US immediately, “while we are in a position of power and honor.” A day earlier, on August 20, 2026, Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that Iranian military power would not save it from collapse if “the people are hungry and we lack financial turnover, economic growth, and national production.”

Takeaways:

1. The divergent views by top Iranian political leaders reopened a rift between so-called pragmatists pushing for a speedy negotiated settlement to the war on terms favorable to Iran, versus an ascendant group of hawkish officials affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pursuing a more radical transformation of Iranian regional influence through unrestrained use of military power. IRGC media outlet, Fars News Agency, issued a public rebuke of Pezeshkian, claiming that the President’s suggestion for peace projected weakness that would encourage new aggression by the US and damage trust in government. Hardline officials similarly castigated Ghalibaf for weakness.

   
   Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf have repeatedly encountered frustration in attempting to rein in what they perceive to be self-destructive actions by the IRGC, including indiscriminate attacks on neighboring countries and continued ceasefire violations. Both men have also reportedly sought to have Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi removed from his post due to their belief that he was ceding civilian governance to the IRGC. Pezeshkian is believed to have become so exasperated by a perceived takeover of policymaking by the military as to have offered his resignation to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei in late May.

2. Iran is no stranger to economic pressure. As many analysts have pointed out, Iran has decades of experience coping with US sanctions. However, Iran’s economic resilience is not limitless, and the country may be historically vulnerable to economic pressure. This year’s protest movement was largely motivated by widespread public dissatisfaction with worsening living standards triggered by a collapse of the value of the rial. While the Iranian regime ruthlessly suppressed the protests by shutting down the internet and killing thousands (or even tens of thousands) of demonstrators, conditions remain ripe for a new round of civil unrest.

   
   According to estimates by Iranian officials, the war inflicted over $270B in damage to the Iranian economy, equivalent to about three-quarters of the country’s nominal GDP of $362B. Current US measures have stifled Iran’s ability to recover from that devastation, with the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Abdolnaser Hemmati, announcing on August 19, 2026, that sanctions and the ongoing US naval blockade have effectively reduced Iran’s oil exports to zero.

   Increased vulnerability does not, however, mean that US economic pressure will necessarily translate into either a quick reopening of the Strait of Hormuz or substantive behavioral change by the Iranian regime. As noted in Weekly Significant Activity Report - August 15, 2026, aggressive ideologues have been appointed to top positions in Iran’s military and security apparatus in apparent anticipation of a prolonged standoff with the US. These hardliners may assume that they can simply outlast the Trump administration given coming US midterm elections. However, in the event that pressure is prolonged and leads to a severe economic downturn, the increasingly hawkish regime is likely to double down on aggression and launch threatened offensive operations against neighboring countries to strike back at the US. We should therefore expect the current lull in combat to be a temporary interregnum that is mutually convenient for both the US and Iran, rather than a step toward permanently deescalating the war.

2. RUSSIA IS REPORTEDLY HELPING IRAN REARM

On August 17, 2026, NBC News reported that European officials have assessed that Russia is helping Iran prepare for renewed fighting with the US by shipping it TNT and other explosives, ammunition, and components for drones through the Caspian Sea.

Takeaways:

1. While Russia’s defense industry is working at a fever pitch to keep up with demand for the War in Ukraine, it is likely that Russia is willing and able to provide some equipment and raw materials to Iran. Russian leaders likely assess that a US quagmire in the Middle East is a win-win situation that boosts global demand for Russian oil and gas, distracts the US and divides NATO, and continues to drain Western stocks of precision-guided munitions and Patriot missile interceptors that could have ended up in Ukraine.

2. The trans-Caspian route has become a significant corridor for mutual military assistance between Russia and Iran since the start of the War in Ukraine in 2022. Iran is believed to have used untracked cargo ships to transfer hundreds of Shahed-type drones to Russia through the Caspian Sea in 2022 and 2023, providing the Kremlin its first stocks of the now ubiquitous weapon. Ukraine notably attacked an Iranian cargo ship it suspected of involvement in the Caspian arms trade on July 25, 2026.

   

EASTERN FRONT

Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

3. RUSSIAN DRONES AND MISSILES MENACE ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA

Suspected Russian Air and Sea Drones Violated Romanian Territory

On August 20, 2026, the Romanian Ministry of Defense announced that a Romanian F-16 destroyed an explosive-laden sea drone near the Neptun Deep gas exploration platform in the Black Sea. The incident followed earlier reports from the Romanian Ministry of Defense that an aerial drone had entered Romanian airspace from Ukraine and crash-landed in an uninhabited area near Tulcea County. Both incidents are under investigation. However, Romanian President Nicușor Dan has implied Russia was behind the recent drone incursions.

^{Romanian F-16 destroys sea drone near the Neptun Deep platform. Source: Romania Insider}

Suspected Russian Missile Exploded in Moldova

On August 17, 2026, an unidentified aerial object crossed into Moldovan airspace from Ukraine and exploded in a corn field near the village of Talmaza, in Stefan Voda district. The Ukrainian Air Force identified the object as a Russian S8000 “Banderol” miniature cruise missile. Moldovan President Maia Sandu similarly attributed the incident to Russia, though she described the offending object as a drone.

Takeaways:

1. These latest incidents represent escalations in Russia’s grey-zone operations targeting Romania. Romania claims that as many as 23 drones of Russian origin have violated its airspace so far this year, a dramatic increase compared to 18 such incidents recorded between February 2022 and December 2025. The most notable of these incidents was on May 29, 2026, when a Russian Shahed drone struck a 10-story apartment building in Galati, Romania, and exploded, injuring two residents. A drone strike on Neptun Deep, Romania’s largest gas platform, could have been even more devastating.
   
   Still, the seaborne incursion was likely a symbolic demonstration of the Kremlin’s capabilities to threaten European interests well into the future rather than a serious attempt to bring down Neptun Deep. The platform will make Romania the largest producer of European natural gas when it becomes operational in 2027, the same year the European Union (EU) plans to totally phase out imports of Russian gas. The incident is likely a Kremlin signal to European leaders that they should not get too comfortable assuming that they can so easily free themselves from Russian influence over their energy supplies, nor feel that such diversified supply would allow them greater leverage to pressure Russia in the future.

2. The suspected Banderol explosion marks the first time a Russian missile has struck Moldovan territory. The incident appears to be a limited but nonetheless deliberate provocation by the Kremlin to probe responses to increasingly direct attacks on Moldovan territory. The missile explosion follows an August 14, 2026, investigative report by The New York Times which asserted that the Kremlin has made destabilizing Moldova a top priority in order to undermine its accession to the EU.

4. UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENCE: RUSSIA HAS RECEIVED NEW STOCKS OF NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILES

Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) reported this week that it has assessed that Russia has received about 50 ballistic missiles from North Korea in recent weeks. Russia’s stocks of North Korean missiles included new Hwasong-11C (KN-30) series models never before used in combat.

Takeaways:

1. Despite its own robust domestic production of long-range drones and missiles, Russia has several reasons to want to secure North Korean ballistic missiles and launchers:

   1. Russia is trying to seize a window of opportunity to inflict as much damage on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure as possible while its inventory of anti-ballistic missile interceptors is depleted. Every missile counts in this endeavor.

   2. While Russia is ramping up production of its own ballistic missiles (and some Ukrainian estimates suggest Russia is even exceeding its production targets for some systems), its capacity has definite limits. Missiles are far more expensive and difficult to manufacture than drones. Sophisticated Russian ballistic missiles such as the Iskander-M cost as much as $3M per unit. Given a growing state budget deficit and deteriorating economic conditions (which have drawn increased scrutiny from Russian officials), Russia will not be able to scale the production of missiles to the same degree that it has achieved with drones. Even with increased production, Russia is still unlikely to domestically produce sufficient quantities of missiles to keep up with demand for both winning the war in Ukraine and replenishing its stocks to deter NATO.

   3. North Korean missiles will help Russia offset potential reliability issues with its Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s HUR has assessed that Russia paused production of Kinzhals in April 2026 to resolve significant problems with the missile’s accuracy.

2. According to NK News, the Hwasong 11C possesses the following history and characteristics:

   Revealed alongside a shortened Hwasong-11A variant at the 2021 8th Party Congress parade, the Hwasong-11C (Hwasong-11Da, KN-30) is a lengthened Hwasong-11-family missile carried in pairs on a 10×10 heavy-duty TEL. First tested a few months later with a depressed trajectory incorporating irregular pull-up flight manoeuvres, it demonstrated a range of at least 600 km. State commentary suggested its warhead had been increased to 2,500 kg, likely to outperform South Korea’s Hyunmoo-4, and it could potentially also carry a smaller Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead to threaten targets in Japan. In early 2024 a ‘Hwasongpho-11Da-4.5’ variant was tested with a claimed 4,500 kg warhead, though state media unusually paired this with a claim that the test was conducted at the type’s maximum range of only 500 km.

WESTERN PACIFIC FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

5. CHINA GREEN LIGHTS THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH STATION NEAR SCARBOROUGH SHOAL

On August 18, 2026, the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology (SCSIO) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences announced that the Chinese government officially approved plans for the construction of a “Marine Ecological and Environmental Field Observation and Research Station” near Scarborough Shoal. The new research station will integrate into a network of similar stations in the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands to “further improve the comprehensive island reef observation network in the South China Sea.”

Takeaways:

1. The move is the latest effort by China to use a combination of military and civilian measures to permanently wrest control over Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. As noted in previous Weekly Significant Activity Reports, China’s determination to seize the Shoal appears to have grown in recent weeks in response to increasing assertiveness by the Philippines and its allies in the wake of the 10th anniversary of the 2016 UN Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that denied Chinese claims to the territory.

2. The plan for an environmental station at Scarborough Shoal flows from a September 2025 move by Beijing to designate the Philippine territory a Chinese “nature reserve.” The designation and subsequent plan for installing a monitoring station have themselves been justified by damage inflicted on the Shoal and neighboring waters by destructive Chinese clam fishing practices.

3. As indicated in the official government announcement, the new station will integrate into a broader network of maritime infrastructure on other disputed territories across the South China Sea, equipped with dual-use sensors capable of supporting Chinese military operations.

6. NORTH KOREA RESPONDS TO NEW OVERTURES BY PRESIDENT TRUMP WITH MISSILES AND AMBIVALENT PRESS RELEASES

In a series of press statements issued between August 19 and August 20, Kim Yo Jong, the sister and top deputy to North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, appeared to downplay suggestions of detente with the US. The flurry of messages came in response to the abrupt decision by President Donald Trump to scale back major joint military exercises between the US and South Korea.

The press statements were followed by North Korea’s launch of 10 short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on August 20.

Takeaways:

1. While Pyongyang’s response was not overtly receptive to President Trump’s overtures, it does not appear to have outright rejected warming ties with the US either. As noted in Weekly Significant Activity Report - August 2, 2025, North Korea, through the person of Kim Yo Jong, has been signaling interest in renewed dialogue with the Trump administration since at least July 2025. North Korea, however, has made any sustained dialogue contingent on a change in US policy away from denuclearization and toward an official recognition of its status as a nuclear power.
   
   The US is unlikely to make such a dramatic shift in its approach to nuclear nonproliferation as such a move would potentially undermine its ability to negotiate an end to the war with Iran, where denuclearization remains the central objective. The dramatic curtailing of joint US-South Korean military training may have been a gambit to restart dialogue by offering a different concession. However, North Korea for its part is not likely to rush back to talks with the US, as it has seen both its economy and global prestige grow due to increased cooperation with Russia and China.

2. The week’s exchanges also provided new public insight into intelligence assessments of the current size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. President Trump announced that the North possessed 57 “very powerful” nuclear weapons. South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back offered a higher estimate to the South Korean Parliament, suggesting the North had between 80 and 120 nuclear weapons.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between August 8, 2026 and August 15, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed hardliners to seven top positions in the Iranian military and security apparatus on August 10, 2026, a move that institutionalizes an offensive shift in Iranian foreign policy and prepares the regime to crush future civil unrest.

The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

2. Russia launched multiple waves of attacks on Ukrainian cities involving hundreds of drones and missiles amid depleted stocks of Ukrainian air defense interceptors. Attacks on August 9, 2026, singled out Odesa as part of a distant blockade of the port to stymie Ukrainian grain exports.

Western Pacific Flashpoints - Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

3. Frigates of the Chinese and Indonesian navies conducted a joint exercise in the waters east of Taiwan on August 12, 2026, a move that marked an escalation in an ongoing Chinese campaign to normalize its control over waters claimed by Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines.

4. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the disputed Kuril Islands in the western Pacific for the first time on August 13, 2026, as part of a tour of the Russian Far East, a move which triggered protests from Japan.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. IRAN SHUFFLES TOP LEADERS

On August 10, Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed new leaders to seven top positions in the military and national security apparatus. The new appointees include:

• Mohsen Rezaei - Appointed Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Rezaei replaces Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, who served in the position on an interim basis after Ali Larijani was killed on March 17, 2026, during Operation Epic Fury. Rezaei previously served as a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader.

• Major General Ahmad Vahidi - Appointed Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Vahidi replaces Lieutenant General Mohammad Pakpour, who was killed on February 28, 2026, during Operation Epic Fury. This is a promotion for Vahidi, who previously served as Deputy Commander for the IRGC.

• Major General Mostafa Izadi - Appointed Deputy Commander of the IRGC. Izadi replaces Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who has been promoted to IRGC Commander. Izadi previously served as Commander of the Cyber and New Threats Headquarters of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

• Major General Ali Abdollahi - Appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. Abdollahi replaces Lieutenant General Abdolrahim Mousavi, who was killed on February 28, 2026, during Operation Epic Fury. Abdollahi previously served as Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

• Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari - Appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. Heydari replaces Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani.1 Heydari previously served as Deputy Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

• Rear Admiral Ali Ozamaei - Appointed Commander of the IRGC Navy. Ozamaei replaces Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed on March 26, 2026, during Operation Epic Fury. Ozamaei previously served as Deputy Commander of the IRGC Navy.

• Hossein Taeb - Appointed Commander of the Basij paramilitary force. Taeb replaces Gholamreza Soleimani, who was killed on March 17, 2026, during Operation Epic Fury. Taeb previously served as Deputy IRGC Commander for Intelligence until 2022 and then as an adviser to the IRGC Commander.

Takeaways:

1. The new appointments suggest an institutionalization of Iran’s shift to a strategy of strategic defense and operational offense. The mixed doctrine seeks to use force against key regional infrastructure belonging to the US and Gulf states as well as to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz to reverse a trend of increasingly large-scale attacks by the US and Israel on Iranian territory and push US military bases farther from its territory.

2. The elevation of ruthless hardliners to top positions in the regime’s security apparatus also appears to be a measure to prepare for renewed civil unrest amid deteriorating economic conditions wrought by the war and a prolonged US naval blockade. Nearly all appointees have a proven willingness to kill Iranian civilians. Major General Ahmad Vahidi, for instance, is sanctioned by the US for his role in orchestrating systematic human rights abuses by Iranian security forces, including the crackdown on national protests in 2022 while serving as Minister of the Interior. Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari commanded the ground forces of the Iranian Army during the crackdown on anti-government protests in 2019. Major General Ali Abdollahi oversaw the massacre of political prisoners at Rasht prison in Gilan province in July 1988 as part of a national purge decreed by then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Hossein Taeb has played a key role in suppressing internal dissent in Iran for decades and has been sanctioned by the US since 2010 for his role in crushing national protests as commander of the Basij in 2009.

EASTERN FRONT

Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

2. RUSSIA RAMPS UP ATTACKS ON UKRAINIAN CITIES

Russia Launched Major Drone and Missile Attack on Odesa

On August 9, 2026, Russia launched a massive bombardment of the Ukrainian port city of Odesa, involving 11 ballistic missiles and a combination of 100 drones and “Banderol” mini cruise missiles. The attack injured 14 people and caused damage to nine areas of the city including the port infrastructure.

Russia Conducted Massive Attack on Ukrainian Cities, including with North Korean Missiles

On August 11, 2026, Russia conducted a large-scale drone and missile attack on Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia, killing 11 and injuring at least 24. Seven of the eleven killed were workers of Zaporizhzhia’s Zaporizhstal metallurgical plant. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that the attacks on Zaporizhzhia involved North Korean ballistic missiles.

Takeaways:

1. On a strategic level, the attacks on Ukrainian cities are part of an intensifying Russian campaign to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure and inflict civilian casualties amid dwindling supplies of Ukrainian anti-ballistic missiles. This strategy is aimed at degrading civilian morale and increasing internal displacement to trigger a new wave of migration out of the country. The Kremlin may hope that major displacement, particularly in winter amid power and heating shortages, could lead to an internal political crisis in Ukraine and a surge in nationalist resentment among its neighbors absorbing refugees, which would potentially increase pressure for Kyiv to capitulate.

2. The use of North Korean missiles to complement its arsenal of domestically made munitions indicates that Russia is taking full advantage of the window of opportunity presented by Ukraine’s depleted stocks of air defense interceptors.

3. On an operational level, the attack on Odesa is part of a revamped Russian campaign to block Ukraine’s grain trade at harvest time. More than 90% of Ukraine’s grain is shipped through Odesa and adjacent Black Sea ports. Since June, Russia has sought to block that trade by attacking at least 50 Ukrainian cargo ships. Russia may be reviving a distant blockade of Odesa in the hopes of achieving greater effects this year amid global supply chain disruptions caused by the war between the US and Iran.

WESTERN PACIFIC FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity in the Western Pacific and Taiwan

3. CHINA AND INDONESIA CONDUCT JOINT NAVAL EXERCISE EAST OF TAIWAN

On August 11, 2026, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced an impending joint naval exercise between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the navy of Indonesia in the waters east of Taiwan. The exercise, held the following day on August 12, 2026, involved the PLA Navy’s Type 054A frigate Honghe and Indonesian Navy frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai. The frigates conducted a passing exercise testing joint communication and replenishment at sea.

Takeaways:

1. The exercise is less provocative than the Chinese military initially suggested it would be. Passing exercises (PASSEX) are common and brief training exercises initiated between ships passing one another at sea. In any case, hosting a joint military exercise in the waters east of Taiwan is an escalation of China’s increasingly assertive maritime claims in the western Pacific. In an interview with English-language Chinese state media outlet Global Times, Chinese military affairs analyst Zhang Junshe suggested the exercises sought to normalize control over the waters that feature overlapping claims by Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines:

   "China has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone east of Taiwan Island. Inviting foreign naval vessels to conduct training in waters under China's own jurisdiction is normal and reasonable. The act also demonstrates that China has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over these waters. The relevant scope of China's sovereignty and maritime rights and interests includes the territorial waters east of Taiwan island, as well as the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf."

   -(Zhang Junshe, Global Times, August 12, 2026)

   To this end, involving a major Southeast Asian nation in its maritime sovereignty patrols is a major step forward for China in its attempt to shift international consensus in favor of its vast territorial claims to not only the island of Taiwan but the vast waters of the western Pacific, including, but not limited to, the South China Sea.

2. The exercise comes amid an assessment by Taiwanese national security officials that Chinese leaders adopted a more assertive policy to reunify with Taiwan at their annual summer retreat at Beidaihe. According to the Taipei Times, the policy adopted has four key pillars to increase internal and external pressure on the Taiwanese government and establish de facto control over the island.

   First, China opposes Taiwan seeking independence by force, the official said.

   The CCP believes that Taiwan increasing its military investment or expanding deployment of uncrewed aerial vehicles would radically disrupt China’s favorable position in the Taiwan Strait, the official said.

   Second, China would strengthen “de facto governance” over Taiwan, they said.

   The CCP would continue to suppress Taiwan’s international space and sovereignty through legal and cognitive warfare, the official said.

   Third, China would mobilize resources to cover all sectors in Taiwan to jointly oppose and frustrate Taiwanese independence forces and form a force supporting cross-strait unification, they said.

   Fourth, China would give its all-out support to “patriotic forces” in Taiwan during the year-end elections, the official said.

   -(Taipei Times, August 11, 2026)

4. PUTIN MAKES FIRST VISIT TO DISPUTED KURIL ISLANDS

On August 13, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Iturup, the largest island of the Kuril chain, during a multi-day tour of the Russian Far East. The trip was Putin’s first visit to the Kuril Islands, historic Japanese territories located off the northeastern coast of Hokkaido that were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War.

Japan summoned Russian Ambassador to Japan Nikolay Nozdrev to protest the visit and is reportedly considering an array of further retaliatory measures.

Takeaways:

1. Putin’s visit coincides with the publication of a new defense white paper by Japan’s Ministry of Defense on August 4, 2026. The paper characterized Russia as a growing threat to Japanese national security due to its increased security cooperation with both China and North Korea. The paper also asserted that Russia has grown increasingly provocative in its military activities near Japanese borders. In Fiscal Year 2025, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force reported scrambling fighters 214 times to intercept Russian aircraft in its air defense identification zone.

2. The unprecedented move by Putin is likely designed to more closely align Russia with China’s ongoing pressure campaign against the government of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Putin may be inclined to sacrifice relations with Japan in the hopes of securing key economic deals with China, the most significant of which is the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. Beijing has yet to greenlight the construction of the natural gas pipeline despite over a decade of negotiations and a purportedly “binding” agreement reached in 2025. Russia needs the pipeline to make up for some of the gas volume lost from European sanctions, but China continues to hold out for greater discounts in pricing and flexibility in purchases.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between August 1, 2026 and August 8, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. Negotiations to end Iranian attacks on shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz were cast into doubt amid a new set of six Iranian demands released on August 8.

The Eastern Front - Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

2. Suspected Russian drones menaced Germany this week, threatening Leipzig/Halle airport and a key German military base near Mechernich.

3. Ukrainian officials reported information that North Korea plans to deploy six ballistic missile launchers along with as many as 120 missiles to Russia in coming weeks.

South China Sea Flashpoints - Significant Activity Related to China’s Military Activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan

4. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and China Coast Guard conducted major military exercises near Scarborough Shoal on August 1 in a show of force to reassert Chinese claims to the Philippine territory.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. DEAL TO REOPEN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ CAST INTO DOUBT BY NEW MAXIMALIST IRANIAN DEMANDS

This week the US and Iran conducted indirect negotiations through Middle Eastern intermediaries to resume a ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz to maritime shipping. Discussions reportedly focused on a new temporary deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz with two lanes of transit, one through mostly Iranian waters where Iran would control inbound traffic and one closer to Oman for outbound traffic. Disputes continued about fees to be collected and whether they would be voluntary contributions as in the Strait of Malacca or a system of tolls.

However, negotiations were upended on August 8, 2026, when Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council appeared to reject the emerging framework in favor of more maximalist conditions for reopening the Strait. Noor News, the state-media outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, listed six new demands from Zolghadr:

1- Never threaten Iran with any language or insult the sanctities of this nation.

2- End the war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq forever.

3- Lift the naval blockade and withdraw its military forces (naval and air force) from around Iran.

4- Pay the damages for the two wars of aggression and imposition on Iran without any reduction or reduction.

5- Lift the cruel and illegal sanctions against the Iranian nation.

6- Unconditionally release the frozen and stolen assets of the Iranian people.

-(Noor News, August 8, 2026)

Iranian attacks on shipping continued throughout the week with at least three vessels struck near the Strait of Hormuz despite a cessation of US bombing.

Takeaways:

Iran continues to press its advantage for several reasons:

1. First, after years of setbacks, Iran has finally reasserted itself and may feel it has the upper hand. Having survived the initial US-Israeli combined offensive, Iranian officials are likely confident that a more intense bombing campaign is unlikely to come in the near future given limitations on US munitions stockpiles. They are also likely to assume that a ground offensive is equally unlikely given the broad unpopularity of the war among the American public.

2. Second, Iranian leaders are exerting as much pressure as they can in an attempt to break what they view as a cycle of progressively worsening predations by the US. The continued throttling of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has created a major strategic dilemma for the US, which Iran may hope will cause it to rethink its entire long-term involvement in the Middle East in order to avoid falling into another “forever war.” As the situation currently stands, the options for US policymakers include: facing public humiliation by accepting maximalist Iranian terms for ending the war, risking a global economic downturn spurred by shortages of petroleum products through a prolonged standoff at the Strait of Hormuz, or gambling on a costly escalation in the conflict. Hawkish Iranian officials, whose strategy to widen the war and close the Strait of Hormuz has thus far been key to a reversal in Iran’s strategic fortunes, may assume it is a matter of time before the US is forced to retreat due to inherent firepower constraints and a desire by the White House to focus on domestic politics in a must win mid-term election. Iran may hope to speed up the US retreat by threatening progressively worsening outcomes the longer the conflict continues.

3. Finally, hawkish Iranian officials likely relish every opportunity to humiliate the Trump administration and the United States more broadly. The continued frustration Iran is inflicting on the US and its allies is a form of payback for years of perceived humiliation dating back to the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani. Iran’s attacks on the US, now from a position of strength, also renew the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and help it recover from a period of significant weakness following January’s mass public uprisings and the US-Israeli strikes on its top leaders in February and March.

4. It is also worth considering that the new set of six demands by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr may be a gambit motivated by complex domestic politics rather than sensible foreign policy considerations. Zolghadr’s position as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council has been called into question in recent days. IranWire has reported that rumors circulating through Iranian domestic media in the first week of August suggest that Zolghadr may be replaced by Mohsen Rezaei, a top advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader and former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Rezaei holds extremely hawkish and uncompromising views, and the new list of demands by Zolghadr may be a gambit to outmaneuver a challenge from him and secure the backing of hardline officials.

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EASTERN FRONT

Significant Activity Related to the War in Ukraine and Russian threats to NATO

2. GERMANY MENACED BY SUSPECTED RUSSIAN DRONES

Armed Drone Found Near Ukrainian Cargo Plane in Germany

On August 5, 2026, a drone carrying an explosive device was found next to a Ukrainian An-124 cargo aircraft at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle airport. The incident occurred at roughly the same time that another cargo plane nearby reported colliding with an unidentified object.

US intelligence officials have assessed that the armed drone was most likely Russian in origin. The Russian Embassy in Berlin issued a statement denying responsibility and describing the incident as a “hastily concocted provocation” by Ukraine and Europe to generate public support for continued hostility to Russia.

Drones Spotted Near Germany’s Mechernich Military Base

On August 6, 2026, security personnel at Germany’s Bundeswehr base in Mechernich reported observing two drones flying nearby. The base serves as a key maintenance hub for US Patriot missile systems.

Takeaways:

1. The suspected Russian drone incidents follow multiple warnings by Western officials this week that the Kremlin is poised to engage in more aggressive actions toward European members of NATO in the near future. On August 6, the Wall Street Journal reported that senior US intelligence officials increasingly believe that Russia may launch an attack or other major provocation directed at one of its European neighbors in the next few years in order to test the resolve of NATO. On the same day, Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas issued a more specific warning suggesting that Russia may be planning to use captured Ukrainian drones to launch attacks on NATO member states.

2. The intention behind a Russian false flag attack using Ukrainian drones would likely be to increase distrust in Ukraine and in particular the Zelensky government in order to create division among NATO leaders regarding future military assistance. Ukrainian drones have on multiple occasions in recent months violated the airspace of NATO member states, allegedly redirected by Russian electronic warfare. In one instance on May 7, 2026, two Ukrainian drones crashed into a fuel storage facility in eastern Latvia near the city of Rēzeknē. The incident caused significant embarrassment for the Latvian government, which led to the firing of the country’s defense minister, Andris Spruds, followed by the resignation of its prime minister, Evika Silina.

3. False flag attacks would serve to erode the general presumption in the West that drone and missile incursions into NATO airspace originating from Ukraine are Russian in origin. Confusion over the attribution of future attacks would permit Russia greater leeway in aggressive boundary pushing hybrid attacks on NATO.

4. The drones spotted near Mechernich may have been conducting surveillance on Patriot missile systems at the base to better understand the status of the future air defense supplies to Ukraine. The drones were likely launched from inside Germany by foreign collaborators with the Russian intelligence services. Russia has relied on a combination of sympathetic German nationals as well as disaffected Ukrainian refugees and Russian migrants as disposable assets to conduct intelligence collection and acts of sabotage inside the country.

3. NORTH KOREA PLANNING TO DEPLOY NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE UNITS TO RUSSIA

Reuters reported on August 5, 2026, that Ukrainian officials believe Moscow and Pyongyang are making plans for a deployment of up to six North Korean ballistic missile launchers equipped with 120 missiles to be deployed to Russia.

Takeaways:

1. Sensing a period of vulnerability, Russia may be trying to acquire North Korean launchers to maximize its opportunities to land crippling blows against Ukrainian critical infrastructure while Ukraine has limited supplies of air defense interceptors.

2. Ukrainian authorities have documented the repeated use of North Korean Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles by the Russian military since 2024, suggesting the coming systems may be from the same series. Hwasong-11s are larger and heavier than Russian Iskander-M missiles but are roughly comparable in appearance and functionality, making them an ideal supplement for Russian forces. The most recent Russian attack using a suspected North Korean missile was on July 30 in the village of Radushne near the city of Kryvyi Rih. The attack struck a residence, killing a family of six.

3. The missile deployment may also be a component of a new wave of North Korean involvement in the war, which Ukrainian officials have been anticipating in recent weeks. During a nightly address on August 8, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine has information that North Korea recently agreed to station between 30,000 and 50,000 troops in Russia.

SOUTH CHINA SEA FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity Related to China’s Military Activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan

4. CHINA’S NAVY AND COAST GUARD CONDUCT MAJOR SHOW OF FORCE AT SCARBOROUGH SHOAL

On August 1, 2026, the Southern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted large-scale military exercises near Scarborough Shoal. The exercises involved at least four warships of the People’s Liberation Army Navy: a Type 052D destroyer, a Type 054A frigate, a Type 056A corvette, and a Type 071 amphibious transport ship, along with two H-6J strategic bombers. The task force carried out a variety of joint naval-air drills demonstrating Chinese power projection capabilities.

On the same day, the China Coast Guard also conducted “rights protection and law enforcement” drills near Scarborough Shoal. The drills, involving “enforcement actions such as boarding and seizure, interception and intrusion, and forced towing,” were intended to assert China’s territorial claims to the area.

Takeaways:

1. The combination of military and coast guard exercises represents one of the most significant Chinese shows of force near Scarborough Shoal in memory. The exercises are part of an intensifying campaign identified in the Weekly Significant Activity Report - July 18, 2026 to reassert Chinese claims to the territory ten years after they were rejected by the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration. The ten-year anniversary of the ruling on July 12 has recently been heavily touted by the Philippines, which celebrates the day as “West Philippine Sea Victory Day.” The US and Japan along with 11 other nations have also affirmed the ruling, drawing China’s ire.

2. China may also feel a broader need to assert its territorial claims more forcefully amid more concerted pushback against its bullying from the Philippines, backed by the US, Japan, and Taiwan in recent years. Since 2023, trilateral coast guard and naval patrols between the US, Japan, and the Philippines have helped bolster Filipino territorial sovereignty against Chinese advances. China may sense a moment of opportunity to reassert its dominance in the region while it perceives that US military commitments are overextended by the war with Iran.

3. Domestic commentary by prominent Chinese military analyst Zhang Xuefeng for The Paper specifically highlighted the significance of the deployment of the H-6J for the exercises. Xuefeng noted the bombers were equipped with YJ-21 hypersonic missiles, a weapon he specifically characterized as capable of destroying aircraft carriers. The messaging around the bomber patrol suggests a pointed warning to the US after the recent deployment of a carrier strike group led by the USS George Washington to the region in late July.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

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This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed in July 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. A series of cyber attacks, believed to be linked with Iran, targeted water systems in 12 states including Georgia, Minnesota, Michigan, New Jersey and South Dakota.

2. Jie Lijian, a prominent Chinese pro-democracy activist, was beaten into a coma by suspected agents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Flushing, New York.

3. A study released in the academic journal Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium found 7% of a sample of 220 military themed mobile apps used by significant numbers of US troops contained code from China’s Huawei and Russia’s Yandex to collect user metadata.

4. According to a new alert issued by the US Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation, North Korea is using a network of IT workers to fraudulently secure remote work positions with US and other Western companies to earn income to fund its missile and nuclear programs.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

5. The website for Canadian think tank Macdonald-Laurier Institute was reportedly cloned in a suspected Russian or Chinese cyber espionage operation.

6. Belgian authorities arrested a Canadian national of Chinese origin suspected of spying for China while serving as an intern at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons.

1. WATER SYSTEMS IN TWELVE STATES TARGETED IN SUSPECTED IRANIAN CYBER ATTACKS

A series of cyber intrusions bearing the hallmarks of Iranian cyber actors targeted water and wastewater systems across multiple US states at the end of July. These events were covered in detail in the Situation Report: “US Water Systems Hit by Suspected Iranian Cyber Attacks”. Follow the link below for the full report.

Additional Information:

By August 5, officials announced that the number of states affected by the attacks climbed to 12, with Georgia, Minnesota, Michigan, New Jersey and South Dakota publicly identified as targets.

2. PROMINENT CHINESE PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST BEATEN INTO A COMA IN NEW YORK CITY BY SUSPECTED CCP AGENTS

On July 15, 2026, prominent Chinese pro-democracy activist and head of the China Democracy Party International Alliance, Jie Lijian, was attacked and beaten into unconsciousness in Flushing, New York, by three unidentified men. The attack left Jie in a coma for two days with severe head injuries. US law enforcement continues investigating the incident, but circumstantial evidence suggests the attack was carried out at the behest of the Chinese government. The attack came just a week after Jie filed a lawsuit against the Chinese government and Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles for previous acts of transnational repression.

Additional Information:

1. This is not the first time Jie Lijian has been attacked by assailants suspected of acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the US. On November 17, 2023 a crowd of demonstrators organized by Jie Lijian in San Francisco to protest the arrival of Xi Jinping at the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in the city was violently assaulted by pro-CCP counter protestors wielding clubs and pepper spray and allegedly a knife. According to a follow-on report of the incident by the then Chair of the Congressional Select Committee on China Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), 15 demonstrators were injured in the melee and Jie Lijian reported being pursued by a group of five to six men.

   

2. On July 8, Akio Yaita, a Japanese national and the director of a Taiwan-based think tank critical of the CCP called Indo-Pacific Strategy, was assaulted in Taipei. The attack was carried out by a 33-year old mainland-born Chinese man residing in Hong Kong with suspected ties to the city’s Wo Shing Wo organized crime group.1 Taiwan’s Liberty Times drew parallels between both attacks suggesting they may have been inspired by, or explicitly green lit, after the enactment of China’s "Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law," on July 1.

3. As previously noted in OPFOR Journal’s Weekly Significant Activity Report - June 27, 2026, the new Chinese ethnic unity law is widely suspected to be a signal that Beijing intends to more forcefully target foreign critics of its domestic policies, particularly related to human rights.

   China has used similar measures in the past to target overseas Hong Kong dissidents under the city’s National Security Law. On July 25, 2025, the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force issued warrants for the arrest of 19 overseas democratic activists associated with the “Hong Kong Parliament” group, including 15 bounties worth HK$1 million (approximately $127,400). Nathan Law, among the most prominent of the activists targeted, was denied entry into Singapore in September 2025. Singapore defended its decision, saying Law’s presence was not in its national interest due to his outstanding arrest warrant.

   -(Dan White, OPFOR Journal, June 27, 2026)

4. Flushing, New York, where the attack on Jie Lijian took place, is also a suspected hotbed for Chinese transnational repression. The area is home to a large community of Falun Gong practitioners, a conservative spiritual movement banned in China in 1999. The group has encountered increasingly frequent acts of harassment and violence directed at its members and group events since as early as 2008, by pro-CCP agitators.

3. STUDY FINDS RUSSIAN AND CHINESE CODE IN LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY THEMED MOBILE APPS MARKETED TO US TROOPS

A new article “No Privacy for Privates: How Military Communities Experience and Perceive the Privacy Risks of Military-Marketed Mobile Apps” released in July in the academic journal Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium found that 7% of a sample of 220 mobile apps marketed specifically to US service members and their families, and several linked to National Guard units, contained code directly linked to Chinese and Russian companies. The research conducted by a team from Purdue University, the US Military Academy at West Point, and Florida International University additionally found that at least 12 of the Military-Marketed Mobile Apps (MMMapps) reviewed, including several specifically tied to National Guard units, integrated with Huawei's HMS Core SDK software to collect information on a user’s location and other metadata. An additional two apps built by Russian companies integrated user data into Russia’s Yandex ad service. Of further concern, the report found that 40% of the apps collected more user data than their privacy labels disclosed.

The researchers provided the following policy recommendations to reduce the risk of personal or other sensitive information being transferred to US adversaries:

(1) a DoD-maintained approved app list for military-affiliated personnel; (2) DoD extension of privacy standards to MMMapps on personal devices; (3) app stores setting and enforcing rules for MMMapps; (4) a U.S. federal law restricting data brokers from buying or selling data about military-affiliated personnel; (5) a U.S. federal law requiring independent audits to verify the accuracy of privacy disclosures for MMMapps; (6) stricter bans on foreign code in MMMapps; and (7) in-phone warnings when foreign or unknown third-party code is present in an installed app.

-(No Privacy for Privates: How Military Communities Experience and Perceive the Privacy Risks of Military-Marketed Mobile Apps, 2026)

Additional Information:

Data collection on US military personnel is especially concerning given multiple recent reports that Iran has used metadata collected by its cyber forces to direct drone and missile attacks in the Middle East.

4. NORTH KOREAN REMOTE IT WORKER SCAM TARGETING US AND WESTERN COMPANIES BEING USED TO FUND MISSILE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

On July 31, the US Department of State and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a joint alert co-signed by 10 allied countries warning that North Korea is using a global network of remote IT workers to earn income for Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.2 According to the alert, the IT workers use sophisticated fake documents as well as AI technology to conceal their identity and impersonate the nationals of other countries to gain remote work positions whose earnings are then remitted to the North Korean government. The workers are known to also use their access to their employers’ systems to steal data and commit other crimes.

The alert details the following tactics, techniques and procedures commonly used in the scheme to fool recruiters and remit money back to North Korea:

• Many North Korean IT workers register for accounts on online platforms by falsifying their nationality or identity. Typical methods used include forging identification documents and impersonating another person. North Korean IT workers use images of identification documents provided by third parties—such as proxies residing in third countries—to register accounts, while the actual work is conducted by the North Korean IT workers themselves.

• North Korean IT workers are increasingly likely to use third-party proxies to facilitate the creation of online accounts, participate in job interviews, and even establish in-person contact to create a false sense of trust and obtain work contracts.

• North Korean IT workers often attempt to avoid being paid by direct deposit and may request payment via money transfer services or cryptocurrency. In many cases, North Korean IT workers provide employers a third party’s bank account as the recipient for payments, request that the third party transfer the funds to a designated foreign account, and provide a part of the payment to the third party as a fee for use of their bank account.

• North Korean IT workers often possess high-level skills in IT-related work and are seeking work in wider areas—such as the development of web pages, mobile applications, software, and blockchain applications—through online platforms and other channels. In some cases, they also get work contracts directly from companies or individuals.

• While many North Korean IT workers reside in North Korea, China, and Russia, as well as Southeast Asian and African countries, they may conceal the fact that they are working from abroad using third-party proxies, VPNs, remote desktop software, and similar tools.

• North Korean IT workers are known to use third-party proxies as facilitators overseas, such as in the United States, to run “laptop farms” which receive company-provided laptop computers for North Korean IT workers to remotely access, obfuscating their true location.

• In addition to obtaining IT-related work, North Korean IT workers may obtain foreign currency by engaging in fraudulent foreign exchange trading using automated trading systems they themselves developed.

-(US Department of State, July 31, 2026)

Additional Information:

Multiple investigations launched by Mexican financial technology firm Bitso Quetzal have found that suspected North Korean remote workers associated with the Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Famous Chollima have attempted to apply for remote work positions within their firm using VPNs in order to appear to reside in Latin America along with AI-enabled face filters to alter their complexion to appear Hispanic.

5. CANADIAN THINK TANK REPORTS ITS WEBSITE BEING CLONED IN A SUSPECTED RUSSIAN OR CHINESE CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION

On July 14, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, a top Canadian conservative think tank, reported that their website had been cloned by a foreign adversary, likely Russia or China, in order to entice its fellows to provide sensitive information.

Early in June 2026, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute was informed by Canadian security and law enforcement officials that an organization linked to a hostile foreign intelligence service had cloned our website. And not just a few pages. They mirrored our very large site essentially in its entirety.

We had every reason to believe that this organization was using its mock MLI website and associated infrastructure to, among other things, recruit Canadians to supply sensitive and even classified information by offering research and other contracts that appeared to be from a reputable and prestigious Canadian think tank. We also believe this to be related to recent warnings issued by Five Eyes intelligence services about the alleged use of social media to recruit just such unsuspecting sources of intelligence in various countries around the world.

-(Macdonald-Laurier Institute, July 14, 2026)

Additional Information:

1. Macdonald-Laurier Institute has been blacklisted by the Russian government as an “undesirable organization” and subjected to previous Russia-linked cyber attacks, suggesting the latest incident may also be the result of Russian actors.

2. It is also plausible that China is responsible for the website clone as it resembles similar cyber espionage operations recently directed at think tanks in the US. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief - June 2026, Chinese intelligence officers have targeted former employees of the US government and military by posing as recruiters for think tanks to solicit research on specialized or sensitive topics to better understand US policy. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute may be of particular interest to Chinese intelligence due to its “Dragon at the Door” project documenting CCP influence on Canadian elections and domestic politics.

6. BELGIAN POLICE ARREST NATO INTERN ON SUSPICION OF SPYING FOR CHINA

On July 24, Belgian authorities announced that they had arrested a Canadian citizen of Chinese origin on suspicion of spying while working as an intern at the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), in Mons. Canada’s Globe and Mail later identified the suspect as Biwei "Claire" Zhang and confirmed China as the country directing the espionage.

Zhang reportedly attended the University of Ottawa for a master’s degree in computer science prior to obtaining the NATO internship in the summer of 2025. Zhang’s self-reported employment history on LinkedIn included previous short periods of work at the Standards Council of Canada, Canadian Space Agency, European Space Agency, and World Trade Organization.

Additional Information:

While this case is unusual, it is not the first instance of an intelligence asset belonging to a member of the OPFOR being embedded into a Western institution through a university internship program.

In 2022, Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer Sergey Cherkasov was arrested in the Netherlands after attempting to begin an internship with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Cherkasov had secured the highly competitive internship, in part, through the recommendations of professors after graduating from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) under the fabricated identity of a Brazilian national named “Viktor Muller Ferreira.” It is suspected that Cherkasov was attempting to get insights into the ongoing (at the time) ICC investigation into the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 over Ukraine in 2014 by a Russian air defense missile.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact djwhite155@gmail.com.

This week, a series of cyber intrusions bearing the hallmarks of Iranian cyber actors targeted water and wastewater systems across multiple US states. This situation report assesses the nature of the attacks, the broader strategic context pointing to Iranian involvement, and what it says about the growing threat of Iranian attacks on the US homeland and US cyber vulnerabilities.

OVERVIEW:

On July 28, Minnesota IT Services, the central information technology agency for the State of Minnesota, announced that it was coordinating with regional and federal agencies to respond to a significant cyber attack launched on July 26 targeting more than 30 municipal water supplies.

The attacks, which locked out users and compromised the ability of operators to monitor and control their systems, caused publicly reported outages in several towns and cities including Braham, Plymouth, South St. Paul and Maple Plain.

Two days later, on July 30, multiple federal agencies issued public advisory warnings of malicious cyber actors targeting Water and Wastewater Sector public utilities. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned that it was observing a dramatic increase in intrusions targeting the large industrial computers known as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used to automate operational processes by water and wastewater systems. According to CISA:

“These threat actors are targeting water entities of all sizes. Even water organizations with mature cybersecurity processes should validate their external connections, as this targeting activity includes cellular modems installed by operators, vendors, or system integrators that may not be documented or included in routine attack surface scans. OT assets exposed to the internet have an increased risk of defacement, configuration changes, operational disruptions, and, in severe cases, physical damage.”

CISA further advised that affected municipalities institute a boil water advisory.

The same day, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided a more detailed warning, stating that since July 27, seven states had reported cyber attacks targeting operational technology used in water and wastewater systems. The announcement specifically warned that attacks had affected Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1100 and 1400 series PLCs. According to the FBI, the attacks risked significant damage to water systems and included “loss of pressure and flooding. Pressure loss in water systems could potentially allow untreated ground water to seep into pipes.”

While the advisories did not explicitly name Iran, and Minnesota’s IT Services declined to attribute the attacks to any international actor, the attacks mirror tactics, techniques, and procedures used by Iranian cyber actors and follow other recent Iranian cyber attacks on US targets.

BIGGER PICTURE:

This week’s attacks follow previous warnings that Iranian cyber actors have been attempting to conduct cyber operations to disrupt US critical infrastructure, specifically in the Water and Wastewater Sector.

Attacks Bear Hallmarks of Iranian Involvement

Anticipating the growing Iranian cyber threat, on April 7, 2026, CISA, the FBI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy, United States Cyber Command, and the Department of the Treasury issued an advisory explicitly warning that Iranian cyber actors had been observed actively trying to compromise Rockwell Automation PLC programs employed by water and wastewater systems.

The advisory noted that an Iranian threat actor affiliated with the Cyber-Electronic Command of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-CEC) known as “CyberAv3ngers” (aka UNC5691/Shahid Kaveh Group) had previously engaged in attacks on PLCs used by water and wastewater systems. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief - April 2026, between October and early November 2023, CyberAv3ngers compromised a series of PLCs regulating water pressure for the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in western Pennsylvania, causing disruptions in service to 6,000 customers.

More recently, on June 11, 2026, a second Iranian cyber threat group, the “Handala Hack Team”, published evidence of an apparent intrusion into the networks of California Water Service (Cal Water). Handala passes itself off as a pro-Palestinian, pro-Iranian hacktivist group, but is generally believed to be part of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence. The group has become especially active since the beginning of the war with the US and Israel in February 2026. Handala has claimed responsibility for numerous recent high-profile hacks of US targets including major medical device company Stryker and the personal email account of FBI Director Kash Patel.

On July 23, 2026, Handala claimed responsibility for attacks on PLCs operating unknown critical infrastructure in Maryland. Handala further announced it would continue attacks specifically targeting water, energy, and transportation systems. The details of these attacks have not yet been publicly confirmed, but the fact that they occurred only days prior to the publicly acknowledged disruptions in Minnesota suggests the likelihood that Handala or other Iranian groups are behind the recent flurry of cyber attacks nationwide. It is also plausible that Maryland is among the seven states affected by recent attacks.

Municipal Water Systems Are Especially Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks

Municipal water systems have long been known to be vulnerable to cyber attacks due to a combination of uniform operational systems and poor industry-wide cyber hygiene.

While no two water and wastewater systems are exactly alike, they share commonalities in their operational processes and technology. Water networks follow similar processes for moving, storing, treating, distributing, and recycling water through a network of reservoirs and pumps, which make them easy for hackers to conceptually understand and assess single points of failure. Further, the operational technology used by most municipal water systems comes from only a handful of vendors. According to an analysis of CISA data by the Foundation for American Innovation, over half of operators used PLCs from only four companies: Rockwell, Siemens, ABB, and Schneider Electric. The relative uniformity of technology makes it easy for malicious actors to scan and identify vulnerabilities.

Hazards within this already vulnerable system are worsened by a poor industry track record for effective cybersecurity. A May 2024 report by the EPA found that 70% of all systems were assessed to violate basic requirements for cybersecurity under the Safe Drinking Water Act. An additional report published in November 2024 by the EPA’s Inspector General found that out of a survey of 1,062 water systems, 97 systems serving 26.6 million people had “critical or high-risk cybersecurity vulnerabilities.” The report suggested an additional 211 drinking water systems, serving 82.7 million people, also had unaddressed systemic cybersecurity issues.

Operators of small water systems are especially vulnerable as they often lack the resources and expertise for combatting continually evolving cyber capabilities. 97% of all US water systems are classified by the Safe Drinking Water Act as small systems serving 10,000 customers or less.

IMPLICATIONS:

While a response and investigation are ongoing, there are two early inferences that can be made from the attacks. First, ongoing vulnerabilities suggest significant regulatory gaps in cybersecurity for US water and wastewater systems. Second, Iran is likely signaling its capability and willingness to exploit these vulnerabilities to launch reciprocal attacks on US critical infrastructure.

Policy and Resource Gaps May Have Worsened Cyber Vulnerabilities in US Water Systems

An inadequate regulatory regime may have worsened the previously discussed systemic cyber vulnerabilities within water systems and contributed to the present crisis.

In October 2023, the EPA withdrew a contentious cybersecurity rule from March 2023 requiring cybersecurity inspections for rural water systems through state sanitary surveys. The rule had been designed to create enforceable standards for cybersecurity for small water operators. The move came after a lawsuit challenging the rule from the American Water Works Association (AWWA), the National Rural Water Association (NRWA), and the states of Missouri, Arkansas, and Iowa.

The lawsuit alleged that state sanitary surveys were not an effective means of instituting effective cybersecurity practices for small municipal water systems and were not consistent with other federal requirements. The plaintiffs instead promoted the “Cybersecurity for Rural Water Systems Act of 2023” as an alternative. Rather than requiring inspections, the Congressional legislation would provide resources and greater technical assistance to small municipal water systems for cybersecurity. Whether the act would have proven an adequate substitute for addressing ongoing cybersecurity issues is unknown as an updated version of this bill from 2025 has yet to pass through Congress.

In August 2025, the EPA released a series of ten recommendations for municipal water systems to improve their cybersecurity along with $9M in grants to upgrade aging infrastructure and conduct cybersecurity training. While the new resources represent a positive development, they likely do not negate the need for basic and enforceable safety standards of the kind that would have been provided by the state sanitary survey inspection regime initially proposed in 2023. Highlighting the need for enforceable standards, a May 2024 report by the EPA expressed serious concern at “alarming cybersecurity vulnerabilities” identified at municipal water systems by its inspectors. In many cases, the vulnerabilities appeared to be the product of negligence and complacency rather than insufficient resources and technical expertise, with the report noting that “some water systems failed to change default passwords, use single logins for all staff, or failed to curtail access by former employees.”

Another issue is that the new grants were allocated to agencies serving mid to large-size municipalities serving more than 10,000 customers, rather than small, rural systems which are known to be underserved.

The conspicuous gaps in resources and safety standards have allowed existing vulnerabilities to fester and become known to US adversaries. Handala has gloated that its June 2026 hack of Cal Water was specifically enabled by poor cybersecurity, stating, “The Handala Cyber Command emphasizes that this disruption occurred due to the lack of technical knowledge among the cybersecurity experts of the California water company in identifying the source of the attack, as well as shortcomings in cyber crisis management procedures.”

Iran is Signaling its Capability and Willingness to Retaliate Against US Critical Infrastructure

The recent attacks (assuming Iranian involvement) likely do not represent the full destructive capability of Iranian cyber threat actors, suggesting they were meant as a signal by Tehran that it had the means to launch reciprocal attacks on the US homeland in response to escalating threats of US attacks on Iranian critical infrastructure.

Iranian groups have been known to employ more dangerous forms of malware which could inflict longer lasting disruption to internal networks. Iranian cyber attacks on Albania in 2022 are illustrative of potential avenues for escalation.

Between July and September 2022, four groups affiliated with the Iranian government employed ransomware and wiper malware against Albania’s online government service portals in retaliation for the country hosting an Iranian opposition event, “Free Iran World Summit.” The Iranian groups also accessed the Albanian Parliament’s email server, and infiltrated databases used by customs and law enforcement, in a likely attempt to extract information about opposition figures attending the event. The attacks caused widespread disruptions of government services and froze the country’s border crossings. Albanian officials believed the attack aimed to completely delete government databases and sabotage the government’s ability to provide public services, of which 95% are coordinated online. The attack was severe enough for Albania to cut diplomatic ties with Iran and consider invoking NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause.

The ongoing cyber attacks in the US, by contrast, have been much more limited in their effects. The current intrusions notably have not featured tampering with chemical levels, a well-known hazard for water systems, which has been attempted in at least one previous cyber attack in the US. In February 2021, unknown, possibly state-sponsored actors, briefly increased the amount of lye in the water supply for the town of Oldsmar, Florida, putting 15,000 residents at risk.

Further suggestive that recent attacks have been demonstrative in nature is the fact that Iranian cyber threat actors themselves have suggested that their operations have thus far been deliberately limited in scope. Following the June 2026 hack and leak operation on Cal Water, affiliates of the Handala Hack Team announced the group chose not to pursue more destructive operations, despite having the capability to do so.

As Vali Nasr, a Johns Hopkins SAIS professor and expert on Iranian grand strategy, notes, Iran’s war effort is carefully calibrated to “control American behavior and force the US to recalculate its options.” As part of such a measured strategy, Iran may choose to escalate the intensity and destructiveness of its cyber operations in response to threatened US attacks against energy sites and bridges, and other forms of critical infrastructure.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

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This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between July 18, 2026 and July 25, 2026.

Executive Summary:

US War with Iran - Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. Iran and the US continued intense fighting between July 18 and July 24, as the Trump administration weighed the risks of escalating the war to open the Strait of Hormuz and destroy suspected Iranian nuclear facilities at Pick Axe Mountain.

2. Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery and other intelligence to strike US bases in the Middle East.

3. The Houthis, an Iranian proxy group in Yemen, began an IRGC-supported blockade of the Red Sea, launching attacks on two Saudi oil tankers.

Russia’s War in Ukraine - Significant Activity Related to Russia’s War in Ukraine

4. Ukrainian drones destroyed at least nine distribution centers for Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer.

South China Sea Flashpoints - Significant Activity Related to China’s Military Activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan

5. According to a new report by The Economist, Russia has been training Chinese units for the military operations it needs to seize Taiwan and defeat the US Navy, including drone operations and submarine warfare, since 2024.

6. Units of the China Coast Guard clashed with ships of the Philippines near Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal.

US WAR WITH IRAN

Significant Activity Related to the US-Iran War

1. INTENSE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN CONTINUES AS THE WHITE HOUSE WEIGHS ESCALATION

This week, fighting between the US and Iran continued with threats by both sides to expand the intensity and scope of the war.

The US conducted bombing waves targeting the Iranian military and Iranian critical infrastructure on all days but the evening of July 24-25, 2026. Meanwhile, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched drone and missile attacks on US bases and infrastructure of multiple Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, including Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait.

The White House announced on July 25 that it had paused strikes due to perceived progress in diplomacy between the US and Iran.

Takeaways:

1. The pause in US strikes on Iran for the first time in two weeks on July 25, appears tied to a pending decision by the White House to either escalate the war or seek a new diplomatic off ramp. According to Axios, President Trump claimed that the strikes were held off due to recent progress in talks with Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

2. The escalation of the war threatened by President Trump this week is likely to consist of a stepped-up bombing campaign involving dozens of newly arrived aircraft in the Middle East this week, as opposed to a ground campaign, though this option has apparently also been considered by the White House. The attacks would potentially focus on destroying Iranian critical infrastructure in order to pressure the Iranian government into negotiations to permanently reopen the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump has also threatened to bomb the suspected Iranian nuclear site at Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La (AKA Pick Axe Mountain) near Natanz, after a new report by The Wall Street Journal released this week said that Israeli intelligence suggested Iran relocated thousands of centrifuges and other technical equipment to the deeply buried site in the Fall 2025.

3. While the President is currently suggesting that an escalation of the war may not be needed due to new Iranian willingness to negotiate, sources inside the White House have told The New York Times that a decision has not yet been made due to concerns that an escalated military campaign would dangerously diminish US stocks of air defense interceptors without guarantees of producing a substantially improved settlement to the war.

4. The White House also has good reason to be skeptical of the feasibility of bombing Pick Axe Mountain as well. The nuclear research facilities at the site are potentially more deeply buried than the Fordow Site struck by US B-2 bombers last year during the 12-Day War in 2025. While the US could damage the site by bombing ventilation shafts, entrance tunnels and support facilities, such damage would only temporarily set back operations. And Iran has shown an impressive capacity to dig out its damaged underground missile cities during the current war. Nevertheless, the current impasse in negotiations with Iran, combined with a new assessment by US intelligence that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has a more favorable view of nuclear weapons than his late father, may force the US to attempt complex and dangerous operations to neutralize the site.

2. RUSSIA PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN STRIKES ON US BASES

US Intelligence Assesses Likely Russian Support for Iranian Strikes

According to a July 22 report by Reuters, US intelligence officials believe that Iran has used Russian intelligence and targeting support as well as enhanced Russian Shahed drone variants to perform strikes on CIA sites in the Gulf.

Ukraine Claims Iran is Using Russian Satellites to Strike US Bases

In a nightly address on July 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine’s intelligence service believes Iran has used Russian satellite imagery to conduct attacks on US forces in the Middle East, including attacks on bases in Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait on July 19 and 20.

Ukraine Strikes Iranian Commercial Ship in the Caspian Sea

On July 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukrainian drones struck a ship involved in transporting military cargo from Iran to Russia. The attacks, which Iran claims killed one Iranian mariner and wounded another, resulted in a formal protest from Tehran and a warning of potential retaliation.

Takeaways:

1. We should expect that Russian intelligence likely plays some supporting role for Iranian targeting. This support is probably limited to the provision of satellite imagery and technical assistance. As the Reuters report suggests, Russian intelligence agencies may also play a more direct role in supporting attacks on clandestine US intelligence sites. While such cooperation clearly demonstrates hostility toward the US and serves to reinforce ties between the regimes in Moscow and Tehran, its overall effects on the Iranian war effort remain very limited thus far. Iranian attacks have scored some notable successes but have overall done very little to actually degrade the US war effort. Iran’s greatest achievement in the ongoing war has been continuing to maintain a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by attacking commercial shipping, rather than deterring or degrading the US military.

2. Iran’s ability to conduct effective strikes on its own should not be underestimated. Iran has considerable human intelligence assets in the region it can call on for targeting information. Iran claims that it received targeting intelligence for deadly strikes on al-Azraq in Jordan from local citizens.1 Iran has also apparently used data collected from the digital exhaust of US soldiers to inform its strikes as well.

3. Ukraine’s strikes on Iranian shipping in the Caspian Sea underscore the seriousness with which Ukraine views the threat posed by continued Russian and Iranian military cooperation, and the fact that President Zelensky’s warnings are not simply self-serving appeals for US support. (It is also worth considering that Ukrainian strikes may have involved coordination with US intelligence, given the ongoing cooperation on deep strikes inside Russia.)

3. THE HOUTHIS ANNOUNCE IRANIAN-SUPPORTED BLOCKADE OF THE RED SEA

The Houthis Declare a Naval Blockade of Saudi Oil

This week Iranian proxy group the Houthis declared a “naval blockade” of Saudi Arabia in response to the “unjust and oppressive siege on our dear people for ​nearly 12 years, plundering our resources ​and imposing a comprehensive blockade on our ports and airports by land, sea, and air.”

The blockade has since struck two Saudi oil tankers and forced others to turn back before approaching the Bab al-Mandeb Strait exiting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.

Iranian Military Specialists Flown into Yemen to Support Houthi Attacks on Shipping in the Red Sea

According to a July 23 report by Reuters, Iran allegedly flew between 10 and 21 IRGC operatives and weapons to the Yemeni port of Hodeidah on July 13 to help the Houthis launch a blockade in the Red Sea. Three days after the IRGC operatives arrived in Yemen, Iran formally asked the Houthis to prepare attacks on shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Takeaways:

1. Attacks on commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait close off two out of the three seaborne routes for Saudi oil. The remaining route through the Suez Canal ensures that oil bound for Asia needs to be shipped through the Mediterranean and around the entirety of Africa, adding time as well as fuel and insurance expenses that drive up the global cost of oil.

   

2. Attacks by the Houthis on shipping through the Red Sea will continue to roil global energy markets and increase pressure on Saudi Arabia, but a blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb will not be as disruptive as the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A comprehensive blockade of the Red Sea will be more difficult for the Houthis to sustain than Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The area has more favorable geography for convoy operations, and despite IRGC assistance the Houthis lack the full array of sophisticated land, air, and sea-based military capabilities that Iran can employ near its shores to track and target ships. Additionally, shipping in the Red Sea has already been running at reduced levels with more ships already planning trips around the Cape of Good Hope due to previous Houthi attacks in 2024 and 2025.

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RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE

Significant Activity Related to Russia’s War in Ukraine

4. UKRAINIAN DRONES DISRUPT OPERATIONS OF WILDBERRIES, RUSSIA’S LARGEST ONLINE RETAILER

This week Ukrainian drones struck multiple warehouses and distribution centers of Wildberries. Called “Russia’s Amazon,” Wildberries is the largest Russian E-commerce platform and online retailer. According to Russian independent media outlet Meduza, Ukrainian drones hit at least nine Wildberries facilities on the following dates and locations:

• July 18 - Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.

• July 18 - Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast.

• July 20 - Koledino, Moscow Oblast.

• July 22 - Krasnodar, Krasnodar Krai.

• July 22 - Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai.

• July 23 - Voronezh, Voronezh Oblast.

• July 24 - Simferopol, Russian-occupied Crimea.

• July 24 - Shushary, St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast.

• July 24 - Novosaratovka, Leningrad Oblast.

Takeaways:

1. Some commentators have suggested the attacks on Russian infrastructure risk backfiring by inflaming Russian public opinion and causing a rally around the flag effect for the Kremlin. This is not a correct view of either the purpose or the execution of the Ukrainian strikes. The strikes on Wildberries are part of a broader cumulative strategy to degrade the Russian war effort by disrupting the country’s logistics networks and economic centers of gravity. Bringing the war closer to home for Russians and piling additional humiliations on the Kremlin are only an added benefit of the campaign and one that lifts Ukrainian morale as much as it sags that of the Russians.

2. While Wildberries is not a part of the formal Russian military industrial complex, it does serve as dual-use infrastructure supporting the military nonetheless. Tens of thousands of dual-use military goods ranging from first aid packs, to drones, to military kit and body armor are sold on the site. This is significant as a key characteristic of the Russian war effort over the past four years has been the persistence of crowdsourced fundraising campaigns for supplies for frontline units. Russian military bloggers and Telegram channels associated with units and soldiers of the Russian military regularly solicit donations for cash, provisions, and military gear.

SOUTH CHINA SEA FLASHPOINTS

Significant Activity Related to China’s Military Activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan

5. THE RUSSIAN MILITARY IS TRAINING CHINESE UNITS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST TAIWAN AT BASES INSIDE RUSSIA

According to a July 23 report by The Economist, the Russian military has been training units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in modern combat operations at a military base near Volgograd, Russia since 2024. The training has focused on drone operations and urban combat. The military exchanges are also believed to include substantial elements of knowledge sharing, with Russia helping China improve its submarine warfare capabilities.

Takeaways:

1. The scope of the training reported by The Economist suggests Russia is preparing China to conduct combat operations on Taiwan as well as counter the US Navy at sea. While the news that the training has taken place at bases inside Russia used to support the war in Ukraine is new, the rest of the story is not exactly a revelation. Russia and China have engaged in highly publicized joint naval training events, including the annual “Joint Sea” exercises held at Qingdao earlier this month and its subsequent joint maritime security patrol. Russia and China have also conducted numerous joint air and sea operations in the Pacific in recent months, including provocative patrols around Japan during the most intense period of China’s feud with Tokyo between December 2025 and January 2026.

2. While not dismissing the threat of Russian and Chinese military cooperation, observers should be somewhat skeptical that the lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine can be easily translated to a war in the South China Sea and that the PLA can be made ready for such a war through a limited series of training events. Russia and Ukraine have adapted their militaries to the realities of their current war through years of immense struggle. It is just not true that such adaptations under fire can be easily passed on to outside parties not directly exposed to the unforgiving feedback of combat. (This is a hard reality that European members of NATO also need to confront when preparing for a possible future confrontation with Russia despite attempts to learn from Ukraine.)

6. THE CHINA COAST GUARD CLASHES WITH PHILIPPINE SHIPS AT SECOND THOMAS AND SCARBOROUGH SHOALS

Units of the China Coast Guard and Philippine Navy Skirmish at Second Thomas Shoal

On July 20, small boat units of the China Coast Guard and Philippine Navy clashed at Second Thomas Shoal. The melee left one Filipino sailor with a head injury after being struck by a Chinese rubber truncheon.

The incident occurred in the vicinity of the BRP Sierra Madre, a Philippine ship deliberately stranded on the reef of Second Thomas Shoal in 1997 to form an outpost asserting Manila’s claims to the territory.

The China Coast Guard Attacks Philippine Government Ships Near Scarborough Shoal

On July 23, the China Coast Guard used powerful water cannons to attack a convoy of eight ships of the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources near Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine vessels were sailing near the shoal to assert their rights to the territory under international law and to resupply local fishermen.

Takeaways:

1. The series of clashes comes on the heels of the tenth anniversary of the July 12, 2016 ruling by the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration that denied the legitimacy of China’s vast territorial claims to the South China Sea including those at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. As discussed in greater detail in Weekly Significant Activity Report - July 18, 2026, the anniversary has stoked impassioned feelings in both the Philippines and China, and the violent incidents this week likely resulted from a renewed effort by both sides to assert their control over the waters.

2. Determination by both the Philippines and China to uphold their territorial claims would have taken on additional urgency this week as the 33rd Meeting of the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was held in Manila on July 23. Neither side would want to appear to be seen backing down from the escalating conflict in front of their regional neighbors. Nevertheless, China’s aggressive maritime behavior in the South China Sea is extremely unpopular among members of ASEAN and the latest violent incident may work against Chinese strategic interests. The State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey Report conducted by Singapore’s Yusof Ishak Institute ranked aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea as one of the top concerns among ASEAN populations.

   China’s encroachments in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves of Southeast Asia’s littoral states (51.7%), along with the possibility of an accidental conflict between an ASEAN member state and China (45.2%), remain key concerns among regional respondents regarding the South China Sea. These concerns highlight the region’s anxieties surrounding sovereignty, maritime rights, access to resources, and the consistent fear of miscalculation and escalation of tensions at sea.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

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This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between July 11, 2026 and July 18, 2026.

Summary:

1. Iran and the US exchanged blows in a week of escalating conflict, effectively ending the April ceasefire. Iran told the Houthis to prepare to close the Red Sea, its military headquarters declared control of the Strait of Hormuz an "invincible red line," Tehran ended its commitments under the Islamabad Memorandum, and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei released a new written statement threatening retaliation.

2. New European sanctions followed revelations that hackers of the Russian FSB attempted to bring down part of the Polish power grid in December 2025.

3. Russia is scaling up production of its S8000 Banderol mini-cruise missile, aiming for 120 a month, to bridge the capability gap between drones and larger missiles.

4. Ukraine’s “Middle Strike” campaign against Crimea tallied 172 damaged or destroyed Russian shadow fleet vessels in the past two weeks as part of Operation Molochka.

5. China strongly protested global support for the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling against its South China Sea claims on the ruling's 10th anniversary.

6. China launched WAICO, a new 29-member global AI alliance, on the sidelines of the World AI Conference in Shanghai.

7. North Korea has built at least 21 new drive-through arms depots for rockets and missiles near the South Korean border since 2023.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Conflict Between US and Iran Intensifies with Trump Notifying Congress of Renewed War

This week the US and Iran engaged in the most intense bout of fighting since the announcement of the ceasefire in April. The fighting, continued from last week, came as the Trump administration sent a formal notification informing Congress of renewed war with Iran, and reimposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports on July 13.

The US conducted waves of bombing every day this week, which, while focused primarily on southern Iran, were far more widespread than previous retaliatory strike operations. Iran responded with drone and missile attacks on Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and for the first time Syria.

Both sides notably targeted critical infrastructure in their attacks. US airstrikes attacked key bridges, railways, ports and airports in southern Iran. Iranian attacks struck power plants and a desalination facility in Kuwait.

Overall battle damage is still being assessed, but Iranian strikes have resulted in US casualties including at least two US service members killed in Jordan.

Iran tells Houthis to Prepare to Close Red Sea

Reuters reported on July 16 that Iran had instructed the Houthis to begin military operations to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to maritime shipping if the US were to follow through on threats to bomb critical infrastructure.

Iran Declares Control of the Strait of Hormuz “An Invincible Red Line”

On July 16, Brigadier General Ebrahim Zolfaghari, spokesman for Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters called permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz an “invincible red line” for Iran, and warned of crushing reciprocal response on regional infrastructure if the US follows through on threats to Iran’s bridges and power plants.

Iran Ends its Commitments to the Islamabad Memorandum

On July 18, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi announced that the country had suspended its obligations under the Islamabad Memorandum in response to continued US attacks.

New Khamenei Statement Calls US "Untrustworthy," Warns of "Unforgettable" Retaliation

On July 18, Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei released a new written statement denouncing the US as fundamentally untrustworthy and threatening “unforgettable” military retaliation to come.

The repeated breach of agreements by the Great Satan vis-a-vis the accord has once again proven to all that the signature of the President of America is now utterly worthless and invalid, and that bullying, hegemonism and savagery are inseparable components of the American creed and doctrine.

[…]

Now that the American enemy is seeking to foment war and suffer heavier costs and further humiliation, it should know that the dear nation of Iran and the Resistance Front hold unforgettable lessons for it.

Takeaways:

1. The intense fighting has caused maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to collapse. A low of 8 ships per day passed through the Strait on July 16, down from around 30 per day a week earlier.

2. The steadily growing intensity of fighting, now moving toward attacks on critical infrastructure, paired with more aggressive posturing by US and Iranian leaders, suggests that the ceasefire is effectively over. The coming week could see some of the most intense and ruthless attacks by both sides since the start of the war.

   -

   The US has begun a massive increase in its tanker aircraft in the Middle East suggesting a coming uptick in overall bombing sorties, and possible re-entry of Israeli aircraft into the war. Numerous Iranian officials have interpreted the attacks on infrastructure and growing force presence to be a prelude to a potential ground campaign against Iranian islands such as Qeshm and Kharg near the Strait of Hormuz.

   -
   Recent activities suggest Iran may seek to escalate the conflict over the next week with attacks on the critical infrastructure of regional Arab states—including on desalination systems, oil fields, and airports—and compel the Houthis to attempt to close the Red Sea by attacking shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

2. RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE LAUNCHED UNSUCCESSFUL CYBER ATTACK ON POLAND’S POWER GRID

On July 13, the European Union and UK announced coordinated sanctions against Russia over attempted cyber attacks on Poland’s energy grid. The attacks, launched in December 2025 by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), using DynoWiper malware, were ultimately unsuccessful. If they had worked, the attacks could have left half a million people without power during the heart of winter.

Takeaways:

The attempted cyber attacks are just the latest known operations in a years-long campaign of sabotage and disruption directed by the Kremlin against European NATO member states. Poland has been a top target of the Russian campaign with Colonel Rafał Syrysko, the head of Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW), warning in May that "Russia keeps pushing the limits," toward more lethal and destructive attacks against the country.

3. RUSSIA AIMS TO PRODUCE 120 BANDEROL CRUISE MISSILES PER MONTH

On July 14, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, an advisor to Ukraine’s Defense Minister, announced that Russia is aiming to produce 120 S8000 “Banderol” mini-cruise missiles per month.

According to Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR), Banderol missiles can carry a maximum payload of 150 kg of explosive up to 500 km at a cruising speed up to 560 km/hour. Banderol missiles are primarily air-launched from “Orion” drones produced by its manufacturer, the Kronstadt Group, but can also be launched from Russian Mi-28 helicopters.

Takeaways:

The Banderol missile is much smaller than a traditional cruise missile and has a smaller warhead than even a Shahed drone. As a result, the weapon can’t penetrate hardened buildings or command bunkers, and is most effective against exposed surface-level targets. Nevertheless, Banderols are appealing to the Russian military as a capability that bridges advantages between larger and more expensive missiles, less survivable drones, and less accurate conventional glide bombs.

4. RUSSIAN SHADOW FLEET SUFFERS MASSIVE BLOWS FROM UKRAINIAN DRONE ATTACKS

This week Ukrainian drones struck and either disabled or destroyed dozens of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet in the waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. In less than two weeks, drones of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces have hit as many as 172 Russian ships including shadow fleet tankers, cargo ships, ferries and support vessels servicing Crimea as part of Operation “Molochka”.

According to the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, between July 6-18, Ukrainian drones struck 129 vessels in the Sea of Azov and 43 vessels in the Black Sea.1

Overview of Operation Molochka progress on July 17. Source: Robert “Magyar” Brovdi on Telegram

Takeaways:

“Molochka” is a Ukrainian acronym that roughly translates to “Moscow will fall because of Crimea.” The operation, launched in July, is the latest phase of Ukraine’s “Middle Strike” campaign begun in early April to attack road, rail, and maritime logistics networks supplying Crimea.2 The campaign has effectively isolated the peninsula from the mainland causing prolonged shortages of fuel, a breakdown of critical infrastructure—including the power grid—and the flight of residents and vacationers back across the Kerch Bridge to the Russian mainland.

The Middle Strike campaign has transformed Crimea’s once strategic geography commanding the Black Sea and buttressing Russian military logistics networks in southern Ukraine into an anchor dragging down the Russian war effort. In a further sign of shifting momentum, the crippling strikes on Russian infrastructure and logistics have allegedly begun forcing Russia to divert some of its best drone units from offensive operations against Ukraine into defensive operations to protect shipping near the peninsula.

5. CHINA PROTESTS ANNIVERSARY OF RULING REJECTING ITS MARITIME CLAIMS

On July 13, China issued a statement reiterating its vast territorial claims to the South China Sea, rejecting the 2016 ruling of the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration on its 10th anniversary.

The “arbitration” violates fundamental principles of international law, including state consent and pacta sunt servanda, contravenes UNCLOS itself, and, still more importantly, runs counter to the basic facts of the South China Sea. The so-called “award” is nothing but a worthless piece of paper that is illegal, null and void, and has no binding force. China does not accept or recognize the “award,” and opposes and does not accept any claim or action based on it. China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea shall not be affected by the “award” under any circumstances.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a stern rebuke directed at European nations affirming their support for the 2016 UN Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.

Certain European countries need to be reminded that blatantly applying double standards on issues concerning international law will only further erode their own credibility on the international stage, and does not help deepen mutual trust between China and Europe. Europe is not a party in the South China Sea and is in no position to pass judgment on China’s legitimate territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. We urge the EU side to act prudently, stop endorsing the illegal “award,” and not to affect the China-EU ties and cooperation.

Takeaways:

The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling has been a major thorn in China’s side for the past ten years, complicating its attempts to legitimize its vast territorial claims to the entirety of the South China Sea. The ruling has effectively undermined the broader narrative Beijing has attempted to cultivate of its peaceful rise untainted by imperial ambition. As a result, China continues to direct intense fury at the Philippines and its supporters in an attempt to wear down continued opposition.

The recent outburst highlights escalating aggressiveness by China in asserting its dominance in the region. Clashes with the Philippines in territory China continues to illegally claim are becoming increasingly violent, most notably near Scarborough Shoal. China appears to have also signaled a willingness to escalate its territorial claims in response to continued resistance. An academic conference in late June put forward historical claims to the Philippines' Batanes islands, likely serving as a trial balloon for future government officials to latch on to.

Ultimately, China continues to escalate because it has good reason to believe it will succeed given enough pressure. Beijing has ended the "one country, two systems" policy in Hong Kong and effectively crushed the Uyghur Muslim minority in Xinjiang despite international opposition. It continues to peel off Taiwan's allies, while strengthening its hold on its near seas with a growing navy. And most significantly, it has recently forced both the US and the European Union to retreat from protectionist policies through its own coercive economic countermeasures.

6. CHINA LAUNCHES WAICO, A NEW GLOBAL AI ALLIANCE HEADQUARTERED IN BEIJING

On July 17, Xi Jinping announced the launch of a new global cooperation body for artificial intelligence, at his keynote address to the World AI Conference in Shanghai. The new organization, to be headquartered in China, named the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO), attracted 29 founding members including Russia, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Belarus, Serbia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa.

Takeaways:

WAICO, which was first proposed at last year’s World AI Conference, is China’s latest effort to establish itself as a global leader to countries underserved by the Western-led international order. The organization will likely serve as a setter of norms and technical standards for the use of AI in developing countries of the so-called Global South. China's strategy carries significant appeal as global trust in the US declines and China comes to be seen as a model for stable economic development. This appeal is bolstered by impressive new open-source AI models, including the newly released Kimi K3 by Moonshot AI, which ranks among the top of all global frontier models.

7. NORTH KOREA HAS BUILT ALMOST TWO DOZEN NEW ROCKET AND MISSILE BASES NEAR THE DMZ

A visual investigation released this week by Radio Free Asia has identified a series of at least 21 uniform, drive-through warehouses constructed near the demilitarized zone in North Korea between 2023 and 2025. The facilities resemble structures at the Kal-gol missile operating base, suggesting they are ammunition depots for North Korean rocket and missile forces.

Takeaways:

As noted in the article (and previous Weekly Significant Activity Reports), the construction corresponds with North Korea’s production of dozens of new multiple launch rocket systems. These include trucks that can launch 600mm and 240mm rockets and serve as platforms for larger missiles. The proximity of the new drive-through facilities to the border means they could be used to store and arm launchers for attacks on Seoul and other major South Korean cities in the event of war.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between July 4, 2026 and July 11, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: Iran held a massive six-day funeral for slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei still unseen despite father’s burial; the US and Iran exchanged blows over continued attacks on ships near the Strait of Hormuz as President Trump announced the ceasefire over.

2. Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused calls by his advisors to end the war in Ukraine along the current frontline and appears poised to escalate the war.

3. New reports illuminated the extent of Chinese and North Korean support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

4. The China Coast Guard rotated vessels deployed in the waters east of Taiwan in a possible move to sustain its presence in the region indefinitely.

5. China tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile in the South Pacific, alarming regional countries in an apparent violation of the region’s “nuclear-free zone.”

6. Kim Jong-un oversaw a live-fire exercise of North Korea’s newest naval destroyer involving over a dozen nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Khamenei Funeral Attracts Huge Crowds with One Notable Absence

This week enormous crowds of mourners attended a six-day funeral procession for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s body was carried through Tehran and major Shia holy cities in Iran and Iraq before being buried in the Shrine of Imam Reza in his birthplace of Mashhad on July 9.

The funeral, which top Iranian leaders attended and which attracted delegations from around the world, was marked by one notable absence, Mojtaba Khamenei, the late Ali’s son and successor as Supreme Leader. While he did not appear in public, Mojtaba released a statement on July 11 declaring the “inevitability” of revenge against the US and Israel.

US and Iran Initiate New Cycle of Attacks Amid Continued Attacks on Shipping

This week, Iran and the US resumed hostilities in response to multiple Iranian attacks on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

On July 7, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked three tanker ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in two days of widespread retaliatory US airstrikes. Iran launched several waves of drone and missile attacks targeting US bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar.

In addition to airstrikes, the Iranian attacks spurred the US to suspend sanctions waivers allowing the sale of Iranian oil, stranding over 60 million barrels of oil already loaded on Iranian tankers. President Trump responded to the continued attacks by declaring the ceasefire “over,” though allowing for talks to continue.

On July 11, the IRGC Navy fired upon and disabled a Cyprus-flagged container ship it accused of using an unauthorized route through the Strait of Hormuz. The group subsequently declared the Strait of Hormuz closed “until further notice.” The US responded to the renewed Iranian aggression with a third round of airstrikes.

Takeaways:

1. Iran’s PressTV claims the funeral is the largest in recorded history with 43 million people in attendance. The director of the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) claims 24 million people attended the funeral service in Tehran alone. These estimates are likely an order of magnitude too high. Iranian independent media outlet Factnameh has estimated attendance in Tehran peaked around 300,000 based on crowd sizes with an absolute limit to attendance at 3 million based on the capacity of public transit.

   -
   Estimates of exact attendance figures aside (and whether all attendees showed up willingly), the massive crowds demonstrated that the Islamic Republic continues to enjoy real support among a segment of Iranians, even amid widespread popular hatred and discontent toward the regime.

2. If there was ever a time for Mojtaba Khamenei to finally appear in public (even if only on video) to put to rest any rumors about his health and fitness to serve as Supreme Leader, it was this week on the occasion of his father and predecessor’s funeral. And yet the only message from Mojtaba Khamenei came in writing, the sole form of communication the new Supreme Leader has engaged in since his appointment in March.

   -

   The continued absence of the new Supreme Leader is going to become more difficult to pass off as a precautionary war-time measure to defend against assassination and will pose increasing problems for governance as time goes on. The regime will ultimately need some kind of formal head of state to publicly commit to a course of action that ends the war while balancing divergent interests in the country. The absence of a final decision maker, a new development in the country, could lead to disagreements about government policy that fracture the regime over the long-term.

3. Policy dysfunction is on display now amid continued attacks on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in violation of the Islamabad Memorandum. Iranian negotiators have conveyed to the US that continued attacks on ships are the result of “rogue elements” of the IRGC who are interested in undermining the broader negotiations between US and Iran in order to seek revenge. This explanation, while likely containing elements of truth, is overly reductive. Iranian attacks on shipping continue for a number of reasons beyond revenge:

   -

   First, by specifically targeting ships that use alternative routes to the prescribed “toll booth” route administered by the so-called “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” the IRGC is trying to institutionalize its control over all traffic through the Strait. Second, continued threats to shipping, contrasted with the US’s continued inability to prevent them, reinforce the world’s dependence on Iranian goodwill to allow oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz, providing Iran with leverage it can use to extract maximum concessions from the US in negotiations. Third, Iran wants to normalize an enduring threat of violence to shipping to create incentives for governments and private companies to cut protection deals for safe passage. Iranian leaders have suggested such deals could amount to a whopping $40B per year.

2. PUTIN REBUFFS ADVICE TO FREEZE FRONTLINES

In a July 9 report by Reuters, Kremlin sources have said that President Vladimir Putin has rebuffed calls by advisors to freeze the frontlines and accept a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. Putin believes that seizing the remainder of the Donbas is achievable through continued military operations and needs to be accomplished to satisfy Russia’s minimum war aims.

Takeaways:

Sources quoted in the article claim that Putin is likely to “escalate” the war in order to make a battlefield breakthrough. What form this escalation is to take remains unclear. As the Russian military appears to have reached the limit of its current capacity in Ukraine, the Kremlin has three main options for escalation it can attempt to break the deadlock. It can order a partial or general mobilization of Russian society to enlarge the military and commandeer resources for the war effort, use nuclear weapons, or launch an attack on NATO.

None of these are good options. However, of the three, the most viable option appears to be a new partial mobilization coming after State Duma elections in late September. Such action has been the subject of a growing number of rumors in recent weeks. The Kremlin has also been reported to have engaged in preliminary steps to facilitate such a mobilization. Spring efforts by Russian security services to consolidate control over the internet may be seen as an attempt to control the information space in the event of a new mobilization wave to head off the public panic that resulted from the partial mobilization in Fall 2022.

3. NEW REPORTS HIGHLIGHT CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO RUSSIA’S WAR EFFORT

China Helping Russia Upgrade its Drones and Battle Starlink

A joint investigation by Russian independent media outlet The Insider, Germany’s Der Spiegel, and France’s Le Monde, released on July 9 has found that China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has gone far beyond what was previously known. China has reportedly been providing Russia with advanced technology to upgrade its drones and air defenses. Most provocatively, China has allegedly been helping the Russian military to combat Ukraine’s use of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet.

North Korea Sustaining Russia’s Ammunition Needs

According to a July 8 report by the Kyiv Post, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) assesses that North Korea remains a top arms supplier to Russia. HUR estimates that since June 2023, Pyongyang has provided Russia with over 7 million rounds of large caliber munitions (rockets, mortars, artillery, and tank shells), 100 ballistic missiles, and 600 artillery systems. HUR further assesses that North Korea continues to supply up to 40% of Russia’s artillery ammunition needs.

Takeaways:

1. Both reports underscore the extent to which allied assistance, rather than simply economic resilience and domestic self-sufficiency, has become key to sustaining Russia’s war effort. While they are not a cohesive alliance like NATO and do not share long-term interests, the OPFOR have shown that loosely coordinated mutual aid amid war can present significant problems for global order.

2. The new investigation into China’s contributions to the Russian war effort is the latest in a string of reports released over the past year drawing on European officials who have grown increasingly skeptical of Beijing. Last July, European officials expressed serious alarm after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the EU’s chief diplomat Kaja Kallas that China would not allow Russia to lose the war in Ukraine. And last month, Kallas and other European officials announced they had obtained credible information that China had been training units of the Russian military for specialized combat tasks at military academies in China.

4. CHINA MAKES MOVE TO INSTITUTIONALIZE MARITIME PATROLS EAST OF TAIWAN

On July 4, the China Coast Guard moved to rotate and replace vessels operating in the waters east of Taiwan. The two Coast Guard vessels had been part of a “special maritime law enforcement operation” announced on June 6 in response to plans by Japan and the Philippines to negotiate changes to their maritime borders near Taiwan.

Ryan D. Martinson, an Assistant Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the US Naval War College, notes that the move may signal an attempt to turn the temporary deployment into an enduring presence in the area:

Since early June, the China Coast Guard (CCG) has maintained a continuous presence in waters east of Taiwan. Beijing describes these operations as a response to a joint statement issued by Japan and the Philippines in late May, in which the two countries pledged cooperation to delimit their maritime boundary.

Given their duration, these operations differ from past practice, in which CCG cutters appeared east of Taiwan for short periods of time, ostensibly to signal dissatisfaction with the island’s political leadership.

On 4 July, the original CCG task force deployed after the joint statement was issued was relieved by two new ships, suggesting that Beijing intends to normalize CCG presence in these waters.

Takeaways:

Ray Powell, the Director of the Sealight Foundation at Stanford University, has offered an even more provocative take on the move. Powell has suggested that the attempt to sustain the deployment may be a sign that China is beginning in earnest a slow-moving quarantine of Taiwan. Powell notes that the vessels in the area had been hailing and attempting to direct commercial shipping in the region and could transition into more coercive law enforcement operations.

5. CHINESE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE TEST ALARMS SOUTH PACIFIC NATIONS

On July 6, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted a test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in the Pacific. A statement and map overlay released by Joseph Wu, the Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, suggests the missile—a JL-2—was launched from the waters of the South China Sea near Guangdong province and landed in the South Pacific near Tuvalu.

The test triggered substantial alarm among regional nations, with Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands protesting the move.

Takeaways:

1. The rare public test of a SLBM, only the second in two years, coincided with multiple events and anniversaries of significance to China. The launch coincided with the signing of a mutual defense pact between Australia and Fiji and occurred on the opening day of the annual Sino-Russian “Joint Sea-2026” annual naval exercises in Qingdao. However, the most likely trigger for the test is the July 7 anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which began the Second Sino-Japanese War. As US Navy Officer Andrew Orchard, writing in The Diplomat, notes, the developer of China’s SLBMs, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), posted an image of a SLBM launch in a graphic commemorating the 89th anniversary of the Incident on Weibo.

   

2. It is not entirely clear what missile was fired. As noted above, Taiwanese officials have publicly announced the missile was a JL-2. However, Chinese foreign language media outlet Global Times has suggested the missile was a JL-3. The JL-3 is a new third-generation missile system capable of carrying multiple independently targeted nuclear warheads over 10,000 km. The general anti-Japanese framing of the launch points to this probability as the JL-3 debuted in public at the 80th anniversary celebration of victory over Japan in the Second World War held on September 3, 2025, alongside other land and air based systems composing China’s nuclear triad.

3. The event was especially alarming to regional nations of the South Pacific as the nuclear-capable missile landed in the middle of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) established under the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga. The treaty prohibits the possession, testing, or use of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable weapons in the area. China is a signatory to multiple parts of the treaty but did not agree to the provision on testing. The test highlights the risks China’s growing military power presents for those nations despite their efforts to avoid provocation or remain neutral.

6. NORTH KOREA TEST FIRES NUCLEAR-CAPABLE CRUISE MISSILES FROM NEW DESTROYER

On July 5, Kim Jong-un supervised a live-fire drill involving the Kang Kon, the newest 5,000-ton destroyer constructed for the North Korean Navy. The ship tested a wide variety of weapons, including a dozen “strategic” cruise missiles.

Takeaways:

1. The 5,000-ton Kang Kon is North Korea’s second Choe Hyon-class destroyer, and one of the most advanced ships in its navy. The first of its class, the eponymous Choe Hyon, was officially commissioned in June. The Kang Kon capsized in a failed launch from Chongjin Shipyard in June 2025 and required months of repairs. The successful live-fire suggests the recovery efforts were successful and the ship is nearly operational.

2. The type of cruise missile tested by the Kang Kon was not announced. It can be inferred, however, that “strategic” means nuclear-capable, indicating the ship could serve as a sea-based component of North Korea’s growing nuclear deterrent. Images of the missile captured from this week’s test resemble those of the Hwasal-2, a land-based nuclear-capable cruise missile.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

This brief highlights significant threats to US homeland security posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea observed in June 2026.

Summary:

Observed Threats - Current activity that poses direct risk to US homeland security

1. The Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance issued a joint bulletin warning that Chinese intelligence is using LinkedIn to target military and government officials to gain classified information and recruit new sources.

2. A new report by OpenAI claimed that Chinese actors are using AI tools to generate disinformation to discredit US technology companies and generate inauthentic protests against the construction of AI data centers.

3. The Department of Justice announced charges against an Iranian-American for allegedly serving as the CEO of a Tehran-based technology firm that transshipped US computer networking equipment to the Iranian military and nuclear program.

4. Iranian cyber proxy group Handala announced multiple hacks of government and critical infrastructure targets in the US.

Horizon Threats - International activity that may pose future risk to US homeland security

5. French newspaper Le Monde reported a months-long effort by French authorities to break up a series of illegal Chinese “overseas police stations” in France.

1. CHINESE INTELLIGENCE USING LINKEDIN AND FAKE JOB SITES TO TARGET MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

On June 3, the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance issued a joint bulletin warning current and former government and military officials that intelligence officers of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are using LinkedIn to cultivate relationships and recruit for fake jobs to develop potential sources.

The bulletin describes a five-step process that Chinese intelligence officers, posing as HR managers for think tanks or private consulting firms, use to cultivate and entrap applicants for defense and foreign policy analyst positions:

First contact: Recruiters post job ads on professional networking platforms and online hiring and freelance “gig work” websites like LinkedIn, Indeed, and Upwork. Resumes are ranked based on likelihood of access to sensitive information; recruiters begin their contact strategies.

Interview: When they are required, interviews are held virtually. Recruiters conceal their identity, and may start probing applicants about access to government contacts. Military members may be asked about their roles and unit activities, home base or naval vessel.

Initial testing: Candidates are asked to write a trial report on a topic such as China’s bilateral relations, the Indo-Pacific region, and related defense issues, or international trade.

Subsequent requests and platform shift: Recruits are informed that for additional reports, the client requires more privileged information. At some point in the recruitment process, intelligence officers typically move the conversation to a more “secure” platform, such as encrypted messaging applications.

Payment: Recruits receive anywhere from a few hundred to several thousand dollars per report, and may be offered more money in return for increasingly sensitive information. Payment methods include third-party payment platforms, such as PayPal, Payoneer, Zelle, Skrill, and Wise, as well as Western Union, e-transfer and cryptocurrency. Recruits will often be compensated by an account belonging to an individual they have not met as part of the recruitment process.

Additional Information:

1. On June 10, a week after the Five Eyes advisory was issued, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that it had seized and taken down 13 websites operating fraudulent consulting companies used to solicit applications from US security clearance holders for fake positions such as “International Affairs Analyst” and “Security Analyst.” According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the operators of the sites used multiple schemes to entice applicants and gain their trust:

   The websites were typically linked or referenced within the entities’ job postings on hiring platforms. The methods and means used by the conspirators include (1) the use of aliases, fictitious personas, and the stolen identities of actual persons; (2) the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generated photographs; (3) relatively large payments for research reports; (4) the use of Telegram and other encrypted applications; (5) pressure to provide “exclusive” or “insider” information; and (6) the transfer of money from places and accounts located overseas to places and accounts located in the United States.

   While unstated in the DOJ press release, the operation bears the hallmarks of Chinese intelligence as the jobs sought information on topics of interest to Beijing.

2. Using LinkedIn and job sites like Indeed isn't a new tactic for Chinese intelligence services. US law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies have warned for years that Chinese actors use these platforms to target American security clearance holders.

2. OPENAI UNCOVERS CHINESE ASTROTURFING CAMPAIGN AGAINST US DATA CENTERS

A report released by US technology firm OpenAI on June 10 disclosed that the company had identified and disabled numerous accounts of Chinese origin used to generate content for social media campaigns opposing several US government and industry initiatives related to artificial intelligence. The content specifically protested US tariffs and trade restrictions targeting China's tech sector, the construction of data centers in the United States, and suspicions that AI labs were providing US intelligence agencies with user data for domestic surveillance. This material was laundered through inauthentic accounts on social media platforms such as X and made to appear to be the product of grassroots American activists.

The campaign was attributed to an unnamed Chinese technology firm working for a regional government client.

Additional Information:

1. Skeptical readers might assess that OpenAI is itself trying to deflect public criticism of AI infrastructure projects and data privacy concerns to a limited PRC influence campaign. While there is reason to suspect motivated reasoning behind the reporting, the activities OpenAI has identified fit a broader pattern of Chinese actors attempting to influence US domestic public opinion on issues of key importance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through “astroturfing” operations on social media.1

2. Between 2019 and 2022, Chinese-linked actors conducted a similar astroturf operation directed at US rare earth mineral ventures. According to Google’s Mandiant Threat Intelligence group, the “DRAGONBRIDGE” campaign used thousands of inauthentic social media accounts “including those posing as residents in Texas to feign concern over environmental and health issues surrounding the plant, including via posts to a public social media group predisposed to be receptive to that content.”

3. TECH CEO JAMSHID GHOMI ARRESTED FOR SELLING NETWORKING EQUIPMENT TO IRAN’S MILITARY AND NUCLEAR PROGRAM

On June 3, the Department of Justice announced the arrest of a 63-year-old dual US-Iranian citizen, Jamshid Ghomi, for illicit technology trade with Iran in violation of US sanctions. Ghomi created a technology firm based in Tehran called Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd. (FPR), which from 2011 to 2023 was used to transship US computer networking equipment through a series of fraudulent eBay and PayPal accounts to buyers in Iran via an intermediary in the United Arab Emirates. Customers for FPR notably included the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Defense.

According to the Department of Justice press release:

From 2017 to 2023, FPR supplied U.S.-origin computer networking equipment to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) – the Iranian government agency responsible for Iran’s nuclear program, including its centrifuge and uranium-enrichment programs. The U.S. State Department sanctioned AEOI in 2020 for playing a leading role in Iran’s nonperformance of its nuclear commitments, including exceeding the limits on its uranium stockpile and enrichment levels. According to the affidavit, AEOI required FPR to register as an approved vendor, which it did in 2021 and 2022.

From 2014 to 2022, FPR supplied U.S.-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics — the Iranian ministry responsible for research, development, and manufacturing across Iran’s defense enterprise -- and to affiliated military and defense-electronics entities. FPR’s 2017 contract with Iran Computer Industries, signed by Ghomi, expressly identified the buyer as the “Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics — Iran Computer Industries.”

Ghomi laundered the proceeds of the trade, which averaged over $10M per year, through a series of shell companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and Turkey. He used the money to build a $35M mansion in Southern California, which he claimed was funded through “foreign inheritance”.

Additional Information:

1. The use of UAE front companies is a recurring technique used by Iranian actors to skirt sanctions and transfer money and technology to the Iranian regime.

2. In January 2021, the DOJ charged two Iranian nationals living in Canada with smuggling US computer technology to Iran through the front companies in the UAE.

3. In July 2025, the DOJ charged Bahram Mohammad Ostovari, a lawful permanent resident of the US and CEO of a Tehran-based engineering firm, with using two UAE shell companies to route sophisticated computer processors to Iranian government agencies between 2018 and 2025.

4. On May 29, 2026, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the FBI announced numerous actions against members of the “Sepehr Network,” an Iranian procurement group with members in Iran and Europe, for fraudulently representing US small businesses to transship US technology products through Dubai to Iran.

4. IRANIAN PROXY GROUP HANDALA CLAIMS HACKS ON FBI WORLD CUP DRONES AND CALIFORNIA WATER UTILITY

Handala Group Claims to Hack FBI Drones at World Cup

On June 12, SITE Intelligence Group announced that it had observed statements by Iranian cyber proxy Handala that claimed the group had access to real-time data from FBI drones used to secure the World Cup. However, SITE’s analysis found that some of the evidence provided by the group did not substantiate its claims.

Handala Group Claims Hack on California Water System

On June 11-12, the Tehran-linked hacker group Handala claimed it had breached systems tied to California Water Service (Cal Water), a utility serving roughly two million customers across more than 100 California communities, including Bakersfield, Visalia, Chico, Salinas, and Stockton. The group called the hack retaliation for alleged US military strikes on Iranian water infrastructure.

Independent analysis by cyber intelligence firm Dataminr found that the Handala hack of Cal Water compromised the RTKBase GNSS base-station platform for Chico Water District. Once inside Cal Water’s network, the group was able to move laterally into a customer billing system and exfiltrated roughly 5GB of data including customer names, addresses, and account credentials. Cal Water reported that preliminary findings showed no operational disruption to its water and wastewater systems.

Additional Information:

1. Handala has portrayed itself as a pro-Palestinian “hacktivist” group, but is generally believed to be directly affiliated with the Iranian regime.

2. Handala has conducted multiple cyber operations targeting the US and allies in recent months. In addition to the operations listed above, Handala has claimed credit for hacking the personal email account of FBI Director Kash Patel, as well as the networks for US medical device company Stryker.

3. As noted in the Homeland Security Brief for April 2026, municipal water systems appear to be a preferred target for Iranian cyber groups, with documented intrusions dating back to at least the 2023 “CyberAv3ngers” attacks on the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa near Pittsburgh.

5. FRANCE SHUTS DOWN NINE ILLEGAL CHINESE “POLICE STATIONS”

On June 18, Le Monde reported that since early 2026, France's counter-intelligence agency, the Directorate-General for Internal Security (DGSI), shut down nine illegal overseas police stations operated by China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS).

Additional Information:

As previously noted in May’s Homeland Security Brief, the US has pursued enforcement actions against Chinese transnational repression networks including an illegal overseas police station in Manhattan, and most recently a network of PRC operatives working as government officials in Arcadia, California.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between June 20, 2026 and June 27, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: Iran ruled out IAEA nuclear inspections and any negotiations over its ballistic missile program, while Iranian and US forces traded strikes for three days after Iran hit two commercial vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. A US pilot also reported an unusual Iranian drone formation before being shot down.

2. Crimea's Russian-installed government declared a state of emergency over fuel shortages caused by Ukrainian strikes on the peninsula's infrastructure and logistics routes.

3. South Ossetian President Alan Gagloev resigned to become an advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, a move Russian state media suggested foreshadows the annexation of the Georgian breakaway region.

4. A top Chinese Justice Ministry official announced Beijing will use its new "Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law," to target foreign critics of its treatment of Tibetans and Uyghurs.

5. Janes reported that the PLA has debuted an upgraded DF-26 ballistic missile with maneuverable warhead fins, alongside the first public appearance of a nuclear-capable DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle.

6. Kim Jong-un supervised a test of North Korea's upgraded 240mm multiple launch rocket system, which state media claims now uses AI-assisted terminal guidance to strike targets up to 100km away.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

US Pilot Reports Encounter with Unusual Iranian Drone Technology

On June 23, CNN issued an investigative report stating that the pilot of a US F-15 fighter shot down by Iranian forces encountered an unusual interconnected “minefield” of Iranian drones prior to being downed. The report characterized the drone formation as appearing like a jellyfish, with drones moving in unison.

Iran Denies Allowing Return of IAEA Inspectors

This week, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued numerous denials that it would allow specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to return to the country to inspect damaged nuclear sites. The denials followed previous statements by both the US Vice President JD Vance and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi that inspectors would be given access to Iranian sites as part of any war-ending deal.

Iranian President Rules Out Talks Over Ballistic Missiles

On June 23, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that Iran will never engage in any negotiations over its ballistic missile program.

Iran Hopes to Make Billions from Hormuz Administration

A June 25 report by the Wall Street Journal suggests that Iran believes its plan to extract fees from “administering” the Strait of Hormuz could yield up to $40B in annual revenue.

US and Iran Again Trade Blows Over Hormuz Control

On June 25, Iranian forces struck the Singapore-flagged cargo vessel Ever Lovely, exiting the Strait of Hormuz along the Omani coast. The US launched retaliatory strikes on June 26, with US Central Command (CENTCOM) reporting strikes on Iranian missile and drone storage locations and coastal radar sites.

Bahrain was subsequently targeted by a wave of Iranian drones on June 26, seemingly in response to US strikes.

On June 27, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Centre reported a second vessel struck by an unknown projectile near the Strait of Hormuz, this time the Panamanian-flagged tanker Kiku. The US responded with a second, broader wave of strikes targeting Iranian air defenses and coastal military sites. Iranian forces then responded with additional strikes against US bases and other targets in Kuwait and Bahrain.

US strikes on Iranian coastal military targets on June 27. Source: US Central Command

Takeaways:

1. While Iran’s drone technology is remarkably advanced and effective, reports of its use of jellyfish-shaped, airborne minefields of drones should be treated with skepticism. The CNN report suggested the pilot’s recall of the event could have been compromised by a concussion received after being shot down.

2. The resumption of Iranian attacks on shipping near the Strait of Hormuz appears to have been prompted by an increase in ships following alternatives to routes authorized by Iran’s so-called “Persian Gulf Strait Authority.” Iran likely is using the attacks to ensure it retains coercive control over the Strait throughout negotiations in order to extract maximum concessions from the US. It also wants to normalize an enduring threat of violence to shipping in order to pressure governments and companies into cutting protection deals in order to squeeze as much of its reported goal of $40B in “service fees” for safe passage as possible in the future.

3. Confusion about the safety of passage through the Strait of Hormuz persists in large part because of ambiguity in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the US and Iran. The MOU specified the following terms for the Strait:

   “Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialog with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”

   Despite claims of the Trump Administration to the contrary, these terms largely defer authority over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to Iran in perpetuity.

4. Nuclear inspections and ballistic missiles are two red lines that will continue to complicate negotiations. While the Trump administration has suggested it will not pressure Iran on its missile program, US allies including the Gulf States and Israel are reportedly pressuring the administration to take a harder line. Iran may ultimately concede on inspections of its damaged nuclear sites, but such concessions are likely to come late in negotiations and in exchange for significant US compromises. Any agreement is likely to be subject to strict Iranian stipulations, and limited to well-known historic sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, rather than any blanket authority to inspect new sites like Pickaxe Mountain.

2. RUSSIA DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY IN CRIMEA

On June 26, Sergey Aksyonov, the Russian-installed “prime minister” of Crimea declared a state of emergency for the peninsula over deteriorating economic conditions caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on critical infrastructure and supply chains. The state of emergency allows the authorities to control the dwindling fuel supply. The announcement came as government traffic reporting showed a five-hour wait to leave the peninsula over the Kerch bridge.

Miles-long traffic jam of vehicles leaving Crimea at the approach to the Kerch Bridge. Source: Astra on Telegram

Takeaways:

Ukrainian long-range strikes on Crimea’s critical infrastructure, now amounting to as many as 100 per day, combined with a broader campaign of special forces raids and “middle-strike” drone attacks on ferry, train, and road routes supplying Crimea, have effectively imposed a distant blockade on the peninsula starving it of fuel, power, military equipment. The blockade has effectively turned the peninsula into a large wasting asset for the Kremlin which is absorbing precious military resources to keep supplied and defended.

Ukrainian Special Operations Forces destroy the North Crimean Canal Railway Bridge, a major logistics route for the peninsula. Source: Special Operations Forces (SSO) of Ukraine

3. SOUTH OSSETIA’S PRESIDENT RESIGNS TO JOIN PUTIN’S STAFF, SIGNALING POSSIBLE ANNEXATION

On June 23, South Ossetian President Alan Gagloev announced his resignation to become advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian media outlet Kommersant suggested the move represented a step toward “unifying” the South Ossetia breakaway region of Georgia with the Russian province of North Ossetia.

Takeaways:

While an internationally recognized part of the Republic of Georgia, South Ossetia has been effectively under Russian control since the early 1990s. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia was engineered by the Kremlin to consolidate its control over the territory as well as the nearby breakaway region of Abkhazia, in order to exert control over Georgian politics and create obstacles to the country’s entry into European institutions. The Kremlin has previously been hesitant to outright annex the territories due to complex ethnic geopolitics in the region that would challenge integration, and concerns that the move would eliminate their use as leverage over internal Georgian affairs. The calculus on annexation may be changing as Russian influence in the South Caucasus faces continual setbacks.

On June 7, 2026, Armenia re-elected the party of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who pledged to pivot away from Russian institutions toward Europe and the US after Russian peacekeepers failed to prevent Azerbaijan from seizing the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the Fall 2023. The results came despite great efforts by Russian intelligence and security services to try to sway the vote away from Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party to more pro-Russian candidates. Relations with Azerbaijan have also deteriorated since late 2024 after Russian air defenses shot down Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 flying between Baku and Grozny, Chechnya.

The shift away from Russian influence in both countries was symbolized in the August 2025 US-brokered peace deal between the former adversaries and an associated agreement to establish a US-led strategic transportation route through the region. The “Zangezur Corridor” connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik province would provide faster land-based shipping between China and the European Union and pose a threat to trade corridors running through Russian territory.

Annexing South Ossetia would shore up Russian influence in the South Caucasus through the threat of further territorial seizures from Georgia (such as Abkhazia) while warning Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow is willing to use force to maintain its regional dominance.

4. CHINA TO USE NEW “ETHNIC UNITY” LAW AGAINST OVERSEAS HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICS

China’s Vice Justice Minister, Hu Weilie, announced on June 23 that Beijing would use provisions in the new “Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law” to target foreign individuals and groups who “undermine ethnic unity and progress or incite ethnic separatism.” Passed in March by the National People’s Congress, the new law goes into effect on July 1.

Takeaways:

The new statement appears to signal that Beijing intends to use the law to target foreign critics of its treatment of ethnic minorities—most notably Tibetans and Uyghurs—through Interpol red notices and other lawfare measures. Such measures are used to pressure foreign governments to either extradite foreign critics, or enact entry bans, or other sanctions against them to satisfy Beijing.

China has used similar measures in the past to target overseas Hong Kong dissidents under the city’s National Security Law. On July 25, 2025, the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force issued warrants for the arrest of 19 overseas democratic activists associated with the “Hong Kong Parliament” group, including 15 bounties worth HK$1 million (approximately $127,400). Nathan Law, among the most prominent of the activists targeted, was denied entry into Singapore in September 2025. Singapore defended its decision, saying Law’s presence was not in its national interest due to his outstanding arrest warrant.

5. NEW REPORT HIGHLIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS TO CHINA’S DF-26 AND DF-17 STRATEGIC MISSILES

A June 23 report by Janes found that the People’s Liberation Army debuted an upgraded DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. The new missile has fins on its warhead that according to Janes, “may be intended to enable terminal manoeuvres by adjusting the flight path in both horizontal and vertical planes, improving the ability to engage mobile targets and penetrate missile-defence systems that may provide it greater maneuverability making intercepts more difficult.”

The report also highlighted the first public appearance of a nuclear-capable DF-17 missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle.

Takeaways:

1. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have provided significant feedback on the effectiveness of US anti-ballistic missile systems and how they might be circumvented. The upgraded DF-26 may be inspired by lessons learned from Ukraine in particular where Russian forces have reportedly experimented with features on their ballistic missiles to make their terminal trajectory more unpredictable and harder to intercept by Patriot interceptors.

2. The DF-17 is China’s answer to the US’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system. The Dark Eagle has rotated through Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations for exercises over the past year. It is not clear if these deployments or any other action directly prompted China to highlight the strategic system now, but it is plausible, as China’s relations with its neighbors, especially Japan, have notably deteriorated in recent months.

6. NORTH KOREA TESTS 240MM ROCKET SYSTEM WITH AI-ASSISTED TERMINAL GUIDANCE

On June 26, Kim Jong-un supervised a test of North Korea’s 240mm multiple launch rocket system, and extended range 155mm artillery shells.

North Korean state-media says the 24-tube, 240mm rocket system has a range of 90km and will be used for Corps-level fire support.

Takeaways:

The 240mm rocket system, a staple of the North Korean military dating back to the Cold War, has undergone years of upgrades under Kim Jong-un. Kim’s personal attendance at two test launches of the system in just over a month, further suggests the rockets represent a significant priority for North Korea’s defense industry.

The 240mm system appears to be moving away from use as an inaccurate area saturation weapon into a more precision strike capability. At the previous launch on May 26, 2026, Korean Central News Agency reported that the rockets utilized an “ultra-precision autonomous navigation system and the TERCOM (terrain contour matching) navigation system and employed an AI terminal guidance function,” to strike targets up to 100km away. While these technological claims are unverifiable, the purported capabilities resemble those of a small cruise missile. Even if the details are accurately portrayed, it is unclear whether North Korea is able to mass manufacture the rockets or whether a small number will serve as special capabilities.

Note: There will be no Weekly Significant Activity Report next week due to the July 4 holiday.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

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While much attention has focused on US domestic and Western reactions to the Islamabad Memorandum (AKA the US-Iran Deal), this Situation Report examines how the negotiated end to the war is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from military strategists and political commentators in China and Russia. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are interpreting the war for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the conclusions the foreign commentators reached.

This Situation Report is broken into three parts:

1. On the War’s Outcomes

   1. Consequences for the US and Iran

   2. Consequences for the Middle East

   3. Consequences for International Order

2. On the Prospect of Continued Negotiations Between the US and Iran

3. Lessons Learned

1. ON THE WAR’S OUTCOMES

Summary of Key Insights:

Chinese and Russian commentators are generally of the opinion that the US did not achieve its war aims but that the war nevertheless produced an outcome closer to a draw than an Iranian victory. Commentators believe Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, along with a greater tolerance for pain and sacrifice and growing domestic political constraints on US President Donald Trump, produced more favorable terms for Iran.

Views were more skeptical as to whether Iran could be considered a true “winner,” as the war severely devastated the country. Iran is widely expected to continue to leverage control over the Strait of Hormuz to deter future US attacks and to exert influence on the world stage, but its diminished military and economy have imposed significant limitations on its options for wielding power.

Israel is widely viewed as a major loser of the conflict, with its war aims ultimately unfulfilled and its relationship with the US increasingly—potentially irrevocably—strained. The Gulf States are also expected to review their geopolitical interests and their relationship with the US and Israel in the wake of the war.

Several commentators surprisingly gave President Trump credit for quickly recognizing the war could not be won and accepting an unfavorable deal over doubling down on a costly intractable conflict.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

Fan Hongda, Director of China-Middle East Studies at Shaoxing University, The Paper, June 16, 2026.

Both the US and Iran claim to have the upper hand on the battlefield, but this advantage cannot be translated into victory. For the US, Trump has been looking for an opportunity to gracefully withdraw from this war. For Iran, although it has withstood the military pressure from the US and Israel, it is also unable to force the US to accept its conditions due to its own limitations.

Wang Jin, Associate Professor, and the Assistant Director, Institute of Middle East Studies, Northwest University of China, The Paper, June 16, 2026.

The main gains for the US include the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s return to the nuclear negotiation track, and the strategic buffer space provided by the de-escalation of the Middle East situation, which helps alleviate energy price fluctuations and domestic political and economic pressures. Iran, on the other hand, gained more direct benefits, including the fact that the US no longer effectively considers regime change as a negotiating objective, the potential lifting of some sanctions, the resumption of oil exports, and the possibility of the gradual unfreezing of frozen assets, while also retaining a certain degree of nuclear capability.

Judging from the outcome of the negotiations, the United States made significant concessions in lifting sanctions and demonstrating goodwill, while Iran responded on issues such as the disposal of highly enriched uranium and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, both sides were able to declare victory to their domestic audiences.

Yaroslav Mirsky, Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 13, 2026.

Beneath the propaganda veneer, the results of the Iranian campaign are soberly reckonable. Tehran has achieved things that seemed politically unattainable just a year ago. The US is ready to discuss a phased lifting of sanctions without requiring the prior dismantling of all nuclear infrastructure. The missile program and support for allied forces have been removed from the agenda for the first phase. The future agreement is expected to be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.

This latter is not a whim. Tehran remembers the history of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear deal, as a systemic lesson in the unreliability of bilateral agreements with Washington. The JCPOA was an executive agreement, not ratified by the Senate as a treaty, and that is precisely why the next president tore it up with the stroke of a pen. The Iranians' insistence on a Security Council resolution is an attempt to insert an institutional fuse where bilateral guarantees once proved to be mere paper. From a technical standpoint, this is sound.

But where Iran's public victory appears certain, the real balance is far more complex. The issue of uranium enrichment, key for Tehran, has officially been postponed until the second stage, and the divergence between the narratives here is at its greatest. Trump says "no enrichment." Tehran says "the right to enrichment is recognized." The parties have apparently agreed to debate this later, calling the current silence on this point an agreement. The fate of the accumulated highly enriched uranium, the enhanced IAEA inspection regime, the timing and scope of sanctions relief are the subjects of the next round, which promises to be no easier than the last.

The figure of 300 billion Russian resources has been renamed "reparations." In reality, according to negotiators, the discussion is about an international investment fund for post-war reconstruction. The precise nature of this fund (who pays, how much, and when) has yet to be agreed upon. Calling it "reparations" is tantamount to considering a clause that hasn't yet been written the final word on the deal. Iranian sources themselves admitted that not all mediators confirmed this exact 300 billion figure.

There's also the question of cost. The military campaign has left so much destruction on Iranian territory that it alone is a reason to negotiate, not to achieve an unconditional victory. Nuclear and missile facilities, the energy sector, and the sanctions-crunched economy all require restoration, and restoration now depends on the stability of the world. The blockade of Hormuz, the main trump card of Iran's tactics, has come at a cost not only to its opponents. Insurance premiums, disrupted export flows, and pressure on an already shaky economy—Tehran has also been charged.

Iran has won the right to sit at the table on its own terms. That's significant. But sitting at the table and rising from it as a winner are two different things, and mixing them is convenient precisely for those who sell simple recipes.

Fyodor Lukyanov, Professor and researcher at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.

The so-called “deal” between the US and Iran, announced by Trump and later confirmed by Tehran, is a typical product of the current political and diplomatic culture. Lots of big words, both sides proclaiming their grand victory, but almost no concrete details, instead promising to implement the agreement at the next stage. The immediate result is the restoration of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of which was precisely the result of the US and Israeli attack on Iran. In other words, after another costly round of military destruction and corresponding casualties, we’ve ended up back where we started.

[…]

President Trump’s goal was to extricate himself from this unpleasant and hopeless conflict, and the announced “grand bargain” appears to allow him to do so. Frankly, there’s no reason to expect its terms to be fulfilled: Iran has no intention of relinquishing its nuclear program (whatever that means), and the United States will bend over backwards to hold on to Iranian money and lift the bulk of sanctions against Tehran. So, there’s still plenty of room for bargaining. The risk of a new war between Iran and the United States remains, of course, and it’s palpable. But it seems everyone already understands that its outcome will be the same as the current one.

Farhad Ibrahimov, Professor of Political Science at RUDN University, Kommersant, June 18, 2026.

On the surface, the document appears to be a diplomatic victory. In essence, however, it leaves open all the key questions: who controls the nuclear program, when and how sanctions will be lifted, who pays for Iran’s reconstruction, what Israel will do next, and how long the US is willing to honor its own commitments.

The victory of the “doves” in Trump’s entourage, tentatively associated with his Vice President J.D. Vance, may prove temporary. Now they need to sell the memorandum as a show of strength through a deal: America, they say, has secured the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, stopped the war, and retained control of the nuclear issue. But the “hawks,” led by National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, haven’t disappeared. They will closely monitor Iran’s every move and exploit any delay, any ambiguity, any dispute with the IAEA as proof that Tehran is once again buying time.

Therein lies the weakness of the current memorandum. It promises too much too quickly, yet fails to answer the fundamental question: why should this time be any different than in 2015–2018? The answer is still unanswered. This is precisely why it is premature to talk of an Iranian victory or a US capitulation. Rather, we are talking about a fragile deal, in which both the US and Israel are already preparing their own versions of a future breakdown. Tehran will argue that it has secured recognition and the lifting of pressure. Washington will argue that it forced Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and curb its nuclear ambitions. Israel, for its part, will argue that no paperwork can negate the threat. And the next American president may well decide once again that someone else’s signature doesn’t bind him to anything.

Evgeny Shestakov, Journalist, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.

The contents of the memorandum are clear: Iran won the conflict with the United States. While the Americans pledged in the document to do much in the interests of the Islamic Republic, Tehran's reciprocal promises are extremely vague. Without inflicting significant damage directly on America during the war (the official death toll of 13 American citizens is acknowledged), the Iranians, through strikes on civilian and military targets of their "pro-American" neighbors in the Persian Gulf, forced them to exert the necessary pressure on Washington. And by closing the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran made it clear to other American allies that the war unleashed by the United States and Israel would be costly. This was enough to force the White House to stop self-deprecating, declaring victory every day, and to begin searching for realistic ways to end the conflict with minimal costs. But the Islamic Republic refused to allow Trump to do so, and the current memorandum is proof of that.

[…]

The memorandum's full provisions will never be implemented—those who drafted it clearly understood this. The document represents a set of wishes, primarily Iranian, which the White House took into account. The deal with the Islamic Republic cemented a reality that is offensive to America: it is impossible to change Iran through military force. It is easier to negotiate with them. And if Tel Aviv is dissatisfied with the deal, that's not America's problem. Trump, by all appearances, has no intention of further bowing to the "little partner," as the US president recently called Israel. At least not as long as the Jewish state is governed by the "ungrateful" and intractable Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has cleverly drawn the head of the White House into direct conflict with the Islamic Republic.

Oleg Barabanov, Professor at MGIMO University, Program Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Valdai Discussion Club, June 19, 2026.

Ultimately, in our view, Trump certainly didn’t win. But it’s also impossible to say he lost, by and large. Iran stood out, but nothing more. And if we’re going to use sports or football terms for the war, it’s probably neither a defeat nor a victory. It’s more likely a draw. This often happens in sports. It also happens in military conflicts. For example, the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s was essentially a draw. Each side remained in virtually the same position as before the conflict, without achieving any of their respective military objectives. True, it took eight years of bloody war for both sides to reach this point. Trump, however, realized this much more quickly. He started his war, it quickly became clear that victory was impossible, and then Trump just as quickly (very quickly by the standards of military conflicts) agreed to a draw. Clearly, from a media perspective, admitting that it’s ultimately a draw is impossible for Trump, and so it’s only natural that he proclaims everywhere that this is a great victory, that all goals have been achieved. It couldn't be otherwise in the media-saturated space of modern politics. This has happened in other conflicts, too, and could very well continue in the future. So, there’s nothing new here. What’s more interesting is something else. Trump has demonstrated, not just in words but in deeds, an understanding that a draw is better than an endless war, under conditions where victory has proven impossible, providing a rather rare example in world politics. Some might say that such a draw is a victory. A victory over oneself, which is perhaps the most difficult thing.

Boris Dolgov, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 18, 2026.

The main reason the US President signed the memorandum was the dashed hope of a blitzkrieg and a swift victory over Iran. The United States intended, at a minimum, to overthrow the current government, and at a maximum, to destroy Iranian statehood. But they failed. Iran not only withstood American attacks, which continued even during negotiations, but also retaliated against Israel and all thirteen US military bases in the region. Some of them were damaged beyond repair. These painful blows, and the generally protracted conflict, forced Trump to first resume bilateral contacts and then negotiate and conclude a painful agreement.

[…]

Instead of an American triumph, society witnessed a protracted war and rising fuel prices. In the run-up to the midterm congressional elections, the American opposition is taking advantage of all this. This is the second factor that forced Trump to sign the memorandum.

[…]

International oversight of the Iranian nuclear program will be discussed. In my opinion, Iran will agree to it. Despite the regime’s resilience, its military and political capabilities are limited.

Gevorg Mirzayan, Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Science’s US and Canadian Studies Institute, Business Newspaper Vzglyad, June 17, 2026.

Yet, none of the key US goals in this war were achieved, including regime change in Iran. On the contrary, the people rallied around the government as a result of American aggression.

The Islamic Republic’s situation on the eve of the war was extremely difficult. Having lost the war in Syria, failed to protect Hezbollah and the Houthis from a decapitating US-Israeli strike, and living in a permanent and increasingly severe economic crisis that had already erupted into large-scale protests, Tehran could easily experience an internal revolution or a government transformation favorable to the US within six months to a year. The country’s elites were divided, and everyone expected a power struggle following the departure of the gravely ill Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Now the situation has changed dramatically. After the Americans and Israelis assassinated the Grand Ayatollah and several other leaders, new elites have come to power. They are far more radical and decisive.

Moreover, Iran, which until recently viewed the lifting of sanctions as one of the few opportunities to save the national economy, has now received an alternative way to replenish its budget by charging fees for tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz. And the deal with the Americans effectively legitimizes this right—even if it appears to be “providing services for guiding and escorting vessels.”

Trump’s logic, in turn, is also understandable. The US president, having become embroiled in the Iranian adventure, found himself in a difficult position. He couldn’t finish off Iran, as that would require a dramatic increase in firepower in the Persian Gulf and a full-scale ground invasion. The US currently lacks both the resources (much of which was spent on Ukraine) and the political will to undertake such a mission.

But he couldn’t simply turn around and leave without an agreement, as that would have catastrophic consequences. Not only for Trump (who could lose the midterm elections), but also for the United States. A US attempt to simply flee the ongoing war would be perceived as a sign of America’s weakening and decrepitude, which would immediately embolden its other political adversaries and lead to the abandonment of its last remaining allies—in East Asia, for example.

So Trump took the damage-cutting approach, opting to strike a deal.

Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, International Affairs, June 15, 2026.

The war, which took place in two phases in 2025 and 2026, inevitably depleted Iran’s economic potential with its destruction and casualties, exacerbating the financial, economic, and social crisis that had been widening and deepening in Iran for many years. It also caused critical damage to Iran’s trade, economic, and financial ties with countries in the region and around the world, as well as to the export and import of oil and other vital goods, and dealt a blow to the Iranian budget.

The US-initiated war devastated Iranians’ living standards, pushing approximately 40% of the country’s 90 million population below the poverty line, creating a dire social situation for the ruling regime. Combined with sanctions, it caused losses of $30-80 million per day, disrupted Iran’s long-established system of governance, and claimed the lives of more than 70 prominent political and military figures, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Equally important, the war undermined Iran’s vital relations with the Persian Gulf monarchies.

In a live televised address on June 10, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian perhaps aptly summarized the article’s comments on the war’s aftermath: “We are currently under sanctions, and our routes are blocked. We face a difficult challenge.... Governing the country is no easy task under the current circumstances, given the shortages we face, the unrest we have experienced, and the problems that remain.”

Finally, the war has politically raised the question of the future and possible transformation of the current Islamic regime. The country’s current leadership understands this perfectly well. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran desperately needs agreements with the United States. These agreements can ensure not only peace but also the lifting of sanctions, numerous Western restrictions, and reprisals imposed on Iran, in order to establish the necessary flow of investment and high technology into the stagnating economy.

Qin Tian, ​​Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

Relatedly, other powers in the Middle East will also make adjustments. For example, the Gulf states, innocently caught in the crossfire, will inevitably rethink their security and geoeconomic strategies after the war, and will reconsider their relationship with Iran. A certain degree of détente, at least technically, between the Arab world, especially the Gulf states, and Iran is to be expected.

From an economic perspective, the ceasefire between the US and Iran is clearly a positive development, allowing for a significant recovery in Gulf oil exports. Due to the war, the Gulf region had effectively become a bottleneck in the global economy over the past two to three months. Unblocking this bottleneck will benefit the global economic cycle.

Gleb Ignatiev, lecturer at the Department of Politics and Management at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Izvestia, June 18, 2026.

On the evening of June 17, Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the first part of the peace agreement. Washington received the most important thing: Tehran’s renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a promise of honor and guarantees. Israel received nothing but a commitment to cease fire in Lebanon or risk severing the entire deal.

Trump understands that Netanyahu’s belligerent sentiments could undo his greatest diplomatic triumph. And so the US president has placed his bets on distancing himself from Israel. At the G7 summit, Trump demonstratively demoted Israel from a “major ally” to a “minor partner.” This isn’t just a personal grudge against Netanyahu’s criticism. It’s a cold calculation: if Israel and Lebanon start shooting again, the deal between Washington and Tehran must not be undermined.

It seems Trump has satisfied his appetite for war and wants to return to his image as a great peacemaker. However, the main obstacle to his “ideal Middle East” has unexpectedly turned out to be not Mojtaba Khamenei, but Benjamin Netanyahu. Because of this clash of interests, their relationship is once again heading for the abyss.

Dmitry Trenin, President of the Russian International Affairs Council, Russian International Affairs Council, June 18, 2026.

Trump’s recent anger directed at Netanyahu reflects something much more important: A significant part of American society and the political class are losing patience with Israel and cooling toward it. This comes against the backdrop of Israel’s growing international isolation.

Indeed, Israel is the main loser from the war. Its new strategy of forcefully eliminating threats along all seven fronts, from Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and above all, Iran, promises ‘forever wars’ rather than stability and security. Its unstated nuclear deterrence has failed to prevent Iran from lobbing missiles and drones at Israeli targets. In the foreseeable future, Israel faces an election in which dissatisfaction with Netanyahu will run against wide support for his radical policies.

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have not fared well either. Their reliance on US military bases as a security guarantee turned out to be a disastrous bargain. Instead of protecting the host countries, these bases acted like magnets, attracting Iranian retaliatory strikes. The image of the Gulf nations as safe and comfortable places to do business has taken a big hit. If these nations are to recover, they will need to come up with a better security policy than aligning themselves with their failed protector.

Qin Tian, ​​Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

The most positive outcome of the memorandum reached between the US and Iran, and perhaps the most visible and perceptible result for the international community and even ordinary people, is the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The restoration of passage through the strait to some extent is already expected, and this is a very positive development.

However, the memorandum’s effectiveness is limited in other aspects. For example, while it calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, a complete and thorough ceasefire in Lebanon is not easy to achieve. In the long run, it’s uncertain whether the US and Iran will never fight again. The nuclear issue has also not been truly resolved.

The fact that the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding this time, rather than the more common agreement, suggests that both sides have given this consideration. Agreements are usually more binding and subject to stricter enforcement. A memorandum of understanding, on the other hand, only represents a certain degree of intent and possibility. It may not require particularly strict enforcement, nor does it imply a strong obligation for either side to fulfill or fully honor its terms.

The decision by both sides to sign a memorandum also carries a sense of caution and conservatism. For the US and Iran, two countries with deep-seated conflicts and fresh from a major war, reaching a binding agreement at this stage is quite difficult.

[…]

Of course, two uncertainties need to be considered during this process. The first is the speed of global economic recovery. According to current assessments, the Strait of Hormuz may take longer than expected to return to normal. Considering the backlog of ships and the mine clearance work during this period, resuming navigation may take more than a month or even longer, requiring a more comprehensive response from the international community.

Secondly, the sustainability of this recovery is now in doubt. Because US-Iran relations remain unstable, and Trump has threatened to resume military action against Iran if a final agreement cannot be reached in the next phase, it is uncertain how long the peace in the Strait of Hormuz can be maintained, or whether fighting will re-emerge in the Persian Gulf region periodically. This will create long-term uncertainty for the global economic recovery.

Dmitry Trenin, President of the Russian International Affairs Council, Russian International Affairs Council, June 18, 2026.

In the short term, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of the US naval blockade of Iran will ease the energy situation on the global market. Yet in the long term, the case of Hormuz has sent a ringing message that in the age of world order transition, all maritime chokepoints are potentially vulnerable to hostile action. Iranian leaders have learned that their ability to close the strait, and the US unwillingness to risk losses in trying to reopen it, Washington’s Achilles’ heel, could be a more powerful deterrent for Tehran than a nuclear-weapons capability. Meanwhile, Tehran intends to regulate traffic through the waterway together with Oman.

As for the nuclear program, Tehran will definitely continue it under any future comprehensive agreement with Washington, if an agreement is indeed reached. A failure to agree would leave Tehran free to pursue the program as before because the Iranians won’t surrender their nuclear materials to anyone. Regarding nuclear deterrence, however, the lessons from the recent war are mixed. On the one hand, America and Israel would probably not have attacked a nuclear-armed Iran. Look at North Korea. On the other hand, a nuclear-armed Israel, even under Iranian ballistic missile strikes, did not use nuclear weapons against Iran. Neither did the US. The option was reportedly discussed, but rejected. Thus, for Iran, being able to close Hormuz may be more effective.

2. ON THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN

Summary of Key Insights:

Commentators are skeptical that an agreement will be reached in 60 days to resolve outstanding issues outlined in the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, such as Iran’s nuclear program, the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and sanctions relief. There is a view that both sides understood these issues would not be fully fixed in 60 days and the negotiating period is essentially being used to freeze the conflict as neither side appears interested in a resumption of all out war. All commentators view Israel as a potential spoiler to continued negotiations.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

Niu Xinchun, Dean of the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

Currently, almost all the difficult issues between the US and Iran have been left for future negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz needs to be reopened within the next 60 days, but how to do so remains a major technical problem. Regarding the lifting of US economic sanctions against Iran, particularly the unfreezing of Iranian funds and how to handle the Iranian nuclear issue, no concrete agreements have been reached, and these all require negotiations within the next 60 days.

It is predictable that the possibility of reaching an agreement in the next 60 days is very small. It is highly likely that no agreement will be reached in the next 60 days, and these issues will be postponed, with the ceasefire being extended again.

That’s how things are in the Middle East; many temporary issues eventually become long-term. The same applies to the US-Iran issue. The nuclear issue and economic sanctions are decades-old problems, and the chances of them being resolved in the next 60 days are extremely slim.

Qin Tian, ​​Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Xinhua News, June 17, 2026.

I think it will be quite difficult to achieve any substantial results in 60 days of negotiations. First of all, the core issue to be resolved in this phase of negotiations is actually the nuclear issue, which has been a source of contention between the US and Iran for many years. For example, how to dispose of and dilute nuclear materials, how to deal with Iranian nuclear facilities and whether or not to dismantle them, whether and to what extent Iran’s nuclear activities should be restricted—these are all difficult issues to resolve. At the same time, these issues are also closely linked to the lifting of sanctions, so the complexity of this negotiation is self-evident.

The negotiations also face some highly complex technical issues. For example, Iran’s nuclear materials are mainly believed to be buried under the collapsed nuclear facilities. How to retrieve these materials—this seemingly small issue—may be a technically challenging problem. I think the US and Iran will continue to engage in very intense competition.

In addition to the inherent difficulty of negotiating the nuclear issue, the negotiations also face many disruptive factors, such as the Israeli factor we just mentioned, which Israel will certainly try to undermine the subsequent negotiations between the US and Iran.

In addition to the subsequent negotiations themselves, the implementation of the memorandum is also subject to change. Problems arising during implementation could affect the progress of subsequent negotiations between the two parties.

Fan Hongda, Director of China-Middle East Studies at Shaoxing University, The Paper, June 16, 2026.

Whether the US and Iran can maintain peace in the future depends on whether they can make some tangible progress in the early stages of negotiations. This would allow them to extend the negotiations even if they cannot complete them within the 60-day period […] given the severe lack of mutual trust between the US and Iran, both sides can only adopt a wait-and-see approach to ensure they retain room for policy adjustments.

Oleg Akulinichev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian-Iranian Business Council under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Kommersant, June 15, 2026.

The weak point is Tehran’s nuclear program. Its fate is being sidelined, reserved for a 60-day period of “further negotiations.” Iran has already stockpiled over 400 kg of weapons-grade uranium. Trump, meanwhile, withdrew from Obama’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal and is now forced to renegotiate. Republican hawks have already warned that any nuclear agreement will be voted on in Congress. This means Trump risks either being accused of softness or the agreement collapsing just before the November midterm elections.

The second ticking time bomb is Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister Katz have already made it clear that the Israeli army will remain in the “safe zones” in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza indefinitely. “If Iran attacks because of events in Lebanon, we will attack them with all our might,” Mr. Katz declared. Iran, however, has included a complete ceasefire in Lebanon among its key conditions. Lebanon, therefore, is turning into a powder keg that could explode regardless of the “grand deal.”

3. LESSONS LEARNED

Summary of Key Insights:

While commentators note the value of leveraging asymmetric advantages, controlling geopolitical chokepoints, and instituting resilient command and control mechanisms, there is skepticism—particularly among Russian analysts—that broad lessons can be learned from Iran’s resistance to the US. They note that Iran survived by accepting significant sacrifices to its military and economy, and pursuing a strategy of regional retaliation that is unavailable to nuclear powers due to risk of catastrophic escalation.

Notable Analysis from Chinese and Russian Commentators:

Yaroslav Mirsky, Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 13, 2026.

Iran has won the right to sit at the table on its own terms. That’s significant. But sitting at the table and rising from it as a winner are two different things, and mixing them is convenient precisely for those who sell simple recipes.

Why doesn’t this recipe carry over?

Here colleagues usually intervene and explain: Russia can do the same, only on a larger scale.

“The West fears escalation more than actual conflict,” writes one such author. “It’s enough to act firmly and consistently, and Washington will come running to the table.”

Withdraw from all formats of dialogue with NATO, deploy medium-range missiles in Kaliningrad and on the Finnish border, and launch systematic cyberattacks on European infrastructure. Iran has demonstrated this.

One would like to believe it. But the argument falls apart at the very first substantive question: under what conditions did Iranian tactics work, and are they replicable for Russia?

Iran escalated in a strictly regional theater. Its main lever created a threat that was sensitive to the global economy, but did not require Washington to make an immediate existential choice. Imagine escalation as a ladder. Between “closing the strait” and “starting a nuclear war,” Iran has flight after flight, so long that diplomacy has time to work on each rung. This headroom was the basis of Iran’s strategy of coercive bargaining: demonstrating a willingness to step up, without actually doing so until the enemy feels that continuing is too costly.

Russia has a shorter ladder. A nuclear power, bordering NATO, a permanent seat on the Security Council, several active arms control treaties. Any of the proposed measures, from the “Oreshniki” project near the Finnish border to cyberattacks on the EU power grid, steps not to the bottom rung, but straight to the top, right up to the ceiling: a direct confrontation between nuclear powers. Where Tehran kept its distance until the top, Moscow stands almost right there.

And what’s more, it has already partially approached this threshold. The moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been declared invalid, the “Oreshnik” project is in serial production, and a readiness to deploy it in Belarus has been declared. The recipe for “unilaterally lifting the moratorium” is overdue: it has been implemented. Moscow has largely traveled the path presented as a revelation.

The idea of ​​a “Resistance Bloc” (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, with coordination across all theaters) demonstrates how easily an analytical impulse can devolve into geopolitical fantasy. China doesn’t build formal military alliances; this is a feature of its strategic culture, not a temporary posture. Beijing watches the Iranian bargaining with interest and without any desire to become complicit. A formalized bloc would give Washington exactly what it seeks: a coherent image of the enemy, justifying the maximum mobilization of its allies. Tehran understands this, which is why, despite all the rhetoric of an “axis of resistance,” it has always avoided formal military commitments that would automatically raise the bar for a retaliatory strike.

What the Iranian experience really says

Strip the propaganda out of the "Iran lesson," and a few observations remain. They're not as striking as the "toughness works" formula, but they're useful.

Asymmetric pressure works when it inflicts increasing damage on an adversary and leaves them with no easy way out. Hormuz was the perfect lever because it didn't just hit the US: through the global oil market, it also affected its allies and neutral observers. Such multifaceted pressure is incomparable to pressure on a single country or bloc.

Mediators aren't window dressing. They underpin the entire mechanism: Pakistan provided the platform for the April ceasefire, Qatar maintained the financial channel and direct negotiations on the June memorandum. Without them, the transition from direct confrontation to bargaining would have been much more difficult. Tehran, despite all the rhetoric of "resistance," invested heavily in these channels. And a demonstrative break with all mediators deprives them of their existence precisely when they're needed most.

Institutional consolidation is more important than the beauty of a public image. Tehran clings to the Security Council resolution for a purely practical reason: a document signed by all five permanent members is far more difficult to tear up alone than a "political agreement" within the gap between administrations. The lesson of the JCPOA has been firmly learned.

And most importantly, Iran's tactics worked because they were based on a long-term strategy with clear priorities. For twenty years, Tehran sought three things: recognition of its right to enrichment, the lifting of sanctions, and the preservation of its regional position. Every specific step—blocking the Strait, accelerating the nuclear program—was subordinated to these goals, not to the independent logic of escalation. Raising the stakes is possible without a strategy. But without one, they rise blindly, and excitement can easily be mistaken for calculation.

Fyodor Lukyanov, Professor and researcher at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2026.

The combined military potential of the United States and Israel (and one could also add the capabilities of the Persian Gulf states) is incomparably greater than Iran’s. However, this advantage prevented a quick and clear victory. Tehran’s retaliatory measures were combined—pressure on military installations, strikes on logistical and infrastructure targets, and the use of Iran-friendly forces and groups in the region. The latter, contrary to expectations, remained operational, although weakened by Israel’s targeted campaign over the previous two years.

Finally, blocking the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, something Iran had never resorted to before, proved to be a very effective tool that was difficult to counter.

Secondly, a key factor in military success is internal resilience, as Iran has demonstrated. The destruction of a significant portion of the country’s military and political leadership at the very outset of the campaign did not have a knockout effect. In fact, judging by several indicators, it even contributed to the moral and political mobilization of the ruling class and the unification of a society that had been divided even earlier in the year. The damage Iran is willing to bear is clearly greater than what the US and its regional allies are willing to tolerate, and this is also a factor in resilience. Clearly, the Islamic Republic has suffered significantly, and recovery will require a long and costly process. But the foundations for this recovery remain intact and have even strengthened, given the emergence of the additional factor of servitude for passage through the Strait.

Third, the overall balance of power and influence in the region. Before the war, there was growing confidence that Iran’s position was weakening due to the crisis within the country and the erosion of the “axis of resistance” under the attacks of its enemies. This confidence became one of the motives for the military action, conceived by the US and Israel as the final blow to destroy the regime and resolve the “Iranian question.” This calculation failed, and now there is reason to talk about the restoration of Iran’s geopolitical capabilities. On the one hand, relations between Iran and the Gulf monarchies have become strained due to the strikes on their targets; the monarchies are certainly harboring a desire for revenge. On the other hand, if Iran withstood the combined punitive action of the two main military powers in this part of the world, and they failed to achieve their goals, the arsenal of the Persian Gulf countries will be even more insufficient for a conflict with Iran. Therefore, the idea of ​​finding a security compromise with Iran, which has been on and off in recent years, is once again relevant.

“Max Vector” Russian Military Commentator, TopWar.ru, (leading Russian military affairs publication), June 20, 2026.

Even assuming Iran won outright, it still doesn't follow that "Russia should do the same," because the two countries are playing different games, with different pieces, at different stages. There are at least three seams along which direct transference is disrupted.

The first seam is nuclear, and it works in reverse. The entire Iranian bargaining was built around the threat of acquiring a bomb. This was an asset precisely because the bomb didn't yet exist: it could be promised, it could be used as a threat, it could be traded away, which is what Iran ultimately did. Russia already has a nuclear arsenal, and it's comparable to the US in terms of warheads. There's nothing to trade away, in the Iranian sense. But the escalation ladder is structured differently. What looks like a demonstration of resolve to a non-nuclear Tehran turns out to be a step closer to the threshold for a nuclear power. And here, the logic of "hit harder" rests not on courage, but on risk, which Iran structurally lacked. Comparing the courage of two players when one has the nuclear button at their fingertips and the other doesn't is to miss the button.

And now about the adversary. For Washington, Iran is an important, but peripheral, theater. The US can retreat here without losing anything existential: postpone, replay, or trade elsewhere. This is precisely why Trump is retreating—not out of weakness, but out of cold calculation, because the costs of escalation now outweigh the benefits for him. The Ukrainian track is not peripheral for Russia. The goal here is not to "force an overseas arbiter to make a deal and part ways," but to change the very status of a neighboring state. What for the US is long-range bargaining, for Russia is a change in the very type of war. And its adversary is not a player with limited stakes overseas, but a neighboring country with all-out stakes and a Western coalition behind it. The logic of pinpointing the opponent's pain point simply doesn't apply here.

The third difference is the phase. The Iranian war was a short and furious exchange of blows, quickly culminating in a negotiated settlement. The Russian special operation is in its fifth year and has long since become a form of positional attrition. The "take a decisive risk and negotiate" formula tacitly assumes there's an exit strategy: strike, set a price, and then sit down. In a war of attrition, there's no such strategy. Escalation doesn't hasten the end; it raises the stakes without any guarantee of a resolution, as Lebanon clearly demonstrates, where Hezbollah isn't party to the agreement, Israel refuses to withdraw its troops, fighting is escalating, and the entire memorandum could fall apart before its allotted sixty days. This is what "agree and part ways" looks like in practice.

The idea of ​​responding to tanks with a strike on the petrochemical plant of the enemy capital deserves special mention. In the Iranian context, this would be seen as pressing a specific sore point. In Russia, this would mean opening a new front against the nuclear coalition, that is, switching to a different game with an unpredictable outcome. One could call this decisiveness. Strategy is more complex.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

A Russian missile struck and set ablaze Kyiv’s Pechersk Lavra during overnight attacks on June 14-15. The Pechersk Lavra, a monastery built in 1051 (predating the founding of Moscow by a century), is the most sacred site in Ukraine and among the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The attack, shocking and odious even by the ruthless standards of the Russian military, reflects a broader Kremlin effort to deliberately target Ukrainian cultural heritage sites in order to eliminate Ukrainian identity.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian cultural heritage is reflected in thousands of cases of damage to Ukrainian cultural sites recorded by both the Ukrainian government and international organizations since the Russian full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

Prior to the attack on the Pechersk Lavra, Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture reported that as of “the end of May 2026, 1,913 cultural heritage monuments and 2,573 cultural infrastructure facilities have been destroyed and damaged in Ukraine due to Russian aggression.”

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also recorded damage to 536 internationally registered Ukrainian cultural heritage sites as of June 10, including “154 religious sites, 280 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 41 museums, 33 monuments, 22 libraries, 5 archaeological sites, 1 archive.”

Below is a select list of some of the sites damaged or destroyed and an account of what has already been lost:

Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial

On March 1, 2022, a Russian missile struck and damaged the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center and nearby Jewish cemetery in Kyiv. The center is dedicated to commemorating the more than 33,000 Jews that were killed at the site in the Babyn Yar ravine between September 29-30, 1941 in the worst single massacre of Jews during the Holocaust. More than 100,000 total victims were killed at Babyn Yar by the Nazis between 1941 and 1943.

Drobytskyi Yar Holocaust Memorial

In March 2022, Russian artillery shelling damaged the Drobytskyi Yar Holocaust Memorial in Kharkiv. The memorial commemorates the more than 15,000 Jews who were killed by the Nazis at the Drobytskyi Yar ravine outside the city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine in a series of massacres beginning in October 1941.

The National Chornobyl Museum and The National Art Museum of Ukraine

On May 24, 2026, a Russian missile attack destroyed The National Chornobyl Museum. The museum catalogued the Chornobyl nuclear disaster and subsequent emergency response effort and preserved archives of unique historical documents and artifacts related to the events. The museum was destroyed less than a month after it was reopened following the completion of extensive renovations. The attack also caused significant damage to the National Art Museum of Ukraine, the country’s premier museum for Ukrainian visual art.

Additional Russian strikes on May 24 also damaged other Ukrainian cultural sites including the Hinaus Gallery, the Zhytnii Market, the Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature, the Ukrainian House, and the Kyiv Opera.

Mamai-Mogila Burial Mound Archaeological Site

A September 2024 report by Conflict Observatory identified significant damage to the Mamai-Mogila Burial Mounds in the Vasylivka district of Zaporizhzhia oblast caused by Russian occupation. The Mamai-Mogila are a series of burial mounds up to 20 meters in height constructed by prehistoric civilizations dating back to 3,000 BC. There is additional evidence to suggest that the damage to the site was caused by systematic looting rather than military operations or construction.

Transfiguration Cathedral in Odesa

On July 23, 2023, a Russian missile attack severely damaged the Transfiguration Cathedral in the city of Odesa. Eyewitnesses and evidence collected at the site suggest the Russian missile directly struck the church’s altar. The Transfiguration Cathedral is one of Ukraine’s most culturally significant religious sites, due to not only its aesthetic beauty but because of its connection to Ukrainian religious persecution during the Soviet period. The cathedral, built in the 19th century, was ordered destroyed by Joseph Stalin in 1936, and was rebuilt following Ukrainian independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mariupol Drama Theatre

On March 16, 2022, Russian forces bombed the Mariupol Drama Theater in the city of Mariupol in Donetsk oblast. The theater, once a prominent local center for performing arts, served as a shelter for hundreds of civilians during the Russian encirclement and sack of the city between February and March 2022. Russian bombing caused the collapse of the building, which killed as many as 600 civilians—mostly women, children and the elderly—who were seeking refuge inside at the time.

Lviv Historic City Center

On March 24, 2026, Russian drones struck and severely damaged the Bernardine Monastery and multiple residential buildings in Lviv’s UNESCO registered central historic district ‘L’viv – the Ensemble of the Historic Centre’ in a rare daytime attack.

Factor Druk Printing House

On May 27, 2024, a Russian missile strike severely damaged the Factor Druk Printing House in the city of Kharkiv. Factor Druk is the country’s largest Ukrainian language printing house and one of the largest full-cycle printing houses in all of Europe.

Kherson Art Museum

During Russia’s eight month occupation of the city of Kherson prior to its liberation in the Ukrainian counter offensive of November 2022, Russian forces, led by members of the Federal Security Service (FSB), systematically looted the Kherson Art Museum of more than 11,000 of its 13,500 artifacts. Items looted included priceless works of Ukrainian art, Scythian gold, ancient Greek amphora, World War II artifacts, and even the bones of Prince Grigory Potemkin stored in the museum.

Museum of Local History in Melitopol

An April 30, 2022, report by The New York Times found that Russian forces systematically looted the Museum of Local History in Melitopol, stealing as many as 1,700 artifacts, including 198 pieces of ancient Scythian gold dating back more than two millennia, and a priceless 1,500 year-old golden tiara from the reign of Attila the Hun.

Russia's Broader Campaign: Language Bans, Forced Deportation, and More than 20,000 Abducted Children

The most significant of Russia’s crimes against Ukrainian heritage go beyond damage to historical structures and artifacts. Russia’s war against Ukraine is a war waged for the extinction of the Ukrainian nation and its cultural identity. In territories it has occupied, Russia has moved to outlaw Ukrainian language education. It has shuttered non-Russian Orthodox places of worship. It has routinely subjected local inhabitants to arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, and execution for their affiliation with the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian nationalist groups.

Most egregious of all, Russia has abducted as many as 20,601 Ukrainian children, the heirs to Ukrainian cultural heritage. Many of these children have been forcibly transferred to remote parts of Russia and Belarus and impressed into military academies for future service in the Russian armed forces. At least two Ukrainian children have reportedly been sent with a cohort of Russians to the Songdowon communist youth camp in North Korea.

Taken together, Russia’s actions in Ukraine constitute a deliberate and systematic policy of erasure of Ukrainian history, Ukrainian culture, and ultimately the Ukrainian people themselves. It is a policy directly prescribed by the Kremlin: from the ideological treatises of Russian President Vladimir Putin who has declared that the Ukrainian people do not exist, to the “kill lists” drawn up to eliminate Ukrainian nationalists and cultural elites at the start of the invasion, to the constant dehumanizing language used by Russian leaders to describe Ukrainians as Nazis.

The Kremlin’s ultimate war aim is not simply the seizure of Ukrainian territory but the destruction of the Ukrainian people and of Ukraine as an idea—that is to say genocide. The Kremlin is not interested in off ramps or positive incentives and will only abandon this goal when it becomes clear the Russian war effort faces total exhaustion. Until then, it is likely that we will see additional, and possibly even more brazen, Russian attacks.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between June 6, 2026 and June 13, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: Days of strikes exchanged between the US, Israel, and Iran threatened the ongoing ceasefire and negotiations; however military escalation was controlled after a diplomatic breakthrough was announced suggesting a war-ending agreement could be signed Sunday, June 14.

2. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine exceeded the duration of the First World War, with the Kremlin showing no signs of stopping the war.

3. China intensified its weeks of provocative maritime maneuvers around Taiwan with patrols east of the island to challenge Japanese and Philippine border delimitation negotiations, and a transit through restricted waters around Taiwan’s Taiping island.

4. China arrested US scholar Min Zin, an expert on Myanmar, on espionage charges ahead of a state visit by Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing to Beijing.

5. Xi Jinping made a state visit to North Korea to strengthen ties between the two long-time allies amid years of multi-vector diplomacy by Pyongyang.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

Ceasefire Interrupted by Days of Bombing

This week the US, Israel and Iran engaged in multiple days of exchanging long-range strikes despite ongoing ceasefire and negotiations.

On June 7, Iran launched a ballistic missile attack against Israel, in response to the country’s continued offensive in Lebanon against Iranian proxy group Hezbollah. In response, (despite a warning by US President Donald Trump,) Israel conducted multiple waves of air strikes on Iranian missile sites and air defense systems.

On June 8, an Iranian drone struck and downed a US AH-64 Apache attack helicopter near the coast of Oman. The drone allegedly failed to detonate but forced the crew to conduct an emergency landing over water. Both crew members were subsequently rescued by a US Navy drone boat—the first such rescue in US history. In response to the attack, the US launched two days of “proportional” strikes on Iranian missile sites, air defense and communications systems near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran further retaliated with multiple waves of drone and missile strikes on US bases, as well as other sites, in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.

War-Ending Agreement Announced

On June 11, US President Donald Trump abruptly called off a third day of air strikes on Iran to announce an imminent deal to end the war between the two countries. President Trump later announced that an agreement would be signed on Sunday June 14 in Geneva, Switzerland.

While President Trump has previously claimed (on several dozen occasions) that a deal to end the war was close, Iranian officials and Pakistani mediators similarly voiced optimism that a final agreement had been reached. On June 12, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated that the final text of a US-Iran agreement to end the war has been agreed upon. A sentiment reflected by social media posts by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

The announcement of a deal was met with mixed reactions in Iran. Media outlets associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps such as Tasnim News, stated that no final decision had been reached on the final text of an agreement.

With less than a day before it is to be signed, the actual contents of the deal remain uncertain. Ongoing reporting has suggested the agreement is a two-page memorandum of understanding consisting of 14 points to end hostilities and begin a 60 day process of further negotiations around more intractable issues such as the status of Iran’s nuclear program and regional security. However, such reports remain disputed as US and Iranian officials have issued denials regarding key points of a supposed agreement.

President Trump has made multiple announcements that the deal to be signed Sunday would include provisions for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz immediately, renounce (again) the development of nuclear weapons, and begin a process of dismantling its nuclear program, all without the US releasing Iranian assets. Iran’s Foreign Ministry on the other hand has claimed the deal will allow Iran to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz and issue “service fees” for transit, and will give it immediate access to billions of dollars of frozen assets.

Takeaways:

1. On the Possibility of a War-Ending Deal: Because US and Iranian officials have disputed the terms of the deal, it is difficult to say what the actual terms are and whether an agreement will actually be signed on Sunday. In any case, it seems likely that officials from both sides are trying to pro-actively shape discussions around the deal (including through misleading information) before the actual terms are announced and identify and counter key domestic critics in advance. The actual deal will likely involve some compromise by both sides and may leave key issues such as Iran’s nuclear stockpile to further negotiations.

2. On This Week’s Flare Up and Climb Down: Even if a deal is reached, this week’s flare up of violence, despite the continued ceasefire, illustrates potential challenges with compliance. Any deal that leaves hawkish domestic audiences unsatisfied could lead to intense political pressure to strengthen military posturing or attempt to extract greater concessions from future rounds of negotiations. The political pressure will likely be greatest in Iran, as the current war has elevated more militant members of the Iranian security forces to key leadership positions, created new grievances against the US to be avenged, and shown Iran’s capacity to wield power through unrestrained military force.

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   In an early sign of the difficulties of selling a deal in Iran, some hardline officials familiar with the contents of the deal have already expressed dissatisfaction with the terms. Upon seeing the agreement, Mahmoud Nabavian, a hawkish Iranian cleric and member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Committee, said “After seeing the text of the agreement, I must say that compared with the two previous versions, it is more damaging and Iran’s retreats have also increased.”

2. RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE PASSED BOTH WORLD WARS IN LENGTH

On June 11, Russia’s war against Ukraine entered its 1569th day, exceeding the length of World War I. The war previously surpassed the duration of Soviet involvement in World War II on January 12, 2026.

On June 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin further illustrated his intention to continue the war by issuing a decree increasing the size of the Russian military to 2.399 million, up from 2.392 million in March.

Takeaways:

1. On Whether Russia Will Seek Peace: Despite its worsening position in the long and intractable conflict, the Kremlin is still unlikely to willingly end the war in Ukraine. Entering into an armistice along the current lines of control would represent a major admission of defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin who views the seizure of the remainder of the Donbas (the final 20% of Donetsk region under Ukrainian control) as a minimum acceptable war aim. Growing Ukrainian military strength casts doubt on whether even the seizure of the Donbas would be a sufficiently convincing victory given Russia’s original aim to “de-militarize” Ukraine. As a result we should expect that Russia will continue to press its war for months to come and will likely choose escalation, through either attempts at mobilization, nuclear saber rattling or threats to NATO member states, over an indecisive end to the war.

2. On Ukraine’s Ability to Win: Successive months of Russian territorial losses, coming on top of mounting casualties, and an intensifying Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has hammered Russian logistics and industrial targets, has sparked growing debate as to whether Ukraine has seized the battlefield initiative and could defeat the Russian military through a cumulative campaign of attrition. While the debate has intensified, the trend lines leading to this moment have been obvious for some time now.

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   In a January 2024 piece for the Wilson Center, entitled “Ukraine Can Win a War of Attrition,” OPFOR Journal’s Dan White argued that given time and continued support from the West, the effects of Western sanctions, Ukraine’s determined defense in depth and intensifying long-range strike campaign, would reach critical mass to give it an advantage over a much larger but less mobilized Russia in a prolonged war. While tactics and technology have evolved since the piece was written, the overall trend of diminishing Russian capability through attrition in manpower and economic capacity has continued. Ukraine, meanwhile, has preserved and even grown its comprehensive national power by developing the world’s most innovative military industrial complex through total society mobilization buttressed by Western military and financial support.

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3. CHINA INTENSIFIES PROVOCATIVE MARITIME PATROLS AROUND TAIWAN

China Conducts “Special Maritime Traffic Law Enforcement Operation” East of Taiwan

Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration announced on June 7 that multiple large Chinese paramilitary vessels had entered waters east of Taiwan as part of a “special maritime traffic law enforcement operation” announced last week to challenge territorial delimitation negotiations between Japan and the Philippines in the area. The group included three cutters of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration’s sea patrol “Hai Xun”—including its largest patrol ship, the 10,000 ton Hai Xun 09— as well as a special purpose firefighting ship Donghaijiu 113, and five ships of the China Coast Guard.

On June 9, Joseph Wu, the Secretary General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, announced that Chinese vessels had attempted to hail foreign vessels in Taiwanese waters, direct their movement, and conduct law enforcement inspections. Chinese state media confirmed these activities, stating:

“During the operation, authorities investigated and addressed various illegal and irregular maritime activities to maintain navigational order, inspected vessels’ navigation aid equipment, and verified the identification code information of passing ships. Maritime law enforcement personnel also conducted patrols of key anchorages, offshore construction areas, high-risk vessel collision warning zones, and waters where submarine power and communication cables are being laid.”

China announced the end of the “special operation” on June 10.

Chinese Ships Enter Restricted Waters Around Taiping Island

On June 11, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration announced that two Chinese vessels entered into prohibited waters around the Taiwanese island of Taiping in the Spratly Island archipelago. The Chinese vessels included the sea patrol ship Sansha Zhi Fa 301 and the supply ship San Sha 2 Hao. The event marked the first time Chinese government vessels entered the restricted territorial waters of the island.

Takeaways:

Both of these moves represent significant steps by China to normalize its control over not only Taiwanese territory, but the broader territorial waters of the South and East China Seas. As noted in the Weekly Significant Activity Report - June 6, 2026, by initiating snap maritime exercises at the site of a border delimitation adjustment by Japan and the Philippines, China is conducting what is effectively its own anti-freedom of navigation patrols. In a sense China is attempting to demonstrate that in the absence of an active US naval presence to challenge its claims, the single prevailing law in the Western Pacific is that of the Chinese Communist Party, with all decisions made on regional maritime issues made in Beijing.

This is not merely conjecture. On May 1, 2026, a new maritime law went into effect in China. The law, initially passed in October 2025, follows a growing push by China’s Supreme People’s Court to settle international maritime disputes in Chinese courts. With an export-driven economy, the world's largest shipbuilding industry, and a rapidly growing navy, China has strong incentives to advance an alternative framework for maritime law that protects its interests and legitimizes its extensive maritime territorial claims that existing international law does not recognize.

4. CHINA ARRESTS US SCHOLAR FOR ESPIONAGE

On June 12, China’s security services announced the arrest of US citizen Min Zin in the city of Kunming on charges of espionage. Min Zin, a PhD candidate at University of California, Berkeley, former Myanmar pro-democracy activist, and founder of the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar, was arrested on June 3 upon arriving in Kunming airport for an event at an area university.

Takeaways:

It is very unusual for China to arrest US citizens on national security related charges. It is possible Min Zin became involved in research on Chinese policy toward Myanmar that ran afoul of local national security laws. However, the timing of the arrest, coming shortly before a June 15-19 state visit to China by Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing, suggests Zin may have been deliberately set up to be arrested at the behest of the Myanmar junta.

5. XI JINPING MAKES RARE STATE VISIT TO NORTH KOREA

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a two-day state visit to North Korea from June 8-9. The trip was Xi’s first visit to North Korea in seven years.

Readouts of the trip featured mutual commitments by China and North Korea to strengthen strategic ties, however nuclear issues and peninsula security were notably absent from discussions.

Takeaways:

1. On the Purpose of the Visit: Overall, the state visit by Xi did not produce any major diplomatic developments, but illustrated China’s enduring interest in keeping constructive relations with North Korea amid Pyongyang’s strategy of diversifying its diplomatic relations. This interest has taken on growing importance in recent years as Kim Jong-un has hedged against dependence on Beijing by forging a new alliance borne of wartime sacrifice with Russia—a bond the North previously shared exclusively with China. The alliance with Russia has helped modernize the North Korean military and contribute to a period of relative economic prosperity. The visit by Xi may have also been used to head off potential diplomatic engagement between the US and North Korea, a goal hinted at in both Washington and Pyongyang since Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025.

2. On the Lack of Emphasis on Denuclearization: The lack of mention of denuclearization by Xi is a major win for Kim Jong-un who has made the expansion and recognition of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal a central priority. That concession by Xi (which could be retracted at a later date) was likely made to head off talks between the US and North Korea, which Pyongyang conditioned on the US’s recognition of its nuclear arsenal.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.

This week’s analysis highlights some of the most significant geopolitical developments involving America’s adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—between May 30, 2026 and June 6, 2026.

Summary:

1. Update on the war with Iran: US and Iranian forces engaged in multiple armed skirmishes, as Iran launched drones and missiles at its neighbors despite ongoing ceasefire.

2. New reporting suggests Russia has lost territory in Ukraine for two months in a row amid toughening Ukrainian defenses.

3. New reports showed Russia and China advancing the development of two powerful and unusual naval vessels.

4. China escalated maritime disputes with Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines with new patrols near Taiwan and the construction of two unknown structures on Scarborough Shoal.

5. Kim Jong-un inspected North Korea’s most advanced naval destroyer and promised to develop newer and more powerful warships in the next five years.

1. IRAN WAR UPDATE

The ceasefire between Iran and the US came under increasing strain this week as the two sides engaged in multiple armed skirmishes after Iranian strikes on the Gulf States.

On June 3, Iran launched dozens of drones and missiles against Bahrain and Kuwait. While most of the weapons were intercepted, one Iranian Shahed drone struck Kuwait International Airport resulting in severe damage to its Terminal 1. Iran denied responsibility for the attack.

Between June 5-6, Iran again launched multiple waves of attack drones and missiles at a variety of targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Strait of Hormuz. The US responded by attacking Iranian coastal radars on Qeshem and Goruk Island.

Source: Vahid Online on Telegram

Takeaways:

1. On Iran’s Denials of Striking Kuwait International Airport: While Iran denied responsibility for the attack, claiming the damage was caused by a malfunctioning Patriot Missile interceptor, CCTV footage clearly shows an Iranian Shahed-type drone strike the roof of the airport.

2. On Iranian Regional Retaliation: Iran is using continued attacks on its Gulf State neighbors to keep momentum going for a transformation of regional power away from the US. Hawkish members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and clergy who have grown in influence since the start of the war have become increasingly vocal in their belief that a policy of unrestrained regional bullying is working to reshape control over the Middle East in Tehran’s favor. On June 6, spokesperson for the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ebrahim Rezaei, stated that Iran will retaliate violently against its neighbors for grievances it has about the US presence in the region.

   “We are in the process of establishing an Iranian equation in the region, whereby Iran no longer exercises restraint against any mischief or disorder. It will bring some pain and expense for the Americans, but they will get used to it.”

   Top cleric and Chairman of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli-Larijani also stated on June 6, that Iran would use an end to the war to generate a “strategic transformation” of the region, with greater Iranian influence over its neighboring Islamic countries’ security—presumably achieved through threat of violence and coercion.

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   The top grievances Iran has at the moment are the continued US blockade and Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran appears to be using continued attacks against the Gulf States to send the message that regional security is indivisible and that there will be no return to business as usual as long as Iranian interests are threatened. Iran appears to have focused increasing pressure on Kuwait and Bahrain in recent days as part of this strategy to probe for vulnerabilities in the US alliance system.

2. RUSSIA LOSES TERRITORY IN UKRAINE FOR SECOND MONTH IN A ROW

According to analysis released this week by the Institute for the Study of War, May marked the second consecutive month that Russian forces experienced net territorial losses to Ukrainian counterattacks.

Takeaways:

Russia’s offensive capability has eroded substantially due to months of extremely high casualties that have exceeded replacement rates. Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated defensive in depth and reconnaissance strike complex, facilitated by overwhelming numbers of surveillance and attack drones, has made even the incremental gains from previous Russian offensives extremely difficult to maintain. Illustrative of these advances in Ukrainian defensive capability, on June 4, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces announced that the new unit inflicted 100,000 Russian casualties in the first year of its existence.

Ukrainian defenses have grown so strong that even ardent pro-war Russian military bloggers have begun expressing concerns that further rounds of mobilization may yield increased casualties without major breakthroughs.

3. RUSSIA AND CHINA COMPLETING NEW AND UNUSUAL WARSHIPS

Massive Russian Surface Combatant Begins Final Sea Trials

On June 1, Russian state-media outlet Interfax announced that the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov had begun final sea trials. Assigned to the Northern Fleet, the Admiral Nakhimov will be Russia’s largest and most powerful combat vessel when it enters service sometime in 2027.

Unusual Chinese Submarine Seen Under Construction

A June 3 article in Naval News identified a new type of “sailless” submarine under construction at JN Shipyard in Shanghai. Author H. I. Sutton assessed the dimensions of the vessel to be approximately the size of a standard US Virginia-class submarine at 120m long and 10-11m wide, with the distinct difference between the two vessels being the Chinese submarine’s lack of a prominent top “sail.” The author suggests a second vessel of a similar design is under construction at the Huludao shipyard at Bohai.

Takeaways:

1. On the Capabilities of the Admiral Nakhimov: There is no official confirmation about the ship’s official weapons systems, however, prominent Russian defense publication TopWar.ru, suggests the ship will have capacity for about 192 missiles and torpedoes: “Preliminary reports, as there is no official confirmation, indicate that the ship received 80 UKSK slots for Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles, as well as Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, 92 (probably) S-300FM air defense missile silos, and 20 533mm torpedoes or Vodopad anti-submarine missiles.”

2. On the Design of the Chinese Submarine: The concept of a sailless submarine is rare, though not entirely novel, with Chinese, Russian and Western navies previously experimenting with low-profile top sails. As Sutton notes, the design of this particular boat suggests it is a new class of nuclear attack submarine, with the lack of a top sail used to increase its underwater speed and stealth.

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4. CHINA ESCALATING MARITIME BATTLES WITH TAIWAN, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES

Chinese Construction Detected on Scarborough Shoal

On May 30, the Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. announced on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue that Manila was investigating new information that China is constructing infrastructure on the Chinese-occupied Philippine waters of Scarborough Shoal (AKA Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc). Teodoro Jr.’s claims of Chinese construction were quickly validated by satellite imagery that showed two man-made objects located at the southern entrance of a lagoon on the shoal.

Standoff Near Taiwan’s Pratas/Dongsha Island Continues

On June 6, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration stated that for the first time a Chinese survey ship “Maritime Silk Road 6” escorted by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel forced their way into the territorial waters of Taiwan’s Pratas/Dongsha Island.

China Launches “Special Law Enforcement Operation” in Waters East of Taiwan

On June 6, China’s Ministry of Transportation announced a “special law enforcement operation” in the waters east of Taiwan in response to recent plans by Japan and the Philippines to delimit the maritime borders of their exclusive economic zones—an action China demands a say in due to its claims to Taiwan and the broader regional waterways.

Takeaways:

1. On Chinese Construction At Scarborough Shoal: Continued construction on Scarborough Shoal would represent a major escalation in China’s efforts to seize the territorial waters of the Philippines in violation of the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, which denied Beijing’s claims to the region. This latest move follows increasingly aggressive behavior by China near Scarborough Shoal over the past year, including numerous violent incidents against Philippine mariners and a unilateral declaration in September 2025 that Scarborough Shoal would be transformed into a Chinese national wildlife refuge and nature preserve.

2. On Chinese Patrols Near Pratas/Dongsha Island: This week’s patrol marks the second major standoff between the Chinese and Taiwanese coast guards near the island in just over a week. The recent incidents exemplify the growing frequency and intensity of maritime encounters near the island. On June 1, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that since 2024, China has increased the number of maritime patrols intruding into Taiwanese territorial waters near Pratas/Dongsha Island to more than 30 annually.

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   As noted in last week’s Significant Activity Report, China views Pratas/Dongsha as part of Taiwan’s weak underbelly. It is using continuous probes of the island to test the broader readiness of the Taiwanese coast guard and military to respond to threats.

3. On the New “Special Law Enforcement Operation”: China appears to have launched maritime patrols in the region Japan and the Philippines are working to delimit (i.e. negotiating adjustments to borders where there are overlapping claims) because of additional overlap with Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone.1 Because China claims Taiwan, it views actions that impact Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty as an affront to its own. Further, Beijing, which holds expansive claims over the South and East China Seas, is unlikely to accept Japan—whose relations with Beijing have grown increasingly hostile under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi—setting new maritime rules in the region.

5. KIM JONG-UN INSPECTS NEWEST DESTROYER AND HINTS AT NEW TYPES OF WARSHIPS TO COME

On June 4, Kim Jong-un inspected the North Korean Navy’s 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyer Kang Kon, the second of two advanced warships Pyongyang launched within the last two years. During the visit Kim suggested Pyongyang would soon embark on the production of more advanced warships. According to Korean Central News Agency:

“Comrade Kim Jong Un expressed great trust and expectation that the vast plans for bolstering up the warship force, including the development and production of underwater secret weapons and the building of 10,000-tonnage destroyers under the five-year plan for modernizing the Navy approved by the Ninth Congress of the WPK, would be surely carried out by our reliable and powerful defence science research group, self-supporting shipbuilding industry and competent and intelligent workers in the munitions industry.”

Takeaways:

The visit to the Kang Kon appeared to roughly coincide with the one year anniversary of the ship’s capsizing during launch, an effort to demonstrate the ship was fully functional. The visit also preceded the upcoming June 8-9 state visit to Pyongyang by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and may have been an attempt to assert North Korea’s growing capability as a regional power. In this regard, the move to inspect a Choe Hyon-class destroyer may have also been especially symbolic as the ship is widely suspected of being developed with Russian technical assistance.

It is also worth noting that Kim Jong-un’s daughter, and presumed successor Ju-ae, accompanied her father on the inspection.

This briefing was compiled by Dan White. Dan is an independent foreign policy analyst based in the New York Metro Area. Dan is a former member of The Wilson Center and The Kennan Institute. Dan holds masters degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Naval Postgraduate School, and the University of Washington. Dan is a former officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the War in Afghanistan.

For more information, corrections, or comments, please contact dan@opforjournal.com.